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+The action of prioritizing is indescribable apart from a reference to the institutional rules of the practice of which an agent is part of. SCHAPIRO: |
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+Schapiro, Tamar (Stanford University). Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory, Noûs 35 (1):93–117, 2001. |
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+In his early article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Rawls sets out to limit the scope of the utilitarian principle by arguing that it is inapplicable to actions of a certain type. His claim is that actions which fall under practice rules, for example actions governed by the rules of games and social institutions, have a structure which is different from the structure of action presupposed by utilitarianism. Such actions are not, therefore, directly subject to utilitarian evaluation. Whereas a practice as a whole can be judged in terms of its overall consequences, Rawls claims, a particular move within a practice can only be judged in relation to the practice rules. Rawls’ argument turns on a conceptual point about the relation between the rules of a practice and the cases to which they are applied. Practice rules, he claims, are “logically prior” to particular cases. “In a practice there are rules setting up offices, specifying certain forms of action appropriate to various offices, establishing penalties for the breach of rules, and so on. We may think of the rules of a practice as defining offices, moves, and offenses. Now what is meant by saying that the practice is logically prior to particular cases is this: given any rule which specifies a form of action (a move), a particular action which would be taken as falling under this rule given that there is the practice would not be described as that sort of action unless there was the practice.” Rawls illustrates the logical priority of practice rules over actions with reference to moves in the game of American baseball. Outside the “stage-setting” of the game of baseball, it is certainly possible to “throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood.” But it is impossible to “steal base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an error, or balk.” Where the rules of baseball are in force, movements come to constitute moves of particular kinds, and conversely in the absence of such rules, actions, which might appear to be moves are properly, described as mere movements. In this respect, Rawls claims, practice rules differ from another general class of rules called “summary rules.” Summary rules are “rules of thumb.” Their role is to They allow us to approximate the results of applying some more precise but perhaps more unwieldy principle to particular cases. As such, summary rules are arrived at by generalizing the results of the prior procedure. They are “reports” of these results, presented as guides for deliberating about what to do in cases which are relevantly similar to those used to generate the reports. Summary rules are therefore logically posterior to the cases to which they apply. For in order to specify a summary rule, it is necessary to generalize over some range of cases, and the relevant descriptions of these cases must be given in advance if generalization over them is to be possible. Whereas summary rules presuppose the existence of a well-defined context of application, the establishment of a practice imposes a new conceptual and normative structure on the context to which they are to apply. In this sense, a practice amounts to “the specification of a new form of activity,” along with a new order of status relations in which that activity makes sense. From the point of view of a participant, the establishment of a practice transforms an expanse of grass into “playing field,” bags on the ground into “bases,” and individuals into occupants of determinate “positions.” Universal laws come to hold a priori, for example that “three strikes make an out,” and that “every inning has a top and a bottom.” And within that new order people come to have special powers, such as the power to “strike out,” or to “steal a base.” The salient point for Rawls’ purposes is that there Practice rules are constitutive constraints on the exercise of these new powers, constraints by which any participant must abide in order to make her movements count as the moves she intends them to be. |
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+This means for any prioritization to count as resolutional action, it must be done within the practice of international law. Rules of international law define what it means to be a country in the international arena, even if states have different domestic ends- this hijacks constitutivism sine ilaw defines what is constitutive of a state to begin with. NARDIN: |
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+Terry Nardin |
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+, “International Ethics and International Law”. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 19-30, published by Cambridge University Press |
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+. JStor, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 . RP 2/6/13 |
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+Any description of the international system as an association of states that share certain ends is necessarily incomplete. Such an association would not constitute a rule-governed moral or legal order. What transforms a number of powers, contingently related in terms of shared interests, into a society proper is not their agreement to participate in a common enterprise for as long as they desire to participate, but their participation in and implicit recognition of the practices, procedures, and other rules of international law that compose international society. The rules of international law, in other words, are not merely regulatory but constitutive: they not only create a normative order among separate political communities but define the status, rights, and duties of these communities within this normative order. In international society 'states' are constituted as such within the practice of international law; 'statehood' is a position or role that is defined by international law, not independent of it.International law includes rules that are the outcome of cooperation to further shared goals as well as rules that make such cooperation possible and that exist even where shared goals are lacking. But it is rules of the latter sort that are fundamental. First, the particular arrangements through which states cooperate to promote shared goals themselves depend on having available authoritative procedures for negotiating such arrangements. These procedures, embodied in customary international law, are prior to the treaties, alliances, and international organizations through which states cooperate. Customary association. international law is thus the foundation of all international Secondly, it is the rules of customary international law that delimit the jurisdiction of states, prohibit aggression and unlawful intervention, and regulate the activities of treaty-making, diplomacy, and war. Because they govern the relations of enemies as well as of friends, these rules provide a basis for international order even in the absence of shared beliefs, values, or ends. By requiring restraint in the pursuit of national aims and toleration of national diversity, customary international law reflects the inevitably plural character of international society and may be said to constitutes a morality of states, one that is a morality of coexistence. |
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+That outweighs- The standard of assessment is instutionalized in a practice, not the desirability of states of affairs that promote the practice. NARDIN: |
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+The argument that the purpose-practice distinction is spurious, which underlies this moral critique of international law, takes different forms. One can argue that the supposedly non-instrumental constraints of practical association are in fact instru mental to the particular ends of practical association. Mervyn Frost puts the objection this way: The distinction here is between rules that constrains the behavior of people with diverse goals and rules that are aimed at advancing at an agreed-upon goal. It is a distinction between constraining rules and instrumental rules. This way of making the distinction between practical association and purposive association will not do, however, because it is always possible to construe constraining rules as instrumental rules. The rules of . . . practical associations may always be portrayed as advancing some set of goals. Frost gives the following examples of how any practical association can be construed as a purposive association: The rules of chess may be said to have been designed to achieve the purpose of provideing players with an intellectually stimulating game. Performing a mass has as its goal (on one view) providing Christians with the experience of sharing the body and blood of Christ, and so on.10 Thus, he argues, one cannot evade the objection by insisting that the purposes of practical association are categorically different from those of purposive association. The first thing to observe in considering this objection is that the 'purposes' of a practice are not necessarily the same as the purposes either of those who designed the practice or of those who may participate in it. From the standpoint of an umpire supervising however in a particular game of chess, the paramount consideration governing the play is that it should be in conformity with the rules of chess. If a player makes an illegal move, arguing that it will result in a more intellectually challenging game, the proper response is to ignore the argument and prohibit the move. In other words, the kinds of reasons that are valid within the game are different from those that might be considered by chess federation officials contemplating changes in the rules of the game. From the internal perspective of the player or the umpire, the authority of the rules is absolute. Players or umpires may disagree about the interpretation or proper application of the rules, but they may not take the position that a valid, authoritative rule should be set aside. It is also important to distinguish between the intentions that may be embedded in a rule or system of rules and the consequences of observing that rule or participating in the system. The relation between an instrumental rule and its purpose is a causal one: an agent produces a desired state of affairs by acting in the way prescribed by the rule. But the relation between the rules of practical association and its 'purposes' is conceptual rather than causal: the agent achieves these purposes not as a consequence of acting but in acting. Thus, the institution of international law does not 'produce' coexistence as the causal consequence of obeying its rules. On the contrary, co existence is the premise of relations between separate states on the basis of inter national law. Similarly, international law does not produce legality as a product of obedience but as an integral aspect of behaving lawfully. |
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+Thus, the standard is consistency with international law. More warrants |
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+1. International law education is key to everything – key to understand society, economics, comparative and domestic government policy, and legitimacy. BARRET: |
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+ International Legal Education in U.S. Law Schools: Plenty of Offerings, But Too Few Students¶ Author(s): John A. Barrett, Jr.¶ Source: The International Lawyer, Vol. 31, No. 3 (FALL 1997), pp. 845-867¶ Published by: American Bar Association¶ Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40707359 .¶ Accessed: 23/04/2014 13:26 |
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+Advancements in the modern world have significantly changed the value and ¶ usefulness of the skills and knowledge gained from international Ilaw study. These ¶ world changes make the need to study international Ilaw is more pressing than ever ¶ before and the consequences of failing to study it more dire. What has changed ¶ in the world that increases the value of having the knowledge and skills provided ¶ by studying international law? ¶ Clearly, the most significant change is that the world has become an international ¶ on many different levels.6 Who would have guessed twentyears ago that a major ¶ U.S. television advertising campaign in 1996 would not be in English nor even ¶ in Spanish?7 We have gone from a world full of largely independent societies ¶ to a multicultural, interdependent, interconnected collective. Many feel this trend ¶ will continue making the world even more international. For example, worldwide ¶ communication and transportation are convenient, commonplace, and affordable, ¶ and every day more people communicate efficiently with people outside their ¶ country, whether by phone, fax, e-mail, overnight courier, or the Internet. ¶ On a businesses level, things have never been so international. The rate of growth ¶ has been exponential.8 The number of multinational corporations has grown from ¶ a handful in the 1960s to the point where guides to multinational corporations ¶ frequently limit themselves to only the largest five hundred companies.9 These ¶ multinational companies not only sell abroad, but also manufacture and incorpo- ¶ rate subsidiaries abroad. Furthermore, this multinational trend is multidirectional: ¶ Japanese manufacturers have plants in the United States, Europe, and lesser- ¶ developed nations; U.S. companies have factories in Asia, Europe, and Latin ¶ America; and European companies are similarly expanded. Truly, it can be said ¶ that the sun never sets on IBM, Mitsubishi, Ford, or Phillips, to name but a few. ¶ Equally significant are small companies throughout the United States who look ¶ abroad for new markets, as well as face competition from abroad. Furthermore, ¶ in 1995, U.S. international trade amounted to $753 billion in exports and $641 ¶ billion in imports.10 Capital also moves globally, with Japanese companies devel- ¶ oping ski resorts in Colorado and U.S. retirement plans investing in the Japanese ¶ stock market. In 1990, the United States had over $43 billion invested in the ¶ finance and service sector in underdeveloped countries alone.11 as clients move ¶ abroad, so do their lawyers. Also, the number of foreign legal consultants practic- ¶ ing abroad continues to grow.12 With all this globalization, not only business but ¶ also disputes, both business and personal, become international. ¶ On a governmental level, international issues have always been present. ¶ However, several recent changes are making governments even more con- ¶ cerned with international issues. First, the growth in international trade, travel and communication forces governments to be concerned with protecting their ¶ citizens abroad, both bodily and financially.13 Consequently, an increase in ¶ the scope and nature of domestic regulation on international interaction with ¶ others has occurred. Second, problems of the modern industrial world are increasingly seen as transboundary in nature, especially pollution, which stub- ¶ bornly refuses to stay within national boundaries. The result has been an ¶ explosion in the number of international conventions and treaties.14 In 1995, ¶ the number of treaties to which the United States was a party required 145 ¶ pages to list.15 Additionally, international organizations, both governmental ¶ and nongovernmental, have grown.16 By 1995, there were over fifty major ¶ intergovernmental organizations17 and in 1992, the Organization for Economic ¶ Cooperation and Development listed over 600 international nongovernmental ¶ organizations in its member states.18 ¶ Such an international world increasingly requires international legal knowledge ¶ and skills.19 For a few, the practice of law has been international for a long time. ¶ Immigration lawyers always had to consider international legal issues. For them, ¶ only particular rules and the number of clients have changed. Similarly, a few ¶ businesses and their lawyers in major urban centers have, for centuries, had to deal ¶ with international business transactions. Additionally, a handful of government ¶ employees have always had careers directed toward the international arena. How- ¶ ever, this small group has grown into the bulk of the bar¶ II. The Benefits of Studying International Law ¶ There are numerous benefits to studying international law. By studying the ¶ laws of other societies, one will be better prepared to assist one's clients in ¶ international transactions. Additionally, by learning something about the culture ¶ and business practices of another country, one can negotiate and structure ¶ agreements more easily and effectively. Most legal systems fit into a family of legal systems. If you have studied one ¶ legal system, you have a basic familiarity with the structure and approach of ¶ other legal systems in that family. One may not know all the particular rules of ¶ a given country, but those rules can be readily learned and will be understood ¶ in the context of how that legal system is likely to work. Therefore, studying comparative law gives a context in which to understand the particular rules of ¶ a given government.22 this understanding is crucial not only to give competent ¶ advice to clients, but also to properly interact with local counsel. ¶ Uuunderstanding understanding public international law provides a useful grounding in both ¶ the nature and source of one's government's power as well as the limits on that power. ¶ 23 A better understanding of the limits imposed on U . S . law by international ¶ law, for example, in the area of human rights, helps courts uphold the basic ¶ rights of its nation's citizens.24 Traditionally, litigators have not looked to interna- ¶ tionalaw when framing legal arguments before U.S. courts and courts confronted ¶ with international law have often misapplied or misconstrued it, due to ignorance ¶ as to its sources and the relative weight to accord those sources.25 However, a ¶ better understanding of international law will give the courts the tools necessary ¶ to apply properly that law, thereby encouraging litigators to argue relevant inter- ¶ national law issues before the courts.26 Additionally, the proliferation of multilat- ¶ eral treaties and conventions makes knowledge of them increasingly important ¶ for the typical practitioner.27 Human rights and international environmental law, ¶ as well as the numerous treaties and conventions that regulate individual's actions ¶ within a state, will increasingly be subjects before domestic courts.28 ¶ This penetration investigation of international law into domestic law continues to grow, not ¶ only through international agreements but also through the creation and growth ¶ of supranational organizations.29 These organizations increasingly who create domestic law. |
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+1. Analytic |
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+2. Analytic |