Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[34]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[35]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[34]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-18 00:00:40.774
	1	+2016-12-18 00:00:40.0

Caselist.CitesClass[35]

Cites

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	1	+CP: The United States Federal Government ought to restrict free speech on public college and university campuses by extending Title IX protections to cover racial harassment.
	2	+
	3	+Competition:
	4	+A Net Benefits
	5	+B Textually competitive – aff ends all restrictions, I increase restrictions on racial harassment
	6	+
	7	+Racial harassment is legal and causes increased attrition rates for minorities and psychological damage – CP solves and is consistent with existing legal frameworks
	8	+Gordon and Johnson ‘3: (Jill and Markus, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 34 2003. “Race, Speech, and a Hostile Educational Environment: What Color is Free Speech” p.g. 428-9)
	9	+Racial harassment in colleges and universities, however, has slipped through the cracks. It cannot be adjudicated under Title VII because Title VII does not extend beyond the workplace to the educational context, and it cannot be adjudicated under Title IX because Title IX proscribes only sexual discrimination in the educational context. Yet it seems more than plausible to infer from the combined spirit of these Civil Rights Acts that they ought to provide the tools to redress harmful types of discrimination. Racial harassment strains the conditions under which black students can remain in college, leads to increased attrition rates for minority students, and causes psychological harm. Just as the protection given to victims of sexual harassment under Title VII was extended to the educational forum through Title IX, so too should the victims of an equally harmful harassment, racial harassment, be protected in that forum. If racial harassment in a school satisfies the Harris standard, then schools ought to have legal avenues toward institutional protections, and victims ought to have legal avenues toward relief, comparable to those provided to victims of sexual harassment. Such an approach would again address the concerns raised by Lawrence over the focus on intent and effects. The focus is not on intentional racism, nor is the focus on the effects that the racism has; just as in the sexual-harassment cases above, the courts could focus on the perception of the environment as hostile and could thus lessen the drowning out of black experience in American institutions. The approach we suggest of giving credence to African Americans’ experience of racism has two virtues beyond its mere consistency with sexualharassment case law: it allays an epistemological problem, and it combats a legal or institutional problem. Racist acts—whether in the form of a court 428 Jill Gordon and Markus Johnson decision or a newspaper editorial—are frequently not recognized by whites as racism, even though African Americans perceive and experience them as such. The experience-based approach mitigates this cognitive handicap that plagues the signatories of the Racial Contract by highlighting racism for them, helping them in “seeing and doing the right thing.”45 Legally or institutionally speaking, the approach mitigates the exclusion of blacks from the “we” of legal discourses. By including black experience and perception, racism can become a problem we are faced with, and that we must deal with in the legal sphere. The preceding argument based on the development of sexual-harassment cases suggests simply that proscription of racial harassment should develop similarly to the proscription of sexual harassment. This entails giving victims the ability to take legal action against a school that fails to respond adequately to such harassment. Furthermore, if legal action against the schools is permitted, then schools must be allowed to enact rules to protect themselves and to safeguard against racial harassment. These rules can develop using the Court’s very own criteria, the Harris test. In practical terms, the mechanisms available in the workplace for such protection are reasonably transferable to the educational environment. What constitutes appropriate response by a school is, of course, dictated by the particularities and policies of the institution. What matters here is merely that the school be allowed to take action against the racism, to protect itself, to end the distress of students, and to allow the work that is done on college campuses—inquiring, studying, evaluating—to continue.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-18 00:00:42.265

Judge

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	1	+Cameron Cohen

Opponent

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	1	+Dougherty Valley

ParentRound

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	1	+28

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Sunset bhat Neg

Title

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	1	+JF - Title IX PIC

Tournament

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	1	+CPS