| ... |
... |
@@ -1,0
+1,69 @@ |
|
1 |
+1. Burden Structure |
|
2 |
+Burden |
|
3 |
+The sufficient negative burden is to show there exists one instance where free speech ought not be constitutionally protected. This means you should frame all negative arguments as PICs out of the resolution- the affirmative has to show that we can make universal claims to every instance. |
|
4 |
+Google Dictionary defines “not” as https://www.google.com/search?q=not+definitionandoq=not+definitionandaqs=chrome.0.0l6.2170j0j7andsourceid=chromeandie=UTF-8 “used with an auxiliary verb or “be” to form the negative.” |
|
5 |
+Google Dictionary defines “any” as https://www.google.com/search?q=not+definitionandoq=not+definitionandaqs=chrome.0.0l6.2170j0j7andsourceid=chromeandie=UTF-8#q=any+definition “whichever of a specified class might be chosen.” |
|
6 |
+So this means the resolution says we can not choose a case to restrict speech. Whatever case might be chosen should not be restricted. So to prove the resolution true, you should show that there does not exist a case where we restrict constitutionally protected speech, else you negate. This is the topical division of ground that’s most grammatically correct- any other interpretation is incorrect. |
|
7 |
+Semantics Outweigh |
|
8 |
+A. They have lexical priority. A pragmatic approach would say “I’ll give you a million dollars if 2+2=5.” Even though you want the money, the pragmatic approach only offers a reason to want the statement to be true, not an actual reason for it to be true. |
|
9 |
+B. Being semantically in line controls the internal link to pragmatic benefits. |
|
10 |
+Nebel 15 Jake “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics” vbriefly February 20th 2015 http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/ |
|
11 |
+1.1 The Topicality Rule vs. Pragmatic Considerations There is an obvious objection to my argument above. If the topicality rule is justified for reasons that have to do with fairness and education, then shouldn’t we just directly appeal to such considerations when determining what proposition we ought to debate? There are at least three ways I see of responding to this objection. One way admits that such pragmatic considerations are relevant—i.e., they are reasons to change the topic—but holds that they are outweighed by the reasons for the topicality rule. It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash—including an essentially vigilantist approach to topicality in which debaters enforce their own pet resolutions on an arbitrary, round-by-round basis. Think here of the utilitarian case for internalizing rules against lying, murder, and other intuitively wrong acts. As the great utilitarian Henry Sidgwick argued, wellbeing is maximized not by everyone doing what they think maximizes wellbeing, but rather (in general) by people sticking to the rules of common sense morality. Otherwise, people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules, thereby undermining social practices that promote wellbeing in the long run. That is exactly what happens if we reject the topicality rule in favor of direct appeals to pragmatic considerations. |
|
12 |
+Contention |
|
13 |
+Universal rules fail. Any application of rules can never be verified because rules are indeterminate, as they require prior knowledge to understand them, which can never be the basis for truth. |
|
14 |
+Kripke Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982 |
|
15 |
+“Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) are compatible with any such finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding plus ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that plus ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of plus ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, these problems apply throughout language and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will to apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there? Did I think explicitly of the Eiffel Tower when I first `grasped the concept of' a table, gave myself directions for what I meant by `table'? And even if I did think of the Tower, cannot any directions I gave myself mentioning it be reinterpreted compatibly with the sceptic's hypothesis? Most important for the ‘private language’ argument, the point of course applies to predicates o f sensations, visual impressions, and the like, as well: “How do I know that in working out the series -f 2 I must write “ 20,004, 20,006” and not “ 20,004, 20,008” ? - (The question: “How do I know that this color is-‘red’?” is similar.)” (Remarks on the Foundations ofMathematics, I, §3.) The passage strikingly illustrates a central thesis of this essay: that Wittgenstein regards the fundamental problems o f the philo sophy of mathematics and of the ‘private language argument’ - the problem of sensation language ~ as at root identical, stemming from his paradox. The whole o f §3 is a succinct and beautiful statement o f the Wittgensteinian paradox; indeed the whole initial section of part I of Remarks' on the Foundations of Mathematics is a development o f the problem with special reference to mathematics and logical inference. It has been supposed that all Ineed to do to determine my use ofthe word ‘green’ is to have an image, a sample, of green that I bring to mind whenever I apply the word in the future. When I use this tojustify my application of‘green’to anew object, should not the sceptical problem be obvious to any reader of Goodman?14 Perhaps by ‘green’, in the past I meant grue,15 and the color image, which indeed was grue, was meant to direct me to apply the word ‘green’ tourne objects always. If the blue object before me now is grue, then it falls in the extension o f‘green’, as I meant it in the past. It is no help to suppose that in the past I stipulated that ‘green’ was to apply to all and only those things ‘of the same color as’ the sample. The sceptic can reinterpret ‘same color’ as same schmolor, l 6 where things have the same schmolor if . . .” (17-20) |
|
16 |
+Even if the AC specifies instances where constitutionally protected speech is good, its still a universal application of those instances, since there are still instances that fall outsides of the rule. |
|
17 |
+Dancy“Ethics Without Principles” by Jonathan Dancy 2004 |
|
18 |
+ “But there are forms of holism that do not go so far as particularism. That is, we can accept the context-sensitivity, the variability, of reasons, but still suppose that there are the sorts of general truths about how reasons behave that might be expressed by moral principles. So even if we do reject Ross's position, there remains some distance to go before we get to particularism. Consider the following series of conditionals offered by Robert Brandom (2000: 88): 1. If I strike this dry, well-made match, then it will light. (this is p→q) |
|
19 |
+2. If p and the match is in a very strong electromagnetic field, then it will not light. ((p and r)→−q) |
|
20 |
+3. If p and r and the match is in a Faraday cage, then it will light. ((1 additions to the premises cannot make a good or cogent inference less good or cogent. Deductive reasoning is like this; an inference, once logically valid, remains so no matter what one adds as a premise (even if it be the negation of one of the original premises). Brandom's in the example is non- monotonic, since the cogent inference in (1) is reversed by the addition of the further consideration that the match is in a strong electromagnetic field. If one allows that this sort of thing can happen, is one therefore a holist in my sense? One would be a holist if the fact that I am striking a dry, well-made match is functioning as a reason for believing that it will light in the first case, but not in the second or the fourth. But Brandom is not trying to allude to that sort of possibility by his example. His point is rather the sort of phenomenon we find in chemistry: a feature may have a certain effect when alone, even though its combination with another feature will have the opposite effect. One could call this a ‘holistic’ point perfectly sensibly, but it is not holistic in my sense of that term. Holism in my sense is the claim that a feature which has a certain effect when alone can have the opposite effect in a combination. It is one thing to say, as Brandom does, that though a alone speaks in favour of action, a+b speaks as a whole against it; it is another to say that though a speaks in favour of action when alone, it speaks against action when in combination. The difference lies in what is doing the speaking against in cases where features are combined. In the former case (Brandom's) it is the combination; in the latter case (mine) it is the feature that originally spoke in favour. |
|
21 |
+If there is an instance where speech would be bad, your framework auto-negates |
|
22 |
+If they read non-ideal theory, that negatesthe burden from pappas- univeralism is bad- burden says aff intent is one of universalism |
|
23 |
+For oppression affs Additionally, any case turn outweighs on particularity- root cause claims fail to understand specific instances of oppression and cannot guide action. |
|
24 |
+Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016. |
|
25 |
+The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ Pragmatism only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ If injustice is an illness, then the pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation. No doubt many, but not all, problems of injustice are a consequence of being a member of a group in history, but even in these cases, we cannot a priori assume that injustices are homogeneously equal for all members of that group. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to the concrete, particular, and unique experiences of injustice.¶ Pragmatism agrees with Sally Haslanger’s concern about Charles Mills’s view. She writes: “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistori- cal), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times” (1). For “the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn’t necessarily a single causal explanation; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context” (1).13¶ Although each situation is unique, there are commonalities among the cases that permit inquiry about common causes. We can “formulate tentative general principles from investigation of similar individual cases, and then . . . check the generalizations by applying them to still further cases” (Dewey, Lectures in China 53). But Dewey insists that the focus should be on the indi- vidual case, and was critical of how so many sociopolitical theories are prone to starting and remaining at the level of “sweeping generalizations.” He states that they “fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations” (Lectures in China 53).¶ The lesson pragmatism provides for nonideal theory today is that it must be careful to not reify any injustice as some single historical force for which particular injustice problems are its manifestation or evidence for its exis- tence. Pragmatism welcomes the wisdom and resources of nonideal theories that are historically grounded on actual injustices, but it issues a warning about how they should be understood and implemented. It is, for example, sympathetic to the critical resources found in critical race theory, but with an important qualification. It understands Derrick Bell’s valuable criticism as context-specific to patterns in the practice of American law. Through his inquiry into particular cases and civil rights policies at a particular time and place, Bell learned and proposed certain general principles such as the one of “interest convergence,” that is, “whites will promote racial advantages for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”14 But, for pragma- tism, these principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis, such as deliberation in establishing public policies or making sense of some concrete injustice. The principles are falsifiable and open to revision as we face situation-specific injustices. In testing their adequacy, we need to consider their function in making us see aspects of injustices we would not otherwise appreciate.15 |
|
26 |
+ |
|
27 |
+ |
|
28 |
+ |
|
29 |
+2. Endowments DA |
|
30 |
+College endowments are high now but college protests discourage endowments |
|
31 |
+Hartocollis 8/4 Anemona Hartocollis, writer for NYT: August 4, 2016, “College Students Protest, Alumni’s Fondness Fades and Checks Shrink” New York Times Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/us/college-protests-alumni-donations.html?_r=0 |
|
32 |
+Scott MacConnell cherishes the memory of his years at Amherst College, where he discovered his future métier as a theatrical designer. But protests on campus over cultural and racial sensitivities last year soured his feelings. Now Mr. MacConnell, who graduated in 1960, is expressing his discontent through his wallet. In June, he cut the college out of his will. “As an alumnus of the college, I feel that I have been lied to, patronized and basically dismissed as an old, white bigot who is insensitive to the needs and feelings of the current college community,” Mr. MacConnell, 77, wrote in a letter to the college’s alumni fund in December, when he first warned that he was reducing his support to the college to a token $5. A backlash from alumni is an unexpected aftershock of the campus disruptions of the last academic year. Although fund-raisers are still gauging the extent of the effect on philanthropy, some colleges — particularly small, elite liberal arts institutions — have reported a decline in donations, accompanied by a laundry list of g5. Alumni from a range of generations say they are baffled by today’s college culture. Among their laments: Students are too wrapped up in racial and identity politics. They are allowed to take too many frivolous courses. They have repudiated the heroes and traditions of the past by judging them by today’s standards rather than in the context of their times. Fraternities are being unfairly maligned, and men are being demonized by sexual assault investigations. And university administrations have been too meek in addressing protesters whose messages have seemed to fly in the face of free speech. Scott C. Johnston, who graduated from Yale in 1982, said he was on campus last fall when activists tried to shut down a free speech conference, “because apparently they missed irony class that day.” He recalled the Yale student who was videotaped screaming at a professor, Nicholas Christakis, that he had failed “to create a place of comfort and home” for students in his capacity as the head of a residential college. A rally at New Haven Superior Court demanding justice for Corey Menafee, an African-American dining hall worker at Yale’s Calhoun College who was charged with breaking a window pane that depicted black slaves carrying cotton. Credit Peter Hvizdak/New Haven Register, via Associated Press “I don’t think anything has damaged Yale’s brand quite like that,” said Mr. Johnston, a founder of an internet start-up and a former hedge fund manager. “This is not your daddy’s liberalism.” “The worst part,” he continued, “is that campus administrators are wilting before the activists like flowers.” Yale College’s alumni fund was flat between this year and last, according to Karen Peart, a university spokeswoman. Among about 35 small, selective liberal arts colleges belonging to the fund-raising organization Staff, or Sharing the Annual Fund Fundamentals, that recently reported their initial annual fund results for the 2016 fiscal year, 29 percent were behind 2015 in dollars, and 64 percent were behind in donors, according to a steering committee member, Scott Kleinheksel of Claremont McKenna College in California. His school, which was also the site of protests, had a decline in donor participation but a rise in giving. At Amherst, the amount of money given by alumni dropped 6.5 percent for the fiscal year that ended June 30, and participation in the alumni fund dropped 1.9 percentage points, to 50.6 percent, the lowest participation rate since 1975, when the college began admitting women, according to the college. The amount raised from big donors decreased significantly. Some of the decline was because of a falloff after two large reunion gifts last year, according to Pete Mackey, a spokesman for Amherst. At Princeton, where protesters unsuccessfully demanded the removal of Woodrow Wilson’s name from university buildings and programs, undergraduate alumni donations dropped 6.6 percent from a record high the year before, and participation dropped 1.9 percentage points, according to the university’s website. A Princeton spokesman, John Cramer, said there was no evidence the drop was connected to campus protests. |
|
33 |
+Education Accessibility Impact |
|
34 |
+Schools with large endowments are able to recruit more low-income students which creates more material equalities on campus. |
|
35 |
+Freedman 13 Josh Freedman, policy analyst in the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation, “Why American Colleges Are Becoming a Force for Inequality,” The Atlantic, May 16, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05/why-american-colleges-are-becoming-a-force-for-inequality/275923/ |
|
36 |
+Not all colleges, however, would need to raise tuition drastically to pay for a larger number of low-income students. Schools with large endowments can cover the shortfall in tuition by drawing money from these reserves. But keeping tuition constant and paying more from the endowment is only an option for schools with monstrous endowments. Many writers cite Amherst College as a success story, which has "aggressively recruited poor and middle-class students in recent years" and has increased its share of low-income students. But Amherst has a very large endowment for the size of its student body. Its strategy is only viable when backed with an endowment of more than three quarters of a million dollars per student from which it can draw additional funds to cover its costs while remaining competitive in its levels of spending. |
|
37 |
+Protests decrease donations enrollments |
|
38 |
+Woodhouse 15 ~Kellie Woodhouse, 11-23-2015, "How Do You Talk to the Alumni Who Hold the Purse Strings?," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/life/inside'higher'ed/2015/12/diversity'protests'on'campus'bad'for'alumni'donations.html |
|
39 |
+As student groups throughout the nation demand more diversity on their campuses, administrators have to consider many constituencies, including students (those protesting and those not) and professors with a range of views. Yet one of the loudest groups isn’t even on campus. Alumni. As protests ripple through college campuses, alumni are far from shy in sharing their viewpoints and frustrations with their alma maters. Around the country, alumni responses to race protests are flooding presidents’ email inboxes and colleges’ social media accounts. And the heightened attention from alumni—who will sometimes threaten to cease philanthropic support if they’re unhappy with an institution’s direction—asks the question of whether the racial protests roiling college campuses throughout America also have the potential to negatively impact university fundraising. “It’s interesting to see how institutions react, and donors will eventually react to that reaction,” said David Strauss, a partner with the higher education consulting firm Art and Science. A lot of the colleges with protest movements—Yale, Harvard, and Brown universities, as well as many others—have a strong history of philanthropy. |
|
40 |
+Endowments are key to education quality |
|
41 |
+ACE 14 "Understanding College and University Endowments," American Council on Education, 2014 |
|
42 |
+An endowment is an aggregation of assets invested by a college or university to support its educational mission in perpetuity. An institution’s endowment actually comprises hundreds or thousands of individual endowments. An endowment allows donors to transfer their private dollars to public purposes with the assurance that their gifts will serve these purposes for as long as the institution continues to exist. An endowment represents a compact between a donor and an institution. It links past, current, and future generations. It also allows an institution to make commitments far into the future, knowing that resources to meet those commitments will continue to be available. Endowments serve institutions and the public by: Providing stability. College and university revenues fluctuate over time with changes in enrollment (tuition), donor interest (gifts), and public (largely state and federal) support. Although endowment earnings also vary with changes in financial markets and investment strategies, most institutions follow prudent guidelines (spending rates) to buffer economic fluctuations that are intended to produce a relatively stable stream of income. Since endowment principal is not spent, the interest generated by endowment earnings supports institutional priorities year after year. This kind of stability is especially important for activities that cannot readily be started and stopped, or for which fluctuating levels of support could be costly or debilitating. Endowments frequently support student aid, faculty positions, innovative academic programs, and medical research, and libraries. Leveraging other sources of revenue. In recent years, as the economy has been severely stressed, institutions have dramatically increased their own student aid expenditures, and endowments have enabled institutions to respond more fully to changing demographics and families’ financial need. It is not surprising that the colleges and universities with the largest endowments are also the ones most likely to offer need blind admission (admitting students without regard to financial circumstances and then providing enough financial aid to enable those admitted to attend). An endowment also allows a college or university to provide a higher level of quality or service at a lower price than would otherwise be possible. This has been especially important in recent years, particularly for publicly supported institutions that have experienced significant cuts in state support. Without endowments or other private gifts, institutions would have had to cut back even further on their programs, levy even greater increases in their prices to students, and/or obtain additional public funding to maintain current programs at current prices. WHAT DOES AN ENDOWMENT DO? An endowment links past, current, and future generations. It allows an institution to make commitments far into the future, knowing that resources to meet those commitments will continue to be available. Understanding College and University Endowments 3 Encouraging innovation and flexibility. An endowment enables faculty and students to conduct innovative research, explore new academic fields, apply new technologies, and develop new teaching methods even if funding is not readily available from other sources, including tuition, gifts, or grants. Such innovation and flexibility has led to entirely new programs and to important discoveries in science, medicine, education, and other fields. Allowing a longer time horizon. Unlike gifts expended upon receipt, an endowed gift keeps giving over time. Endowed institutions can plan strategically to use a more reliable stream of earnings to strengthen and enhance the quality of their programs, even if many years will be required to achieve some of their goals. By making endowed gifts, alumni and others take responsibility for ensuring the long-term well-being of colleges and universities; their gifts help enable future generations of students to benefit from a higher quality of education and allow these institutions to make even greater contributions to the public good. |
|
43 |
+Endowments benefit disadvantaged students the most- they increase funds |
|
44 |
+AAU 9 ~Association of American Universities, "MYTHS ABOUT COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS," January 2009 |
|
45 |
+MYTH: Universities are not using enough of their endowments to make college accessible and affordable for low- and middle-income students. The cost of a college education is much higher for all students than the tuition prices charged by institutions. For college and universities with sizable endowments, the difference is subsidized by earnings from their endowments. The extensive aid colleges and universities extend to students from low- and middle-income families, which often covers tuition, books and living expenses, helps ensure that a top-quality education remains a path to the American dream. Many institutions with significant endowments are making this dream possible by converting loans to grants and by makeing college free for thousands of low- and moderate-income students (students from families with incomes below $40,000, and in some cases below $60,000 or $70,000 a year). Some of these institutions are: the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Emory University; Vanderbilt University; the University of Washington; Stanford University; the University of Maryland at College Park; Princeton University; the University of Florida; Yale University; the University of Pennsylvania; Indiana University; Harvard University; Texas AandM University; Columbia University; and the University of Virginia. At these and many other institutions, financial aid is not just for low-income students. Middle income students are also offered significant financial support to help make college affordable, including grant aid to help reduce post-graduation debt. In addition to financial aid, universities conduct a variety of outreach programs to attract low-income applicants. These extensive outreach efforts include sending school repsresentatives to low-income communities, paying for low-income high school students to visit the campus, and waiving application fees. |
|
46 |
+Innovation Impact |
|
47 |
+Endowments are key to college tech innovation – multiple warrants |
|
48 |
+Leigh 14 Steven R. Leigh, dean of CU-Boulder’s College of Arts and Sciences, “Endowments and the future of higher education,” University of Colorado, Boulder College of Arts and Sciences, March 4, 2014, http://www.colorado.edu/artsandsciences/news-events/message-dean/endowments-and-future-higher-education |
|
49 |
+These broad trends point directly to the need for CU-Boulder’s College of Arts and Sciences to increase endowment funding across the college. Endowments drive improvements in the quality of an institution and reflect alums, donors and supporters who recognize the importance of research universities in the 21st century. Endowed professorships are the first and most important component of increasing our academic quality. Named chairs recognize significant faculty achievements and help the university support faculty salary and research. CU-Boulder professors are among the most productive in the nation and are heavily recruited by competitors, including Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Cornell, Berkeley, Illinois, UC Irvine and many others. Often, these competitors offer our faculty endowed professorships, conferring prestige and research support. CU must provide its faculty with comparable support to be competitive. A second major area for endowments is student scholarships and, for graduate students, fellowships. A stable source of income that helps pay tuition is the most direct and effective way to offset the costs of education. Endowed scholarships are also effective recruiting tools for admitting the nation’s best to CU. Our dynamic programs, departments and majors are attracting more and more applicants, including the best in the nation. Like faculty support, endowed scholarships and fellowships confer prestige and, most importantly, allow students to focus entirely on academics without balancing jobs and worrying about future loan repayments. Finally, endowment funding for programs greatly enriches the institution, providing capabilities that are difficult to attain when tuition revenue provides the majority of funding. Institutions funded mainly by tuition must make sure that expenditures directly benefit students, which sometimes limits options for innovation and risk-taking. Programmatic funding enables faculty and students to take risks in their research and creative work. For example, in my own field, this might involve traveling to an unexplored region to prospect for human fossils or archaeological sites. Support for high-risk projects allows our faculty and students to develop new areas of knowledge, benefitting society by broadening the capacity of the institution to innovate. The future of higher education, including CU’s future, depends to a large degree on how successfully we can build major endowments. Ultimately, U.S. competitiveness and leadership in the global knowledge economy depends on this as well. For alums, donors and supporters, endowments indelibly affirm the importance of higher education and enduringly preserve its viability and vitality. |
|
50 |
+Innovation solves great power war |
|
51 |
+Taylor 04 Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Mark, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4/1/2004 |
|
52 |
+Introduction Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. Technology also lowers information and transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. Finally, Buzan and Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place. |
|
53 |
+ Power wars cause extinction. |
|
54 |
+FREEMAN 14 Chas W. Freehamn, served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, past president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, 9/13/14, “A New Set of Great Power Relationships,” |
|
55 |
+We live in a time of great strategic fluidity. Borders are shifting. Lines of control are blurring. Long-established spheres of influence are fading away. Some states are decaying and dissolving as others germinate and take root. The global economic order is precarious. New economic and geopolitical fault lines are emerging. The great powers of North and South America are barely on speaking terms. Europe is again riven by geopolitical antagonisms. Ukraine should be a prosperous, independent borderland between the European Union and Russia. It has instead become a cockpit of strategic contention. The United States and Russia have relapsed into hostility. The post-Ottoman borders of West Asia and North Africa are being erased. Neither Europeans, nor Russians, nor Americans can now protect or direct their longstanding clients in the Middle East. Brazil, China, and India are peacefully competing for the favor of Africa. But, in the Indo-Pacific, China and Japan are at daggers drawn and striving to ostracize each other. Sino-American relations seem to be following US-Russian relations into mutual exasperation and intransigence. No one surveying this scene could disagree that the world would benefit from recrafting the relationships between its great powers. As President Xi Jinping has proposed, new types of relations might enable the great powers to manage their interactions to the common advantage while lowering the risk of armed conflict. This is, after all, the nuclear age. A war could end in the annihilation of all who take part in it. Short of that, unbridled animosity and contention between great powers and their allies and friends have high opportunity costs and foster the tensions inherent in military posturing, arms races, instability, and impoverishment. |
|
56 |
+ |
|
57 |
+ |
|
58 |
+ |
|
59 |
+3. Cyberbullying DA |
|
60 |
+Cyberbullying is protected by the first amendment. |
|
61 |
+Aaron Short 14 (journalist for NY Post). “Cyberbullies Get First Amendment Protection”. NY Post, July 1, 2014. http://nypost.com/2014/07/01/cyberbullies-get-first-amendment-protection-from-court/ RC |
|
62 |
+Bullies hiding behind computer screens now have the First Amendment to protect them. The state’s highest court on Tuesday struck down an Albany County law that criminalized cyberbullying, crimping government efforts to crack down on electronic harassment. In a 5-2 ruling, the Court of Appeals ruled that the local law was “overbroad” and trampled free-speech rights of online tormentors. “Although the First Amendment may not give defendant the right to engage in these activities, the text of Albany County’s law envelops far more than acts of cyberbullying against children by criminalizing a variety of constitutionally protected modes of expression,” the decision said. County legislators passed the law in response to an Albany-area teen who created a Facebook page to harass and embarrass classmates in 2010. The ruling will force New York City’s lawmakers to change tactics. “I’m not happy with the court’s decision,” said City Councilman Mark Weprin (D-Queens). “Your right to throw a punch ends at someone else’s nose and I think your right to post an insult should end where it affects a child’s mental state.” |
|
63 |
+Anti-cyberbullying laws key to prevent cyberbullying – squo solves and checks off campus behavior |
|
64 |
+Patchin 10. Justin W. Patchin, Professor of Criminal Justice in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 09/28/10, "Cyberbullying Laws and School Policy: A Blessing or Curse?," Cyberbullying Research Center, http://cyberbullying.org/cyberbullying-laws-and-school-policy-a-blessing-or-curse |
|
65 |
+Many schools are now in a difficult position of having to respond to a mandate to have a cyberbullying policy, without much guidance from the state about the circumstances under which they can (or must) respond. When folks ask me if I think there needs to be a “cyberbullying law” I basically respond by saying “perhaps – but not the kind of law most legislators would propose.” I would look for a law to be more “prescriptive” than “proscriptive.” By that, I mean I would like to see specific guidance from states about *how* and *when* schools can take action in cyberbullying incidents. Many states have taken the easy way out by simply passing laws saying effectively “schools need to deal with this.” Not only have they stopped short in terms of providing specific instructions or even a framework from which schools can evaluate their role, but they have not provided any additional resources to address these issues. Some states are now requiring schools to educate students and staff about cyberbullying or online safety more generally, but have provided no funding to carry out such activities. Unfunded mandates have become cliché in education, and this is just another example. Moreover, school administrators are in a precarious position because they see many examples in the media where schools have been sued because they took action against a student when they shouldn’t have or they failed to take action when they were supposed to. Schools need help determining where the legal line is. Many states already have existing criminal and civil remedies to deal with cyberbullying. Extreme cases would fall under criminal harassment or stalking laws or a target could pursue civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation, to name a few. Bullying (whatever the form) that occurs at school is no doubt already subject to an existing bullying policy. To be sure, schools should bring their bullying and harassment policies into the 21st Century by explicitly identifying cyberbullying as a proscribed behavior, but they need to move beyond the behaviors that occur on school grounds or those that utilize school-owned resources. But in order to do this they need guidance from their state legislators and Departments of Education so that they draft a policy and procedure that will be held up in court. School, technology, and privacy lawyers disagree about what should (or must) be in a policy. It’s no wonder many educators are simply throwing their hands up. We really like New Hampshire’s recently passed bullying law, even though like other efforts it demands a lot from schools without a corresponding increase in resources. This section is key: “Bullying or cyberbullying shall occur when an action or communication as defined in RSA 193-F:3: … (b) Occurs off of school property or outside of a school-sponsored activity or event, if the conduct interferes with a pupil’s educational opportunities or substantially disrupts the orderly operations of the school or school-sponsored activity or event.” This puts schools, students, and parents on notice that there are instances when schools can discipline students for their off campus behavior. It will take many years, though, before we will know if this law can be used as a model. Schools will need to pass policies based on the law; a school will then need to discipline a bully based on the new policy; then they will need to be sued; then the case will need to be appealed. Perhaps then the case will get to a significant enough court that it will matter. Hang on and see how it turns out. In the meantime, lobby your legislators to pass meaningful, prescriptive laws instead of laws that simply say “cyberbullying is wrong, now YOU do SOMETHING about it.” It’s election time, so I’m sure your local representative will be all ears… |
|
66 |
+ |
|
67 |
+Cyberbullying ruins lives—it destroys a student’s ability to participate in school, causes self harm, and further abuse later in life. |
|
68 |
+ETCB 16. “A Surprising Long-term Effect of Cyberbullying”. End To Cyber Bullying, 2016. http://www.endcyberbullying.org/a-surprising-long-term-effect-of-cyberbullying/ |
|
69 |
+If someone repeatedly tells the victim online that he or she is worthless, useless, a waste of space or that he or she should kill themselves, soon the victim might – at least partially – begin to believe it. According to Psychcentral.com, signs that someone is experience low self-esteem include: • Self-critical or a negative opinion of themselves • Sensitivity to even constructive criticism • Fatigue, insomnia, headaches • Poor performance at school or work due to lack of trying or lethargy It is important for an individual to maintain a healthy self-esteem so that he or she can achieve in life. A cyberbullying victim may miss out on opportunities because the victim believes he or she is unworthy of achievement. It’s important to realize that these two effects go well beyond being in a bad mood and not liking something about oneself. Depression, Low Self-Esteem and Dating Abuse Research is inconclusive, but most would agree that people who are victimized in abusive dating relationships often choose those relationships because of their depression or low self-esteem. Findyouthinfo.gov states that past experience with stressful life events – cyberbullying, for example – can put someone at risk for entering an abusive dating relationship. This is especially true if the cyberabuse included abuse directed at a female victim’s sexuality, or lack thereof. Feelings of worthlessness and a negative outlook on life can throw a previously-cyberbullied victim into yet another abusive relationship. However, instead of faceless strangers and bullies dolling out abuse, it would be the victim’s significant other. Dating abuse can encompass many forms of abuse, including cyberabuse. According to Dosomething.com, other forms of abuse in dating relationships include: • Physical abuse – in the form of “hitting, punching, slapping, biting” and anything that causes physical pain. • Mental abuse – in the form of verbal putdowns and belittling. The abuser might call their victim names, “make threats, or accuse the other person of cheating.” • Emotional abuse – in the form of control over the victim’s “behavior, personality, and life.” • Sexual abuse – in the form of unwanted touching, pressuring the victim to have sex, or rape. It’s getting harder to track cyberbullying since most people make their online profiles and social networking pages private. Also, apps like Snapchat would allow cyberbullies to attack their victim and have the evidence wiped away within seconds. According to this tech expert, “Users are drawn to the impermanence of the site’s uploads and the anonymity that impermanence provides.” However impermanent the actual abusive message may be, the lasting effects of the abuse upon the psyche of the victim are anything but impermanent. |