Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[26]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[35]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[26]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-03 19:51:56.842
	1	+2016-12-03 19:51:56.0

Caselist.CitesClass[35]

Cites

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	1	+Limiting QI clogs the courts – empirically confirmed – best study, Noll 8’
	2	+Noll, David L. "Qualified Immunity in Limbo: Rights, Procedure, and the Social Costs of Damages Litigation Against Public Officials." NYUL Rev. 83 (2008): 911
	3	+In the context of ordinary civil litigation between two private parties, the total (or “social”) cost of litigation is generally limited to the cost of litigating the claim, the cost to the public of providing a dispute resolution system, and the cost created by an incorrect decision.36 Damages litigation against public officers, however, implicates several additional costs.37 As the case law on qualified immunity suggests, these additional costs should be assessed when deciding how to adjudicate a claim against a government official for damages.38 Damages litigation gives rise to unique negative externalities. Consider a hypothetical, based loosely on Iqbal, in which a mid-level Justice Department lawyer, sued for her personal role in the development of an allegedly unconstitutional policy, is required to comply with discovery requests (depositions, responses to interrogatories, document productions, and so on). Discovery will produce several direct costs: The lawyer will not simultaneously be able to perform her primary responsibilities (a concern that assumes particular importance if she serves a critical public function);39 she will avail herself of government resources, such as legal and informal assistance from other government employees, that are unavailable to private litigants; 40 and, except in cases of clear illegal conduct, the government will most likely indemnify her for any eventual settlement or damages award.41 Beyond these direct costs, the case law recognizes four categories of indirect costs of damages litigation against public officials. In contrast to the opportunity costs of haling a government employee into court and indemnifying her against a judgment, these costs are far more difficult to measure. Moreover, they generally reflect the assumption on the part of the courts that negative systemic effects follow from allowing a “culture” of litigation against government officials to develop.42 The first indirect cost is the risk that the “fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”43 A leading statement of the problem was delivered more than a half century ago by Judge Learned Hand.44 He argued that in the abstract, there is no legitimate reason that an official “guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others” should escape liability.45 But Hand noted that denying recovery may nonetheless be in the public interest: The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.46 Characteristically, Hand recognized that for the purposes of determining whether a particular class of claims should be allowed, the aggregate costs and benefits are what matters, not the justice of the individual case. The second indirect cost is the deadweight loss of nonmeritorious litigation, is a problem exacerbated by the disproportionate number of nonmeritorious constitutional tort claims.48 In the most comprehensive study of § 1983 litigation yet conducted, Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab concluded that “constitutional tort plaintiffs do significantly worse than non-civil rights litigants in every measurable way.”49 One article by a former Justice Department lawyer reported that of the more than 12,000 Bivens actions filed between 1971 and 1986, only thirty had resulted in judgments for plaintiffs, only four of those judgments had been paid, and settlements were rare.50 To be sure, there are meritorious damages claims against public officials, and they may have social benefits surpassing the value of individual claims. Yet the perception that constitutional tort cases “flood the federal courts with questionable claims that belong, if anywhere, in state court”51 is supported at least by anecdotal evidence and has undoubtedly affected the development of the modern qualified immunity doctrine.53
	4	+Clogging courts kills fair adjudication of cases and crowds out civil suits like the aff– turns case.
	5	+PFAW: PFAW (People for the American way) “Overloaded Courts, Not Enough Judges: The Impact on Real People” 2012.
	6	+Courts play a critical role for our nation and our communities. All Americans count on being able to “get their day in court.” Court delays damage small businesses, whether they are seeking to vindicate their rights as plaintiffs or to put a lawsuit behind them. Courts – the infrastructure of justice – are just as important to the rule of law as roads and bridges are to transportation. Without enough judges, that infrastructure is crumbling. Making our courts fully functional is an issue of good government. Federal judges are required to give priority to criminal cases over civil ones. Since the number of criminal cases has surged over the past several years – a 70 increase in the past decade – judges are forced to delay the civil cases, often for years. This means long delays for Americans seeking justice in cases involving: discrimination civil rights predatory lending practices consumer fraud immigrant rights environment government benefits business contracts mergers copyright infringement When there aren’t enough judges on the bench, many plaintiffs are forced into inadequate settlements, and small businesses are pressured to make unnecessary settlements to end the expense and uncertainty of litigation.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-03 19:51:58.507

Judge

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	1	+Suketh Subramanya

Opponent

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	1	+Westwood SM

ParentRound

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	1	+26

Round

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	1	+5

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Li Neg

Title

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	1	+ND - Court Clog DA

Tournament

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	1	+Longhorn Classic