Changes for page Valley Foley Aff
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... ... @@ -1,33 +1,0 @@ 1 -Only internal motivations have the conceptual capacity to motivate action, which is a prerequisite for moral considerations. 2 -Katsafanas, Paul. “Deriving ethics from action: a nietzschean version of constitutivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83:3, pp. 620-660, November 2011. 3 -While externalism captures…decidedly odd property. 4 - 5 -Thus, morality is a system of reasons we can all accept—mutual justifiability is the only way to solve the subjectivity of abstract moral theories. 6 -Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. 7 -Contractualism can also … in certain contexts. 8 -Moral principles are adopted only if they can be justified on the basis of agent specific reasonable rejection. 9 -Nagel, Thomas. "One-to-One’." London Review of Books 4 (1999). 10 -The nerve of Scanlon’s … of any individual. 11 -Contractualism forms the basis for a moral community. If the purpose of moral norms is to facilitate life and communal interactions in a society, then a contractualist account of reasons comes first. 12 -Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. 13 -According to contractualism, … these principles require. 14 - 15 -Contractual obligations are agent relative—reasonable rejection of principles can only come between two rational agents. This means we evaluate every moral consideration on a 1-1 ratio, not whether the aggregate of everyone following the principle would have a positive net effect. James: 16 -James, Aaron. "Contractualism's (not so) slippery slope." Legal Theory 18.03 (2012): 263-292. 17 -According to contractualism, …reasonably object to the imposition. 18 - 19 -Thus the standard is consistency with the agent relative principle of reasonable rejection. 20 - 21 -Students cannot accept restrictions relative to the college because the basis of public universities and colleges is the constitution, which the protection of speech. Buchter: 22 -Buchter, Jonathan. “Contract law and the student-university relationship.” Indiana Law Journal, vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973. 23 -This theoretical mixture …these constitutional rights. 24 - 25 - 26 -Metaethical actualism means no fiat for counteradvocacies. Jackson and Pargetter: 27 -Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, “Oughts, Options, and Actualism”, Philosophical Review, 1986 28 -There are four considerations … referred to at the beginning.” 29 - 30 - 31 -And, contracts will always be made based on subjective emotions because that contributes to agent relative rejection. 32 -Spranca, Mark, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron. "Omission and commission in judgment and choice." Journal of experimental social psychology 27.1 (1991): 76-105. 33 -Subjects read scenarios …ignorant of the effects of not acting. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,27 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tournament: ALL Jan-Feb | Round: 1 | Opponent: all | Judge: all 2 -Equality is necessary to include all voices in moral deliberation and avoid unjustly imposing values on others. This is the central message of egalitarian social movements. Anderson: 3 - “There must be… their claim heard” 4 -Anderson, Elizabeth Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109.2 (1999). 5 - 6 -The standard is consistency with basic capability equality. Only this provides the true value of equality – not concerned with goods or happiness, but what people can do. Sen: 7 -“It is arguable… basic capability equality” 8 - Sen, Amartya Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard University. “Equality of What?” Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1979). 9 - 10 -A focus on capabilities allows the maintenance of intuitions about fundamental human rights without requiring people to fulfill them. It creates consensus among conceptions of the good. Nussbaum: 11 -Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. 12 - 13 -Only it allows dialogue between the oppressed, philosophers, and policymakers on equal comprehensible terms. Glass 14 -“Can liberalism provide... proper discussion possible” 15 -Glass, Arthur Professor of Law, University of New South Wales. “A Review of Postcolonial Liberalism by Duncan Iverson.” Australian Humanities Review 30 (2003). 16 - 17 -The capabilities approach best captures the value of rights – rights are not valuable as abstract rules, but are only fulfilled when people have the ability to exercise them. For example, someone who cannot walk lacks the full value of the freedom of movement without extra resources. Nussbaum 2 18 -“Regarding fundamental rights... right to someone.” 19 -Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. Bracketed for Grammar 20 - 21 -Capabilities can be interpreted in different ways in different societies – that is the point of pluralism. Nussbaum 3 22 -“I also insist… the two nations.” 23 -Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. Bracketed for Grammar 24 - 25 -No agent has greater epistemic access to moral truths because morals aren’t verifiable with empirical fact. Markovitz 26 -“Relatedly, internalism about… some of us are” 27 - Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +These are all aff cites I'm reading on the November-December topic - Tournament
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