Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[33]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[33]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-01-14 22:49:34.757
	1	+2017-01-14 22:49:34.0

Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Cites

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	1	+Agency, or the setting and pursuing of ends, is inescapable.
	2	+Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8
	3	+3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on ordinary enterprises their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15
	4	+Impacts:
	5	+A Analytic
	6	+B Analytic
	7	+Next, Analytic
	8	+And, all frameworks presuppose liberty- three warrants.
	9	+1. Analytic
	10	+2. Analytic
	11	+3. Analytic
	12	+Freedom implies an innate right to determine the course of your actions. In the state of nature, might rather than right governs these judgments. Absent of a public authority, rights violations are inevitable.
	13	+Varden “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010
	14	+“The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right with this claim: however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individuals human beings... can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6 There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might (‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private prop- erty, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is representative in this way – by being “united a priori ” or by being an “omnilateral” will (6: 263) – it can regulates on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.” (46-47)
	15	+Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will.
	16	+And, prefer omnilateral will over any alternative Kantian interpretation- a public authority interpretation of Kantianism escapes objections of idealism by recognizing that freedom is not protected under idealized private constraints.
	17	+Varden 2 “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010
	18	+“The second related distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought concerns Kant’s explicit challenge of the (typically implicit) liberal assump- tion that the reasoning and actions of the public authority should be thought of as analogous to the reasoning and actions of virtuous private individuals. This line of reasoning is typically assumed by both weak and strong voluntarist theories. On such views, ‘public reason’ is seen as referring to what virtuous individuals would or could hypothetically consent to. Instead, Kant proposes that the reasoning and actions of the public authority should be, exactly, public, meaning that any decisions or actions should be such that all citizens (whether virtuous or not) could hypothetically consent to them. To represent the citizens properly, then, the public authority must reason within a framework set by its citizens’ rights. This is why Kant emphasizes that the citizens’ hypothetical consent is understood as what citizens would consent to simply as citizens (6: 314). And as citizens their aim is to enable a condition in which rightful interaction, or interaction consistent with everyone’s right to freedom, is possible – exactly what is not possible in the state of nature. The perspective of the public authority is therefore not an idealized perspective of personal virtue or of private right, but rather a common public perspective constitutive of a rightful condition. Establishing such a public perspective to regu- late citizens’ interactions is necessary for rightful interaction on this view.” (47)
	19	+And, according to Cornell Law, the Brandenburg v. Ohio U.S. Supreme Court decision maintains that seditious speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it does not indicate an “imminent” threat.
	20	+https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444
	21	+But, seditious speech is never compatible with an omnilateral will and must be restricted. The intent requires the right to destroy the state, which justifies the annihilation of all rights.
	22	+Varden 3 “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010
	23	+“To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does considers seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).” (52

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-01-14 22:49:36.532

Judge

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	1	+James Sanger

Opponent

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	1	+Loyola JN

ParentRound

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	1	+33

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Li Neg

Title

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	1	+JF - NC - Kant

Tournament

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	1	+Harvard Westlake