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  • Caselist.RoundClass[4]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[4]

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Caselist.RoundClass[4]

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1		-2016-11-19 03:22:33.811
	1	+2016-11-19 03:22:33.0

Caselist.CitesClass[4]

Cites

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	1	+I affirm the resolution. Resolved: The United States Federal Government ought to limit qualified immunity for police officers. Some evidence is bracketed for gender and clarity.
	2	+
	3	+Observation 1. Qualified immunity is only an applicable defense for suits over constitutional torts — federal employees are given absolute protections for all other tort violations. US Department of Justice:
	4	+"33. Immunity of Government Officers Sued as Individuals for Official Acts." Office of the United States Attorneys, US Department of Justice, 2016, www.justice.gov/usam/civil-resource-manual-33-immunity-government-officers-sued-individuals.
	5	+
	6	+The general rule at common law was that in order for a government official to be protected by absolute immunity for common law torts, not only did the official have to be acting within the outer perimeter of his/her official duties, but the conduct at issue also had to be discretionary in nature. Westfall v. Irwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-298 (1988). In enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA), Congress abrogated this common law rule and extended absolute immunity for common law torts to all federal employees regardless of whether the conduct at issue was discretionary. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991). FELRTCA confers such immunity by making the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for all common law torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope of their office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). However, the immunity conferred by FELRTCA does not extend or apply to suits against federal employees for violation of the Constitution or federal statutes. Thus, government officials sued for constitutional torts continue to be protected only by qualified immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Where applicable, qualified immunity protects an official from trial and the burdens of litigation. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
	7	+
	8	+I adhere to the legal definition of qualified immunity, or “government employees’ immunity from trial, as long as a) the official did not break a Constitutional right or federal statute that was clearly established at the time of violation, and b) the officer could not have reasonably believed their conduct to be lawful under that right or statute.
	9	+
	10	+I define “limit” as “to restrict or confine, as to area, extent, time, etc.” To clarify: I do not defend the complete abolishment of qualified immunity, but rather, restricting it to the extent that it no longer impedes justice.
	11	+Dictionary, F. (2016). Retrieved from Free Dictionary Website : thefreedictionary.com
	12	+
	13	+Framework
	14	+
	15	+Part I is framework.
	16	+
	17	+‘Ought’ implies obligation, so I value morality.
	18	+"Ought." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought. “used to express obligation”
	19	+
	20	+First — all people have a conception of morality and value; regardless of how it is conceptualized, the idea of obligations and systems of motivation for action is universal. Rawls 71:
	21	+John Rawls. Professor at Harvard: A Theory of Justice, 1971
	22	+Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute. Men People disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of their association. Yet we may still say, despite this disagreement, that they each have a conception of justice. That is, they understand the need for, and they are prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Thus it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which these different sets of principle, these different conceptions, have in common. Those who hold different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life. Men can agree to this description of just institutions since the notions of an arbitrary distinction and of a proper balance, which are included in the concept of justice, are left open for each to interpret according to the principles of justice that he accepts. these principles single out which similarities and differences among persons are relevant in determining rights and duties and they specify which division of advantages is appropriate. clearly this distinction between the concept and the various conceptions of justice settles no important questions. It simply helps to identity the role of the principles of social justice.
	23	+
	24	+Furthermore, to make prescriptive moral demands in a social context, we need a collective notion of morality — a kind of public reason. This concept is deeply rooted in our identity as social creatures. Quong 13:
	25	+Quong, Jonathan, "Public Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/.
	26	+
	27	+Others, most notably Gaus, argue that the idea of public reason follows from certain basic features of our everyday moral practices and reactive attitudes, along with certain claims about the nature of reasons (Gaus 2011). On this view, social morality involves a particular kind of interpersonal relationship; one where we claim the standing to make demands of others, and where, under the right conditions, we acknowledge the standing of others to make demands on us (Gaus 2011, 184). But for this sort of relationship to exist, we must believe that when we make moral demands of others, those others have sufficient reasons to comply with our demands—if they did not have sufficient reasons to comply, then the reactive attitudes that form an essential part of the interpersonal relationship of social morality would cease to make sense (Gaus 2011, 205–232). If, as Gaus maintains, different people have different reasons depending on their differing epistemic positions and sets of justified beliefs, the practice of making moral demands of others must involve public reason: the moral demands we make on others must be justifiable to those others by appeal to reasons they have, and not simply by appeal to the truth as we see it.
	28	+Although it differs from discourse ethics in important respects, this account also promises to grounds public reason in a broader account of the nature of social morality and epistemology. It will thus also be vulnerable to similar worries about whether public reason ought to be embedded in a comprehensive and controversial philosophical theory of morality and epistemology.
	29	+
	30	+Note that this means my criterion is a prerequisite to our ability to make morally prescriptive statements at all — we must understand that there is a basic grounds for moral thinking for all citizens of a society.
	31	+Thus, the criterion for this round ought to be improving public reason.
	32	+
	33	+I define public reason as “the generally acceptable code of ethics for the public in a given society.”
	34	+For example, in our society, most regard murder without mitigating circumstances as bad. When in conversation with another member of this society, we don’t have to explain why murder is bad every time we reference it — the “badness” of it is assumed by public reason.
	35	+
	36	+And, seeking to improve public reason is of utmost importance. Six warrants:
	37	+
	38	+1) Moral discussion — public reason is crucial to the development of discourse, which is especially important to prioritize in a forum like debate; Quong 2:
	39	+Some philosophers present the idea of public reason, or the public use of reason, as an essential and central part of the nature of rational discourse about moral norms. Habermas's influential account of discourse ethics (Habermas 1990; Habermas 1996) has been presented by some as grounding a conception of public reason in this way. On this view, the validity of moral and political norms can only be established by an intersubjective and idealized practice of argumentation. Only through an inclusive and noncoercive discursive process where all participants are equally situated can genuinely intersubjectively valid norms emerge. Habermas thus proposes a dialogical principle of universalization, (U), stating that a moral norm “is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion” (Habermas 1998, 42). For Habermas, this principle follows from the presuppositions of rational moral discourse, and so—at least on one interpretation—to engage in reasoned moral or political argument with others is to commit oneself to something like the idea of public reason—to commit oneself to finding norms that could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion. On this account, public reason is grounded in the nature of reasoned moral argument: one cannot, without contradiction, avoid the idea of public reason insofar as one wants to engage in reasoned moral or political argument with others.
	40	+Although Habermas's account of discourse ethics has been influential amongst those who favor some version of discursive or deliberative democracy (Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1990; Dryzek 2000), its capacity to serve as the basis for public reason is the subject of a number of criticisms. Perhaps most importantly, by grounding public reason in a broader account of truth, validity, and rational argument, public reason becomes tied to a specific and controversial philosophical doctrine. But some proponents of public reason believe its role is to serve as a mechanism of justification amongst persons who reasonably disagree about philosophical and other issues typically embedded in what Rawls calls comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1996, 13). If one believes the idea of public reason should stand apart from any particular comprehensive doctrine or philosophical theory of truth and rationality, the appeal to the presuppositions of rational discourse will be a problematic basis for public reason (see Rawls 1996, 376–381).
	41	+
	42	+2) Public reason resolves its own issues — prioritization of improving public reason results in a constantly improving status quo. Although problematic norms do exist in public reason, public reason is the most effective tool to removing those norms, too.
	43	+3) Bounds — acknowledging the public perspective rather than prioritizing the perspectives of just a few allows for a greater range of moral thought. Norms of a collective are less likely to hold the ingrained biases of an individual or subgroup.
	44	+4) Public reason, if effectively cultivated, promotes democratic thought and advocacy, resulting in a more representative government. Madigan 02:
	45	+James P. Madigan, The Idea of Public Reason Resuscitated, 10 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 719 (2002), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol10/iss3/5
	46	+The ideal of public reason, if realized, then, is a dynamic social force that cultivates democratic citizenship by "taking people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be."3 Essential to deliberative democracy, Rawls claims, is a "knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct."3' Though essential, citizens have only a moral (not a legal) duty of civility toward one another to follow its dictates. 2 That moral obligation pushes citizens to advocate and vote - and to explain their positions and votes - using the political values of public reason at least for matters of constitutional import. Civility also involves a willingness to listen to others.3 Before focusing on Rawls's evolving notion of the limits of citizens' public reason (or the degree to which comprehensive views may infiltrate), it is useful to see how it applies to government actors.
	47	+
	48	+5) Public reason is the foundation for the social contract, and/or any justifications for a representative system of government. The United States, which is the country specified in the resolution, relies on public reason as a justification for law; the higher the standards for public reason, the higher the standards for law. Rossi 10:
	49	+Rossi, Enzo. "Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Liberal Legitimacy." Public Reason Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy, vol. 2, no. 2, Dec. 2010, pp. 21-39. file:///Users/LindseyWilliams/Downloads/vol-2-no-2-december-2010.pdf.
	50	+
	51	+The basic idea is that a well-grounded political framework need not just embody liberal values; for political power to be properly exercised we also need a freely developed consensus. That consensus is established through the ideas of public reason and public justification: publicly justified principles are acceptable to reasonable citizens (on an adequate characterization of reasonableness), and thus can be presented as enjoying the free hypothetical consent of the citizenry, which in turns confers legitimacy upon liberal political arrangements.3 That is the sort of (hypothetical) consent relation I discuss here.
	52	+Finally, by “free consent” – as opposed to consent simpliciter – I understand a form of consent that is based on the exercise of the consenting individuals’ personal autonomy. “Personal autonomy” should be understood as an umbrella term here: rather than in its original Kantian sense,4 I use the term as a placeholder for all the typical foundational commitments of contemporary liberalism (a conception of persons as free and equal, a notion of human flourishing, etc.). Those commitments explain how a consensus can carry normative force, and are thus used by different theorists to motivate their adherence to the consensus view of liberal legitimacy.
	53	+
	54	+Thus, we ought to seek to improve public reason.
	55	+
	56	+
	57	+Offense
	58	+
	59	+Part II is offense.
	60	+
	61	+Contention 1: Orientation of value
	62	+
	63	+a. The codification of rights under law inspires an orientation of value in the populace. Haase 11:
	64	+Haase, Marco. Deputy Programme Director of the Sino-German Legal Cooperation Programme; area of expertise in Constitutional law, specifically law relating to the organisation of the state; private law; criminal law; administrative law, constitution of the courts; corporate law, competition law, and legal methodology "What Does it Mean to Codify Law? ." 25 Sept. 2011, file:///Users/LindseyWilliams/Downloads/Haase20-20What20does20it20mean20to20codify20law.pdf.
	65	+
	66	+Consequently, it might not be a coincidence that the holistic concept of law is particularly attractive to countries where the state has a strong role as a legislator. The state is supposed to not only respect and protect the individual rights of its citizens but also realize a legal order according to a substantial idea of humanity . The French civil code not only wrote down the existing legal rules of the French society but in the wake of the French revolution also established a new social order according to the new revolutionary idea of humanity . And the German Federal Constitutional Court considers the fundamental rights of the German constitution not only as individual rights but also as set of values or principles that extend to the legal order in its entirety.9 German law has thus always been based on a distinct idea of man; it is the task of the state to create the conditions that enable the citizens to pursue this idea.
	67	+Codifying the law is not just a value-free technique but implies a holistic concept of law with a particular idea of humanity , and a state which tries to allow its citizens to live up to this idea. One can doubt whether, in a pluralistic society, it is still possible or at least legitimate for the state and its legal order to embrace such an idea of man.10 However, without a substantial principle of a legal order one has to give up the idea of law as a legal system and thus the very idea of legal codification.
	68	+
	69	+
	70	+b. Current qualified immunity impedes the clarification of legal civil rights, including especially relevant ones in today’s political climate. Chen 15:
	71	+Alan K. Chen, professor of law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Qualified Immunity Limiting Access to Justice and Impeding Development of the Law,” Human Rights Magazine Vol. 41, 2015.
	72	+
	73	+Critics of qualified immunity point out that the breadth of the doctrine’s protection means that people like Savana Redding whose rights have been violated will go without compensation. Contrary to Marbury’s admonition, their rights can be violated, but they will receive no remedy. But there are broader social costs associated with qualified immunity as well. Because of the way the doctrine is structured, courts can decide an official is entitled to qualified immunity by concluding that they he or she have not violated a “clearly established” right without ever answering the question of whether their his or her conduct did, in fact, violated the Constitution. This means that courts can dismiss constitutional rights claims without precisely clarifying the scope of the law. Constitutional doctrine, like the common law, evolves and is refined through series of court decisions. But qualified immunity interferes with this law-pronouncing function of the federal courts and reduces the amount of guidance about the meaning of the Constitution for both government officials and the public at large. John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999).
	74	+
	75	+
	76	+c) Finally, improving the public virtue can result in a feedback loop that creates, in turn, more just law, greater protections for citizens, and consequently, more virtue. Rawls 97:
	77	+Rawls, John. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, no. 3, 1997, pp. 765-807, www.hartsem.edu/academic/courses/summer2009/Idea20of20Public20Reason20Revisted20(Rawls).pdf.
	78	+
	79	+1. The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood. Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular community or those who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship.

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	1	+2016-11-19 03:22:35.590

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	1	+Sunset bhat Aff

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	1	+ND - 1AC - Public Reason

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