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6 |
+The qualified immunity defense available to most executive branch officials in § 1983 cases is a creature of policy constructed by the Supreme Court for the express purpose of “shielding government actors from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”1 In contrast to the absolute immunity accorded to legislators, judges, and prosecutors, the Court no longer engages in any pretense that its qualified immunity rulings are interpreting the congressional intent underlying § 1983.2 In its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court openly refashioned the definition of qualified immunity in the interest of sparing public officials not only from liability, but also from the costs of litigation, “permitting the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”3 Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of the Court’s prior two-part definition of qualified immunity and rewrote the objective prong to provide that executive-branch officials are safeguarded from liability so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”4 In the years since Harlow, the Court has continued to refine the defense and expand the protection it affords government officials.5 At the same time, the breadth of the defense has become apparent in the Supreme Court decisions applying the Harlow standard. During the past fifteen years, the Court has issued eighteen opinions addressing the question whether a particular constitutional right was clearly established. |