Summary

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  • Caselist.RoundClass[13]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[14]

Details

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EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-14 05:14:35.536
	1	+2016-11-14 05:14:35.0

Caselist.CitesClass[14]

Cites

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	1	+US attack submarines are exclusively powered by nuclear energy – key to checking Russian expansion.
	2	+Schmitt ‘16: Eric Schmitt writes in “Russia Bolsters Its Submarine Fleet and Tensions With U.S. Rise” on April 20th, 2016. Eric P. Schmitt (born 1959) is a Pulitzer Prize–winning American journalist who writes for the New York Times. 1234567He has twice shared a Pulitzer Prize, 1 in 2009 with some of his New York Times colleagues for international reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/europe/russia-bolsters-submarine-fleet-and-tensions-with-us-rise.html?_r=2; AB
	3	+NAPLES, Italy — Russian attack submarines, the most in two decades, are prowling the coastlines of Scandinavia and Scotland, the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic in what Western military officials say is a significantly increased presence aimed at contesting American and NATO undersea dominance. Adm. Mark Ferguson, the United States Navy’s top commander in Europe, said last fall that the intensity of Russian submarine patrols had risen by almost 50 percent over the past year, citing public remarks by the Russian Navy chief, Adm. Viktor Chirkov. Analysts say that tempo has not changed since then. The patrols are the most visible sign of a renewed interest in submarine warfare by President Vladimir V. Putin, whose government has spent billions of dollars for new classes of diesel and nuclear-powered attack submarines that are quieter, better armed and operated by more proficient crews than in the past. The tensions are part of an expanding rivalry and military buildup, with echoes of the Cold War, between the United States and Russia. Moscow is projecting force not only in the North Atlantic but also in Syria and Ukraine and building up its nuclear arsenal and cyberwarfare capacities in what American military officials say is an attempt to prove its relevance after years of economic decline and retrenchment. Independent American military analysts see the increased Russian submarine patrols as a legitimate challenge to the United States and NATO. Even short of tensions, there is the possibility of accidents and miscalculations. But whatever the threat, the Pentagon is also using the stepped-up Russian patrols as another argument for bigger budgets for submarines and anti-submarine warfare. American naval officials say that in the short term, the growing number of Russian submarines, with their ability to shadow Western vessels and European coastlines, will require more ships, planes and subs to monitor them. In the long term, the Defense Department has proposed $8.1 billion over the next five years for “undersea capabilities,” including nine new Virginia-class attack submarines that can carry up to 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles, more than triple the capacity now. “We’re back to the great powers competition,” Adm. John M. Richardson, the chief of naval operations, said in an interview. Last week, unarmed Russian warplanes repeatedly buzzed a Navy destroyer in the Baltic Sea and at one point came within 30 feet of the warship, American officials said. Last year some of Russia’s new diesel submarines launched four cruise missiles at targets in Syria. Mr. Putin’s military modernization program also includes new intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as aircraft, tanks and air defense systems. To be sure, there is hardly parity between the Russian and American submarine fleets. Russia has about 45 attack submarines — about two dozen are nuclear-powered and 20 are diesel — which are designed to sink other submarines or ships, collect intelligence and conduct patrols. But Western naval analysts say that only about half of those are able to deploy at any given time. Most stay closer to home and maintain an operational tempo far below a Cold War peak. The United States has 53 attack submarines, all nuclear-powered, as well as four other nuclear-powered submarines that carry cruise missiles and Special Operations forces. At any given time, roughly a third of America’s attack submarines are at sea, either on patrols or training, with the others undergoing maintenance. American Navy officials and Western analysts say that American attack submarines, which are made for speed, endurance and stealth to deploy far from American shores, remain superior to their Russian counterparts. The Pentagon is also developing sophisticated technology to monitor encrypted communications from Russian submarines and new kinds of remotely controlled or autonomous vessels.
	4	+US presence in the Pacific essential – nuclear submarines key.
	5	+Warden et al ‘13: Executive Director of the Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics @ CSIS (John K. Warden, Elbridge A. Colby, Abraham M. Denmark, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S. China Relations: A Way Forward”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013, Accessed 6-25-16, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf); AB
	6	+The Working Group believes the United States should strive to maintain, and in important respects strengthen, its extended deterrent structure in the Pacific. In particular, the Group commends the recent “rebalancing” effort toward the Asia-Pacific region, including its political, military, and economic aspects. Efforts such as the Extended Deterrence Dialogue and Extended Deterrence Policy Committee are commendable first steps that should be sustained and built upon. Especially important, however, will be the translation of admirable rhetoric about a restoration of U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region and promising first steps in the evolution of the U.S. regional force structure into sustained and concrete investments of resources, time, and energy. In the military realm, this means making significant investments in the kinds of capabilities that can maintain U.S. military advantages in the region, particularly conventional capabilities designed to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/ AD) operations. ¶ Specifically, the United States should maintain an effective nuclear deterrent that can provide credible extended nuclear deterrence in the Western Pacific. Although the Working Group does not agree on every aspect of the appropriate U.S. nuclear or conventional modernization program, areas of agreement include the procurement of a fleet of next-generation strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a new heavy bomber capable of carrying nuclear ordnance, and a new nuclear cruise missile. In addition, there is support within the Working Group for updating the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, although some members believe the program should be contingent on U.S. allies making very substantial financial contributions. With this proviso, the Group supports the maintenance of a globally deployable posture of nonstrategic weapons and dual-capable aircraft . On the conventional side, the United States should invest in particularly valuable individual programs and capabilities such as the Virginia-class submarine (including the use of its payload module for prompt or time-urgent regional strike missions), effective and cost-efficient tactical missile defenses, a penetrating bomber, and other such capabilities.
	7	+Strong navy de-escalates all conflict and deters great power war
	8	+Roughead ‘7: Admiral, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Gary, James Conway, General, US Marine Corps, and Thad Allen, Admiral, US Coast Guard, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," Oct 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf
	9	+This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts. The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-14 05:14:37.114

Judge

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	1	+x

Opponent

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	1	+x

ParentRound

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	1	+13

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Sunset bhat Neg

Title

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	1	+SO - Submarine DA

Tournament

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	1	+x