Tournament: Spring Woods | Round: 2 | Opponent: Muhammad Katak | Judge: Momo Ullah
Because of the necessity of police officers, I stand in negation of the resolution Resolved: The United States ought to limit qualified immunity for police officers.
 
Value and Criterion
Value: 

Because the increasing violence in the United States, my value for this round will be community safety. Defined as the standard of a community to protect one another. 

Squires '1997 (Peter Squires. Professor of Criminology and Public Policy at the University of Brighton. "CRIMINOLOGY AND THE 'COMMUNITY SAFETY' PARADIGM: SAFETY, POWER AND SUCCESS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LOCAL" http://www.britsoccrim.org/volume2/012.pdf) 

The discourse on 'community safety' has been around for little over a decade. (SOLACE, 1986) Even so, it has become well established in a fairly short period of time, but this only begs a further question. We should not take them for granted. Use of the concept 'community safety' was developed by the GLC Police Committee Support Unit to describe a distinctly local government approach to crime prevention and related issues. More and more in local government circles the phrase 'crime prevention' has been reinterpreted to mean the promotion of community safety and the securing of improvements in the quality of life of residents by reference to a wide range of social issues, the tackling of certain risks and sources of vulnerability and development of policies on a broad range of fronts (ADC, 1990; Coopers and Lybrand, 1994). According to the Local Government Management Board, 'community safety is the concept of community-based action to inhibit and remedy the causes and consequences of criminal, intimidatory and other related anti-social behaviour. Its purpose is to secure sustainable reductions in crime and fear of crime in local communities. Its approach is based on the formation of multi-agency partnerships between the public, private and voluntary sectors to formulate and introduce community-based measures against crime' (LGMB, 1996). A survey into the community safety activities of local government by the Local Government Management Board in England and Wales, from which the above definition is derived, asked authorities to nominate their core priorities for the coming year. The specific priorities identified by the responding authorities were, in descending order: (1) young people, (2) substance misuse, (3) fear of crime, and (4) CCTV and town centre security (LGMB, 1996: 25.) Such a list of priorities will hardly be surprising though they reflect a variety of concerns and in some respects quite contrasting criminological perspectives. To some, no doubt, they will reflect a pragmatic, balanced and multi-layered response to problems of crime and community safety whilst to others it will appear more of a 'shotgun' approach - something might work - or perhaps just 'suck it and see'. 

Value criterion: 

In order to achieve community safety, it is necessary for police officers and community members to reduce risk of injury. Therefore, the value criterion is reducing risks to individuals. Reducing risks to individuals is a basic concept in which we ought to reduce the harms that a community might face. 

Office of the Instutional Review Board’ 16 (Guidance on Assessing and Minimizing Risk in Human Research. Feb. 29th 2016 UNM Office of the Institutional Review Board. http://irb.unm.edu/sites/default/files/Guidance20on20Assessing20and20Minimizing20Risk20in20Human20Research.pdf) 

Risk is the probability of harm or injury (physical, psychological, social, legal or economic) occurring as a result of participation in a research study. Both the probability and magnitude (severity) of a possible harm may vary from minimal to significant. The magnitude of potential harm is the summative measure of its severity, duration and reversibility. Thus, a research protocol should lower  probability of harm occurring.. Alternatively, a protocol with a high probability of harm occurring, but a low severity of harm, may be assigned minimal risk for participants (e.g. itchiness after electrode tape removal, or distress related to answering sensitive, personal questions). Federal regulations define only “minimal risk”. Minimal risk is where the “probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research is not greater in and of themselves.
 
Contention 1: Qualified immunity increases police training. 

Diedrich '08 (Dawn M. Diedrich, Deputy Director of Legal Services and Special Agent, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Decatur, Georgia. "Rigid Order of Battle': A Police Training Perspective on the Qualified Immunity Analysis" http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_archandarticle_id=1551andissue_id=72008)
In 2001, the Supreme Court stated in Saucier v. Katz that the “initial inquiry” for the court when deciding the question of qualified immunity is to determine whether the officer violated a constitutional right.13 The Court explained that determining first whether a constitutional violation has occurred “serves to advance understanding of the law.”14 Prior to the Saucier decision, courts sometimes concluded that the right was not clearly established without making the determination of whether the officer’s actions had violated the Constitution. After Saucier, the lower courts were obliged not to skip the first step in the qualified immunity analysis—hence the phrase “rigid order of battle.” From the perspective of police training, the Saucier-imposed rigid order of battle makes sense. A professional police officer must have an understanding of basic constitutional principles relating to arrest, search and seizure, and the lawful use of force in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.15 One commentator explains, “The main aim of Saucier is to encourage the elaboration of constitutional law.”16 Although this order may require judges and litigants to devote time to clarifying the issues, the results are “bright-line rules” that are easily imparted to officers during training. Such training enables officers to understand what the Constitution requires and prohibits A recent case illustrates this point. In McClish v. Nugent, a deputy went to McClish’s home with probable cause to arrest him for aggravated stalking but did not have an arrest warrant.17 McClish answered the door and was standing inside the threshold of his house.18 The deputy reached inside, grabbed McClish, and placed him under arrest.19 The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine whether reaching through the doorway into McClish’s home violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that it did as there was no consent, no exigent circumstance, and no warrant.20 After determining that McClish’s constitutional rights had been violated, the court addressed the second inquiry and concluded that the right was not clearly established.21 Hence, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity and was dismissed from the suit. For a police trainer, this case gives clear guidance to officers and is actually a primer for Fourth Amendment issues relating to entry into a home. The Court gave a bright-line rule: “We have made clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch’ is too much.”22 The court explained that it would have been lawful for the deputies to have asked McClish to step outside and then to have arrested him (as had occurred in a prior case).23 As a result, officers have been trained on this point,24 and by following their training, they will safeguard the constitutional rights of individuals. In contrast to the clear guidance that decisions following the Saucier analysis provide, one commentator suggests that the Saucierrigid order of battle should be jettisoned so that courts do not “glibly announce new constitutional rights in dictum.”25 Instead, courts should “warn of the probable unconstitutionality—without taking a definitive position.”26 Then officers who persist in such conduct are “either acting in bad faith disregard of the court’s warning or taking a calculated risk that their conduct will ultimately be vindicated.”27 This analysis is problematic. First, “warnings” are not clearly established law. The requirement that the law be clearly established is long-standing qualified immunity jurisprudence and predates Saucier by almost 20 years.28 How many such “warnings” are required before a court concludes that the law is now clearly established? Can the law ever be clearly established with warnings alone? Meanwhile, conduct that may in fact be unconstitutional continues to the detriment of the public.
Better training has reduces police violence overall. 

Klinger, '12 (David A. Klinger. Professor at Saint Louis University School of Law.  POLICE TRAINING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY. http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/86247519/police-training-as-instrument-accountability)

The matter of how to hold police officers and agencies accountable to the public they are sworn to serve has been a perennial issue since local police departments first formed in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century.1 American law enforcement during the formative years was not particularly responsive to the needs and wishes of the polity as many agencies were wracked with corruption, inefficiency, and low personnel standards.2 During the first phases of the police professionalism movement in the early twentieth century, training came to be viewed as a promising means to develop more responsible officers and agencies.3 Since that time, training has become a mainstay of American policing as it is believed that providing training to officers will enable them to carry out their duties in a fair, effective, and lawful manner. 4 Today, almost all officers start their careers by attending a monthslong police academy where they receive basic law enforcement training, then move on to serve an on-the-job apprenticeship wherein they patrol with experienced officers who provide additional “field” training for a few months, and then periodically attend various “in-service” training classes and courses throughout the rest of their careers.5 While much of the basic, field, and in-service training is directed at mundane topics such as how to properly operate department equipment and file reports, a good bit of the training that officers receive at various stages of their careers concern matters that are highly salient where public accountability is concerned.6 Officers receive training on many such topics. For example: how to properly investigate crimes (so that they can identify perpetrators, avoid arresting innocents, and, thus, help bring justice to victims),7 how to enhance’s public safety by preventing crimes from occurring in the first place,8 and how to abide by laws that govern their own behavior and behave judiciously as they carry out their duties.9 Instruction on lawful and judicious behavior addresses many topics including: avoiding corruption by neither taking nor soliciting bribes, treating all citizens equally by eschewing racial profiling, and avoiding the use of excessive force by using only that amount of force reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective.

Contention 2: Qualified Immunity is key to public safety 

Qualified immunity therefore is necessary to increase public safety. Without qualified immunities officers will think twice about actions which decrease both the safety of police and the community. This makes it so the affirmative will always cause for more violence. Therefore the negative is necessary to upholding community safety

Rosen '10 (Michael M. Rosen. Attorney of law, professor at University of San Deigo. A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement. Golden Gate University Law Review Volume 35 Issue 2. http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1899andcontext=ggulrev) 

This effect dovetails with a growing tendency toward "depolicing" that has become prevalent in several of America's urban cores. According to many officers, recent years have seen an increase in lawsuits and informal complaints brought against law enforcement, a correlate tendency in departments to steer officers away from necessarily risky conduct in do-ordie situations, and a concomitant decline in officer morale. 61 In 1981 in the State of California,"2 residents placed 8,686 complaints against peace officers, of which 1,552 or 18 were ultimately sustained.63 In 2000, Californians recorded 23,395 complaints, of which 2,395 or 10 were sustained. 64 This ballooning of claims - in particular unsuccessful ones65 - is as troubling as it is dramatic. The Oakland, California, Citizens Police Review Board ("CPRB") embodies this deterrent effect.66 This board provides an independent forum in which aggrieved citizens can register their complaints about police conduct. 67 At the same time, Detective Jesse H. Grant, who has had personal experience appearing before the CPRB, notes that complaints, more than 80 of which were not sustained in 2002, impose a serious deterrent effect on police conduct. 68 Officers now more than ever think twice and act conservatively - although not necessarily safely - when engaged in violent altercations with or apprehensions of dangerous suspects. 69 Ironically, the presence of entities like the CPRB undermines the justification for excessive force lawsuits to begin with: by providing an avenue for voicing grievances over police conduct, such boards obviate some of the need for civil actions. Moreover, they reflect the deterrent effect that wide-open public access to disciplinary bodies can breed. Thus, there exist significant reasons for the courts to grant some kind of immunity to law enforcement officials in order to ensure the continued quality of their work. By increasing the threat of litigation, frivolous lawsuits can serve to deter officers' reasonable conduct, thus imperiling public safety and upending the delicate balance society seeks between forcefully fighting crime and respectfully treating all citizens.

Tournament: Bellaire | Round: Triples | Opponent: Jerry Crist | Judge: Andy Stubbs
We as beings aren’t independent subjects.  Even though we experience the illusion of agency, our being and identity is constructed through various social discourses that creates categories that we fall into whether we like it or not.  You could say that I have brown hair and glasses, and those are descriptions applied to me but they also create me, because without brown hair I wouldn’t be the same me.  Because there is no entity that is me beyond the infinite amount of descriptions and categories that I could fall into.  Gender is the same — it is yet another predetermined social category that sorts out flesh.

Phoenix
“Gender Nihilism: A Manifesto.” https://libcom.org/library/gender-nihilism-anti-manifesto July 9, 2015. Phoenixsinger. The self, the subject is a product of power. The “I” in “I am a man” or “I am a woman” is not an “I” which transcends those statements. Those statements do not reveal a truth about the “I,” rather they constitute the “I.” Man and Woman do not exist as labels for certain metaphysical or essential categories of being, they are rather discursive, social, and linguistic symbols which are historically contingent. They evolve and change over time; their implications have always been determined by power. Who we are, the very core of our being, might perhaps not be found in the categorical realm of being at all. The self is a convergence of power and discourses. Every word you use to define yourself, every category of identity within which you find yourself place, is the result of a historical development of power. Gender, race, sexuality, and every other normative category is not referencing a truth about the body of the subject or about the soul of the subject. These categories construct the subject and the self. There is no static self, no consistent “I”, no history transcending subject. We can only refer to a self with the language given to us, and that language has radically fluctuated throughout history, and continues to fluctuate in our day to day life. We are nothing but the convergence of many different discourses and languages which are utterly beyond our control, yet we experience the sensation of agency. We navigate these discourses, occasionally subverting, always surviving. The ability to navigate this does not indicate a metaphysical self which acts upon a sense of agency, it only indicates that there is symbolic and discursive looseness surrounding our constitution. We thus understand gender through these terms. We see gender as a specific set of discourses embodied in medicine, psychiatry, the social sciences, religion, and our daily interactions with others. We do not see gender as a feature of our “true selves,” but as a whole order of meaning and intelligibility which we find ourselves operating in. We do not look at gender as a thing which a stable self can be said to possess. On the contrary we say that gender is done and participated in, and that this doing is a creative act by which the self is constructed and given social significance and meaning.

Your politics does not subvert trans inequality like it claims to.  You claim to fight for trans equality, but in doing so you appeal to the same idea of normative gender that got us here in the first place — we can’t look there, we need to look beyond that.

Phoenix 2
“Gender Nihilism: A Manifesto.” https://libcom.org/library/gender-nihilism-anti-manifesto July 9, 2015.At this point it becomes tempting to embrace a certain liberal politics of expansion. Countless theorists and activists have laid stake to the claim that our experience of transgender embodiment might be able to pose a threat to the process of normalization that is gender. We have heard the suggestion that non-binary identity, trans identity, and queer identity might be able to create a subversion of gender. This cannot be the case.  In staking our claim on identity labels of non-binary, we find ourselves always again caught back in the realm of gender. To reject take on identity in a rejection of the gender binary is still to accept the binary as a point of reference. In the resistance to it, one only reconstructs the normative status of the binary. Norms have already accounted for dissent; they lay the frameworks and languages through which dissent can be expressed. It is not merely that our verbal dissent occurs in the language of gender, but that the actions we take to subvert gender in dress and affect are themselves only subversive through their reference to the norm.  If an identity politics of non-binary identity cannot liberate us, it is also true that a queer or trans identity politics offers us no hope. Both fall into the same trap of referencing the norm by trying to “do” gender differently. The very basis of such politics is grounded in the logic of identity, which is itself a product of modern and contemporary discourses of power. As we have already shown quite thoroughly, there can be no stable identity which we can reference. Thus any appeal to a revolutionary or emancipatory identity is only an appeal to certain discourses. In this case, that discourse is gender. This is not to say that those who identify as trans, queer, or non-binary are at fault for gender. This is the mistake of the traditional radical feminist approach. We repudiate such claims, as they merely attack those most hurt by gender. Even if deviation from the norm is always accounted for and neutralized, it sure as hell is still punished. The queer, the trans, the non-binary body is still the site of massive violence. Our siblings and comrades still are murdered all around us, still live in poverty, still live in the shadows. We do not denounce them, for that would be to denounce ourselves. Instead we call for an honest discussion about the limits of our politics and a demand for a new way forward. With this attitude at the forefront, it is not merely certain formulations of identity politics which we seek to combat, but the need for identity altogether. Our claim is that the ever expanding list of personal preferred pronouns, the growing and ever more nuanced labels for various expressions of sexuality and gender, and the attempt to construct new identity categories more broadly is not worth the effort. If we have shown that identity is not a truth but a social and discursive construction, we can then realize that the creation of these new identities is not the sudden discovery of previously unknown lived experience, but rather the creation of new terms upon which we can be constituted. All we do when we expand gender categories is to we create new more nuanced channels through which power can operate. We do not liberate ourselves, we ensnare ourselves in countless and even more nuanced and powerful norms. Each one a new chain. To use this terminology is not hyperbolic; the violence of gender cannot be overestimated. Each trans woman murdered, each intersex infant coercively operated on, each queer kid thrown onto the streets is a victim of gender. The deviance from the norm is always punished. Even though gender has accounted for deviation, it still punishes it. Expansions of norms is an expansion of deviance; it is an expansion of ways we can fall outside a discursive ideal. Infinite gender identities create infinite new spaces of deviation which will be violently punished. Gender must punish deviance, thus gender must go.

AND, although categories are constructed as normative, they really aren’t.  The sum total of a category is the affect that it produces in you — but there are always other things that can affect you in similar ways.  The question of being isn’t identity or the creation of a subject but an unraveling of the infinite amount of potentials and descriptions that create you — allowing them to change and evolve, since that’s what existence is: relationship, interaction, and possibility.  We reject the totalizing subject in favor of an every-changing fluidity that affirms possibility.
Musser
Sensational Flesh Race, Power, and Masochism. Amber Jamilla Musser. new york university press. New York and London. 2014. p. 145-6 The link that I am making between Deleuze’s mode of embodiment and those that he ascribes to the masochist forms the bedrock of a politics of nonidentity by illuminating a way to be attentive to the flesh while not reifying a connection between experience and subjectivity. This is affinity through sensation, a mode of relationality and method- ology in which Deleuze considers himself embedded. Deleuze writes: “What do my relations with gays, alcoholics, and drug-users matter, if I can obtain similar effects by different means? . . . The question’s nothing to do with the character of this or that exclusive group, it’s to do with the transversal relations that ensure that any effects produced in some particular way (through homosexuality, drugs, and so on) can always be produced by other means.”102 Deleuze’s emphasis on sensation and affect speaks to experience, but this experience is not legible as identity, nor is it subject-forming. Given Deleuze’s antipathy toward subjectivity, this is not surprising. Deleuze argues that subjectivity is pernicious and should be unraveled: “It’s not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming inhuman, of a universal animal becoming—not seeing yourself as some dumb animal, but unraveling your body’s human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily intensity, with every-one discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, populations, species that inhabit them.” 103 This state of hypercorporeality exists in tension with the disembodied freedom of disability. Deleuze helps us to consider the ways that illness produces a state that oscillates between an intense being-in-the body and disembodiment. In other words, it produces a form of self-annihilation, which, though associated with masochism, is actually distinct from it. By submitting to the corporeal, illness annihilates the subject and enacts desubjectification or impersonality, which is akin to the state of freedom that Deleuze and Guattari describe with regard to the BwO. Rather than the subject, however, the sensations produced by illness are the agents of transformation.

Because being is transformative and it’s task is to constantly discover new potentials, the role of the ballot is to affirm transformative becomings.  Learning and knowledge, which are what we seek here, literally only exist through becomings since becoming is the activation of potential, and potential is the way we gain access to knowledge or existence at all that can count as new.
Ramey
In this sense, learning centers on problems, not on solutions. The essence of swimming is never a permanent solution to a problem. Rather, swimming introduces a "problematic field," enabling nonidentical repetition within a milieu. The real question is not "What is swimming?" but " Where can I swim? " " When can I swim?" or "How long and how fast can I swim? " These are questions determined by the essence of swimming as a virtual, differential power latent in signs. As Deleuze explains it, To learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a solution to the problem. Moreover, problematic Ideas are precisely the ultimate elements of nature and the subliminal objects of little perceptions. As a result, "learning" always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind. (DR, 165) What is the character of this dark, unconscious complicity? For Deleuze it is the syntheses of a body that passively and continuously engender the context of new actions. These syntheses are produced not at the level of clearly identifiable objects, stable objectivities consciously apprehended, but with problematic, subperceptual forces that appear only as subliminal or unconscious elements (DR, 108-10). In a certain sense, for Deleuze, every perception is a new creation, and learning happens when a new mode of existence comes into being. This is because every mode of life is a form of becoming that actualizes virtual potencies, creating new assemblages of bodies and sense. Learning takes place in this context, and happens through a kind of participation in the unknown, a projection of activity toward a virtual whole (Le., swimming itself) that is never completely or directly lived, but manifest or ramified over multiple series of iterations (DR , 109).

Now all we need to do is access this possibility, this space in between the binary propagated by the affirmative.  Well, you’re in luck.  Because I’m a beach ball.  Yup, you heard me, I’m a beach ball.  Amidst the masses of fascist categorizations that occur within this resolution, there is one burger that stands in the space in between.  Between autonomous and not, between adolescent and adult.  It is the non-human, the beach ball.
Colebrook
Death of the PostHuman Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1 Claire Colebrook OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS with Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor 2014 One way to pose the question of the unacceptable is to consider what we, as a species, might affirm as our own or reject as inhuman. This is a standard and complex border, played out in the thought experiments of monstrosity and the genre of the supposedly post-apocalyptic. If we imagine a future where certain aspects of humanity take over then we may adjust ourselves accordingly. Dystopias are warnings or cautionary tales in which a tendency of the present may be averted. (This is perhaps why many post-apocalyptic dystopias have considered unacceptable solutions to the problem of energy (ranging from the cannibalism of Soylent Green 1973 and Kenneth Cook’s Play Little Victims 1978 to the faux humans bred for maintaining the rest of us in Brave New World and Moon 2009.) Such dystopias would, presumably, act as salutary cautions against us following the course of our current actions to the nightmarish conclusions that would follow. If we imagine another species—vampires—who are defined by a certain inhumanity that has manifested itself in the human species, then the battle for humanity as life becomes a figural war against the future. The vampiric or zombied other is an allegory for humanity gone awry, the bad humanity from which we can save ourselves in order to emerge as properly and justifiably human. That is: we imagine what it might be for the inhumanity within ourselves—a rapacity, ruthlessness and consuming rage—to become a species in its own right (figured as the dystopian man of the future). Rather than deal with humanity’s war on itself we have narrativized and figured the horror of humanity into some distant other. We imagine that it is in the future that man becomes cannibalistic, void of empathy, ruthlessly calculative, and so dependent on technology that he ceases to think; in this exercise of the imagination we preclude considering all the ways in which this ‘other’ dystopian ‘man’ has already (and has always already) arrived.

Vote for me to invite me into the room.  This round, this debate space needs a little bit of roundness, a little bit of non-human but I can’t walk in unless I’ve been invited — that’s where you come in.  Your vote activates my burger, I’m gonna bite as many fascists as I can.  You affirm the existence of something that actively resists binary opposition, which is what I contextualize as the biggest problem of both oppression and philosophy.

The destruction of this boundary allows for the liberation of potential — space beyond the oppositional forces of life and death allow for a new kind of life, life capable of erasing stable binaries that create the conditions upon which the vampires of society exist.  This is key to deconstructing the repressive ontology of opposition that conceals the possibility of an ethical subject.
Buchanon
Buchanon, Ian. 2000. Deleuzism: A Metacommentary. Duke University Press p. 31-32 Superstition is Deleuze's catch-all rubric for the concatenation of sad passions, weak and inadequate ideas, fear and their corresponding hopes, in short, any kind of bitter-spirited angst that 'delivers us over to phantoms.' Phantoms are illusions we are happy not to see as illusory – ideology, in the bad sense, or what Deleuze and Guattari would later call 'opinion' (from which all misfortune derives). There is no need to negate these illusions, though, because as soon as their falsity is exposed they disappear like so many vampires caught in the morning sun. Nonetheless, the task of philosophy is to denounce all such mystifications because so long as they obtain they separate us from our true capabilities. However, adequate ideas are not attained simply by consciousness-raising: a freshened awareness of the lure ideology presents does not amount to an increase in our knowledge of our peculiar abilities and powers, it does not banish sad passions altogether, it merely mitigates one of the major sources of them. The greatest of all illusions is that an ideological purification, or better still, purging, is all it takes to reach an adequate idea of our true powers. One has, rather, to get back to the multiplicity of relations between things and bodies, as well as bodies and bodies; back, that is, to to the most basic of our manifold ignorances, and the fact we do not yet know what a body can do. In effect, one has to reckon with the fact that Deleuze suggests Spinoza's conception of the body must be taken as a model if we are to think in terms of power (which in its different modes refers at once to desire and the repressing apparatus of representation).

Taking political action without analyzing the subconscious and micro-political motivations doesn’t make sense because absent this analysis we don’t even know what action is.  Also means I control the internal link to taking the action the resolution presents, and any political advocacies that exist in the round.
Deleuze and Guattari 4
Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 347-8Not only can the libidinal investment of the social field interferes with the investment of interest, and constrains constrain the most disadvantaged, the most exploited, to seek their ends in an oppressive machine, but what is reactionary or revolutionary in the preconscious investment of interest does not necessarily coincide with what is reactionary or revolutionary in the unconscious libidinal investment. A revolutionary preconscious investment bears upon new aims, new social syntheses, a new power. But it could be that a part at least of the unconscious libido continues to invest the former body, the old form of power, its codes, and its flows. It is all the easier, and the contradiction is all the better masked, as a state of forces does not prevail over the former state without preserving or reviving the old full body as a residual and subordinated territoriality (witness how the capitalist machine revives the despotic Urstaat, or how the socialist machine preserves a State and market monopoly capitalism). But there is something more serious: even when the libido embraces the new body-the new force that corresponds to the effectively revolutionary goals and syntheses from the viewpoint of the preconscious-it is not certain that the unconscious libidinal investment is itself revolutionary. For the same breaks do not pass at the level of the unconscious desires and the preconscious interests. The preconscious revolutionary break is sufficiently well defined by the promotion of a socius as a full body carrying new aims, as a form of power or a formation of sovereignty that subordinates desiring-production under new conditions. But even though the unconscious libido is charged with investing this socius, its investment is not necessarily revolutionary in the same sense as the preconscious investment. In fact, the unconscious revolutionary break it implies for its part the body without organs as the limit of the socius that desiring-production subordinates in its turn, under the condition of an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. The preconscious revolution refers to a new regime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests. But the unconscious revolution does not merely refer to the socius that conditions this change as a form of power: it refers within this socius to the regime of desiring-production as an overthrown power on the body without organs, It is not the same state of flows and schizzes: in one case the break is between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology: desire is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-production. But these forms can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals in this instance than in the other). If the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and its preconscious investments, but not be so-and even remain fascist and police-like-from the standpoint of its libidinal investments, Truly revolutionary preconscious interests do not necessarily imply unconscious investments of the same nature; an apparatus of interest never takes the place of a machine of desire.

Tournament: Apple Valley JV | Round: 7 | Opponent: Xavier Gaal | Judge: Bucket
Link- you trigger me by being liberal.
Impact- I got fatter.
Biggest Impacr- you oppressed me. It's not my fault I'm lazy, never work hard, and get boners over everything. Stop being oppressive.
Alt- embrace the bouncy chubby.
ROB:
The standard is minimizing structural oppression, defined as promoting the material
conditions necessary for inclusion. Debate is a space for real world change, but we
have to consider tangible policy action above all else. CURRY ͛14:
Dr. Tommy J. Curry 14, ͞The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century͟, Victory Briefs, 2014
Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue,
thinking, and (personal) politicswhen addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity,
global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to
a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In ͞Ideal
Theory as Ideology,͟ Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are
confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that ͞ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative
ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.͟ At the most general level, the
conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and
shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy ͞problem͟ by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a
paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive
model which arguesthat for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization
of a social phenomenon (P), one ͞necessarily has to abstract away from certain features͟ of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap
between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in
rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures
which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: ͞What distinguishes ideal
theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,͟ so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of ͞
thought͟ is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our ͞theories͟ seek to address. Our attempts to situate social
disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we
cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we
observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or
the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our
empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions
addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our
ideological tendencies and politics.

Tournament: Spring Woods | Round: 3 | Opponent: JOSS | Judge: WOSS
Counter-plan text: We, the United States, should abolish the police, or every warranted law employee of a civil police force in the US. Smith 15:
Mychal Denzel Smith, 4-9-2015, "Abolish the Police. Instead, Let’s Have Full Social, Economic, and Political Equality.," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/abolish-police-instead-lets-have-full-social-economic-and-political-equality/
 You abolish it. In 1964, Malcolm X told the students of Oxford Union: “You’re living at a time of extremism, a time of revolution, a time when there’s got to be a change. People in power have misused it and now there has to be change and a better world has to be built. And the only way it’s going to be built is with extreme methods.” Abolishing the police is an extreme measure, but as a measure of justice, it should be our ultimate goal. We don’t consider the abolition of police a viable position to take because we believe they’re the only thing standing between upstanding citizens and the violence of the deranged. We’re afraid of being attacked on the street, of having our homes shot at, and being left without access to equally violent retribution. But does this mean Do we want police, or safety and security? Safety and security are ideas, ones that may never be fully achieved, and the police are an institution that have proved themselves capable of only providing the illusion of safety and security to a select few. The bulk of their jobs has nothing to do with violence prevention. They spend most of their time doing things like Slager did in his initial contact with Scott—stopping people for broken taillights. Writing for Gawker, David Graeber of the London School of Economics says: The police spend very little of their time dealing with violent criminals—indeed, police sociologists report that only about 10 of the average police officer’s time is devoted to criminal matters of any kind. Most of the remaining 90 is spent dealing with infractions of various administrative codes and regulations: all those rules about how and where one can eat, drink, smoke, sell, sit, walk, and drive. If two people punch each other, or even draw a knife on each other, police are unlikely to get involved. Drive down the street in a car without license plates, on the other hand, and the authorities will show up instantly, threatening all sorts of dire consequences if you don’t do exactly what they tell you. The police, then, are essentially just bureaucrats with weapons. Their main role in society is to bring the threat of physical force—even, death—into situations where it would never have been otherwise invoked, such as the enforcement of civic ordinances about the sale of untaxed cigarettes. Ninety percent of an officer’s time isn’t devoted to our safety, but rather to things we may find annoying (or in the case of things like untaxed cigarettes, create a black market for goods that threaten the profits of businesses), inserting the potential for violence where there is cause for none. And when it comes to preventing heinous acts of violence (or holding the perpetrators accountable) that should be condemned by all, like domestic violence and sexual assault, the police are largely ineffectual. The police are not performing the function we say they are, and there are real ways to achieve a world with less violence that don’t include the police. We simply haven’t tried. Until we invest in full employment, universal healthcare that includes mental health services, free education at every level, comprehensive sex education that teaches about consent and bodily autonomy, the decriminalization of drugs and erasure of the stigma around drug use, affordable and adequate housing, eliminating homophobia and transphobia—things that actually reduce the amount of violence we witness—I don’t want to hear about how necessary the police are. They are only necessary because we are all too willing to hide behind our cowardice and not actually put forth the effort to create a better world. It’s too extreme. When I say, “abolish the police,” I’m usually asked what I would have us replace them with. My answer is always full social, economic, and political equality, but that’s not what’s actually being asked. What people mean is “who is going to protect us?” Who protects us now? If you’re white and well-off, perhaps the police protect you. The rest of us, not so much. What use do I have for an institution that routinely kills people who look like me, and make it so I’m afraid to walk out of my home? My honest answer is that I don’t know what a world without police looks like. I only know there will be less dead black people. I know that a world without police is a world with one less institution dedicated to the maintenance of white supremacy and inequality. It’s a world worth imagining.

Police are increasingly militarized. Militarizing of police is increasing violence. The negatives claims that the police force is protecting community is not true in the status quo. Militarizing makes conflict inevitable. 

ACLU '14 (American Civil Liberties Union. "War Comes Home The Excessive Militarization of American Policing." https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf) 

American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously militarized.10 For decades, the federal government has equipped state and local law enforcement agencies with military weapons and vehicles, as well as military tactical training, for the (often explicit) purpose of waging the War on Drugs. Not all communities are equally impacted by this phenomenon; the disproportionate impact of the War on Drugs in communities of color has been well documented.11 Police militarization can result in tragedy for both civilians and police officers, escalate the risks of needless violence, cause the destruction of personal property, and undermine civil liberties. Significantly, the militarization of American policing has been allowed to occur in the absence of public discourse or oversight. The militarization of American policing has occurred as a direct result of federal programs that use equipment transfers and funding to encourage aggressive enforcement of the War on Drugs by state and local police agencies. One such program is the 1033 Program, launched in the 1990s during the heyday of the War on Drugs, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Defense to transfer military equipment to local law enforcement agencies.12 This program, originally enacted as part of the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, initially authorized the transfer of equipment that was “suitable for use by such agencies in counterdrug activities.”13 In 1996, Congress made the program permanent and expanded the program’s scope to require that preference be given to transfers made for the purpose of “counterdrug and counterterrorism activities.”14 There are few limitations or requirements imposed on agencies that participate in the 1033 Program.15 In addition, equipment transferred under the 1033 Program is free to receiving agencies, though they are required to pay for transport and maintenance. The federal government requires agencies that receive 1033 equipment to use it within one year of receipt,16 so there can be no doubt that participation in this program creates an incentive for law enforcement agencies to use military equipment. 

And Militarism causes violence. 

LaForgia '11 (Rachel LaForgia Program Director, Peace and Security Funders Group. "Intersections of Violence Against Women and Militarism" Center for Women’s Global Leadership Rutgers http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/docman/violence-against-women-publications/387-intersectionsvaw-militarism-pdf-1/file) 

Militarism as an ideology creates a culture of fear and supports the use of aggression, violence and military interventions for settling disputes and enforcing economic and political interests. Militarism privileges violent forms of masculinity, which often has grave consequences for the safety and security of women, children, men, and society as a whole. Attacks on civilians participating in social movements, military interventions and ongoing conflicts exemplify the ways in which militarism influences how we view women and men, our families, neighbors, public life, and specific countries. A culture of militarism is built over time through the construction of the “enemy,” the indoctrination of children, and the creation of myths about the nation as well as “the other”. As a result, militarism is linked to nationalism. Feminist theory and action provide means of both analyzing and opposing militarism and its links to violence against women. It enables an analysis of the power relations that buttress militarism and exposes the ways in which male violence is constructed as a legitimate form of control. In addition to providing analytical tools for deconstructing militarism, feminism also challenges normative views of peace. For feminists, peace is the absence of all violence, including all forms of gender-based violence. Violence emanating from war, and everyday violence experienced by women and girls, are components of a broad spectrum of violence that occur throughout women’s lifecycles. Understanding the correlations between militarism and violence against women requires an appreciation of the psychological processes that enable violence to occur, the socio-cultural norms that legitimize the use of violence, and the structural hierarchies that perpetuate violence. These processes, norms and hierarchies are present during war and peace times. Violence prior to conflict may inform violence against women during conflict, and violence against women during conflict impacts violence against women in post conflict societies.
Police are increasingly militarized. Militarizing of police is increasing violence. The negatives claims that the police force is protecting community is not true in the status quo. Militarizing makes conflict inevitable. 

ACLU '14 (American Civil Liberties Union. "War Comes Home The Excessive Militarization of American Policing." https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf) 

American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously militarized.10 For decades, the federal government has equipped state and local law enforcement agencies with military weapons and vehicles, as well as military tactical training, for the (often explicit) purpose of waging the War on Drugs. Not all communities are equally impacted by this phenomenon; the disproportionate impact of the War on Drugs in communities of color has been well documented.11 Police militarization can result in tragedy for both civilians and police officers, escalate the risks of needless violence, cause the destruction of personal property, and undermine civil liberties. Significantly, the militarization of American policing has been allowed to occur in the absence of public discourse or oversight. The militarization of American policing has occurred as a direct result of federal programs that use equipment transfers and funding to encourage aggressive enforcement of the War on Drugs by state and local police agencies. One such program is the 1033 Program, launched in the 1990s during the heyday of the War on Drugs, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Defense to transfer military equipment to local law enforcement agencies.12 This program, originally enacted as part of the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, initially authorized the transfer of equipment that was “suitable for use by such agencies in counterdrug activities.”13 In 1996, Congress made the program permanent and expanded the program’s scope to require that preference be given to transfers made for the purpose of “counterdrug and counterterrorism activities.”14 There are few limitations or requirements imposed on agencies that participate in the 1033 Program.15 In addition, equipment transferred under the 1033 Program is free to receiving agencies, though they are required to pay for transport and maintenance. The federal government requires agencies that receive 1033 equipment to use it within one year of receipt,16 so there can be no doubt that participation in this program creates an incentive for law enforcement agencies to use military equipment. 

And Militarism causes violence. 

LaForgia '11 (Rachel LaForgia Program Director, Peace and Security Funders Group. "Intersections of Violence Against Women and Militarism" Center for Women’s Global Leadership Rutgers http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/docman/violence-against-women-publications/387-intersectionsvaw-militarism-pdf-1/file) 

Militarism as an ideology creates a culture of fear and supports the use of aggression, violence and military interventions for settling disputes and enforcing economic and political interests. Militarism privileges violent forms of masculinity, which often has grave consequences for the safety and security of women, children, men, and society as a whole. Attacks on civilians participating in social movements, military interventions and ongoing conflicts exemplify the ways in which militarism influences how we view women and men, our families, neighbors, public life, and specific countries. A culture of militarism is built over time through the construction of the “enemy,” the indoctrination of children, and the creation of myths about the nation as well as “the other”. As a result, militarism is linked to nationalism. Feminist theory and action provide means of both analyzing and opposing militarism and its links to violence against women. It enables an analysis of the power relations that buttress militarism and exposes the ways in which male violence is constructed as a legitimate form of control. In addition to providing analytical tools for deconstructing militarism, feminism also challenges normative views of peace. For feminists, peace is the absence of all violence, including all forms of gender-based violence. Violence emanating from war, and everyday violence experienced by women and girls, are components of a broad spectrum of violence that occur throughout women’s lifecycles. Understanding the correlations between militarism and violence against women requires an appreciation of the psychological processes that enable violence to occur, the socio-cultural norms that legitimize the use of violence, and the structural hierarchies that perpetuate violence. These processes, norms and hierarchies are present during war and peace times. Violence prior to conflict may inform violence against women during conflict, and violence against women during conflict impacts violence against women in post conflict societies.

Tournament: Read Me | Round: Quads | Opponent: Read Me | Judge: Read Me
Contact me if you would like to purchase any of the cases.

Tournament: Fatty Kins | Round: 9 | Opponent: Droopy | Judge: Mr Peacock
Interpretation: You have to resemble a beach ball.
Violation:
Standards:

1. Becoming
   2. Strat skew
   3. Clash

Voter:
Fairness. Education. Deleuze. Drop the beach ball.

Tournament: Strake ThunderMatch | Round: Semis | Opponent: Josh | Judge: Aneel
Schott '12 (Federal Bureau of Investigator "Qualified Immunity How It Protects Law Enforcement Officers." Sept. 2012 https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/september/qualified-immunity-how-it-protects-law-enforcement-officers) 

While law enforcement officers recognize the inherent risks of their occupation, they should be comforted by the description given by the Supreme Court as to the effect of the qualified immunity doctrine on one of those inherent risks—that of being sued civilly. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court explained that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”4 The plaintiff in Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, sued, among others, President Richard M. Nixon and one of his aides, Bryce Harlow, alleging that he was dismissed from his employment with the Air Force in violation of his First Amendment and other statutory rights. The defendants sought immunity from the lawsuit. While ruling on the issue of immunity, the Supreme Court distinguished the president from his aide. First, the Court noted that its “decisions consistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”5 

Schwartz '13 (Faculty at the Touro Law Center. "Supreme Court Fortifies Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement Officers in Warrant Cases. http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1659andcontext=scholarlyworks) 

To accomplish this goal, it is necessary, for starters, to identify several basic principles of Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity law. Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims challenging arrests, searches, and uses of force by law enforcement officers are normally governed by an objective reasonableness standard. For example, an officer has probable cause for an arrest when based upon the facts and circumstances known to the officer, a reasonably prudent person could have concluded that the suspect committed or is committing a crime.6 Probable cause is essentially a reasonableness standard.7 Similarly an officer’s use of force in carrying out an arrest or investigatory stop will comport with the Fourth Amendment if, under all of the circumstance facing the officer, it was objectively reasonable.8 Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standards give substantial deference to the judgment of the law enforcement officer.9 Furthermore, an officer who violated the Fourth Amendment because she did not act in an objectively reasonable manner may still escape personal liability under qualified immunity. This is so even though the qualifed immunity standard itself is one of objective reasonableness.10 Thus, a law enforcement officer who violated the §1983 plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights will be shielded from liability unless those rights were clearly established when the officer acted. Liability will attach only if the officer violated the plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. This means that a law enforcement officer sued under §1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment is effectively granted two levels of reasonableness protection, one under the Fourth Amendment and another under qualified immunity. To recover damages on a §1983 Fourth Amendment claim the plaintiff has to overcome both levels of reasonableness protection. This is because an officer found to have acted unreasonably for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment could nevertheless be found to have acted reasonably for the purpose of qualified immunity.11 To avoid the linguistic awkwardness of an officer having acted “reasonably unreasonably,” courts normally prefer different language, for example, that the officer had “arguable probable cause,” or made a “reasonable mistake,” or used force at the “hazy border” of reasonable and unreasonable force.12 Prior to its decision in Millender the controlling Supreme Court precedent on the immunity of officers who apply for warrants was Malley v. Briggs