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1 -CP Text: Public Colleges and Universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech except for term papers produced by professionals who sell them to students who turn them in as original work.
2 -Competes through mutual exclusivity- I don’t include term papers while the aff does.
3 -The sale of term papers, although blatant plagiarism, is speech protected by the first amendment
4 -Duke Law Journal 73, Term Paper Companies and the Constitution, 1973, 1275-1317 (1974) Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol22/iss6/3
5 -TERM PAPERS AS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT The preparation and sale of term papers involves not only written communication but also "pure speech," an exchange of ideas arguably protectable under the first amendment . 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that this protection extends to even the most marginal "exchanges of ideas." Justice Frankfurter conceded in his dissent to Winters v. New York17 that "wiholly neutral futilities, of course, come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." The majority in Winters stated, with more enthusiasm, that even though the magazines in question contained "nothing of any possible value," they were "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature." ' A term paper, arguably, is somewhat more than a "wiholly neutral futility" and is clearly entitled to as much constitutional protection as magazines which contain "nothing of any possible value to society."
6 -Turns and outweighs the case
7 -1 Plagiarism is free-riding the system because it requires the exploitation of others by taking advantage of one’s efforts. Free riding is immoral under the omnilateral will.
8 -Ripstein 09 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom. Harvard University Press, 2009.
9 -So mandatory cooperation cannot treat terms of interaction as reciprocal because they are voluntary. Instead, there is a more direct requirement of reciprocity: everyone must do his or her own part; the person who fails to do so violates reciprocity by taking advantage of the cooperative efforts of others, like the one who fails to keep up his end of a contract. From this perspective, the “free rider” wrongs his fellow citizens by taking advantage of their efforts. The free rider may claim—and it may even be true— that he would rather do without the rightful condition and go it alone. That claim is beside the point, because the obligation to enter a rightful condition is unconditional, that is, it does not depend upon any particular person’s subjective assessment of the benefits it will yield. Others are entitled to treat the creating and sustaining of a rightful condition as one of the free rider’s purposes, quite apart from what he may have to say about it. Thus they can rightly complain that they are being required to work for the purposes of another, or that they and are being used by the free rider, and they can make this claim even if the free rider’s failure to contribute costs them nothing.
10 -2 Plagiarism misrepresents the will of the original author and the plagiarizer
11 -Sadler 11 Brook J. Sadler, “Nothing New Left to Say: Plagiarism, Originality, and the Discipline of Philosophy,” Florida Philosophical Review Volume XII, Issue 1, Winter 2012
12 -Kant’s own view of the author may constitute a metaphysically perplexing extreme, insofar as it suggests that the text, qua speech of a rational agent, is an extension of his noumenal self. But the modern idea that writing emanates from, manifests, or represents the unique personality of an author is what underwrites, so to speak, the modern notion of plagiarism. We must believe in the notion of original writing, seemingly freed of influences, in order to think plagiarism a distinctive, identifiable violation, especially when financial effects are absent. And the violation points in two directions. It points toward the original author, whose very person is co-opted or misrepresented through the unacknowledged taking of her words, and it points toward the plagiarizer, who misrepresents her own person by writing in someone else’s voice, making a puppet of herself as she enacts an original author’s speech. Thus, the modern complaint against plagiarism is doubly invested in the idea that the text is an enactment of the person, and that as such, it must be original.
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1 -Bob Overing
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1 -Harvard
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1 -Policy such as the aff that use the state to target homelessness prop us neoliberalism.
2 -Craig Willse 10 (assistant professor of cultural studies at George Mason University). "Neo-liberal biopolitics and the invention of chronic homelessness." Economy and Society 39.2 (2010): 155-184.
3 -Those populations targeted as ‘chronically homeless’ would appear, then, to fit within programmes of state racism twice over: both as populations considered social and economic drains and also as populations marked as racially inferior. But, rather than directly killed or abandoned, we have what appears to be the opposite, as those designated chronically homeless are moved into housing programmes understood to protect and secure their health and wellbeing. How can this be? Is it the end of state racism? The earlier discussion suggests another understanding of chronic homelessness initiatives, and points to some of the historical limitations of Foucault’s analysis. Foucault’s description of biopower and state racism describes the emergence of the modern state form and its organization as the social welfare state. In such a formation, the modern nation-state seeks to line up a national population with a national economy; the Keynesian welfare state did exactly this. In the contemporary neo-liberal context, social programmes become industries that serve the economy directly, not necessarily through investing in a labouring population, but through the production of service and knowledge industries. In such a situation, illness and unproductivity may not need to be reduced or eliminated, as they would be in the social welfare state. Rather, illness and waste, and populations organized as such, become fertile sites for economic investment, as they multiply opportunities for developing and extending governance mechanisms, making economic life possible. The reproduction of housing insecurity and deprivation attests to the continuation of social abandonment through withdrawal and disinvestment. However, the invention of chronic homelessness suggests something in addition, as those nearest to death and most subject to the subordinating and dehumanizing effects of institutional racism become the privileged targets of federal policy and funding (at least for the time being). But, rather than a reversal of abandonment, the invention of chronic homelessness indicates how abandonment takes place within an economy and in service to the economy. If chronic homelessness programmes enable rather than challenge neo-liberal housing insecurity and deprivation at structural levels, it is not so clear that these programmes are ‘life-saving’, even if they do prolong or save some individual lives. Rather, the invention of chronic homelessness reminds us that the deaths of biopower are not instantaneous or complete, and that, in being slow to die and continuing to bear costs, populations marked by and for death demand of neo-liberal apparatuses a biopolitical investment. Thus, we might want to amend Foucault’s view of illness and death as the negation and loss of power, allowing us to question his assertion that ‘death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it’ (Foucault, 1990 1976, p. 138). The invention of chronic homelessness emerges in a context of neo-liberal economic restructuring of relationships between life, health, illness and death that moves past Foucault’s formulation of a zero-sum game in which those marked as ill or unproductive would be treated only as negation or loss. State racism in the neo-liberal context is a process of calculation and distribution, in addition to deprivation. Technical programmes such as chronic homelessness initiatives, and the economic investment they entail, should not be mistaken for political and social rescue of abandoned populations. These programmes emerge to manage costs and to transform illness and death into productive parts of post-industrial economies. Neo-liberal forms of state racism facilitate the continued reproduction of housing insecurity and deprivation as forms of racial subordination, even while organizing those ‘losses’ into productive economic enterprises.
4 -Cities are sponges of capital—they absorb surplus value to further push off the inevitable crisis that is capitalism.
5 -Kafui Attoh 11 (Macalester College and his PhD in Geography from Syracuse University, MA in urban studies). "What kind of right is the right to the city?." Progress in human geography 35.5 (2011): 669-685. RC
6 -David Harvey (2008) situates the concept of the right to the city within a broader and more sweeping analysis of urbanization. The rise and transformation of cities, Harvey argues, must be seen as central to the reproduction of capitalist society.23 Cities, he argues, play an active role ‘in absorbing surpluses’ (Harvey, 2008: 25; see also Harvey, 1982) and staving off crises of overproduction and/or under consumption. Cities are crucial in satisfying capitalism’s perpetual ‘need to find profitable terrains for ... surplus production and absorption’ (Harvey, 2008: 24). If cities are indeed sites in which surpluses are absorbed, distributed, and produced, then, for Harvey, to have a right to the city has a very particular meaning.24
7 -Capitalism needs to expend surplus to be survive. Capitalism seeks to maximize profit, inevitably creating surplus value. Spending that surplus is used to justify further exploitation in name of creating more surplus, ad infinitum.
8 -David Harvey 12 (Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received his PhD in geography from the University of Cambridge in 1961). “Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution”. Verso Books, 2012. RC
9 -To claim the right to the city in the sense I mean it here is to claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of urbanization, over the ways in which our cities are made and remade, and to do so in a fundamental and radical way. From their very inception, cities have arisen through the geographical and social concentration of a surplus product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon of some sort, since surpluses have been extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while control over the use of the surplus typically lies in the hands of a few (such as a religious oligarchy, or a warrior poet with imperial ambitions). This general situation persists under capitalism, of course, but in this case there is a rather different dynamic at work. Capitalism rests, as Marx tells us, upon the perpetual search for surplus value (profit). But to produce surplus value capitalists have to produce a surplus product. This means that capitalism is perpetually producing the surplus product that urbanization requires. The reverse relation also holds. Capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus products it perpetually produces. In this way an inner connection emerges between the development of capitalism and urbanization. Hardly surprisingly, therefore, the logistical curves of growth of capitalist output over time are broadly paralleled by the logistical curves of urbanization of the world's population.
10 -The alternative is complete rejection of the capitalist system; mere reform is insufficient because it ensures the system will regenerate itself stronger from the pieces left.
11 -Joel Kovel 07, Professor of Social Studies at Bard, The Enemy of Nature, 2007, p 142-3
12 -The value-term that subsumes everything into the spell of capital sets going a kind of wheel of accumulation, from production to consumption and back, spinning ever more rapidly as the inertial mass of capital grows, and generating its force field as a spinning magnet generates an electrical field. This phenomenon has important implications for the reformability of the system. Because capital is so spectral, and succeeds so well in ideologically mystifying its real nature, attention is constantly deflected from the actual source of eco-destabilization to the instruments by which that source acts. The real problem, however, is the whole mass of globally accumulated capital, along with the speed of its circulation and the class structures sustaining this. That is what generates the force field, in proportion to its own scale; and it is this force field, acting across the numberless points of insertion that constitute the ecosphere, that creates ever larger agglomerations of capital, sets the ecological crisis going, and keeps it from being resolved. For one fact may be taken as certain — that to resolve the ecological crisis as a whole, as against tidying up one corner or another, is radically incompatible with the existence of gigantic pools of capital, the force field these induce, the criminal underworld with which they connect, and, by extension, the elites who comprise the transnational bourgeoisie. And by not resolving the crisis as a whole, we open ourselves to the spectre of another mythical creature, the many-headed hydra, that regenerated itself the more its individual tentacles were chopped away. To realize this is to recognize that there is no compromising with capital, no schema of reformism that will clean up its act by making it act more greenly or efficiently We shall explore the practical implications of this thesis in Part III, and here need simply to restate the conclusion in blunt terms: green capital, or non-polluting capital, is preferable to the immediately ecodestructive breed on its immediate terms. But this is the lesser point, and diminishes with its very success. For green capital (or ‘socially/ecologically responsible investing’) exists, by its very capital-nature, essentially to create more value, and this leaches away from the concretely green location to join the great pool, and follows its force field into zones of greater concentration, expanded profitability — and greater ecodestruction.
13 -Also, the alternative solves better than the aff: as long as capitalism persists, exploitation is inevitable and piecemeal reforms such as the right to housing will be inevitably rolled back. The alt is a pre-requisite to actually solving for the harms the aff identifies.
14 -Richard Wolff 06 (Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst). “Anti-Slavery and Anti-Capitalism”. 15 December 2006. http://www.rdwolff.com/content/anti-slavery-and-anti-capitalism
15 -Thus, no surprise attaches to the fact, these days, that one widespread kind of social criticism concentrates on softening capitalism’s negative impacts on workers and the larger society. It seeks to raise workers’ wages and benefits and to make governments limit capitalists’ rapaciousness and the social costs of their competition. In the US, this is what “liberals” do: from the minimalist oppositions within the Democratic Party to the demands of social democrats and many “radicals” for major wage increases, major government interventions, and so on. What always frustrates liberals and radicals is the difficulty of achieving these improved workers’ conditions and the insecurity and temporariness of whatever improvements they do achieve. Today they bemoan yet another roll-back of improvements, namely those won under FDR’s New Deal, Kennedy’s New Frontier, and so on. Marxism is that other kind of opposition that demands the abolition of capitalism as a system. Since Marxists find capitalist exploitation to be as immoral and inhumane as slavery, they might logically seek a further amendment to the US Constitution that abolishes it as well. A Marxist program would seek to replace capitalist production by a non-wage system, one where the workers will not only produce surpluses but also be their own boards of directors. The “associated workers” would, as Marx suggested, appropriate their own surpluses and distribute them. The wage-payer versus wage-recipient division of people inside production would vanish. Every worker’s job description would entail not only his/her technical responsibilities to produce a specific output but also her/his responsibilities as part of the collective that appropriates and distributes the surplus. Monday to Thursday, each worker in each enterprise makes commodities, and every Friday, each worker functions as a member of that enterprise’s board of directors. The stakes here are less obtaining higher wages than abolishing the wage system.The point of such a Marxist program is to overcome the conflicts, wastes, and inequalities (economic, political, and cultural) that flow from the existence of capitalist exploitation whether or not wages are raised. The point is likewise to stress the incompatibility of any genuine democracy with the wage system and its usual social effects (and again whether wages are higher or lower). Of course, in the struggle between such a Marxist perspective and its various critics, the latter will depict the programmatic advocacy of an end to the wage system as impracticable, utopian, or deluded. Those persuaded by neoclassical economics will simply dismiss or ignore not only the Marxist criticism of the wage system but Marxism altogether. For them, the wage system is not only eternal and necessary, but also fair and “efficient.” For them, since there “is” no surplus, they need not read or learn Marxist theory and criticism, let alone debate it. So Marxist theory is and its proponents can and are largely excluded from public discourse in the media, the schools, and politics. For liberals suspicious of neoclassical economics – or “neoliberalism” as it is now more often called - the Marxian program sketched above would be seen as utopian fantasy at best. Yet, not the least irony of Bush’s America today is how his regime’s relentless removal or reduction of the past reforms (high wages, pensions, medical insurance, social security, state social programs, etc.) makes a liberal politics today seem painfully deluded to so many. The liberals seem hopelessly weak, unable to stop let alone reverse the Bush juggernaut. Worse still, what liberals they advocate are precisely the reforms now being dismantled and thus revealed as having been fundamentally insecure all along. The audience for capitalism’s critics and opponents is thus being primed to listen rather attentively to Marxist claims that an abolition of the wage system offers not only a better society but also a far better basis for securing those improvements in wages and working conditions that mass action can achieve. What is needed now are Marxists able and willing to articulate those claims to that audience, to persuade ever more of capitalism’s critics and opponents that abolition of exploitation and the wage system must be a component of their program for social change.
16 -Affirming treats the symptom by just brushing over the real issue—they don’t solve anything.
17 -James H. Carr 98 (Senior Vice President for Policy, Research, and Evaluation at the Fannie Mae Foundation), (1998) Comment on Chester Hartman's “The case for a right to housing”: The right to “poverty with a roof"—a response to hartman, Housing Policy Debate, 9:2, 247-257,
18 -The reasons the housing affordability crisis persists, however, are much deeper than obstacles created by those who oppose specific programs or shifting political priorities. Access to decent and affordable housing is an outcome of a number of resource allocation processes, of which the housing market is perhaps the most superficial. The approach that would ensure the greatest and most cost effective allocation of decent, affordable housing is one that is free of discriminatory barriers to broader societal opportunities that ultimately shape access to the housing market. Included are such areas as education, transportation, and employment. Unless all households have equal opportunities to receive an education that prepares them for the labor market, people with similar aptitudes for a given occupation will have different abilities with which to compete for specific jobs. Because public education in the United States is funded primarily through local property taxes, and affluent households and employers have migrated in large numbers out of central cities and into the suburbs, central-city schools districts are often underfunded. At the same time, many of these districts have schools with deteriorating infrastructure and students with systemic social problems resulting from concentrated poverty. Understandably, central-city school districts face a particularly challenging task in providing quality education. Due in large part to the economic restructuring of U.S. cities, quality jobs requiring moderate education and skill levels have largely migrated to the suburbs. Meanwhile, minority populations have concentrated in central cities due partly to past and present discrimination in the housing market. This ‘‘spatial mismatch,’’ further complicated by the low priority U.S. metropolitan areas have given to public transit systems and the high costs of automobile ownership in central cities relative to other areas in the United States, results in many residents lacking access to quality jobs.
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1 -Counterplan Text: The United States should take a needs based approach to the right to housing.
2 -Competition:
3 -1. Textually competitive- I use a needs based approach instead of a rights based approach which is different from the text of the AC.
4 -2. Functional competition- the implication of a right is a demand in absolute instances, whereas the CP PICs out of the absolute claim- rather, we just give housing assistance based on circumstances.
5 -Only a needs-based approach can effectively solve neoliberal institutions. It’s empirically proven to be effective.
6 -Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017).
7 -In these sorts of cases, democratic progress depends upon the mobilization of social forces against exclusionary rights to private property. In these cases, a different social morality is brought into play, the social morality of need-satisfaction. Where the structure of rights blocks access to needed resources, it becomes a means of legitimating objective harm. Since it allows the harms of need-deprivation to proceed unchecked, its own legitimacy comes into question. Its legitimacy is challenged by social movements which do not appeal to authorities or experts to satisfy their rights for them, but draw on their own social power to secure access to and control over the resources that they need to satisfy their own rights. This form of organizing is consistent with the master democratic norm of self-determination, and is, in fact, the only way that needs can be satisfied in an empowering, as opposed to paternalistic, way. To put this crucial point another way, only a needs-based social morality exposes the real problem with the capitalist value system: it subordinates the life-value of goods and services to their money-value. The basic life-value of any good is the contribution that it makes to the satisfaction of non-optional needs (McMurtry 1998: 164). When lifevalue is subordinated to money-value, people can be deprived of that which they need and the economy still judged good, because the basis of judgement is not the satisfaction of people’s life-requirements, but return on investment to the owners of capital. Such is the case with housing markets as currently constituted. Hundreds of thousands of people cannot afford homes, but if house prices are rising, the markets are judged good by those who profit from them. Occasionally (as with the Vancouver foreign buyers tax) governments will intervene to cool markets in order to prevent the emergence of bubbles and the deeper social problems they can cause, but this sort of regulation is distinct from a structural solution to the homelessness crisis.
8 -Rights based approaches to housing are extremely vague and inefficient when held to particular instances- guts solvency and proves needs based approaches do more for the oppressed.
9 -Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017).
10 - The Universal Declaration asserts that housing is a right, but it does not further define the conditions that count as satisfying that right. All rights-statements tend to be programmatic and abstract. A discussion of human life-requirements, by contrast, cannot be carried out without reflection on the nature of the life that has the requirements. In other words, it is never enough to assert that “x is a life-requirement,” one must always unpack the life-value of x in relation to human life to explain just what it is that x contributes to life which, if absent, would cause harm. We tried to provide this complex unpacking in the case of the need for homes in Section One. If we content ourselves with the assertion that ‘housing is a right,’ it remains an open question what is required to satisfy the right. Does any sort of ‘roof over one’s head’ constitute satisfaction of the right? Are the rights of social assistance recipients housed in motels while they await public housing violated? There is no straightforward answer to these questions if we focus only on the right to housing, because it does not explain why it is that human beings need housing, beyond the obvious that we require shelter. When the need deprived mobilize to explain just what they need, and demand the resources to satisfy that need through their own labour and intelligence, this problem disappears because they tell everyone exactly what they require to satisfy their need.
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1 -A) Interpretation: The aff must specify a comprehensive role of the ballot and clarify how the round will play out under that role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC. To clarify, if the affirmative reads an argument that endows a role of the ballot, they must
2 -1. Clarify how we determine what a legitimate advocacy is and how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether topicality constrains the aff advocacy or not.
3 -2. Every plank of the ROB must be warranted, just like the standard text for a normative ethical theory, and what area of debate must be warranted i.e. which assumptions we should accept and which we shouldn’t.
4 -3. Describe how to weigh and compare between competing advocacies i.e. whether the role of the ballot is solely determined by the flow or another method of engagement.
5 -B) Violation:
6 -C) Vote Neg:
7 -1. Engagement
8 -A) Analytic
9 -B) Resolvability
10 -No RVI, Procedurals, DTD
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1 -Any public is composited with a plurality of views. This creates a dilemma between accepting subjectivity or coercion. However, subjectivity is untenable. I can’t say, “the sky is blue, but I don’t believe it”, since I have already committed myself the truth of the statement by uttering the preceding statement. This leaves us with coercion, but this just begs the question of what “just” coercion is in the first place.
2 -Benhabib 96 Seyla Benhabib 96 (Turkish-American philosopher. She is Eugene Mayer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, and director of the program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, and a well-known contemporary philosopher), ed. Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political. Vol. 31. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. RC
3 -In the last two decades, theorists of deliberative democracy have stressed the democratic potential for reasoned persuasion to the almost complete exclusion of the independently justifiable arguments for power as coercion in democratic life. Yet democracies must have their coercive as well as their deliberative moments. Against deliberative theorists who associate the coercion in democracy with "violence" and make that coercion at best tangential to the democratic process, this essay argues that coercion must play a large, valuable, and relatively legitimate role in almost any democracy that functions well. But against those who assume the full legitimacy of coercion in conditions of lasting disagreement, this essay argues that any justification for coercion will necessarily be incomplete. In conditions of lasting disagreement there is no unquestionably fair procedure for producing a decision to coerce. Moreover, much coercion in existing democracies will be far from fair, and policies requiring coercion will often have features that are far from just. Recognizing the need for coercion, and recognizing too that no coercion can be either incontestably fair or predictably just, democracies must find ways of fighting, while they use it, the very coercion that they need. Democracies usually fight their own coercive power by girding that power about with the institutional safeguards of individual rights, free speech and association, and other features of the "rule of law," sometimes including constitutional requirements that every policy have at least a nominal "public purpose." Along with these safeguards, democracies need political parties, interest groups, and other traditional institutions that can serve as instruments of formal opposition. Less obviously, this essay argues that democracies also need to foster and value informal deliberative enclaves of resistance in which those who lose in each coercive move can rework their ideas and their strategies, gathering their forces and deciding in a more protected space in what way or whether to continue the battle.
4 -We solve this with deliberation—communicative action bridges the gap between public and private subjectivities, creating ethics.
5 -Liu 02 Hsin-I Liu 02 (University of Hong Kong). “HABERMAS ON NORMATIVE INTERSUBJECTIVITY: THE SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE OF “PUBLIC COMMUNICATION”. 2002 http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/bcn2002/n_eng/programme/prog_ind/asp4.asp?id_pre=118 RC
6 -“In my view, Habermas’s picture of bourgeois private and public sphere is like two concentric circles linked through “communication.” The inner circle represents private autonomy and its subjective particularity. The possibility of the outer circle~-~-the public sphere and its generality and abstractness~-~-is a derivative of the inter-subjective dialogues in this inner circle. The “exteriority” of the public and the objective is dependent upon the existence and development of the “interiority” of the private and the subjective. On the other hand, due to its objectivity and abstractness, the public sphere is able to secure a “social space of communication structure” for concrete and subjective private individuals, in which they can “communicate with each other, and confirm each other’s subjectivity as it emerged from their spheres of intimacy” (Habermas 1989a, 54; 1996, 360). The bourgeois public sphere is a historical product of the dialectical play of the subjective interior and the objective exterior spaces. Nonetheless, when this historical relationship between the interior and the exterior in the bourgeois public sphere reversed, the nature of public sphere also under went “social-structural transformation.” Following Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry in the 1940’s, Habermas argues that the arrival of the culture industry contributed greatly to this transformation~-~-in both the spheres of publicness and the concept of rationality implied in it.3”
7 -Moreover, governments represent the conclusion that people reach through deliberation since that determines what is “just” coercion.
8 -Seyla Benhabib 2 (Turkish-American philosopher. She is Eugene Mayer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, and director of the program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, and a well-known contemporary philosopher), ed. Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political. Vol. 31. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. RC
9 -When delegitimation walks hand in hand with legitimation, sufficient legitimation must remain to let reasonably just coercion do its good work of helping organize social arrangements and redressing the greater injustices that would emerge without it. Each individual in each society must feel out this delicate balance for herself. The trick is to recognize the importance , particularly to the most disadvantaged, of having a large number of relatively democratic and relatively unchallenged decisions made (and democratic coercion imposed) on a daily, monthly, and yearly basis as a matter of routine, and at the same time to recognize the importance, particularly to the most disadvantaged, of maintaining, in the institutions and culture of the society and in the minds of its citizens, some ongoing recognition and critique of the ways in which those decisions (and that coercion) are unfair and unjust.
10 -Thus, the standard is promoting deliberation.
11 -I contend that granting a right to housing forecloses public deliberation. Labeling housing as a right shuts down dialogue; it becomes a trump card that prevents us from discussing foundation of the issue.
12 -Fitzpatrick and Watts 10 ~-~- Suzanne Fitzpatrick and Beth Watts. "‘The Right to Housing’for Homeless People." Homelessness Research in Europe (2010): 105-122. RC
13 -First, and most fundamentally, intrinsic to the notion of human rights is the idea that they are self-evident, inalienable and non-negotiable: ‘absolute’ in other words. But are the rights declared by the architects of international and European human rights instruments – particularly social rights such as the right to housing – any less politically contested than other claims about how material resources should be distributed in society? One could argue that labelling such claims as moral ‘rights’ is a mere rhetorical device intended to shut down debate by investing one’s own particular political priorities with a ‘protected’ status; after all, as Dworkin (1977) put it, ‘rights are trumps’. But if one dispenses with theological or other natural law justifications for human rights, then what is the foundation of their protected status? Many human rights supporters argue that they are not anchored in a pre-social natural order or in divine reason, but rather are socially constructed and inter-subjective, rooted in a broad normative consensus about the things that all human beings are morally entitled to in order to attain a basic standard of living and to participate in society (Dean, 2010). But the idea that such a consensus exists at a global level is, at the very least, highly arguable (Finch, 1979; Miller, 1999; Lukes, 2008).
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1 -2017-03-10 05:22:13.0
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1 -Emily Jackson
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1 -Clements NM
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1 -52
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1 -4
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1 -MA - NC - Habermas
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1 -TFA State
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1 -A. Interpretation: If the aff advocates for a subset of the resolution, then they must have a carded solvency advocates that advocates for the aff and explicitly calls it a “right to housing” read in the 1AC.
2 -B. Violation:
3 -C. Standards
4 -1. Limits
5 -2. Topic Focus
6 -Fairness, DTD, CI
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1 -2017-03-10 22:20:52.0
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1 -Jennifer Melin
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1 -Earl Warren NO
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1 -53
Round
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1 -6
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1 -Strake Jesuit Li Neg
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1 -MA - T - Solvency Advocate
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1 -TFA State
Caselist.CitesClass[85]
Cites
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1 -Interpretation: The right to housing is a positive right.
2 -Velasquez et al 14 ~-~- Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, S.J., and Michael J. Meyer. “Rights”. MARKKULA CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS, Aug. 8, 2014. https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/rights/
3 -Kant's principle is also often used to justify positive or, as they are often called, welfare rights. Where negative rights are "negative" in the sense that they claim for each person a zone of non-interference from others, positive rights are "positive" in the sense that they claim for each person the positive assistance of others in fulfilling basic constituents of human well-being like health and education. In moral and political philosophy, these basic human needs are often referred to as "welfare" concerns (thus this use of the term "welfare" is similar to but not identical with the common American usage of "welfare" to refer to government payments to the poor). Many people argue that a fundamental right to freedom is worthless if people aren't able to exercise that freedom. A right to freedom, then, implies that every human being also has a fundamental right to what is necessary to secure a minimum level of well being. Positive rights, therefore, are rights that provide something that people need to secure their well being, such as a right to an education, the right to food, the right to medical care, the right to housing, or the right to a job. Positive rights impose a positive duty on us—the duty actively to help a person to have or to do something. A young person's right to an education, for example, imposes on us a duty to provide that young person with an education. Respecting a positive right, then requires more than merely not acting; positive rights impose on us the duty to help sustain the welfare of those who are in need of help.
4 -Violation:
5 -Standards:
6 -1.Ground
7 -2.Field context
8 -Bo Bengtsson 01 (Uppsala University, Department of Government and Institute for Housing and Urban Research). “Housing as a Social Right: Implications for Welfare State Theory”. Nordic Political Science Association, 2001. RC
9 -The article contributes to two central and interrelated discourses in welfare state theory and housing policy. One concerns the meaning of a `right to housing', and the other concerns the meaning of the dichotomy `universal'^`selective' in housing policy. The right to housing is best seen as a political `marker of concern' pointing out housing as an area for welfare state policy. The more precise meaning of the idea is always de¢ned socially, in a speci¢c national context of relations between state, citizen, and markets in housing provision. Two alternative interpretations of a right to housing are suggested, each related to a certain logic of housing provision. In a selective housing policy, the state provides a `protected' complement to the general housing market, and the right to housing implies some legalistic minimum rights for households of lesser means. In a universal housing policy, the state provides correctives to the general housing market in order to make housing available to all types of households, and the right to housing is best seen as a social right in Marshall's meaning of an obligation of the state towards society as a whole. The concepts of `universal' and `selective' may be applied to either the political discourse or the social outcome of policies. Furthermore, they may refer to di¡erent political levels (e.g. welfare state level, sector level, and policy instrument level). If the dichotomy is not speci¢ed in those two respects, the distinction between a universal and a selective policy will always be seriously blurred.
10 -A) Analytic
11 -3. Limits
12 -
13 -Voters:
14 -Jurisdiction, DTD, CI
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1 -2017-03-10 22:20:53.0
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1 -Jennifer Melin
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1 -Earl Warren NO
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1 -53
Round
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1 -6
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1 -Strake Jesuit Li Neg
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1 -MA - T - Positive Right
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1 -TFA State
Caselist.CitesClass[86]
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1 -Agency, or the setting and pursuing of ends, is inescapable.
2 -Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8
3 -3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on ordinary enterprises their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15
4 -This outweighs: A. Analytic B. Analytic
5 -Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent.
6 -Korsgaard“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard
7 -The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.
8 -Analytic
9 -Prefer additionally- all frameworks presuppose liberty- three warrants.
10 -1. Analytic
11 -2. Analytic
12 -3. Analytic
13 -Impact Calc:
14 -1. Analytic
15 -2. Analytic
16 -
17 -NC – Free Markets
18 -Contention x is free markets
19 -Kantianism justifies a system of free markets- we have the right to make inferior choices and businesspeople have a right to choose how they want to distribute their own goods. This also means nobody has to sell you a house either- there should be zero interference, positive or negative
20 -Jones 04 September 2004, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies;2004, Vol. 16 Issue 1/2, p65, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/14576363/immanuel-kant-free-market-capitalist
21 -This essay argues that Kant's philosophy provides a justification for free markets. The myths about Kant are that he was a recluse, knew nothing about business, and that his epistemology divorced reason from reality, while his primary interest was metaphysics. Yet Kant's categorical imperative demands obedience even in the face of uncertainty about the external world. Adam Smith described this principle as the inward testimony of an impartial observer. Smith and Kant put individual decisions at the center of morality, but agreed that people have a tendency to make morally inferior chokes. Those who propose to regulate the economy are as troubled by this tendency as those they regulate. The self-sacrifice prescription is economically, psychologically, and morally unstable. In recommending market competition, Smith was unconsciously applying a Kantian formula. Market decisions are individual decisions. Individuals prefer to do business with those they trust: this is an incentive to honesty. A morality that depends upon incentives is imperfect but superior to a morality imposed by force.
22 -The AFF infringes on the right of employers to decide who to sell to.
23 -Friedman n.d. David Friedman, Some Responses to Mike Huben's A Non-Libertarian FAQ, http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/response_to_huben.html
24 -The problems with this, in the case of both the Scientologists and the ACLU, are that it confuses rhetoric with reality and, more seriously, blurs real disagreements about what freedom and rights are. For a simple example, consider the issue of fair housing legislation~-~-over which my father quit the ACLU many years ago. The ACLU would claim that in supporting fair housing legislation it is supporting the right of blacks, jews, etc. to buy or rent housing. Libertarians would respond that nobody has the right to buy something that the owner does not wish to sell, and that the ACLU was actually attacking the right of an owner to decide whom he would rent or sell his property to. Hence whether the ACLU's position was a defense of rights or an attack on rights depends on what rights you believe people have. This is the point that Mike is getting at later in this section when he writes "Nor might we need or want to accept the versions of "freedom" and "rights" that libertarians propose." But instead of actually arguing it, he rhetorically points out that libertarianism is not egalitarianism~-~-which while true, is not obviously relevant to the question of what rights people do or should have. Perhaps I was too quick, earlier in this response, to offer Mike as a counterexample to his own comments on evangelists.
25 -
26 -The NC also turns the AC- the market has empirically proven to provide better housing for more people than the government. Data proves.
27 -Husock 16 Hussock, Howard. "We Don't Need Subsidized Housing." City Journal. City Journal, 26 Jan. 2016. Web. 05 Feb. 2017. https://www.city-journal.org/html/we-donE28099t-need-subsidized-housing-11954.html.
28 -. Maybe our housing programs haven’t failed because of some minor management problem but because they are flawed at the core. The truth is, devoting government resources to subsidized housing for the poor—whether in the form of public housing or even housing vouchers—is not just unnecessary but also counterproductive. It not only derails what the private market can do on its own, but more significantly, it has profoundly destructive unintended consequences. For housing subsidies undermine the efforts of those poor families who work and sacrifice to advance their lot in life—and who have the right and the need to distinguish themselves, both physically and psychologically, from those who do not share their solid virtues. Rather than confront these harsh truths, we have over the past century gone through at least five major varieties of subsidized housing, always looking for the philosophers’ stone that will turn a bad idea into one that will work. We began with philanthropic housing built by “limited dividend” corporations, whose investors were to accept a below-market return in order to serve the poor. The disappointing results of such efforts—the projects served few people and tended to decline quickly—led housing advocates to call for public, not just private, spending for housing. Government first responded to their pleas with housing projects owned and operated by public authorities. These speedily declined. “Housers” then sought other solutions, such as using cheap, federally underwritten mortgages and rents paid by Washington to subsidize private landlords. The expense of this last approach, which had its heyday in the sixties, and the resultant wave of decline and foreclosure led to the twin approaches of our current era. In the first of these, tenants use portable, government-provided vouchers to pay any private landlord who will accept them. In the second, federal tax credits encourage deep-pocketed corporate investors looking for tax shelters to finance new or renovated rental housing owned and managed by nonprofit community groups. Both approaches have had serious problems, but this hasn’t deterred housing advocates from asserting that the way to fix the housing market is through even more such subsidies than the $12 billion that HUD already provides (out of its $25 billion annual budget) and the billions more in subsidies that state and local governments expend. This mountain of government housing subsidies rests on three remarkably tenacious myths. Myth No. 1: The market will not provide. The core belief of housing advocates is that the private market cannot and will not provide adequate housing within the means of the poor. The photos of immigrants squeezed into postage-stamp-sized rooms in a recent New York Times series on housing for the poor strain to make this point. But housers have been making such assertions for more than 60 years, and reality keeps contradicting them. In 1935, for example, Catherine Bauer—perhaps America’s most influential public housing crusader—claimed that the private housing market could not serve fully two-thirds of Americans and they would need public housing. The post–World War II era’s explosion of home ownership quickly gave the lie to such claims, certainly with respect to those in the lower middle class and up. As for the poor, a look at pre-Depression history shows that housing advocates get it wrong again. From the end of the Civil War up until the New Deal and the National Housing Act of 1937—which gave public housing its first push—the private housing market generated a cornucopia of housing forms to accommodate those of modest means as they gradually improved their condition. In those years Chicago saw the construction of 211,000 low-cost two-family homes—or 21 percent of its residences. In Brooklyn 120,000 two-family structures with ground-floor stores sprang up. In Boston some 40 percent of the population of 770,000 lived in the 65,376 units of the city’s three-decker frame houses, vilified by housing reformers. These areas of low-cost, unsubsidized housing were home to the striving poor. In Boston, as pioneer sociologists Robert Woods and Albert Kennedy describe it in their brilliant 1914 work, The Zone of Emergence, these neighborhoods teemed with clerks and skilled and semi-skilled workmen. “Over 65 percent of the residence property of the zone is owned by those who reside on it,” wrote Woods and Kennedy, “and this is the best possible index that can be given of the end that holds the imagination and galvanizes the powers of a large proportion of the population. Doubtless the greater share of this property is encumbered with mortgage, but it is an index of striving and accomplishment.” Even in the poorest neighborhoods, housing, if modest, was rarely abject. A 1907 report by the U.S. Immigration Commission, for instance, found that in the eastern cities, crowding in such neighborhoods was by no means overwhelming, with 134 persons for every 100 rooms. “Eighty-four in every 100 of the homes studied are in good or fair condition,” wrote the commission. True, many lived without hot water or their own bathrooms. But rents were cheap. A 1909 study by the President’s Homes Commission of Washington, D.C., found that a majority of the 1,200 families surveyed paid but 17.5 percent of their income for housing costs. Many of the poor—just like the “emerging” class that Woods and Kennedy described—lived in small homes they owned or in small buildings in which the owner lived. To be sure, as we know above all from Jacob Riis’s powerful 1891 book, How the Other Half Lives, some families lived in hovels, even in unlit cellars. “It no longer excites even passing attention when the sanitary police count 101 adults and 91 children in a Crosby Street house,” he wrote, “or when a midnight inspection in Mulberry Street unearths 150 ‘lodgers’ sleeping on filthy floors in two buildings.” Many buildings did not have their own toilets, and large numbers of people relied on public baths to get clean. But it is essential to remember that the conditions in which these poor families lived were not permanent—a fact unacknowledged by either Riis or present-day housing advocates. After all, the generation of children for whom Riis despaired went on to accomplish America’s explosive economic growth after the turn of the century and into the twenties. By 1930 the New York settlement-house pioneer Lillian Wald would write in her memoirs of the Lower East Side that, where once Riis had deplored overcrowding, she now found herself surrounded by “empties”: the poor had climbed the economic ladder and headed to Brooklyn and the Bronx. In other words, “substandard” housing was a stage through which many passed, but in which they did not inevitably remain. The arrival of Dominicans from Washington Heights in Hudson River Valley towns and Salvadorans from Queens on Long Island is proof that this process continues. Perversely, housing reformers invariably make matters worse by banning the conditions that shock them. Insisting unrealistically on standards beyond the financial means of the poor, they help create housing shortages, which they then seek to remedy through public subsidies. Even Jacob Riis observed in 1907 that new tenement standards threatened “to make it impossible for anyone not able to pay $75 a month to live on Manhattan Island.” Though Riis’s colleague Lawrence Veiller, head of the influential New York–based National Housing Association from 1900 to 1920, cautioned that “housing legislation must distinguish between what is desirable and what is essential,” most housing programs since the New Deal have rejected this sensible advice. The high standards that have resulted—whether for the number of closets, the square feet of kitchen counter space, or handicapped access—have caused private owners and builders to bypass the low-income market. So stringent are the standards that, under current building codes and zoning laws, much of the distinctive lower-cost housing that shaped the architectural identity of America’s cities—such as Brooklyn’s attached brownstones with basement apartments—could not be built today. True, even with relaxed building and housing codes, we still might not be able to build brand-new housing within the reach of those earning the minimum wage or those living on public assistance. Yet this is not an irresistible argument for government subsidies. Used housing, like used cars, gets passed along to those of more and more modest means. When new homes are built for the lower middle class, the rental housing in which they’ve been living (itself probably inherited from the middle class) historically has been passed along to those who are poorer. In a subtle way, the very existence of subsidized housing is likely to contribute to the over-regulation that leads to constraints in housing supply—and to calls for further subsidies. When builders have plenty of work putting up high-cost subsidized apartments, they don’t agitate for a less regulated market. Why should they seek an opportunity to build lower-margin low-cost housing? The rejoinder, then, to the myth that the market will not provide is that a greater supply of housing could be—and has been—created in a less regulated market. Myth No. 2: By taking profit-driven landlords out of the equation, state-supported housing can offer the poor higher-quality housing for the same rent. Four generations of attempts to provide subsidized housing built to higher standards than the poor could afford on their own in the private market have proved that this idea just doesn’t work. Each generation has seen the same depressing pattern: initial success followed by serious decline and ultimately by demands for additional public funds to cover ever-rising costs. You can see the outlines of this pattern as early as 1854, when the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor decided to build a “model tenement” at the corner of Elizabeth and Mott Streets. Constructed by a newly formed limited-dividend corporation, the building degenerated just 11 years later into what would be called “one of the worst slum pockets in the city.” It was sold and soon after demolished. Like its ill-fated predecessor, later public housing also aimed to do away with profit, financing construction through the sale of public bonds and then using the project’s rental income to pay a public authority to provide maintenance. But the maintenance failures of public housing projects became legendary, to the point that a 1988 study estimated it would take at least $30 billion to remedy them. Instead of providing housing that rental income from tenants can maintain, the federal government has had to supply $4 billion in annual “operating assistance” to housing authorities for maintenance and administrative costs—and still the maintenance problems multiply. The new public housing model that advocates favor retains the core—and fatal—dogma that the profit motive has no place in providing housing for the poor. In this model, nonprofit community groups run smaller, mixed-income apartment buildings, financed by monies raised through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, a program set up in 1986 to encourage corporations to support low-income housing. In New York City some 200 nonprofit groups manage 48,000 housing units. Though at this point such housing is widely viewed as successful, the New School for Social Research has found, in an examination of 34 developments in six cities, that “beyond an initial snapshot of well-being, loom major problems which, if unaddressed, will threaten the stock of affordable housing in this study.” Predictably enough, more than 60 percent of the projects already had trouble maintaining their paint and plaster, elevators, hall lighting, and roofs. Why does non-market housing founder? First, providing the poor with better housing than they can afford also saddles them with higher maintenance costs than they can afford. A newly announced state-financed “affordable housing” complex in Cambridge, Massachusetts, will cost $1.3 million—for eight units. That’s $162,500 per apartment. Recent subsidized projects in the Bronx and central Harlem cost $150,000 and $113,000 per unit, respectively. These apartments may be built to higher standards, but their fancier kitchens, more numerous bathrooms, and larger space mean more maintenance. Not surprisingly, limited rents can’t keep up with the need for service. The New York City Housing Partnership, which arranges private construction of housing for low-income buyers, has observed that nonprofit housing management groups in general “have no magic formula that allows them to manage property at less than cost. Ultimately they will need operating subsidies to remain viable.” Second, it is by no means true that cutting out the profit-making landlord reduces maintenance costs. On the contrary, public authorities and nonprofit management firms are bureaucracies with their own overhead expenses, and unlike private owners, they have no incentive to control costs. Nor have their employees any incentive to provide good service; and tenants, who are not full-fledged paying customers, have little leverage. Indeed, public housing authorities have demonstrated an ability rivaling any slumlord to disinvest in their properties. Rather than being a source of ill-gotten gains, private ownership is a source of cost control. The expensive but ineffective maintenance regime of subsidized housing—with its formal bids and union contracts—replaces housing maintenance performed through a far less costly informal economy. Poor homeowners and so-called “tenement landlords” (owners of small, multi-family buildings, many owner-occupied) contribute their own “sweat equity” or hire neighborhood tradesmen, not all of whom are licensed, let alone unionized. As one study of a low-income neighborhood in Montreal observed, “Owners can maintain their buildings and keep their rents low through the cooperation of their tenants on maintenance and through their own hard work.” None of these factors comes into play in the bureaucratic environment of public or nonprofit ownership. Far from being more cost-effective than private housing, subsidized housing is even more expensive than it first appears. Its cost includes the vast amount of property-tax revenue forgone when rental housing is held by public authorities or non-taxpaying nonprofit groups. By choosing to invest in housing, cities choose not to invest in other services, or not to leave money in the private economy to finance growth that would provide opportunity for poor and non-poor alike. Under the Rebuild New York program championed by the Koch and Dinkins administrations, the city “invested” an estimated $5 billion (much of it from its own operating budget) in housing renovation and gave up millions in property-tax revenues by deeding buildings to nonprofit organizations. The rejoinder, then, to the myth of the public or nonprofit alternative is that gleaming new projects are bound to decay—and to have significant long-term public costs. But for housing advocates, this is really just a political problem: that of making clear to the body politic that perpetually escalating subsidies to guarantee a safe and sanitary environment for the poor are the cost of living in a moral body politic. Here we arrive at the nub of their mistaken ideology. Myth No. 3: The moral qualities of the poor are a product of their housing “environment.” The essence of the housing advocates’ worldview, as the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor put it in 1854, is that “physical evils produce moral evils.” Improved physical surroundings will lead people to become upright, ambitious, and successful. Perhaps the quintessential myth of environmental determinism is that kids who might otherwise have no place to do their homework have their own room in government-assisted housing—and therefore succeed where they would have failed. There is much that is appealing in this view, which has a powerful hold on the liberal psyche. But the track record of public housing—which by almost any physical measure is superior to the housing in which most of its residents have previously lived—has hardly borne out the notion that better housing uplifts the poor. The response of housing reformers to drug- and gunfire-riddled projects has been not to re-examine the premise but to tinker with the model. Having long dwelled on design, they now devote equal attention to the social “environment.” Thus Secretary Cisneros has dreamed of new, low-rise, mixed-income subsidized housing that will correct the mistake of concentrating the poor in apartment towers now said to have encouraged crime. So, too, the nonprofit, “community-based” management of renovated apartment buildings is touted as a nurturing environment, in which the poorest are inspired by gainfully employed “role-model” neighbors to improve their habits and their lot. Here is where housing advocates most radically misunderstand the nature of the unsubsidized housing market. They can’t see its crucial role in weaving a healthy social fabric and inspiring individuals to advance. By pushing to provide the poor with better housing than they could otherwise afford, houses are blind to the fact that they are interfering with a delicate system that rewards effort and achievement by giving people the chance to live in better homes in better neighborhoods. In this unsubsidized system, you earn your way to a better neighborhood. In fact, you must help to create and to maintain better neighborhoods by your own effort. Housing subsidies—whether in the form of subsidized apartments or even vouchers that you can take to a landlord of your choice—turn this system on its head and undermine it, for housing subsidies do not reward achievement; they reward need. Those who strive and save are offered the same subsidized unit as those on public assistance; the provident and the improvident become indistinguishable. Those who work must live alongside those who do not. To believe that this is just is to believe that the poor are fundamentally undifferentiated—that they are all the same in being victims of an oppressive system. Those done the greatest injustice by such naiveté are the hardworking poor, who find to their horror that their new neighbor in a housing project is a drug dealer, or that the house next door has been rented, through a housing voucher, to an AFDC mother who does not supervise her children. Subsidies deny the self-sacrificing, working poor the chance to put physical and social distance between themselves and the non-working or antisocial poor. The New York Times cited the case of a hardworking woman who found herself in a bad neighborhood surrounded by gang violence as evidence of the need for increased housing subsidies, but it more likely demonstrates the opposite. By subsidizing troubled families, perhaps with criminal members, so that they can live in the same neighborhoods as those who hold modest but honest jobs, we expose the law-abiding to the disorder and violence of the undisciplined and the lawless, depriving them of the decent neighborhoods—decent in values if shabby in appearance—that their efforts should earn them. If we fail to allow the hardworking to distinguish themselves, by virtue of where they live, from those who do not share these traits, we devalue them. Even if we could somehow subsidize only the good citizens, the deserving poor, we would still do them a grave disservice, fostering the belief that they have moved to better homes in better neighborhoods by dint of largesse, not accomplishment—an entirely different psychology. A neighborhood of good housing is not necessarily a good neighborhood. And a poor and shabby neighborhood is not necessarily a bad neighborhood. The terms on which residents have come to a place, as well as the extent to which they own property and have otherwise invested in the upkeep and safety of it, matter far more. It is worth recalling the distinctions sociologist Herbert Gans made among different types of poor neighborhoods. “In most American cities,” he wrote, “there are two major types of low-rent neighborhoods: the areas of first and second settlement for urban migrants; and the areas that attract the criminal, the mentally ill, the socially rejected, and those who have given up the attempt to cope with life. The former kind of area, in which immigrants try to adapt to the urban milieu . . . , may be called an urban village. The second kind of area, populated largely by single men, pathological families, people in hiding from themselves or society, and individuals who provide the most disreputable of illegal-but-demanded services to the rest of the community, . . . might be called an urban jungle. “Subsidized housing does not differentiate between these groups. In fact, it seeks to address the problems of the lawless by mixing them in among the law-abiding and upwardly mobile, who are regarded almost as mere instruments for the salvation of the disorderly. Because it is based on the myth that the lawless are victims rather than victimizers, such a policy makes victims of those who would build an urban village by enmeshing them in an unsafe, disorganized neighborhood. True, the new subsidized projects run by community groups, with the advice of such sophisticated organizations as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation, do seek to screen tenants so as to keep bad actors out of mixed-income developments. But it defies imagination to think that such a process will be as effective as the screening that the market does. Indeed, in its analysis of such housing in New York, the New School found that though 6 percent of tenants were in arrears on their rent, the eviction rate was still zero. By remaining focused on the myth that physical conditions are the single most important quality of housing, houses have misunderstood the dynamics of neighborhoods—not merely as places where people live but as communities of shared ideals. As a result, they have blindly based new policies on old mistakes. Consider, for instance, recent housing initiatives that aim to promote racial integration by placing low-income minority families in apartments in the suburbs. These policies are a recipe for racial resentment, which has in fact developed. Asking working-class whites to accept the welfare poor—who would inspire discomfort whether white or black—as neighbors is the worst way to address the race issue. The right way is to enforce housing non-discrimination laws and thus allow the diffusion of upwardly mobile minority-group members into neighborhoods where, if they at first appear to be outsiders, it is only by virtue of race, not class. A realistic housing policy would strive for a non-subsidized world in which many different sorts of housing form a housing ladder. The lower rungs will be modest indeed—as modest as the single-room-occupancy hotels that sprang up in San Diego when that city allowed dwellings with less-than-full bathrooms and limited parking. By relaxing its code requirements, the city catalyzed construction of some 2,700 new SRO units for the working poor—day laborers, cabdrivers, fast-food employees. The SROs have formed a housing ladder all their own: lower-rent buildings may have no TV or phone, while lobby guards in the better buildings enforce more stringent guest policies. A sensible housing policy would purge housing and building codes of unnecessary barriers to construction. The New York City Housing Partnership, for instance, would like to build new versions of old-fashioned Brooklyn row houses, but handicapped-access laws forbid basement apartments, which allow for a less expensive overall design. Requirements for cast-iron or copper pipes instead of less expensive plastic ones, or for excessive numbers of electric outlets, increase the cost of housing needlessly. Hugely expensive environmental cleanup requirements discourage developers from building low-cost (or any other kind of) housing on the many “brownfield” sites of inner cities. Policy makers should push for safe ways to “minimally rehab” older buildings, so that they’re not priced out of the reach of the unsubsidized poor. City Homes, a Baltimore developer, has tried this on a small scale, with the cooperation of local and state authorities that have held renovation requirements to a minimum. Because of its low costs, City Homes doesn’t need the federal rent subsidies on which most low-income housing complexes depend. City Homes rents only to the employed and has created blocks—inhabited by nurses, city sanitation workers, and the like—that are oases of safety and civility in the midst of bad neighborhoods. Even with building codes that focus on basic safety issues and try not to raise prices, there will be people who can’t afford anything we think should be built. In some cases this may be the result of poverty despite effort. In others it may be the result of bad life choices and the wrong values. For those in temporary emergency situations, we should provide shelters, basic arrangements that ensure no one must live on the street. For those whose lack of housing is really a symptom of larger problems—the alcoholic, the drug addict, the teenage mother who cannot afford her own household—we can look to institutional ways, such as group homes, to deliver the combination of shelter, guidance, and treatment they need.
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-10 22:20:54.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Jennifer Melin
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Earl Warren NO
ParentRound
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -53
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -6
Team
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Strake Jesuit Li Neg
Title
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -MA - NC - Kant
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -TFA State
Caselist.RoundClass[49]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -77,78
Caselist.RoundClass[50]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -79
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-02-19 01:55:34.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Bob Overing
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Hunter College TF
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Harvard
Caselist.RoundClass[51]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -80,81,82
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-09 19:09:44.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Rodrigo Paramo
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Plano East Sr High CZ
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -TFA State
Caselist.RoundClass[52]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -83
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-10 05:22:11.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Emily Jackson
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Clements NM
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -4
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -TFA State
Caselist.RoundClass[53]
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-10 22:20:50.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Jennifer Melin
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Earl Warren NO
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -6
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -TFA State
Caselist.RoundClass[54]
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -2017-03-11 15:41:04.863
Judge
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Rodrigo Paramo, Demarcus Powell, Blake Andrews
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Cypress Woods LC
Round
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -Octas
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1 -TFA State

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