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... ... @@ -1,12 +1,0 @@ 1 -CP Text: Public Colleges and Universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech except for term papers produced by professionals who sell them to students who turn them in as original work. 2 -Competes through mutual exclusivity- I don’t include term papers while the aff does. 3 -The sale of term papers, although blatant plagiarism, is speech protected by the first amendment 4 -Duke Law Journal 73, Term Paper Companies and the Constitution, 1973, 1275-1317 (1974) Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol22/iss6/3 5 -TERM PAPERS AS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT The preparation and sale of term papers involves not only written communication but also "pure speech," an exchange of ideas arguably protectable under the first amendment . 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that this protection extends to even the most marginal "exchanges of ideas." Justice Frankfurter conceded in his dissent to Winters v. New York17 that "wiholly neutral futilities, of course, come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." The majority in Winters stated, with more enthusiasm, that even though the magazines in question contained "nothing of any possible value," they were "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature." ' A term paper, arguably, is somewhat more than a "wiholly neutral futility" and is clearly entitled to as much constitutional protection as magazines which contain "nothing of any possible value to society." 6 -Turns and outweighs the case 7 -1 Plagiarism is free-riding the system because it requires the exploitation of others by taking advantage of one’s efforts. Free riding is immoral under the omnilateral will. 8 -Ripstein 09 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom. Harvard University Press, 2009. 9 -So mandatory cooperation cannot treat terms of interaction as reciprocal because they are voluntary. Instead, there is a more direct requirement of reciprocity: everyone must do his or her own part; the person who fails to do so violates reciprocity by taking advantage of the cooperative efforts of others, like the one who fails to keep up his end of a contract. From this perspective, the “free rider” wrongs his fellow citizens by taking advantage of their efforts. The free rider may claim—and it may even be true— that he would rather do without the rightful condition and go it alone. That claim is beside the point, because the obligation to enter a rightful condition is unconditional, that is, it does not depend upon any particular person’s subjective assessment of the benefits it will yield. Others are entitled to treat the creating and sustaining of a rightful condition as one of the free rider’s purposes, quite apart from what he may have to say about it. Thus they can rightly complain that they are being required to work for the purposes of another, or that they and are being used by the free rider, and they can make this claim even if the free rider’s failure to contribute costs them nothing. 10 -2 Plagiarism misrepresents the will of the original author and the plagiarizer 11 -Sadler 11 Brook J. Sadler, “Nothing New Left to Say: Plagiarism, Originality, and the Discipline of Philosophy,” Florida Philosophical Review Volume XII, Issue 1, Winter 2012 12 -Kant’s own view of the author may constitute a metaphysically perplexing extreme, insofar as it suggests that the text, qua speech of a rational agent, is an extension of his noumenal self. But the modern idea that writing emanates from, manifests, or represents the unique personality of an author is what underwrites, so to speak, the modern notion of plagiarism. We must believe in the notion of original writing, seemingly freed of influences, in order to think plagiarism a distinctive, identifiable violation, especially when financial effects are absent. And the violation points in two directions. It points toward the original author, whose very person is co-opted or misrepresented through the unacknowledged taking of her words, and it points toward the plagiarizer, who misrepresents her own person by writing in someone else’s voice, making a puppet of herself as she enacts an original author’s speech. Thus, the modern complaint against plagiarism is doubly invested in the idea that the text is an enactment of the person, and that as such, it must be original. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,18 +1,0 @@ 1 -Policy such as the aff that use the state to target homelessness prop us neoliberalism. 2 -Craig Willse 10 (assistant professor of cultural studies at George Mason University). "Neo-liberal biopolitics and the invention of chronic homelessness." Economy and Society 39.2 (2010): 155-184. 3 -Those populations targeted as ‘chronically homeless’ would appear, then, to fit within programmes of state racism twice over: both as populations considered social and economic drains and also as populations marked as racially inferior. But, rather than directly killed or abandoned, we have what appears to be the opposite, as those designated chronically homeless are moved into housing programmes understood to protect and secure their health and wellbeing. How can this be? Is it the end of state racism? The earlier discussion suggests another understanding of chronic homelessness initiatives, and points to some of the historical limitations of Foucault’s analysis. Foucault’s description of biopower and state racism describes the emergence of the modern state form and its organization as the social welfare state. In such a formation, the modern nation-state seeks to line up a national population with a national economy; the Keynesian welfare state did exactly this. In the contemporary neo-liberal context, social programmes become industries that serve the economy directly, not necessarily through investing in a labouring population, but through the production of service and knowledge industries. In such a situation, illness and unproductivity may not need to be reduced or eliminated, as they would be in the social welfare state. Rather, illness and waste, and populations organized as such, become fertile sites for economic investment, as they multiply opportunities for developing and extending governance mechanisms, making economic life possible. The reproduction of housing insecurity and deprivation attests to the continuation of social abandonment through withdrawal and disinvestment. However, the invention of chronic homelessness suggests something in addition, as those nearest to death and most subject to the subordinating and dehumanizing effects of institutional racism become the privileged targets of federal policy and funding (at least for the time being). But, rather than a reversal of abandonment, the invention of chronic homelessness indicates how abandonment takes place within an economy and in service to the economy. If chronic homelessness programmes enable rather than challenge neo-liberal housing insecurity and deprivation at structural levels, it is not so clear that these programmes are ‘life-saving’, even if they do prolong or save some individual lives. Rather, the invention of chronic homelessness reminds us that the deaths of biopower are not instantaneous or complete, and that, in being slow to die and continuing to bear costs, populations marked by and for death demand of neo-liberal apparatuses a biopolitical investment. Thus, we might want to amend Foucault’s view of illness and death as the negation and loss of power, allowing us to question his assertion that ‘death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it’ (Foucault, 1990 1976, p. 138). The invention of chronic homelessness emerges in a context of neo-liberal economic restructuring of relationships between life, health, illness and death that moves past Foucault’s formulation of a zero-sum game in which those marked as ill or unproductive would be treated only as negation or loss. State racism in the neo-liberal context is a process of calculation and distribution, in addition to deprivation. Technical programmes such as chronic homelessness initiatives, and the economic investment they entail, should not be mistaken for political and social rescue of abandoned populations. These programmes emerge to manage costs and to transform illness and death into productive parts of post-industrial economies. Neo-liberal forms of state racism facilitate the continued reproduction of housing insecurity and deprivation as forms of racial subordination, even while organizing those ‘losses’ into productive economic enterprises. 4 -Cities are sponges of capital—they absorb surplus value to further push off the inevitable crisis that is capitalism. 5 -Kafui Attoh 11 (Macalester College and his PhD in Geography from Syracuse University, MA in urban studies). "What kind of right is the right to the city?." Progress in human geography 35.5 (2011): 669-685. RC 6 -David Harvey (2008) situates the concept of the right to the city within a broader and more sweeping analysis of urbanization. The rise and transformation of cities, Harvey argues, must be seen as central to the reproduction of capitalist society.23 Cities, he argues, play an active role ‘in absorbing surpluses’ (Harvey, 2008: 25; see also Harvey, 1982) and staving off crises of overproduction and/or under consumption. Cities are crucial in satisfying capitalism’s perpetual ‘need to find profitable terrains for ... surplus production and absorption’ (Harvey, 2008: 24). If cities are indeed sites in which surpluses are absorbed, distributed, and produced, then, for Harvey, to have a right to the city has a very particular meaning.24 7 -Capitalism needs to expend surplus to be survive. Capitalism seeks to maximize profit, inevitably creating surplus value. Spending that surplus is used to justify further exploitation in name of creating more surplus, ad infinitum. 8 -David Harvey 12 (Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received his PhD in geography from the University of Cambridge in 1961). “Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution”. Verso Books, 2012. RC 9 -To claim the right to the city in the sense I mean it here is to claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of urbanization, over the ways in which our cities are made and remade, and to do so in a fundamental and radical way. From their very inception, cities have arisen through the geographical and social concentration of a surplus product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon of some sort, since surpluses have been extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while control over the use of the surplus typically lies in the hands of a few (such as a religious oligarchy, or a warrior poet with imperial ambitions). This general situation persists under capitalism, of course, but in this case there is a rather different dynamic at work. Capitalism rests, as Marx tells us, upon the perpetual search for surplus value (profit). But to produce surplus value capitalists have to produce a surplus product. This means that capitalism is perpetually producing the surplus product that urbanization requires. The reverse relation also holds. Capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus products it perpetually produces. In this way an inner connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbanization. Hardly surprisingly, therefore, the logistical curves of growth of capitalist output over time are broadly paralleled by the logistical curves of urbanization of the world's population. 10 -The alternative is complete rejection of the capitalist system; mere reform is insufficient because it ensures the system will regenerate itself stronger from the pieces left. 11 -Joel Kovel 07, Professor of Social Studies at Bard, The Enemy of Nature, 2007, p 142-3 12 -The value-term that subsumes everything into the spell of capital sets going a kind of wheel of accumulation, from production to consumption and back, spinning ever more rapidly as the inertial mass of capital grows, and generating its force field as a spinning magnet generates an electrical field. This phenomenon has important implications for the reformability of the system. Because capital is so spectral, and succeeds so well in ideologically mystifying its real nature, attention is constantly deflected from the actual source of eco-destabilization to the instruments by which that source acts. The real problem, however, is the whole mass of globally accumulated capital, along with the speed of its circulation and the class structures sustaining this. That is what generates the force field, in proportion to its own scale; and it is this force field, acting across the numberless points of insertion that constitute the ecosphere, that creates ever larger agglomerations of capital, sets the ecological crisis going, and keeps it from being resolved. For one fact may be taken as certain — that to resolve the ecological crisis as a whole, as against tidying up one corner or another, is radically incompatible with the existence of gigantic pools of capital, the force field these induce, the criminal underworld with which they connect, and, by extension, the elites who comprise the transnational bourgeoisie. And by not resolving the crisis as a whole, we open ourselves to the spectre of another mythical creature, the many-headed hydra, that regenerated itself the more its individual tentacles were chopped away. To realize this is to recognize that there is no compromising with capital, no schema of reformism that will clean up its act by making it act more greenly or efficiently We shall explore the practical implications of this thesis in Part III, and here need simply to restate the conclusion in blunt terms: green capital, or non-polluting capital, is preferable to the immediately ecodestructive breed on its immediate terms. But this is the lesser point, and diminishes with its very success. For green capital (or ‘socially/ecologically responsible investing’) exists, by its very capital-nature, essentially to create more value, and this leaches away from the concretely green location to join the great pool, and follows its force field into zones of greater concentration, expanded profitability — and greater ecodestruction. 13 -Also, the alternative solves better than the aff: as long as capitalism persists, exploitation is inevitable and piecemeal reforms such as the right to housing will be inevitably rolled back. The alt is a pre-requisite to actually solving for the harms the aff identifies. 14 -Richard Wolff 06 (Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst). “Anti-Slavery and Anti-Capitalism”. 15 December 2006. http://www.rdwolff.com/content/anti-slavery-and-anti-capitalism 15 -Thus, no surprise attaches to the fact, these days, that one widespread kind of social criticism concentrates on softening capitalism’s negative impacts on workers and the larger society. It seeks to raise workers’ wages and benefits and to make governments limit capitalists’ rapaciousness and the social costs of their competition. In the US, this is what “liberals” do: from the minimalist oppositions within the Democratic Party to the demands of social democrats and many “radicals” for major wage increases, major government interventions, and so on. What always frustrates liberals and radicals is the difficulty of achieving these improved workers’ conditions and the insecurity and temporariness of whatever improvements they do achieve. Today they bemoan yet another roll-back of improvements, namely those won under FDR’s New Deal, Kennedy’s New Frontier, and so on. Marxism is that other kind of opposition that demands the abolition of capitalism as a system. Since Marxists find capitalist exploitation to be as immoral and inhumane as slavery, they might logically seek a further amendment to the US Constitution that abolishes it as well. A Marxist program would seek to replace capitalist production by a non-wage system, one where the workers will not only produce surpluses but also be their own boards of directors. The “associated workers” would, as Marx suggested, appropriate their own surpluses and distribute them. The wage-payer versus wage-recipient division of people inside production would vanish. Every worker’s job description would entail not only his/her technical responsibilities to produce a specific output but also her/his responsibilities as part of the collective that appropriates and distributes the surplus. Monday to Thursday, each worker in each enterprise makes commodities, and every Friday, each worker functions as a member of that enterprise’s board of directors. The stakes here are less obtaining higher wages than abolishing the wage system.The point of such a Marxist program is to overcome the conflicts, wastes, and inequalities (economic, political, and cultural) that flow from the existence of capitalist exploitation whether or not wages are raised. The point is likewise to stress the incompatibility of any genuine democracy with the wage system and its usual social effects (and again whether wages are higher or lower). Of course, in the struggle between such a Marxist perspective and its various critics, the latter will depict the programmatic advocacy of an end to the wage system as impracticable, utopian, or deluded. Those persuaded by neoclassical economics will simply dismiss or ignore not only the Marxist criticism of the wage system but Marxism altogether. For them, the wage system is not only eternal and necessary, but also fair and “efficient.” For them, since there “is” no surplus, they need not read or learn Marxist theory and criticism, let alone debate it. So Marxist theory is and its proponents can and are largely excluded from public discourse in the media, the schools, and politics. For liberals suspicious of neoclassical economics – or “neoliberalism” as it is now more often called - the Marxian program sketched above would be seen as utopian fantasy at best. Yet, not the least irony of Bush’s America today is how his regime’s relentless removal or reduction of the past reforms (high wages, pensions, medical insurance, social security, state social programs, etc.) makes a liberal politics today seem painfully deluded to so many. The liberals seem hopelessly weak, unable to stop let alone reverse the Bush juggernaut. Worse still, what liberals they advocate are precisely the reforms now being dismantled and thus revealed as having been fundamentally insecure all along. The audience for capitalism’s critics and opponents is thus being primed to listen rather attentively to Marxist claims that an abolition of the wage system offers not only a better society but also a far better basis for securing those improvements in wages and working conditions that mass action can achieve. What is needed now are Marxists able and willing to articulate those claims to that audience, to persuade ever more of capitalism’s critics and opponents that abolition of exploitation and the wage system must be a component of their program for social change. 16 -Affirming treats the symptom by just brushing over the real issue—they don’t solve anything. 17 -James H. Carr 98 (Senior Vice President for Policy, Research, and Evaluation at the Fannie Mae Foundation), (1998) Comment on Chester Hartman's “The case for a right to housing”: The right to “poverty with a roof"—a response to hartman, Housing Policy Debate, 9:2, 247-257, 18 -The reasons the housing affordability crisis persists, however, are much deeper than obstacles created by those who oppose specific programs or shifting political priorities. Access to decent and affordable housing is an outcome of a number of resource allocation processes, of which the housing market is perhaps the most superficial. The approach that would ensure the greatest and most cost effective allocation of decent, affordable housing is one that is free of discriminatory barriers to broader societal opportunities that ultimately shape access to the housing market. Included are such areas as education, transportation, and employment. Unless all households have equal opportunities to receive an education that prepares them for the labor market, people with similar aptitudes for a given occupation will have different abilities with which to compete for specific jobs. Because public education in the United States is funded primarily through local property taxes, and affluent households and employers have migrated in large numbers out of central cities and into the suburbs, central-city schools districts are often underfunded. At the same time, many of these districts have schools with deteriorating infrastructure and students with systemic social problems resulting from concentrated poverty. Understandably, central-city school districts face a particularly challenging task in providing quality education. Due in large part to the economic restructuring of U.S. cities, quality jobs requiring moderate education and skill levels have largely migrated to the suburbs. Meanwhile, minority populations have concentrated in central cities due partly to past and present discrimination in the housing market. This ‘‘spatial mismatch,’’ further complicated by the low priority U.S. metropolitan areas have given to public transit systems and the high costs of automobile ownership in central cities relative to other areas in the United States, results in many residents lacking access to quality jobs. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,10 +1,0 @@ 1 -Counterplan Text: The United States should take a needs based approach to the right to housing. 2 -Competition: 3 -1. Textually competitive- I use a needs based approach instead of a rights based approach which is different from the text of the AC. 4 -2. Functional competition- the implication of a right is a demand in absolute instances, whereas the CP PICs out of the absolute claim- rather, we just give housing assistance based on circumstances. 5 -Only a needs-based approach can effectively solve neoliberal institutions. It’s empirically proven to be effective. 6 -Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017). 7 -In these sorts of cases, democratic progress depends upon the mobilization of social forces against exclusionary rights to private property. In these cases, a different social morality is brought into play, the social morality of need-satisfaction. Where the structure of rights blocks access to needed resources, it becomes a means of legitimating objective harm. Since it allows the harms of need-deprivation to proceed unchecked, its own legitimacy comes into question. Its legitimacy is challenged by social movements which do not appeal to authorities or experts to satisfy their rights for them, but draw on their own social power to secure access to and control over the resources that they need to satisfy their own rights. This form of organizing is consistent with the master democratic norm of self-determination, and is, in fact, the only way that needs can be satisfied in an empowering, as opposed to paternalistic, way. To put this crucial point another way, only a needs-based social morality exposes the real problem with the capitalist value system: it subordinates the life-value of goods and services to their money-value. The basic life-value of any good is the contribution that it makes to the satisfaction of non-optional needs (McMurtry 1998: 164). When lifevalue is subordinated to money-value, people can be deprived of that which they need and the economy still judged good, because the basis of judgement is not the satisfaction of people’s life-requirements, but return on investment to the owners of capital. Such is the case with housing markets as currently constituted. Hundreds of thousands of people cannot afford homes, but if house prices are rising, the markets are judged good by those who profit from them. Occasionally (as with the Vancouver foreign buyers tax) governments will intervene to cool markets in order to prevent the emergence of bubbles and the deeper social problems they can cause, but this sort of regulation is distinct from a structural solution to the homelessness crisis. 8 -Rights based approaches to housing are extremely vague and inefficient when held to particular instances- guts solvency and proves needs based approaches do more for the oppressed. 9 -Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017). 10 - The Universal Declaration asserts that housing is a right, but it does not further define the conditions that count as satisfying that right. All rights-statements tend to be programmatic and abstract. A discussion of human life-requirements, by contrast, cannot be carried out without reflection on the nature of the life that has the requirements. In other words, it is never enough to assert that “x is a life-requirement,” one must always unpack the life-value of x in relation to human life to explain just what it is that x contributes to life which, if absent, would cause harm. We tried to provide this complex unpacking in the case of the need for homes in Section One. If we content ourselves with the assertion that ‘housing is a right,’ it remains an open question what is required to satisfy the right. Does any sort of ‘roof over one’s head’ constitute satisfaction of the right? Are the rights of social assistance recipients housed in motels while they await public housing violated? There is no straightforward answer to these questions if we focus only on the right to housing, because it does not explain why it is that human beings need housing, beyond the obvious that we require shelter. When the need deprived mobilize to explain just what they need, and demand the resources to satisfy that need through their own labour and intelligence, this problem disappears because they tell everyone exactly what they require to satisfy their need. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,10 +1,0 @@ 1 -A) Interpretation: The aff must specify a comprehensive role of the ballot and clarify how the round will play out under that role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC. To clarify, if the affirmative reads an argument that endows a role of the ballot, they must 2 -1. Clarify how we determine what a legitimate advocacy is and how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether topicality constrains the aff advocacy or not. 3 -2. Every plank of the ROB must be warranted, just like the standard text for a normative ethical theory, and what area of debate must be warranted i.e. which assumptions we should accept and which we shouldn’t. 4 -3. Describe how to weigh and compare between competing advocacies i.e. whether the role of the ballot is solely determined by the flow or another method of engagement. 5 -B) Violation: 6 -C) Vote Neg: 7 -1. Engagement 8 -A) Analytic 9 -B) Resolvability 10 -No RVI, Procedurals, DTD - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,13 +1,0 @@ 1 -Any public is composited with a plurality of views. This creates a dilemma between accepting subjectivity or coercion. However, subjectivity is untenable. I can’t say, “the sky is blue, but I don’t believe it”, since I have already committed myself the truth of the statement by uttering the preceding statement. This leaves us with coercion, but this just begs the question of what “just” coercion is in the first place. 2 -Benhabib 96 Seyla Benhabib 96 (Turkish-American philosopher. She is Eugene Mayer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, and director of the program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, and a well-known contemporary philosopher), ed. Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political. Vol. 31. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. RC 3 -In the last two decades, theorists of deliberative democracy have stressed the democratic potential for reasoned persuasion to the almost complete exclusion of the independently justifiable arguments for power as coercion in democratic life. Yet democracies must have their coercive as well as their deliberative moments. Against deliberative theorists who associate the coercion in democracy with "violence" and make that coercion at best tangential to the democratic process, this essay argues that coercion must play a large, valuable, and relatively legitimate role in almost any democracy that functions well. But against those who assume the full legitimacy of coercion in conditions of lasting disagreement, this essay argues that any justification for coercion will necessarily be incomplete. In conditions of lasting disagreement there is no unquestionably fair procedure for producing a decision to coerce. Moreover, much coercion in existing democracies will be far from fair, and policies requiring coercion will often have features that are far from just. Recognizing the need for coercion, and recognizing too that no coercion can be either incontestably fair or predictably just, democracies must find ways of fighting, while they use it, the very coercion that they need. Democracies usually fight their own coercive power by girding that power about with the institutional safeguards of individual rights, free speech and association, and other features of the "rule of law," sometimes including constitutional requirements that every policy have at least a nominal "public purpose." Along with these safeguards, democracies need political parties, interest groups, and other traditional institutions that can serve as instruments of formal opposition. Less obviously, this essay argues that democracies also need to foster and value informal deliberative enclaves of resistance in which those who lose in each coercive move can rework their ideas and their strategies, gathering their forces and deciding in a more protected space in what way or whether to continue the battle. 4 -We solve this with deliberation—communicative action bridges the gap between public and private subjectivities, creating ethics. 5 -Liu 02 Hsin-I Liu 02 (University of Hong Kong). “HABERMAS ON NORMATIVE INTERSUBJECTIVITY: THE SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE OF “PUBLIC COMMUNICATION”. 2002 http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/bcn2002/n_eng/programme/prog_ind/asp4.asp?id_pre=118 RC 6 -“In my view, Habermas’s picture of bourgeois private and public sphere is like two concentric circles linked through “communication.” The inner circle represents private autonomy and its subjective particularity. The possibility of the outer circle~-~-the public sphere and its generality and abstractness~-~-is a derivative of the inter-subjective dialogues in this inner circle. The “exteriority” of the public and the objective is dependent upon the existence and development of the “interiority” of the private and the subjective. On the other hand, due to its objectivity and abstractness, the public sphere is able to secure a “social space of communication structure” for concrete and subjective private individuals, in which they can “communicate with each other, and confirm each other’s subjectivity as it emerged from their spheres of intimacy” (Habermas 1989a, 54; 1996, 360). The bourgeois public sphere is a historical product of the dialectical play of the subjective interior and the objective exterior spaces. Nonetheless, when this historical relationship between the interior and the exterior in the bourgeois public sphere reversed, the nature of public sphere also under went “social-structural transformation.” Following Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry in the 1940’s, Habermas argues that the arrival of the culture industry contributed greatly to this transformation~-~-in both the spheres of publicness and the concept of rationality implied in it.3” 7 -Moreover, governments represent the conclusion that people reach through deliberation since that determines what is “just” coercion. 8 -Seyla Benhabib 2 (Turkish-American philosopher. She is Eugene Mayer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, and director of the program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, and a well-known contemporary philosopher), ed. Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political. Vol. 31. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. RC 9 -When delegitimation walks hand in hand with legitimation, sufficient legitimation must remain to let reasonably just coercion do its good work of helping organize social arrangements and redressing the greater injustices that would emerge without it. Each individual in each society must feel out this delicate balance for herself. The trick is to recognize the importance , particularly to the most disadvantaged, of having a large number of relatively democratic and relatively unchallenged decisions made (and democratic coercion imposed) on a daily, monthly, and yearly basis as a matter of routine, and at the same time to recognize the importance, particularly to the most disadvantaged, of maintaining, in the institutions and culture of the society and in the minds of its citizens, some ongoing recognition and critique of the ways in which those decisions (and that coercion) are unfair and unjust. 10 -Thus, the standard is promoting deliberation. 11 -I contend that granting a right to housing forecloses public deliberation. Labeling housing as a right shuts down dialogue; it becomes a trump card that prevents us from discussing foundation of the issue. 12 -Fitzpatrick and Watts 10 ~-~- Suzanne Fitzpatrick and Beth Watts. "‘The Right to Housing’for Homeless People." Homelessness Research in Europe (2010): 105-122. RC 13 -First, and most fundamentally, intrinsic to the notion of human rights is the idea that they are self-evident, inalienable and non-negotiable: ‘absolute’ in other words. But are the rights declared by the architects of international and European human rights instruments – particularly social rights such as the right to housing – any less politically contested than other claims about how material resources should be distributed in society? One could argue that labelling such claims as moral ‘rights’ is a mere rhetorical device intended to shut down debate by investing one’s own particular political priorities with a ‘protected’ status; after all, as Dworkin (1977) put it, ‘rights are trumps’. But if one dispenses with theological or other natural law justifications for human rights, then what is the foundation of their protected status? Many human rights supporters argue that they are not anchored in a pre-social natural order or in divine reason, but rather are socially constructed and inter-subjective, rooted in a broad normative consensus about the things that all human beings are morally entitled to in order to attain a basic standard of living and to participate in society (Dean, 2010). But the idea that such a consensus exists at a global level is, at the very least, highly arguable (Finch, 1979; Miller, 1999; Lukes, 2008). - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,6 +1,0 @@ 1 -A. Interpretation: If the aff advocates for a subset of the resolution, then they must have a carded solvency advocates that advocates for the aff and explicitly calls it a “right to housing” read in the 1AC. 2 -B. Violation: 3 -C. Standards 4 -1. Limits 5 -2. Topic Focus 6 -Fairness, DTD, CI - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,14 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation: The right to housing is a positive right. 2 -Velasquez et al 14 ~-~- Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, S.J., and Michael J. Meyer. “Rights”. MARKKULA CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS, Aug. 8, 2014. https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/rights/ 3 -Kant's principle is also often used to justify positive or, as they are often called, welfare rights. Where negative rights are "negative" in the sense that they claim for each person a zone of non-interference from others, positive rights are "positive" in the sense that they claim for each person the positive assistance of others in fulfilling basic constituents of human well-being like health and education. In moral and political philosophy, these basic human needs are often referred to as "welfare" concerns (thus this use of the term "welfare" is similar to but not identical with the common American usage of "welfare" to refer to government payments to the poor). Many people argue that a fundamental right to freedom is worthless if people aren't able to exercise that freedom. A right to freedom, then, implies that every human being also has a fundamental right to what is necessary to secure a minimum level of well being. Positive rights, therefore, are rights that provide something that people need to secure their well being, such as a right to an education, the right to food, the right to medical care, the right to housing, or the right to a job. Positive rights impose a positive duty on us—the duty actively to help a person to have or to do something. A young person's right to an education, for example, imposes on us a duty to provide that young person with an education. Respecting a positive right, then requires more than merely not acting; positive rights impose on us the duty to help sustain the welfare of those who are in need of help. 4 -Violation: 5 -Standards: 6 -1.Ground 7 -2.Field context 8 -Bo Bengtsson 01 (Uppsala University, Department of Government and Institute for Housing and Urban Research). “Housing as a Social Right: Implications for Welfare State Theory”. Nordic Political Science Association, 2001. RC 9 -The article contributes to two central and interrelated discourses in welfare state theory and housing policy. One concerns the meaning of a `right to housing', and the other concerns the meaning of the dichotomy `universal'^`selective' in housing policy. The right to housing is best seen as a political `marker of concern' pointing out housing as an area for welfare state policy. The more precise meaning of the idea is always de¢ned socially, in a speci¢c national context of relations between state, citizen, and markets in housing provision. Two alternative interpretations of a right to housing are suggested, each related to a certain logic of housing provision. In a selective housing policy, the state provides a `protected' complement to the general housing market, and the right to housing implies some legalistic minimum rights for households of lesser means. In a universal housing policy, the state provides correctives to the general housing market in order to make housing available to all types of households, and the right to housing is best seen as a social right in Marshall's meaning of an obligation of the state towards society as a whole. The concepts of `universal' and `selective' may be applied to either the political discourse or the social outcome of policies. Furthermore, they may refer to di¡erent political levels (e.g. welfare state level, sector level, and policy instrument level). If the dichotomy is not speci¢ed in those two respects, the distinction between a universal and a selective policy will always be seriously blurred. 10 -A) Analytic 11 -3. Limits 12 - 13 -Voters: 14 -Jurisdiction, DTD, CI - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,28 +1,0 @@ 1 -Agency, or the setting and pursuing of ends, is inescapable. 2 -Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8 3 -3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on ordinary enterprises their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15 4 -This outweighs: A. Analytic B. Analytic 5 -Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent. 6 -Korsgaard“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard 7 -The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him. 8 -Analytic 9 -Prefer additionally- all frameworks presuppose liberty- three warrants. 10 -1. Analytic 11 -2. Analytic 12 -3. Analytic 13 -Impact Calc: 14 -1. Analytic 15 -2. Analytic 16 - 17 -NC – Free Markets 18 -Contention x is free markets 19 -Kantianism justifies a system of free markets- we have the right to make inferior choices and businesspeople have a right to choose how they want to distribute their own goods. This also means nobody has to sell you a house either- there should be zero interference, positive or negative 20 -Jones 04 September 2004, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies;2004, Vol. 16 Issue 1/2, p65, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/14576363/immanuel-kant-free-market-capitalist 21 -This essay argues that Kant's philosophy provides a justification for free markets. The myths about Kant are that he was a recluse, knew nothing about business, and that his epistemology divorced reason from reality, while his primary interest was metaphysics. Yet Kant's categorical imperative demands obedience even in the face of uncertainty about the external world. Adam Smith described this principle as the inward testimony of an impartial observer. Smith and Kant put individual decisions at the center of morality, but agreed that people have a tendency to make morally inferior chokes. Those who propose to regulate the economy are as troubled by this tendency as those they regulate. The self-sacrifice prescription is economically, psychologically, and morally unstable. In recommending market competition, Smith was unconsciously applying a Kantian formula. Market decisions are individual decisions. Individuals prefer to do business with those they trust: this is an incentive to honesty. A morality that depends upon incentives is imperfect but superior to a morality imposed by force. 22 -The AFF infringes on the right of employers to decide who to sell to. 23 -Friedman n.d. David Friedman, Some Responses to Mike Huben's A Non-Libertarian FAQ, http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/response_to_huben.html 24 -The problems with this, in the case of both the Scientologists and the ACLU, are that it confuses rhetoric with reality and, more seriously, blurs real disagreements about what freedom and rights are. For a simple example, consider the issue of fair housing legislation~-~-over which my father quit the ACLU many years ago. The ACLU would claim that in supporting fair housing legislation it is supporting the right of blacks, jews, etc. to buy or rent housing. Libertarians would respond that nobody has the right to buy something that the owner does not wish to sell, and that the ACLU was actually attacking the right of an owner to decide whom he would rent or sell his property to. Hence whether the ACLU's position was a defense of rights or an attack on rights depends on what rights you believe people have. This is the point that Mike is getting at later in this section when he writes "Nor might we need or want to accept the versions of "freedom" and "rights" that libertarians propose." But instead of actually arguing it, he rhetorically points out that libertarianism is not egalitarianism~-~-which while true, is not obviously relevant to the question of what rights people do or should have. Perhaps I was too quick, earlier in this response, to offer Mike as a counterexample to his own comments on evangelists. 25 - 26 -The NC also turns the AC- the market has empirically proven to provide better housing for more people than the government. Data proves. 27 -Husock 16 Hussock, Howard. "We Don't Need Subsidized Housing." City Journal. City Journal, 26 Jan. 2016. Web. 05 Feb. 2017. https://www.city-journal.org/html/we-donE28099t-need-subsidized-housing-11954.html. 28 -. Maybe our housing programs haven’t failed because of some minor management problem but because they are flawed at the core. The truth is, devoting government resources to subsidized housing for the poor—whether in the form of public housing or even housing vouchers—is not just unnecessary but also counterproductive. It not only derails what the private market can do on its own, but more significantly, it has profoundly destructive unintended consequences. For housing subsidies undermine the efforts of those poor families who work and sacrifice to advance their lot in life—and who have the right and the need to distinguish themselves, both physically and psychologically, from those who do not share their solid virtues. Rather than confront these harsh truths, we have over the past century gone through at least five major varieties of subsidized housing, always looking for the philosophers’ stone that will turn a bad idea into one that will work. We began with philanthropic housing built by “limited dividend” corporations, whose investors were to accept a below-market return in order to serve the poor. The disappointing results of such efforts—the projects served few people and tended to decline quickly—led housing advocates to call for public, not just private, spending for housing. Government first responded to their pleas with housing projects owned and operated by public authorities. These speedily declined. “Housers” then sought other solutions, such as using cheap, federally underwritten mortgages and rents paid by Washington to subsidize private landlords. The expense of this last approach, which had its heyday in the sixties, and the resultant wave of decline and foreclosure led to the twin approaches of our current era. In the first of these, tenants use portable, government-provided vouchers to pay any private landlord who will accept them. In the second, federal tax credits encourage deep-pocketed corporate investors looking for tax shelters to finance new or renovated rental housing owned and managed by nonprofit community groups. Both approaches have had serious problems, but this hasn’t deterred housing advocates from asserting that the way to fix the housing market is through even more such subsidies than the $12 billion that HUD already provides (out of its $25 billion annual budget) and the billions more in subsidies that state and local governments expend. This mountain of government housing subsidies rests on three remarkably tenacious myths. Myth No. 1: The market will not provide. The core belief of housing advocates is that the private market cannot and will not provide adequate housing within the means of the poor. The photos of immigrants squeezed into postage-stamp-sized rooms in a recent New York Times series on housing for the poor strain to make this point. But housers have been making such assertions for more than 60 years, and reality keeps contradicting them. In 1935, for example, Catherine Bauer—perhaps America’s most influential public housing crusader—claimed that the private housing market could not serve fully two-thirds of Americans and they would need public housing. The post–World War II era’s explosion of home ownership quickly gave the lie to such claims, certainly with respect to those in the lower middle class and up. As for the poor, a look at pre-Depression history shows that housing advocates get it wrong again. From the end of the Civil War up until the New Deal and the National Housing Act of 1937—which gave public housing its first push—the private housing market generated a cornucopia of housing forms to accommodate those of modest means as they gradually improved their condition. In those years Chicago saw the construction of 211,000 low-cost two-family homes—or 21 percent of its residences. In Brooklyn 120,000 two-family structures with ground-floor stores sprang up. In Boston some 40 percent of the population of 770,000 lived in the 65,376 units of the city’s three-decker frame houses, vilified by housing reformers. These areas of low-cost, unsubsidized housing were home to the striving poor. In Boston, as pioneer sociologists Robert Woods and Albert Kennedy describe it in their brilliant 1914 work, The Zone of Emergence, these neighborhoods teemed with clerks and skilled and semi-skilled workmen. “Over 65 percent of the residence property of the zone is owned by those who reside on it,” wrote Woods and Kennedy, “and this is the best possible index that can be given of the end that holds the imagination and galvanizes the powers of a large proportion of the population. Doubtless the greater share of this property is encumbered with mortgage, but it is an index of striving and accomplishment.” Even in the poorest neighborhoods, housing, if modest, was rarely abject. A 1907 report by the U.S. Immigration Commission, for instance, found that in the eastern cities, crowding in such neighborhoods was by no means overwhelming, with 134 persons for every 100 rooms. “Eighty-four in every 100 of the homes studied are in good or fair condition,” wrote the commission. True, many lived without hot water or their own bathrooms. But rents were cheap. A 1909 study by the President’s Homes Commission of Washington, D.C., found that a majority of the 1,200 families surveyed paid but 17.5 percent of their income for housing costs. Many of the poor—just like the “emerging” class that Woods and Kennedy described—lived in small homes they owned or in small buildings in which the owner lived. To be sure, as we know above all from Jacob Riis’s powerful 1891 book, How the Other Half Lives, some families lived in hovels, even in unlit cellars. “It no longer excites even passing attention when the sanitary police count 101 adults and 91 children in a Crosby Street house,” he wrote, “or when a midnight inspection in Mulberry Street unearths 150 ‘lodgers’ sleeping on filthy floors in two buildings.” Many buildings did not have their own toilets, and large numbers of people relied on public baths to get clean. But it is essential to remember that the conditions in which these poor families lived were not permanent—a fact unacknowledged by either Riis or present-day housing advocates. After all, the generation of children for whom Riis despaired went on to accomplish America’s explosive economic growth after the turn of the century and into the twenties. By 1930 the New York settlement-house pioneer Lillian Wald would write in her memoirs of the Lower East Side that, where once Riis had deplored overcrowding, she now found herself surrounded by “empties”: the poor had climbed the economic ladder and headed to Brooklyn and the Bronx. In other words, “substandard” housing was a stage through which many passed, but in which they did not inevitably remain. The arrival of Dominicans from Washington Heights in Hudson River Valley towns and Salvadorans from Queens on Long Island is proof that this process continues. Perversely, housing reformers invariably make matters worse by banning the conditions that shock them. Insisting unrealistically on standards beyond the financial means of the poor, they help create housing shortages, which they then seek to remedy through public subsidies. Even Jacob Riis observed in 1907 that new tenement standards threatened “to make it impossible for anyone not able to pay $75 a month to live on Manhattan Island.” Though Riis’s colleague Lawrence Veiller, head of the influential New York–based National Housing Association from 1900 to 1920, cautioned that “housing legislation must distinguish between what is desirable and what is essential,” most housing programs since the New Deal have rejected this sensible advice. The high standards that have resulted—whether for the number of closets, the square feet of kitchen counter space, or handicapped access—have caused private owners and builders to bypass the low-income market. So stringent are the standards that, under current building codes and zoning laws, much of the distinctive lower-cost housing that shaped the architectural identity of America’s cities—such as Brooklyn’s attached brownstones with basement apartments—could not be built today. True, even with relaxed building and housing codes, we still might not be able to build brand-new housing within the reach of those earning the minimum wage or those living on public assistance. Yet this is not an irresistible argument for government subsidies. Used housing, like used cars, gets passed along to those of more and more modest means. When new homes are built for the lower middle class, the rental housing in which they’ve been living (itself probably inherited from the middle class) historically has been passed along to those who are poorer. In a subtle way, the very existence of subsidized housing is likely to contribute to the over-regulation that leads to constraints in housing supply—and to calls for further subsidies. When builders have plenty of work putting up high-cost subsidized apartments, they don’t agitate for a less regulated market. Why should they seek an opportunity to build lower-margin low-cost housing? The rejoinder, then, to the myth that the market will not provide is that a greater supply of housing could be—and has been—created in a less regulated market. Myth No. 2: By taking profit-driven landlords out of the equation, state-supported housing can offer the poor higher-quality housing for the same rent. Four generations of attempts to provide subsidized housing built to higher standards than the poor could afford on their own in the private market have proved that this idea just doesn’t work. Each generation has seen the same depressing pattern: initial success followed by serious decline and ultimately by demands for additional public funds to cover ever-rising costs. You can see the outlines of this pattern as early as 1854, when the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor decided to build a “model tenement” at the corner of Elizabeth and Mott Streets. Constructed by a newly formed limited-dividend corporation, the building degenerated just 11 years later into what would be called “one of the worst slum pockets in the city.” It was sold and soon after demolished. Like its ill-fated predecessor, later public housing also aimed to do away with profit, financing construction through the sale of public bonds and then using the project’s rental income to pay a public authority to provide maintenance. But the maintenance failures of public housing projects became legendary, to the point that a 1988 study estimated it would take at least $30 billion to remedy them. Instead of providing housing that rental income from tenants can maintain, the federal government has had to supply $4 billion in annual “operating assistance” to housing authorities for maintenance and administrative costs—and still the maintenance problems multiply. The new public housing model that advocates favor retains the core—and fatal—dogma that the profit motive has no place in providing housing for the poor. In this model, nonprofit community groups run smaller, mixed-income apartment buildings, financed by monies raised through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, a program set up in 1986 to encourage corporations to support low-income housing. In New York City some 200 nonprofit groups manage 48,000 housing units. Though at this point such housing is widely viewed as successful, the New School for Social Research has found, in an examination of 34 developments in six cities, that “beyond an initial snapshot of well-being, loom major problems which, if unaddressed, will threaten the stock of affordable housing in this study.” Predictably enough, more than 60 percent of the projects already had trouble maintaining their paint and plaster, elevators, hall lighting, and roofs. Why does non-market housing founder? First, providing the poor with better housing than they can afford also saddles them with higher maintenance costs than they can afford. A newly announced state-financed “affordable housing” complex in Cambridge, Massachusetts, will cost $1.3 million—for eight units. That’s $162,500 per apartment. Recent subsidized projects in the Bronx and central Harlem cost $150,000 and $113,000 per unit, respectively. These apartments may be built to higher standards, but their fancier kitchens, more numerous bathrooms, and larger space mean more maintenance. Not surprisingly, limited rents can’t keep up with the need for service. The New York City Housing Partnership, which arranges private construction of housing for low-income buyers, has observed that nonprofit housing management groups in general “have no magic formula that allows them to manage property at less than cost. Ultimately they will need operating subsidies to remain viable.” Second, it is by no means true that cutting out the profit-making landlord reduces maintenance costs. On the contrary, public authorities and nonprofit management firms are bureaucracies with their own overhead expenses, and unlike private owners, they have no incentive to control costs. Nor have their employees any incentive to provide good service; and tenants, who are not full-fledged paying customers, have little leverage. Indeed, public housing authorities have demonstrated an ability rivaling any slumlord to disinvest in their properties. Rather than being a source of ill-gotten gains, private ownership is a source of cost control. The expensive but ineffective maintenance regime of subsidized housing—with its formal bids and union contracts—replaces housing maintenance performed through a far less costly informal economy. Poor homeowners and so-called “tenement landlords” (owners of small, multi-family buildings, many owner-occupied) contribute their own “sweat equity” or hire neighborhood tradesmen, not all of whom are licensed, let alone unionized. As one study of a low-income neighborhood in Montreal observed, “Owners can maintain their buildings and keep their rents low through the cooperation of their tenants on maintenance and through their own hard work.” None of these factors comes into play in the bureaucratic environment of public or nonprofit ownership. Far from being more cost-effective than private housing, subsidized housing is even more expensive than it first appears. Its cost includes the vast amount of property-tax revenue forgone when rental housing is held by public authorities or non-taxpaying nonprofit groups. By choosing to invest in housing, cities choose not to invest in other services, or not to leave money in the private economy to finance growth that would provide opportunity for poor and non-poor alike. Under the Rebuild New York program championed by the Koch and Dinkins administrations, the city “invested” an estimated $5 billion (much of it from its own operating budget) in housing renovation and gave up millions in property-tax revenues by deeding buildings to nonprofit organizations. The rejoinder, then, to the myth of the public or nonprofit alternative is that gleaming new projects are bound to decay—and to have significant long-term public costs. But for housing advocates, this is really just a political problem: that of making clear to the body politic that perpetually escalating subsidies to guarantee a safe and sanitary environment for the poor are the cost of living in a moral body politic. Here we arrive at the nub of their mistaken ideology. Myth No. 3: The moral qualities of the poor are a product of their housing “environment.” The essence of the housing advocates’ worldview, as the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor put it in 1854, is that “physical evils produce moral evils.” Improved physical surroundings will lead people to become upright, ambitious, and successful. Perhaps the quintessential myth of environmental determinism is that kids who might otherwise have no place to do their homework have their own room in government-assisted housing—and therefore succeed where they would have failed. There is much that is appealing in this view, which has a powerful hold on the liberal psyche. But the track record of public housing—which by almost any physical measure is superior to the housing in which most of its residents have previously lived—has hardly borne out the notion that better housing uplifts the poor. The response of housing reformers to drug- and gunfire-riddled projects has been not to re-examine the premise but to tinker with the model. Having long dwelled on design, they now devote equal attention to the social “environment.” Thus Secretary Cisneros has dreamed of new, low-rise, mixed-income subsidized housing that will correct the mistake of concentrating the poor in apartment towers now said to have encouraged crime. So, too, the nonprofit, “community-based” management of renovated apartment buildings is touted as a nurturing environment, in which the poorest are inspired by gainfully employed “role-model” neighbors to improve their habits and their lot. Here is where housing advocates most radically misunderstand the nature of the unsubsidized housing market. They can’t see its crucial role in weaving a healthy social fabric and inspiring individuals to advance. By pushing to provide the poor with better housing than they could otherwise afford, houses are blind to the fact that they are interfering with a delicate system that rewards effort and achievement by giving people the chance to live in better homes in better neighborhoods. In this unsubsidized system, you earn your way to a better neighborhood. In fact, you must help to create and to maintain better neighborhoods by your own effort. Housing subsidies—whether in the form of subsidized apartments or even vouchers that you can take to a landlord of your choice—turn this system on its head and undermine it, for housing subsidies do not reward achievement; they reward need. Those who strive and save are offered the same subsidized unit as those on public assistance; the provident and the improvident become indistinguishable. Those who work must live alongside those who do not. To believe that this is just is to believe that the poor are fundamentally undifferentiated—that they are all the same in being victims of an oppressive system. Those done the greatest injustice by such naiveté are the hardworking poor, who find to their horror that their new neighbor in a housing project is a drug dealer, or that the house next door has been rented, through a housing voucher, to an AFDC mother who does not supervise her children. Subsidies deny the self-sacrificing, working poor the chance to put physical and social distance between themselves and the non-working or antisocial poor. The New York Times cited the case of a hardworking woman who found herself in a bad neighborhood surrounded by gang violence as evidence of the need for increased housing subsidies, but it more likely demonstrates the opposite. By subsidizing troubled families, perhaps with criminal members, so that they can live in the same neighborhoods as those who hold modest but honest jobs, we expose the law-abiding to the disorder and violence of the undisciplined and the lawless, depriving them of the decent neighborhoods—decent in values if shabby in appearance—that their efforts should earn them. If we fail to allow the hardworking to distinguish themselves, by virtue of where they live, from those who do not share these traits, we devalue them. Even if we could somehow subsidize only the good citizens, the deserving poor, we would still do them a grave disservice, fostering the belief that they have moved to better homes in better neighborhoods by dint of largesse, not accomplishment—an entirely different psychology. A neighborhood of good housing is not necessarily a good neighborhood. And a poor and shabby neighborhood is not necessarily a bad neighborhood. The terms on which residents have come to a place, as well as the extent to which they own property and have otherwise invested in the upkeep and safety of it, matter far more. It is worth recalling the distinctions sociologist Herbert Gans made among different types of poor neighborhoods. “In most American cities,” he wrote, “there are two major types of low-rent neighborhoods: the areas of first and second settlement for urban migrants; and the areas that attract the criminal, the mentally ill, the socially rejected, and those who have given up the attempt to cope with life. The former kind of area, in which immigrants try to adapt to the urban milieu . . . , may be called an urban village. The second kind of area, populated largely by single men, pathological families, people in hiding from themselves or society, and individuals who provide the most disreputable of illegal-but-demanded services to the rest of the community, . . . might be called an urban jungle. “Subsidized housing does not differentiate between these groups. In fact, it seeks to address the problems of the lawless by mixing them in among the law-abiding and upwardly mobile, who are regarded almost as mere instruments for the salvation of the disorderly. Because it is based on the myth that the lawless are victims rather than victimizers, such a policy makes victims of those who would build an urban village by enmeshing them in an unsafe, disorganized neighborhood. True, the new subsidized projects run by community groups, with the advice of such sophisticated organizations as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation, do seek to screen tenants so as to keep bad actors out of mixed-income developments. But it defies imagination to think that such a process will be as effective as the screening that the market does. Indeed, in its analysis of such housing in New York, the New School found that though 6 percent of tenants were in arrears on their rent, the eviction rate was still zero. By remaining focused on the myth that physical conditions are the single most important quality of housing, houses have misunderstood the dynamics of neighborhoods—not merely as places where people live but as communities of shared ideals. As a result, they have blindly based new policies on old mistakes. Consider, for instance, recent housing initiatives that aim to promote racial integration by placing low-income minority families in apartments in the suburbs. These policies are a recipe for racial resentment, which has in fact developed. Asking working-class whites to accept the welfare poor—who would inspire discomfort whether white or black—as neighbors is the worst way to address the race issue. The right way is to enforce housing non-discrimination laws and thus allow the diffusion of upwardly mobile minority-group members into neighborhoods where, if they at first appear to be outsiders, it is only by virtue of race, not class. A realistic housing policy would strive for a non-subsidized world in which many different sorts of housing form a housing ladder. The lower rungs will be modest indeed—as modest as the single-room-occupancy hotels that sprang up in San Diego when that city allowed dwellings with less-than-full bathrooms and limited parking. By relaxing its code requirements, the city catalyzed construction of some 2,700 new SRO units for the working poor—day laborers, cabdrivers, fast-food employees. The SROs have formed a housing ladder all their own: lower-rent buildings may have no TV or phone, while lobby guards in the better buildings enforce more stringent guest policies. A sensible housing policy would purge housing and building codes of unnecessary barriers to construction. The New York City Housing Partnership, for instance, would like to build new versions of old-fashioned Brooklyn row houses, but handicapped-access laws forbid basement apartments, which allow for a less expensive overall design. Requirements for cast-iron or copper pipes instead of less expensive plastic ones, or for excessive numbers of electric outlets, increase the cost of housing needlessly. Hugely expensive environmental cleanup requirements discourage developers from building low-cost (or any other kind of) housing on the many “brownfield” sites of inner cities. Policy makers should push for safe ways to “minimally rehab” older buildings, so that they’re not priced out of the reach of the unsubsidized poor. City Homes, a Baltimore developer, has tried this on a small scale, with the cooperation of local and state authorities that have held renovation requirements to a minimum. Because of its low costs, City Homes doesn’t need the federal rent subsidies on which most low-income housing complexes depend. City Homes rents only to the employed and has created blocks—inhabited by nurses, city sanitation workers, and the like—that are oases of safety and civility in the midst of bad neighborhoods. Even with building codes that focus on basic safety issues and try not to raise prices, there will be people who can’t afford anything we think should be built. In some cases this may be the result of poverty despite effort. In others it may be the result of bad life choices and the wrong values. For those in temporary emergency situations, we should provide shelters, basic arrangements that ensure no one must live on the street. For those whose lack of housing is really a symptom of larger problems—the alcoholic, the drug addict, the teenage mother who cannot afford her own household—we can look to institutional ways, such as group homes, to deliver the combination of shelter, guidance, and treatment they need. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,14 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation: The aff must explicitly specify in the form of a plan text how the aff implements a right to housing. To clarify, they must specify the specific method of enforcement for the right to housing. 2 -Violation: 3 -There are multiple ways to implement a right to housing based on current demands. 4 -Schiller ’15. Ben Schiller '15 (Ben Schiller is a New York staff writer for Co.Exist. He edited a European management magazine and was a reporter in San Francisco, Prague and Brussels.), 2-6-2015, "4 Ways To Make Housing More Affordable," Co.Exist, http://www.fastcoexist.com/3037614/4-ways-to-make-housing-more-affordable 5 -If you thought big cities like New York, Mumbai, and London were unaffordable already, here's a depressing prediction: It's going to get worse. A new report forecasts a growing shortage of reasonably priced housing in the coming decades, based on current migration and income trends. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that by 2025 1.6 billion people—or 440 million households—will either be "financially stretched by housing costs" or be living in "crowded, inadequate, and unsafe housing." McKinsey defines affordable as 30 of income, and its 440 million figure includes 200 million existing households in developing countries, 32 million households in advanced economies living in substandard housing, and 100 million households that are finding it hard to meet their costs. On top of that, it expects 106 million households to join the ranks of the "stretched" by 2025. That has huge implications for society, the report says: For families lacking decent affordable housing, health outcomes are poorer, children do less well in school and tend to drop out earlier, unemployment and under-employment rates are higher, and financial inclusion is lower. So what's to be done? McKinsey's overriding point is that traditional approaches are likely to fail. Handing out income support or subsidies will be inadequate. Cities need to take "market-based approaches" that "create value while reducing costs." Below are the four approaches the report recommends: UNLOCK LAND The best thing cities can do is to make more land available for housing, preferably land that puts poor people near opportunities. Siting affordable housing on the outskirts of town runs the risk of cementing poverty, rather than alleviating it. McKinsey recommends cities pursue transit-oriented development (housing built around new lines and stations), open up unused public land, and have policies designed to get development started quicker (like higher taxes for land that sits idle). "Inclusionary planning," meanwhile, allows developers to build more densely in return for commitments to make more affordable housing available. VALUE ENGINEERING McKinsey says improving the productivity of the construction industry would also help make more housing units available (it's been falling behind other industries). Here the report recommends standardizing more aspects of home design, and doing more construction off-site then wheeling it into place. "The off-site manufacturing process improves quality and enables the developer to shrink schedules by having parts delivered as needed, rather than waiting for them to be fabricated on site," the report says. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE Driving down the cost of maintaining and operating buildings might also help make more homes available. Ways to do that include focusing on energy efficiency (new windows, insulation and so on) and scaling up service operators to make them bigger and more cost competitive. BETTER FINANCING Cities can also help lower-income residents afford new homes by minimizing barriers to finance, particularly in the developing world. The report suggests three ways: reducing the cost of issuing mortgages (by, for example, standardizing the way properties are valued), reducing the cost of funding mortgages, and setting up mandatory savings funds that offer below-market interest rates. Affordable housing may be a dry topic (and the report is a little dry) but it's a vitally important one affecting billions of people. McKinsey believes its four approaches can meet the housing gap for everyone earning 50 to 80 of median income, while those earning less will also need additional support. "Despite efforts to address the affordable housing gap, it continues to grow and its effects are spreading, potentially causing greater harm to citizens and economies," says the report. 6 -You need to spec in order for anyone to understand what the right even means. 7 -Hartman 98 Chester. (Hartman is Executive Director of the Poverty and Race Research Action Council in Washington, DC.) "The Case for a Right to Housing." Housing Policy Debate 9.2 (1998): 223-41. Web. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b39f/779ea88791e8f08dbb1351ec060ab6439085.pdf. 8 -What are the components of this right? I would include affordability, physical quality of the unit, and the social and physical characteristics of the neighborhood environment. What should the affordability standard be? Some version of Michael Stone’s (1993) ‘‘shelter poverty’’ standard is best, taking into account household size, household income, and the cost of nonshelter basics, as opposed to a fixed percentage of income What standards should be used for housing and neighborhood conditions? Local housing codes vary enormously in coverage, detail, and standards. The best of these might form the basis for a national code, or HUD’s Housing Quality Standards might be used. There are few usable neighborhood quality standards at present, and serious work must be undertaken to develop these. Overcrowding standards must guard, on the one hand, against cultural bias (Myers, Baer, and Choi 1996; Pader 1994) and, on the other hand, against accepting dramatically lower standards for the poor. Provision must be made for changing or rising standards. Antidiscrimination requirements should permit choice of neighborhoods: the option of in-place as well as dispersion remedies for badly impacted inner-city neighborhoods.Secure tenure should be a key element. Provision should be made, however, for legitimate changes in land use and for an owner’s business reasons that require removal of residents. Defined behavioral infractions can constitute grounds for eviction. Willful nonpayment would be grounds for eviction or foreclosure, but systems should be established to provide needed emergency and longer-term subsidies if incomes are inadequate to pay contracted housing costs, in order to avoid loss of one’s home. 9 -Impacts: 10 -a) Kills resolvability 11 -b) Debatability 12 -c) Analytic 13 -d) Fiat Abuse 14 -Voters: Fairness, Jurisdiction, DTD, CI, No RVIs - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,19 +1,0 @@ 1 -IPV is not a gender issue- painting it in terms of patriarchy only diminishes survivors in existing heterosexual male survivors. Hess 14 2 -http://www.fighting4fair.com/uncategorized/domestic-violence-one-sided-media-coverage-and-bogus-statistics/ 3 -Domestic violence (DV), also referred to as Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) or Family Violence, is a shocking blight on the community. This is a scourge that inflicts substantial negative impacts on the lives of countless people men, womin and children. Whilst definitions have evolved and broadened, DV is loosely defined as “physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse“. It is important to acknowledge that DVIPV encompasses man on man, womin on womin, man on woman, and woman on man violence (both cis- and transgender). Further, in many instances violence is perpetrated by both partners as shown in the accompanying diagram. There is also a strong nexus between the incidence of child abuse/neglect and subsequent perpetration of domestic violence by affected individuals upon reaching adulthood. The Wikipedia entry for ‘Epidemiology of domestic violence‘ provides readers with useful background information on this topic. For those willing to read something a little meatier, I would recommend this paper by esteemed DV researcher Malcolm George. Malcolm walks the reader through the historical context to the current debate about gender differences in violent behaviour and the way that society responds to the issue. Many of those working within the DV sector, particularly here in Australia, only choose to acknowledge one element of the problem – that part involving male perpetrators and female survivors victim survivors. It is no coincidence that most staff within these government agencies, universities and NGO’s are strongly influenced by, and biased towards, feminist ideology. The feminist position is unequivocal, and it is that domestic violence = men’s violence towards womin. Here isan example of that mindset, and here are many others. This routine failure by feminists to recognize and discuss male victim survivors, female perpetrators and bi-directional violence is no accident or coincidence. It is a deliberate strategy to build their brand, and in so doing demonize the overwhelming majority of men who have never, and would never, hurt or abuse their partner. As a result, and in order to support the feminist narrative, a great deal of ‘cherry-picking’ and misrepresentation occurs in relation to the statistics provided in DV literature. In addition, the design and implementation of survey instruments is too often tainted with bias. This issue, that of feminist efforts to hide or discredit legitimate research and/or generate false or misleading statistics, is explored inthis further blog post. 4 - 5 -Best studies prove- men make up almost 40 of IPV survivors. NCADV http://www.ncadv.org/learn/statistics 6 -On average, nearly 20 people per minute are physically abused by an intimate partner in the United States. During one year, this equates to more than 10 million womin and men.1 1 in 3 womin and 1 in 4 men have been victim survivors of some form of physical violence by an intimate partner within their lifetime.1 1 in 5 womin and 1 in 7 men have been victim survivors of severe physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.1 1 in 7 womin and 1 in 18 men have been stalked by an intimate partner during their lifetime to the point in which they felt very fearful or believed that they or someone close to them would be harmed or killed.1 On a typical day, there are more than 20,000 phone calls placed to domestic violence hotlines nationwide.9 The presence of a gun in a domestic violence situation increases the risk of homicide by 500.10 Intimate partner violence accounts for 15 of all violent crime.2 womin between the ages of 18-24 are most commonly abused by an intimate partner.2 19 of domestic violence involves a weapon.2 Domestic victim survivorization is correlated with a higher rate of depression and suicidal behavior.2 Only 34 of people who are injured by intimate partners receive medical care for their injuries.2 RAPE 1 in 5 womin and 1 in 71 men in the United States has been raped in their lifetime.1 Almost half of female (46.7) and male (44.9) victim survivors of rape in the United States were raped by an acquaintance. Of these, 45.4 of female rape victim survivors and 29 of male rape victim survivors were raped by an intimate partner.11 STALKING 19.3 million womin and 5.1 million men in the United States have been stalked in their lifetime.1 60.8 of female stalking victim survivors and 43.5 men reported being stalked by a current or former intimate partner.11 7 -Links: You definitely link your plan text explicitly say womxn, which means that you are excluding men from the discussion. 8 -And, saying that you intend to investigate perpetrators of men is not enough. Your entire framing construes this as a gender specific issue. By using IPV to exemplify any sort of oppression towards womxn, you automatically paint violence against womxn as more important than the opposite. 9 -This toxic mindset throughout the government directly harms battered men and robs them of necessary support. SAVE 10 10 -http://www.saveservices.org/pdf/SAVE-VAWA-Discriminates-Against-Males.pdf 11 -Not surprisingly, the actions detailed above eventually bias the provision of shelter services, outreach, and other services at the local level, which is documented below. Shelters An estimated 1,200 abuse shelters are currently in operation in the United States. It’s well-known that most of these shelters routinely turn away male DV IPV victim survivors, or provide them a substantially lower level of service. One former shelter director revealed, “The shelter did not provide services to male victim survivors of domestic violence, even when the men had suffered physical abuse similar to what womin had experienced. Instead the men were referred to a local police station to 6 SAVE: STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS request a restraining order.”30 Some shelters only provide men a voucher for them to stay at a local motel or informally restrict their services to homosexual males. Psychologist David Fontes noted that when he advised male victim survivors to call local domestic violence programs for help, his clients found that “either the shelters and centers never returned their calls, or they were told by the workers that they really don’t have the services for male victim survivors of domestic violence.” In those cases when men in desperate straits showed up at their door for help, Fontes noted that “some of the men felt they were treated at these shelters and centers more with suspect than respect.”31 Ironically, not only do shelters discriminate against male victim survivors, they also treat female batterers as victim survivors. In one case a female abuser called wanted to get help with her anger management problem, but the local domestic violence center “tried to convince her that she was a victim survivor and not a perpetrator.”32 In a more curious case: A woman was arrested and ordered out of the house following her assault against her husband. She was referred to a shelter. Her attorney provided the shelter counselor with a detailed account of what had transpired: “Mrs. C. grabbed Mr. C. by his necktie (and) he pushed her away. Mrs. C. then punched his face and her fingernail cut his neck.” And how did the shelter workers assess the situation in its records? “Physical abuse” of the woman by her husband.33 12 -This toxic mindset throughout the government directly harms battered men and robs them of necessary support. Palmatier 13 13 -October 1, 2013 By Dr. Tara J. Palmatier http://www.avoiceformen.com/mens-rights/activism/domestic-violence-awareness-month-the-invisible-victim survivors/ 14 -October is domestic violence awareness month. In the true spirit of raising public awareness, Shrink4Men,AVoiceForMen and DAHMW (the Domestic Abuse Hotline for Men and womin) would like to shine a spotlight on a group of individuals who comprise approximately half the victim survivors of domestic violence. A group who is afforded very few resources and are typically ignored and/or ridiculed when they speak out about their victimization — often by the very individuals seeking to raise public awareness about the insidious social malady of domestic violence. Who is this invisible and marginalized group of domestic violence victim survivors pushed to the periphery of public awareness? Men. Men are turned away from most domestic violence shelters. Men do not meet eligibility to receive aid from most domestic violence support organizations by virtue of being men, which is nothing short of overt discrimination, sexism and bigotry. To the best of our knowledge, there are no court advocacy programs for male victim survivors of domestic violence. Men (and their children) are not eligible for state and federal stipends for safe housing from their female abusers. There are no free or subsidized counseling programs nor are there free legal services/legal aid for male victim survivors of domestic violence. In the United States, there is only one shelter for male victim survivors of domestic violence (the Valley Oasis Shelter in Antelope, CA) out of the approximately 1,800 shelters available to womin and their children nationwide. Canada also used to have a domestic violence shelter for men that was run by the late Earl Silverman. Mr. Silverman committed suicide this past spring after succumbing to a state of learned helplessness and hopelessness after years of begging for funding and assistance for his much needed shelter. Essentially, Canadian womin domestic violence organizations locked arms and blocked Mr. Silverman from the funding trough. The same thing happens to organizations like DAHMW in the United States. The repeated message to organizations that want to help male domestic violence victim survivors seems to be, “Be grateful for the few scraps of government funding that drop from the table and if you complain about the disparity, you won’t even get that.” The reality is that most governments are willfully blind to and/or profit from the suffering and victimization of their male citizens. 15 -The alt is to embrace a gender inclusive approach to dealing with IPV survivors as well as redistribute funding and support efforts to any and all victim survivors. I won’t defend a floating pic. 16 -Reps first—they precede policy—they don’t get to weigh the case—we’re a prereq. 17 -Neta Crawford 02,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21 18 -Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument. 19 -And prefer prefiat impacts that examine the underlying assumptions behind our discourse as opposed to post-fiat impacts because fiat is illusory. The judge signing the ballot doesn’t actually have effects in the real world whereas you can have actual impacts on how we view the world. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,8 +1,0 @@ 1 -The United States federal government should engage in binding regulatory negotiation over the right to housing for internal refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic in the United States of America with the United States should guarantee internal refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic the right to housing in the United States of America as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement 2 -Counterplan competes – doesn’t fiat topical action, the process is uncertain, open ended, and not immediate 3 -USDA 6 (The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service administers programs that facilitate the efficient, fair marketing of U.S. agricultural products, including food, fiber, and specialty crops “What is Negotiated Rulemaking?”, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5089434) 4 -How reg-neg differs from “traditional” notice-and-comment rulemaking The “traditional” notice-and-comment rulemaking provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires an agency planning to adopt a rule on a particular subject to publish a proposed rule (NPRM) in the Federal Register and to offer the public an opportunity to comment. The APA does not specify who is to draft the proposed rule nor any particular procedure to govern the drafting process. Ordinarily, agency staff performs this function, with discretion to determine how much opportunity is allowed for public input. Typically, there is no opportunity for interchange of views among potentially affected parties, even where an agency chooses to conduct a hearing. The “traditional” notice-and-comment rulemaking can be very adversarial. The dynamics encourage parties to take extreme positions in their written and oral statements – in both pre-proposal contacts as well as in comments on any published proposed rule as well as withholding of information that might be viewed as damaging. This adversarial atmosphere may contribute to the expense and delay associated with regulatory proceedings, as parties try to position themselves for the expected litigation. What is lacking is an opportunity for the parties to exchange views, share information, and focus on finding constructive, creative solutions to problems. In negotiated rulemaking, the agency, with the assistance of one or more neutral advisors known as “convenors,” assembles a committee of representatives of all affected interests to negotiate a proposed rule. Sometimes the law itself will specify which interests are to be included on the committee. Once assembled, the next goal is for members to receive training in interest-based problem-solving and consensus-decision making. They then must make sure that all views are heard and that each committee member agrees to a set of ground rules for the negotiated rulemaking process. The ultimate goal is to reach consensus on a text that all parties can accept. The agency is represented at the table by an official who is sufficiently senior to be able to speak authoritatively on its behalf. Negotiating sessions are chaired by a neutral mediator or facilitator skilled in assisting in the resolution of multiparty disputes. The Checklist—Advantages as well as Misperceptions The advantages of negotiated rulemaking include: Producing greater information sharing and better communication; Enhancing public awareness and involvement; Providing a “reality check” to agencies and other interests; Encouraging discovery of more creative options for rulemaking; Increasing compliance with rules; Saving time, money and effort in the long run; Allowing earlier implementation dates; Building cooperative relationships among key parties; Increasing the certainty of the outcome for all and thus enabling better planning; Producing superior rules on technically complex topics because of the input of all parties; Giving rise to fewer legislative “end runs” against the rule; and Reducing post-issuance contentiousness and litigation. What negotiating rulemaking does not do: It does not cause the agency to delegate its ultimate obligation to determine the content of the proposed and final regulations; It does not exempt the agency from any statutory or other requirements; It does not eliminate the agency’s obligation to produce any economic analysis; paperwork or other regulatory analysis requirements imposed by law or agency policy; It does not require parties or non-parties to set aside their legal or political rights as a condition of participating; and It is not compulsory, participation is voluntary, for the agency and for others. 5 - 6 -Reg neg facilitates government-civilian cooperation, results in greater satisfaction with regulations and better compliance after implementation—social psychology and empirics prove 7 -Freeman and Langbein 2K (Jody Freeman is the Archibald Cox Professor at Harvard Law School and a leading expert on administrative law and environmental law. She holds a Bachelor of the Arts from Stanford University, a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Toronto, and a Master of Laws in addition to a Doctors of Jurisdictional Science from Harvard University. She served as Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in the Obama White House in 2009-2010. Freeman is a prominent scholar of regulation and institutional design, and a leading thinker on collaborative and contractual approaches to governance. After leaving the White House, she advised the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on topics of structural reform at the Department of the Interior. She has been appointed to the Administrative Conference of the United States, the government think tank for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of federal agencies, and is a member of the American College of Environmental Lawyers. Laura I Langbein is the Professor of Quantitative Methods, Program Evaluation, Policy Analysis, and Public Choice and American College. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of North Carolina, a BA in Government from Oberlin College. Freeman, J. Langbein, R. I. “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,” N.Y.U. Environmental Journal, Volume 9, 2000. http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/freeman/legitimacy20benefit.pdf//ky) 8 -D. Compliance The compliance implications of consensus-based processes remain a matter of speculation.360 No one has yet produced empirical data on the relationship between negotiated rulemaking and compliance, let alone data comparing the compliance implications of negotiated and conventional rules.361 However, the Phase II results introduce interesting new findings into the debate. The data shows reg-neg participants to be significantly more likely than conventional rulemaking participants to report the perception that others will be able to comply with the final rule.362 Perceiving that others will comply might induce more compliance among competitors, along the lines of game theoretic models, at least until evidence of defection emerges.363 Moreover, to the extent that compliance failures are at least partly due to technical and information deficits—rather than to mere political resistance—it seems plausible that reports of the learning effect and more horizontal sharing of information might help to improve compliance in the long run.364 The claim that reg-neg could improve compliance is consistent with social psychology studies showing that in both legal and organizational settings, “fair procedures lead to greater compliance with the rules and decisions with which they are associated.”365 Similarly, negotiated rulemaking might facilitate compliance by bringing to the surface some of the contentious issues earlier in the rulemaking process, where they might be solved collectively rather than dictated by the agency. Although speculative, these hypotheses seem to fit better with Kerwin and Langbein’s data than do the rather negative expectations about compliance. Higher satisfaction could well translate into better long-term compliance, even if litigation rates remained the same. Consistent with our contention that process matters, we expect it to matter to compliance as well. In any event, empirical studies of compliance should no longer be so difficult to produce. A number of negotiated rules are now several years old, with some in the advanced stages of implementation. A study of compliance might compare numbers of enforcement actions for negotiated as compared to conventional rules, measured by notices of violation, or penalties, for example.366 It might investigate as well whether compliance methods differ between the two types of rules: perhaps the enforcement of negotiated rules occurs more cooperatively, or informally, than enforcement of conventional rules. Possibly, relationships struck during the negotiated rulemaking make a difference at the compliance stage.367 To date, the effects of how the rule is developed on eventual compliance remain a matter of speculation, even though it is ultimately an empirical issue on which both theory and empirical evidence must be brought to bear. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,17 +1,0 @@ 1 -Dems will very narrowly retain filibuster now – key to stop full realization of Trump/GOP agenda 2 -Bayer 1-4-17 (Nick Bayer, “Democrats Look At The 2018 Map And Get Ready To Fight For The Filibuster,” 1-4-17, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-democrats-2018-midterm-elections_us_586d4f81e4b0de3a08fab52f) 3 -The outcome of the 2016 election shocked and worried Democrats across the country. Unfortunately for them, there may be worse to come in the 2018 midterm elections. In less than two years, 33 Senate seats will be up for grabs. Senate Democrats, armed with the filibuster, are the last line of defense against incoming President Donald Trump and the congressional Republican agenda. That means the electoral stakes are high in 2018, and Democrats must fight to keep up their numbers. The picture looks reasonably sunny for Republicans, who have only eight Senate seats on the ballot next year. Six of them (Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Wyoming) are likely safe for the GOP. Democrats, on the other hand, have 23 Senate seats to defend ― 25 if you count the independents who caucus with the Democrats. A dozen of those seats are likely safe in the Democrats’ camp. They’ll probably hold onto seven seats in the Northeast ― Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware. Democrats are expected to retain five more seats in California, Hawaii, Washington, New Mexico and Minnesota. The two Senate seats now held by independents ― Angus King (Maine) and Bernie Sanders (Vt.) ― are also likely to stay in the hands of their incumbents or go to Democrats. That leaves 13 seats ― 11 held by Democrats and two held by Republicans ― as potential tossups. Just two of the tossup seats are in states that voted for Hillary Clinton last November: Nevada and Virginia. Others are in states ― like Pennsylvania, Florida and Michigan ― that only went for Donald Trump by small margins. But Trump’s victories can’t be ignored. Midterm elections have tended to favor the opposition ― that is, the party that isn’t led by the sitting president. So history could be working for the Democrats. But the 2018 midterms could be different. Kyle Kondik and Geoffrey Skelley of Sabato’s Crystal Ball argue that today’s extremely polarized political environment means that the GOP has a good chance of picking up seats in a few “very Republican states” now held by Democrats. Here’s an early look at those tossup races: First-term senators like Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) and Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.) may have a harder time defending their seats. In Wisconsin, Gov. Scott Walker, a former GOP presidential candidate, has ruled out a 2018 Senate bid against Baldwin, but Republicans still have time to find another strong candidate to take on the junior senator. The GOP has plenty of time to find a strong candidate to unseat Donnelly in Indiana, too. The first-term senator won office in 2012 after tea party favorite Richard Mourdock took out six-term Sen. Richard Lugar in the Republican primary and then took himself out in the general election with controversial remarks about rape. Now the Republicans have a good chance of winning that Senate seat back. As for Heitkamp, she appeared to top Trump’s list for agriculture secretary at one point. That looked like bad news for Democrats trying to hold onto the North Dakota Senate seat. New reports suggest former Georgia Gov. Sonny Perdue is now the best bet for the agriculture post. But even if Heitkamp is running for re-election, she faces a battle in a state that voted for Trump by a 36-point margin. Second-term senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) and Jon Tester (D-Mont.) also hail from states that voted for Trump by wide margins (19 points and 21 points, respectively). Both are well-established incumbents ― a boon for re-election. But if they face strong challengers in their heavily Republican states, McCaskill and Tester could still be in trouble. Tester probably stands a better chance of the two. While going for Trump last year, Montana also re-elected its Democratic governor, Steve Bullock, to a second term. The Senate race in Ohio could get interesting. Democratic incumbent Sherrod Brown won his 2006 and 2012 elections by comfortable margins, so the same is possible next year. But the sizable victories of both Trump and fellow Sen. Rob Portman (R) last November could provide momentum for Republicans to oust Brown after roughly four decades of public service in Ohio. Specifically, while Brown could probably beat state Treasurer Josh Mandel again, a bid by Ohio Gov. John Kasich would likely prove tougher competition. The popular Kasich is perfectly positioned for a 2018 Senate bid: He led Trump by 11 points in the state’s 2016 presidential primary, and he can’t run for re-election next year having served two consecutive terms as governor. The Senate seat in Florida has a good chance of staying blue, as long as Sen. Bill Nelson (D) runs for re-election. The three-term incumbent won his previous Senate races by reasonable margins and looks like the favorite in 2018. But there is one key caveat to forecasting Nelson’s victory so soon. Gov. Rick Scott (R-Fla.), who will be forced out of office by term limits at the end of next year, has begun to lay the foundation for a potential 2018 Senate bid. Scott could run with the support of newly re-elected Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), by-then-President Trump and a Republican-controlled Congress. That gives him a solid chance of knocking out Nelson. In Arizona, the Republican Senate primary next year will probably be more interesting than the general election. During the 2016 campaign, one-term Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) repeatedly sparred with Trump, expressing his clear disapproval and refusing to endorse the nominee. Now he’s under fire within his own party. Former state Sen. Kelli Ward has said she’ll challenge Flake in the Republican primary. Although Ward is fresh off a 12-plus point loss to veteran Sen. John McCain in the 2016 primary, she did mount a formidable challenge to him. Whether or not Flake gets past her, however, Democrats will likely have a hard time snatching this one from the Republicans. There are some tossup states on the 2018 map in which Democrats still hold a slight advantage over Republicans ― mostly states with well-established Democratic incumbents. With the water crisis in Flint still tainting his reputation, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder (R) has become increasingly unpopular. This bodes well for Democratic Sen. Debbie Stabenow’s bid for re-election. The state did narrowly support Trump in 2016 ― the first time Michigan has gone Republican in a presidential contest since 1988 ― but Stabenow is a strong candidate running for a fourth term. Like Heitkamp in North Dakota, Sen. Joe Manchin in West Virginia is a moderate Democrat willing to work with the Trump administration. Indeed, Trump considered Manchin for the position of energy secretary. While the job ultimately went to former Texas Gov. Rick Perry (R), Manchin’s willingness to work across the aisle plays well in his red state. If he can soar above the anger toward the Democratic Party in West Virginia ― a state Trump won by 43 points ― he may yet hold onto his seat. In Pennsylvania, Sen. Bob Casey Jr. (D) will likely keep his seat despite the huge upset that saw his state back Trump last year and also re-elect Sen. Pat Toomey (R). Still, it will definitely be a race to watch. Similarly, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), the Democrats’ vice presidential nominee last year, will probably hold onto his seat in 2018. Clinton and Kaine carried Virginia by a comfortable, if still surprisingly close, 5 points in November. With lower turnout in the midterm election, the state may be competitive. But given a solid turnout in Northern Virginia, Kaine should be able to secure his seat for a second term. Finally, there’s Nevada. Last year, the state saw some hard-fought battles but still went blue. Voters supported Clinton and elected Democrat Catherine Cortez Masto to take over retiring Sen. Harry Reid’s seat. Democrats could pick up another seat here in 2018 with the right candidate against one-term Sen. Dean Heller (R). While it won’t be easy to knock off the incumbent, a strong candidate and good campaigning would give Democrats reasonable hope. The bottom line for 2018: Democrats likely won’t take back the Senate majority, but Republicans probably won’t reach the 60 seats they need to block a Democratic filibuster, either. To get that filibuster-proof majority, Republicans will have to flip eight of the 11 competitive seats held by Democrats and win their own two tossup contests. 4 - 5 -Plan ignites republican opposition 6 -Flegenheimer 17 (Matt, Yamiche Alcindor, “Ben Carson Urges Ending Reliance on Welfare in Bid to Be Housing Chief,” January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/ben-carsons-hud-housing-nominee-hearing.html//utd-va 7 -Yet Americans had come to view HUD’s mission as “putting roofs over the heads of poor people,” Mr. Carson said. “It has the ability to be so much more than that.” As with his presidential campaign, Mr. Carson leaned heavily on his own compelling biography, straying frequently from his prepared opening remarks as he spoke of life in an impoverished section of Detroit as the son of a single mother with a third-grade education. He waded through several contentious moments, including some aimed at his prospective boss, President-elect Donald J. Trump, and the specter of conflicts over HUD funding and Trump family business ventures. But Mr. Carson, who was prone to fits of spaciness and occasionally bewildering remarks as a candidate, appeared to avoid any major slips on Thursday. The tone of the proceedings diverged sharply from that of hearings this week for Rex W. Tillerson, Mr. Trump’s choice for secretary of state, and Senator Jeff Sessions, Republican of Alabama and the selection for attorney general. Both men faced aggressive questioning from Democrats — and, in Mr. Tillerson’s case, from a Republican, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida. On Thursday, Mr. Rubio introduced Mr. Carson as a leader with “the values, the compassion and the character and the kind of drive that we need.” Senators from both parties made warm reference to Mr. Carson’s granddaughter in attendance, who wore pink headphones during the testimony. They thanked him for his career in medicine. Even some of the more pointed questioners, like Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio, the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, were disarmed. “You remind me of Columbo,” Mr. Carson said at one point, to extended laughs. “I’ve actually heard that before,” Mr. Brown said. Still, there were sharp exchanges. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, sought to pin Mr. Carson down on a simple question: “Can you assure me that not a single taxpayer dollar that you give out will financially benefit the president-elect or his family?” Mr. Carson said he would be driven by morals. Ms. Warren cut him off, saying her specific concern was whether grants and loans could specifically benefit Mr. Trump. “It will not be my intention to do anything to benefit any American,” Mr. Carson said, becoming flustered for a moment before quickly clarifying that he wanted to use the department to help “all Americans.” Ms. Warren called on Mr. Trump to establish a blind trust, accusing him of “hiding” his assets. Mr. Carson would not commit definitively to avoiding Trump businesses if confirmed. “If there happens to be an extraordinarily good program that’s working for millions of people and it turns out that someone that you’re targeting is going to gain $10 from it, am I going to say no?” Mr. Carson said. Later, he agreed to work with Mr. Brown to construct a system to identify properties tied both to the Trump family and the department. He committed to telling senators about the department’s dealings with any businesses owned by Mr. Trump or his relatives. More often, Mr. Carson sat patiently as lawmakers recited some of the most fraught comments of his public life. In one interaction, Senator Bob Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, asked if Mr. Carson truly believed in HUD’s mission, given his trail of comments railing against government intervention. “I think the rental assistance program is essential,” Mr. Carson said, when pressed twice, “and what I have said if you’ve been reading my writings: It is cruel and unusual punishment to withdraw those programs before you provide an alternative.” When asked about housing protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender citizens, Mr. Carson, a vocal opponent of same-sex marriage, said he would “enforce all the laws of the land” if confirmed. But he expressed his personal opposition to any expression of what he called “extra rights” for certain groups. For Republicans, the hearing supplied an opportunity to pay tribute to a figure revered by the conservative base. Senator Thom Tillis, Republican of North Carolina, asked Mr. Carson what he thought was “the best possible thing we can do for someone on government assistance.” “Get them off it,” Mr. Carson said. 8 - 9 -That wrecks red-state Democrats – crushes their re-election strategy – gives the GOP a filibuster-proof majority 10 -Roarty 16 (Alex Roarty, “Senate Democrats’ Challenge in 2018: The White Working Class,” 11-16-16, http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/senate-democrats-midterms-2018) 11 -The only thing standing between Senate Democrats and an electoral wipeout in 2018? Donald Trump’s base. A party that’s only three seats short of a Senate majority is nonetheless bracing to play defense for the next two years, hoping to hold a daunting 10 seats in states that went red in last week’s presidential race. In some of the states — Indiana, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, West Virginia — Trump’s margin of victory reached nearly 20 points or more. Another five — Michigan*, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Florida — unexpectedly swung in the GOP nominee’s favor, instilling fresh fear in Democrats that seats once presumed safe are anything but. Democrats are nervous not just about the fact that Trump won, but how he did so. The New York real estate mogul won because of his popularity with white working-class voters, whose slow drift from the Democratic Party he accelerated to devastating effect. They abandoned Democrats as few, even seasoned, party operatives suspected they could, leading to victories in places like Michigan and Wisconsin that President Barack Obama won easily just four years ago. A new game plan Now, these re-election-seeking Democrats must come up with a game plan to win those voters back — or risk watching their party lose big when they can least afford to see their ranks thinned further. “The underlying vulnerability Democrats have created for themselves is still very present, and probably uniquely so, with the 2018 class of Senate Democrats — almost every place you can think of where Democrats weren’t able to communicate to working-class voters is on the ballot,” said Josh Holmes, a GOP Senate strategist. How Democrats do that isn’t yet clear. Democratic strategists say they won’t know for at least several months — after they’ve had a chance to analyze data — exactly what happened in last week’s election. The evaluation process is all the more important given the fact that the party’s polling and data operations showed them on track to win the presidency. They know they did poorly with blue-collar white voters, they just aren’t yet entirely sure why. “We’re still in the theorizing mode,” said Matt Canter, a Democratic strategist. “We’ll know a lot more by about the beginning of next year.” The 2018 map for Democrats is so poor in large part because this class of senators faced elections in 2006 and 2012, both strong years for the party. It’s how Sen. Heidi Heitkamp delivered an upset victory four years ago in North Dakota, or how Sen. Jon Tester won in Montana. Two of the Democratic senators expected to seek re-election — Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida and Claire McCaskill of Missouri — won four years ago thanks to weak Republican nominees (McCaskill defeated former Republican Rep. Todd Akin, whose statement about “legitimate rape” became a national controversy that year.) Only one Republican senator up for re-election in two years, Dean Heller of Nevada, represents a state won by Hillary Clinton Democrats don’t dismiss the challenge in front of them but add that they’re confident that many of their incumbents are well prepared to win over white working-class voters. Sens. Bob Casey of Pennsylvania and Sherrod Brown of Ohio, for instance, are traditional blue-collar Democrats who have been popular in coal country. 12 -Filibuster-proof majority facilitates immigration restrictions 13 -Diaz 16 (Kevin Diaz, Houston Chronicle, “Trump's tough talk on the border will be tested in Congress,” 12-26-16, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-s-tough-talk-on-the-border-will-be-tested-10819777.php) 14 -WASHINGTON - After a presidential campaign built on hard-line promises to secure the border and end illegal immigration, Donald Trump will traverse more difficult terrain in Congress next year among worried Democrats and skeptical Republicans. Although advocates of strict legal enforcement have been emboldened by hawkish Cabinet picks like Alabama Sen. Jeff Sessions for attorney general, Trump will face political and fiscal constraints living up to his vow to build a border wall and deport illegal immigrants on a massive scale, particularly if he widens his dragnet beyond those with criminal records. And despite the bellicose campaign rhetoric, there still is no clear GOP agenda on immigration, with different cliques within the Republican-led Congress favoring different approaches toward visas, deportation and legal status. Democrats, too, have some cards to play. The Republican majorities in the next Congress hardly are filibuster-proof, with 48 Democrats in the Senate. To overcome the 60-vote threshold to stop a filibuster, Republicans will need to peel away at least eight Senate Democrats to pass anything that immigration advocates consider draconian, including a massive border wall. There are some changes Trump could make on his own, particularly in reversing President Barack Obama's executive orders shielding and granting work permits to millions of illegal immigrants who otherwise could face deportation. Funding substantial new border measures - with or without a 2,000-mile wall - or an aggressive new interior enforcement program likely would require money, meaning congressional action. That is where Senate Democrats could be an obstacle. "There's a bunch of stuff that doesn't need Congress, so we have to keep that in mind," said Todd Schulte, president of FWD.us, an immigration reform group founded with the help of tech moguls Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook and Bill Gates of Microsoft. "But, in terms of what needs to move through Congress, I would say that anything that passes the Senate will probably need 60 votes." 15 -Deportation effort spins out of control – causes widespread conflict and genocide 16 -Allen 16 (Danielle Allen and Richard Ashby Wilson, “Mass deportation isn’t just impractical. It’s very, very dangerous,” 9-23-16, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mass-deportation-isnt-just-impractical-its-very-very-dangerous/2016/09/23/c6d3b4ee-7b77-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html?utm_term=.e4deabe64545) 17 -We’ve hit the home stretch of the election. The time has come to get serious, really serious, about understanding what’s at stake with Donald Trump’s proposal to deport 5 million to 11 million undocumented immigrants and his promise that 2 million will be deported in “a matter of months” if he is elected. In May, former homeland security secretary Michael Chertoff told the New York Times: “I can’t even begin to picture how we would deport 11 million people in a few years where we don’t have a police state, where the police can’t break down your door at will and take you away without a warrant.” He also said, “Unless you suspend the Constitution and instruct the police to behave as if we live in North Korea, it ain’t happening.” Trump’s specific policy involves adding 5,000 Border Patrol agents, tripling the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation agents, creating a special deportation force that he has described as a military unit and deporting not merely people who have been convicted of crimes but also immigrants on visa overstays and undocumented immigrants who have been arrested, even if not convicted. He has proposed expedited procedures that would, to ensure speed, presumably require setting aside the due process protections meant to safeguard rights and minimize error. One of the last times the world saw such a major effort at mass deportations in a developed country was in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. That experience is instructive. In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and four decades of peaceful ethnic and religious relations in Yugoslavia, post-communist politicians of all three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat, Muslim and Serb) came to power on a surge of ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Starting in 1992, they promulgated official policies such as the “Six Strategic Objectives for the Bosnian Serb People” that included the forcible removal of other groups from towns and villages, using new “crisis staffs” made up of police and civilian paramilitaries. The process spun out of control and, in many communities, neighbors turned against neighbors, driving them out of their homes and seizing their assets. It started with a small number of activists, fewer than a few thousand people who were extreme nationalists and members of fringe parties. But as the propaganda and fear spread, the wider citizenry participated in the campaign of persecution. With the cover of official policy, civilians took it upon themselves to hasten the expulsion of members of other ethnic or religious groups. The fratricidal conflict claimed 100,000 lives. The majority of fatalities were civilians murdered in the context of mass deportations. The Bosnian deportations grew into a systematic policy termed “ethnic cleansing.” The U.N. Security Council declared forcible removal based on ethnicity a crime against humanity in 1994. And eventually there was also accountability for political leaders who enacted deportation policies and incited their followers to hatred and violence. In March 2016, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found former Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic guilty of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The tribunal ruled that his speeches and official propaganda made a significant contribution to an overarching joint criminal enterprise to create an ethnically homogenous state of Bosnian Serbs. The United States, of course, has its own history of mass deportations. There is the 19th-century Trail of Tears, when the U.S. government forcibly relocated members of Southeastern Native American tribes to land west of the Mississippi River. And in the 1930s and 1940s, under the pressure of the Great Depression, about 2 million Mexicans and Mexican Americans were deported; many lost their property. This was also the backdrop to the famous Zoot Suit Riots in Los Angeles in 1943, when U.S. sailors and Marines attacked Latino youths. The violence spread to San Diego and Oakland, and developed into broader racial violence that summer in Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, New York and Evansville, Ind. In the 1950s, the deportation of millions was attempted again with Operation Wetback; again people lost their property. Some died in the desert heat of Mexicali. The notion that governments have learned how to conduct mass deportations in “humane and efficient” ways is ludicrous. The summary removal of millions of members of a minority ethnic or religious group from a territory has been accompanied, in nearly every historical instance, by assault, murder, crimes against humanity and, occasionally, genocide. It has involved armed roadblocks to check papers, the smashing down of doors in the night to drag people out of their homes. It has also involved unrestrained popular violence against a target population. We might like to think that we’re above all that sort of thing, that with the right kind of training a special deportation force and beefed-up ICE units would carry out an orderly removal. But we do have in our midst the elements that have historically made mass deportations so dangerous: heated rhetoric that slurs whole minority groups (“they’re not sending their best . . . they’re rapists”); an activist minority of white nationalists; an armed minority of militiamen; and the ongoing militarization of our police forces. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,22 +1,0 @@ 1 -Just some shells I may or may not read. 2 - 3 -1. Debaters cannot break new plans at the TOC 4 -2. The affirmative cannot read a theoretically justified burden structure unless the burden text and the full text of all theory standards are disclosed. 5 -3. Debaters must say what the aff is at least 15 minutes before the round, unless it's a new aff. 6 -4. the affirmative has to spec what conpro speech is in the 1AC 7 -5. the affirmative has to grant DA links (i.e. concede that they defend x or y as conpro speech) if asked in CX 8 -6. The affirmative has to have a balancing test to determine what constitutes conpro speech in the 1ac 9 -7. the affirmative has to specify a mechanism by which to restrict conpro speech in the 1ac 10 -8. the affirmative has to spec what the punishment is for a violation of conpro speech 11 -9. the affirmative cannot claim the right to reclarify their advocacy in CX. 12 -10. the aff cannot read CX checks as a meta-theory interp 13 -the sufficient neg burden is to prove that there is no coherent understanding of what constitutes constitutionally protected speech 14 -12. contigent standards are bad 15 -13. the aff needs a single weighing mechanism back to which all their offense links 16 -14. a prioris are bad 17 -15. if the aff doesn't define ought in the 1ac they can't in the 1ar 18 -16. no parallel turns in the 1ar if the 1nc reads util 19 -17. The affirmative can only defend a plan that gets rid of speech restrictions if that speech restriction is enforced on at least 40 percent of college campuses. 20 -18. multiple nibs bad 21 -19. must spec truth testing or comparing worlds in the aff 22 -20. must only defend truth testing ROB - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,19 +1,0 @@ 1 -NC – Kant 2 -Framework 3 -Agency, or the setting and pursuing of ends, is inescapable. 4 -Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8 5 -3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on ordinary enterprises their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15 6 -Analytics 7 -Freedom implies an innate right to determine the course of your actions. In the state of nature, might rather than right governs these judgments. Absent of a public authority, rights violations are inevitable. 8 -Varden 10 “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 9 -“The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right with this claim: however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individuals human beings... can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6 There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might (‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private prop- erty, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is representative in this way – by being “united a priori ” or by being an “omnilateral” will (6: 263) – it can regulates on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.” (46-47) 10 -Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. 11 -Seditious Speech Contention 12 -The intent of seditious speech requires the right to destroy the state, which justifies the annihilation of all rights, making is inconsistent with the omnilateral will. 13 -Varden 10 “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 14 -“To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does considers seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).” (52 15 -Seditious speech is constitutionally protected. 16 -Justia n.d. Justia, "Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel", http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/41-seditious-speech.html 17 -Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel.—Opposition to government through speech alone has been subject to punishment throughout much of history under laws proscribing “seditious” utterances. In this country, the Sedition Act of 1798 made criminal, inter alia, malicious writings which defamed, brought into contempt or disrepute, or excited the hatred of the people against the Government, the President, or the Congress, or which stirred people to sedition.966 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,967 the Court surveyed the controversy surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Sedition Act and concluded that debate “first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.... Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history .... That history reflects a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.” The “central meaning” discerned by the Court, quoting Madison’s comment that in a republican government “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people,” is that “the right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.” 18 -The Brandenburg v. Ohio U.S. Supreme Court decision maintains that seditious speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it does not indicate an “imminent” threat. 19 -https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,21 +1,0 @@ 1 -One of the following propositions must be true: a) humans will go extinct before we become too advanced, b) we decide to for whatever reason to never run simulations, or c) we are in a simulation. Bostrom explains. 2 -Bostrom, Nick. "Are we living in a computer simulation?." The Philosophical Quarterly 53.211 (2003): 243-255. 3 -“Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super‐powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that if these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine‐grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully.” 4 - 5 -This means that as society advances and we run more simulation, the number of simulated people exponentially outnumber the real people meaning it is far more likely that we are in a simulation. Computers can simulate consciousness—substrate-interdependence is real, Bostrom2. 6 -Bostrom, Nick. "Are we living in a computer simulation?." The Philosophical Quarterly 53.211 (2003): 243-255. 7 -“A common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate‐ independence. The idea is the idea that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon‐based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon‐based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given. The argument we shall present does not, however, depend on any very strong version of functionalism or computationalism. For example, we need not assume that the thesis of substrate‐independence is necessarily true (either analytically or metaphysically) – just that, in fact, a computer running a suitable program would be conscious. Moreover, we need not assume that in order to create a mind on a computer it would be sufficient to program it in such a way that it behaves like a human in all situations, including passing the Turing test etc. We need only the weaker assumption that it would suffice for the generation of subjective experiences that the computational processes of a human brain are structurally replicated in suitably fine‐grained detail, such as on the level of individual synapses. This attenuated version of substrate‐independence is quite widely accepted. Neurotransmitters, nerve growth factors, and other chemicals that are smaller than a synapse clearly play a role in human cognition and learning. The substrate‐independence thesis is not that the effects of these chemicals are small or irrelevant, but rather that they affect subjective experience only via their direct or indirect influence on computational activities. For example, if there can be no difference in subjective experience without there also being a difference in synaptic discharges, then the requisite detail of simulation is at the synaptic level (or higher).” 8 - 9 -And, quantum mechanics only further proves that we are in a simulation, Grabianowski. 10 -Grabianowski, Ed. “You’re living in a computer simulation and math proves it”. Questions Reality. 2011 11 -“One very strong argument against this unsettling theory is that a computer with the computational power to accomplish this is impossible. Setting aside the fact that today's computational power surely seemed unimaginable 100 years ago, there's a more interesting solution – the computers only actively simulates what they it needs to. This is something that actually happens in modern computer games, and you've seen it if you've ever moved faster than your graphics card was capable of rendering the scenery, as the trees and buildings that had previously been beyond your view were drawn on the screen before your eyes. It actually explains a few of the trickier things about quantum physics, like why particles have an indeterminate position until they're observed.” 12 -We are in an age where censorship prevents the growth of internet power. 13 -Rosenbaum 2-21 https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenrosenbaum/2017/02/21/its-down-to-the-tech-industry-to-protect-free-speech-in-the-trump-era/#72fd043c108e Steven Rosenbaum FEB 21, 2017 14 -Simon cautions us that it's tempting for the media to be drawn into an activist stance. He says there’s danger ahead, “But only if the U.S. media takes the bait, and starts acting more like the opposition,” says Simon. "The high-impact reporting in recent days on the links between Trump aides and Russia shows that the media retains sufficient credibility in the US to change the political dynamic. It is also a vivid reminder of what’s at stake." A free press is a fragile thing, and in many parts of the world, it is in grave danger. Free speech is core to our Democracy - it isn't something you can suspend and reinstate as suits the current political climate. We’re living in a new world of instant information decimation. That’s going to challenge tech leaders and platform providers to rethink their position of being neutral providers without a responsibility to filter or edit. As much as we may wish for a more "media-literate" consumer, it will fall to CEO’s of Google, Facebook, and Reddit to lead the way. 15 -Internet censorship is defined by Wikipedia as: 16 -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship 17 -Internet censorship is the control or suppression of what can be accessed, published, or viewed on the Internet enacted by regulators, or on their own initiative. Individuals and organizations may engage in self-censorship for moral, religious, or business reasons, to conform to societal norms, due to intimidation, or out of fear of legal or other consequences. 18 -Censorship ensures that tech growth stays at a low. 19 -Leatherman 99 Brian Leatherman American University Washington, DC December 19, 1999 Internet Censorship and the Freedom of Speech http://www.szasz.com/undergraduate/leathermanpaper.htm 20 -Censorship is a restriction that is not for greater liberty, but for the deprivation of liberty. The Supreme Court’s solution to this problem is to enforce laws that make it illegal to express one’s opinion, or ideas on the Internet. However, I feel as though there is a more efficient way to control obscene material on the Internet. Through the use of special programs designed to filter obscene Internet material, parents can allow their children to enjoy the Internet without the risk of viewing inappropriate images or ideas. Parental regulation is the only way to allow unregulated Internet use and the expansion of knowledge. Even the Clinton administration stated that “unnecessary regulation could cripple the growth and diversity of the Internet . . . the administration supports industry self-regulation, adoption of competing ratings system and development of easy-to-use technical solutions . . . .” (“White”). 21 -The aff increases technology meaning they increase the number of computing technology which means that we are running simulations inside simulations. This stacking causes the real computer to over word and crash and we get shut down. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,12 +1,0 @@ 1 -Counterplan text: Public colleges and universities ought to restrict constitutionally protected restriction policies that restrict the denial of the 1915 Armenian Genocide. 2 -Kyrou 15 Kyrou, Alexandros. “Erasing Memory, Erasing People: Armenian Genocide Remembrance and Denial at Harvard.” November 2015. American Historical Association. 3 -In the case of students who engage in organized genocide-denial efforts, administrations should make it absolutely clear that while they support free speech, the commitment to free speech must be accompanied by a commitment to respect for procedure and organized events. Universities should reiterate that supporting free speech does not endorse a policy of genocide denial. Conversely, by ignoring and not applying any consequences to such actions, universities are emboldening apologists of genocide. The centennial of the Armenian Genocide affords an opportunity for university administrations to develop such policies where none currently exist for dealing with this issue. 4 -Competes- the aff says they defend all conpro speech, genocide denial is conpro and the aff can’t restrict it. 5 -And, Armenian genocide denial keeps the genocide alive today. 6 -Walrath 15 Walrath, Dana. “Denial Keeps the Genocide Alive”. Armenians can’t put the genocide behind them while Turks deny their responsibility – and the United States turns a blind eye. April 30th 2015. 7 -The new Turkish Republic’s propaganda strove, as it still does, to let memories of genocide rest in oblivion. Turkish scholar Taner Akçam has shown how Turkish grade school texts overlook the Armenian genocide, casting the Armenian as a historical cancer and an existential threat from within. Having been raised on this diet for three generations, today’s genocide deniers in Turkey have little reason to doubt their position. I’m reminded of the success of such propaganda when, as an Armenian-American, fellow citizens ask me: “This genocide happened so long ago, why can’t Armenians let it go?” I think they know the answer — namely, that moving towards a just future requires sincerity about the past. We do better to honor than to bury our mistakes, however colossal they may be. Pope Francis recognized this earlier this month, when he described the mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks as genocide. In response, Turkey recalled its ambassador to the Vatican. Meanwhile, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia tacitly endorse Turkey’s policy of genocide denial, fearing reprisal by this strategically important state. Scholars recognize that genocide takes place in a series of stages, of which extermination is only one; the last stage is denial. Genocide does not end until denial ends. This year Armenians are not just commemorating a genocide that took place 100 years ago; they are asking to end the denial that keeps this genocide alive. The persistence of denial by a vibrant culture such as Turkey’s speaks to the destructive, coercive power of shame. But let’s not forget that there is also such a thing as healthy shame. Honest reflection on the past can bring people who were once friendly neighbors back together again. Such reconciliation was a goal of Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian journalist who was assassinated outside his Istanbul office for his efforts at a truthful accounting of history. A growing cadre of Turkish scholars, journalists, artists and writers, including Taner Akçam, Uğur Ümit Üngör, Orhan Pamuk, Elif Shafak, and others, have managed to journey out of a contrived historical landscape, recognizing that the health of their beloved country is at stake. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offers the familiar “war is hell” incantation: “Millions of people of all religions and ethnicities lost their lives in the First World War … and experienced events which had inhumane consequences – such as relocation – during the First World War.” What if the tables were turned: can you imagine if we in the United States did not own our history of slavery? Can you imagine our children’s history books overlooking American Indians’ presence in North America before Europeans arrived? While historical breaches of human rights in our country are far from healed, at least our history books, in large measure, own up to them. Americans know something of the healing power of justified shame to reestablish productive connections between cultures, to reopen physically closed borders. By forsaking such opportunities, denial of the Armenian genocide poses a moral question that is asked again and again in issues ranging from the question of reparations for slavery in the United States to the atrocities of ISIS in Syria and Iraq: Is it ever appropriate to put political exigencies or financial interests ahead of historical accuracy? A decade ago, Samantha Power, who today serves as Washington’s ambassador to the U.N., pointed out that the United States’ handling of the Armenian genocide in the decade after the event set up pernicious patterns that still disrupt the world today. It sent a tacit message that genocide is permissible, that we, as a nation, and will put short term military, political, and financial interests ahead of justice and truth. 8 -Outweighs: A) Spillover effect – Not restricting denial speech reifies the culture of three generations of denying the Armenian genocide. B) Uniquely true for college campuses – students are taught to have misconceptions of the truth in order to prioritize government interests. 9 -It is your obligation as a judge to bring subjugated knowledge to light. 10 -Medina 11 Medina, J. (2011). Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism. Foucault Studies, 1(12), 9–35 11 - 12 -The discursive practices in which memory and oblivion are manufactured are not uniform and harmonious, but heterogeneous and full of conflicts and tensions. Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field. Different fields—or domains of discursive interaction—contain particular discursive regimes with their particular ways of producing knowledge. In the battle among power/ knowledge frameworks, some come on top and become dominant while others are displaced and become subjugated. Foucault’s methodology offers a way of exploiting that vibrant plurality of epistemic perspectives which always contains some bodies of experiences and memories that are erased or hidden in the mainstream frameworks that become hegemonic after prevailing in sustained epistemic battles. What Foucault calls subjugated knowledges3 are forms of experiencing and remembering that are pushed to the margins and rendered unqualified and unworthy of epistemic respect by prevailing and hegemonic discourses. Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipatory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges. 4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insurrection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to contestation. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,23 +1,0 @@ 1 -The standard is consistency with the sovereign’s authority. Prefer: 2 -1. The sovereign is impossible to avoid. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed. 3 -Parrish Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish 4 -But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible ~-~- they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among persons in the state of nature there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning. 5 -This outweighs: 6 -a) individuals are always ontologically self-interested, meaning we are key to ethical motivation. 7 -Mercer 01 In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism.: Mark Mercer. Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 217-23 8 -To begin: To understand what another has done is both to have a particular sort of true description of the his action he has performed, one that reveals it to be intentional, and to know the agent's his practical reason for performing that action. In turn, to know an agent's reason for performing particular action involves understanding their motivation in doing it. An interpreter cannot, though, really understand an agent's motivation in performing an action unless she sees that motivation as a motivation, unless she is cognizant of its force as a motivation. It is not enough, that is to say, to understand what a person who intentionally sips from a saucer of mud has done to note merely that he had the desire to sip from a saucer of mud, and believed himself both possessed of a saucer of mud and able to sip from it. An interpreter has also to comprehend what in desiring to sip from a saucer of mud was attractive to him. Now usually, of course, there is no problem in our comprehending what it is in the desires had by people around us that attracts them as desirable. The people around us are more or less like us in many if not most of their desires, wants and wishes, and few of them desire to sip from a saucer of mud, so in our day to day life we do not often have cause to turn our attention explicitly to the question from whence arrives the motivational force of their desires. Still, it is not exceedingly uncommon for us, even for those of us who are not psychologists, sociologists, or anthropologists, to be stumped by some piece of what we take to be behaviour. How are we to make sense of some such piece of strange behaviour? One way is to connect that piece of behaviour to one or more of the strange agent's self-regarding ends. If we can see in sipping from a saucer of mud a way of maintaining self-respect, or even a way to delight in the taste of mud, we can understand the desire the agent had to sip from the a saucer of mud. We need not connect his self-regarding end to an intention to realize that end in or through his action; we need only, I think, connect it to an expectation of realizing it. But is this the only way we can make sense of desires we ourselves do not share and cannot, at first at least, imagine sharing? I think that it is. Without our perceiving a connection to an intention or an expectation of realizing some self-regarding end, we cannot see in any consideration we attribute to an agent a motivation to act. 9 -b) Non-uniques disads to the framework. The sovereign exists regardless or not. 10 -2. The state’s only purpose is to do as it wishes. 11 -Hobbes Thomas ~-~- philosopher, historian, ethicist, geometrician, squarer of the circle ~-~- Leviathan, selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, ed. w/ intro by Edwin Curley, Hackett. p. 213 12 -XXIX 9 A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this: That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which the commonwealth maketh, it he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to itself, which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him, which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth 13 -Outweighs: the resolution talks about what a state ought to do, not individuals. Specificity comes first since different actors have different obligations. 14 -3. The state constitutively was created for the purpose of controlling morality. 15 -Koch Andrew M. Koch, “Dionysian Politics: The Anarchist Implications of Nietzsche’s Critique of Western Epistemology” I am not Man, I am Dynamite!: Fredriech Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition, ed. John Moore 16 -The character of the nation-state, and the validity of its foundations, represent another matter. If the nation-state arose out of conditions that are historical and dependent upon the material conditions of life then, obviously, there can be no link between the exercise of power and any transcendental notion of collective essence, human or social teleologies, or moral foundations. There is still a question, however, regarding the "will to structure" as part of the "will to power." What is the origin of the process that initiates the construction of a political structure? The will to any structure is, for Nietzsche, Apollonian will. Nietzsche's position is that the relationship between human beings and the world of nature was essentially an aesthetic relationship. The world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon? This claim has several facets. The world requires interpretation. Human beings do not engage in uncovering any hidden transcendental truths. Science does not uncover truth, but is only a form of interpretation that takes place within a strict syntactical structure, The "objectivity" it seeks to bring to interpretation produces an outcome of a lower order than the artistic.10 Science's real character is actually the suspension of "will" in its interpretation." The condition of artistic creation is the highest condition for the human being. The Apollonian and Dionysian are the two forces whose tension produces art. Nietzsche uses the metaphors of "dream" and "intoxication" to indicate what he means by these two concepts." The Apollonian is an aesthetic will to construct an illusion, a fantasy, that brings beauty and order. Through the construction of an image we interpret our place and activities in relation to the world. "lf we could imagine an incarnation of dissonance-and what is man if not that?-that dissonance, in order to endure life, would need a marvelous illusion to cover it with a veil of beauty. This is the proper artistic intention of Apollo...""˜3 We are redeemed through these illusions." The illusions give us identity, purpose, and connection. Nietzsche argues that this fantasy has its origins in necessity.15 Necessity initiates the construction of the illusion, but that alone is insufficient to validate the tentative and contingent outcome as corresponding to the "true." This is important because it establishes the foundationless character of all political structure. If the origin of structure is aesthetic rather than "essential" or even "scientific," then the tentative and contingent nature of any structure is more apparent. As Nietzsche puts it, art is not an imitation of nature but its metaphysical supplement, raised up beside nature to overcome it.'6 The construction of a political order is precisely the type of product that Nietzsche describes as the outcome of Apollonian will. A political structure is the residue of the "will to power" as it seeks to bring order to the world by constructing an image of its structure. This drive gives rise to the formation of an illusion. The origin of the "political" is the need to create order and structure, to raise human beings out of the dissonance of nature. In political terms, the will to construction, driven by necessity, has generated the representation of "human nature" as a fixed reference point for a deductive process of political application. Once a definition of the human character can be asserted, a political structure emerges as a logical outcome. This is the case regardless of the content of that representation. Nietzsche's rejection of the Western philosophic tradition would, therefore, also constitute a rejection of the Western political traditions. From the perspective of genealogy, the characterizations of human nature that have served as the foundation for political prescriptions from Plato to Hobbes, Locke, Kropotkin, and Marx" have their origins in specific historical and contextual necessities. Human nature was represented in order to provide a basis for an Apollonian construction, the need to bring order and structure. The practice of politics is the application of that illusion. 17 -I contend that under a Hobbesian framework, restrictions are justified: 18 -Not only do we have no rights under the NC framework, the sovereign has a unique obligation to quiet dissent. 19 -Parkin 12 (Jon, University of York, “Thomas Hobbes and the Problem of Self-Censorship,” History of European Ideas) 20 -Hobbes saw the unregulated public expression of controversial beliefs and opinions as the root of civil strife. Hobbesian subjects therefore have no right to the free public expression of their beliefs, and are obliged to conform their public statements to whatever is required of them by the sovereign. This view was elaborated unapologetically in chapter 42 of Leviathan, where Hobbes confronted the potentially hard case of religious believers who were required by their sovereign to subscribe publicly to beliefs that they privately found intolerable. In response, Hobbes points out that any command to a Christian which forbids belief in Christ will simply be ineffective because belief cannot be commanded. On the other hand, if a Christian is required to say that he does not believe in Christ, Hobbes counsels that ‘Profession with the tongue is but an externall thing’, and is no more than a gesture signifying obedience to the sovereign. Therefore a Christian commanded to repudiate Christ has the same liberty as Naaman the Syrian in the Book of Kings who, after he had converted to the God of Israel, was still required to worship in the temple of Rimmon and did so (or so Hobbes claimed) with the approval of the prophet Elisha. 21 -And, decisions made by public colleges are indeed state decisions, meaning that public colleges are legally the sovereign. 22 -Buchter 73, Jonathan. “Contract law and the student-university relationship.” Indiana Law Journal, vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973. 23 -“This theoretical mixture was applied in student-university litigation until Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education was decided in 1961. Dixon held, generally, that a public university’s actions were state actions and therefore subject to constitutional restraints and, more particularly, that a student must be afforded procedural due process prior to expulsion. However, the state action doctrine in Dixon has not replaced the implied contract theory. Courts still view the student-university relationship as one of contract with certain constitutional protections required if the institution is public. Thus, there may currently be some limits on what the public university may demand from the student. For example, a public university may not be able to deny a student certain first amendment rights. However, since the Dixon holding is limited to public institutions, a private university may be able to contract in such a way as to limit these constitutional rights.” - EntryDate
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