Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[2]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[3]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[2]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-09-27 18:39:07.491
	1	+2016-09-27 18:39:07.0

Caselist.CitesClass[3]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,47 @@
	1	+The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer:
	2	+1. State Obligations- The constitutive obligation of governments is to be utilitarian.
	3	+Robert Goodin 90, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences, “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142
	4	+My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, they are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.
	5	+2. You should default to util if I win defense on their standard—we naturally want to make the world better.
	6	+Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 14 American philosopher. He specializes in ethics, epistemology, and more recently in neuroethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of cognitive science, "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed),
	7	+Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.
	8	+3. Respect for equality justifies util - util controls the internal link into K impacts and kant. Cummiskey 90
	9	+Cummiskey, David. Associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810 We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value, but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.
	10	+
	11	+I defend the resolution as a general principle, but can specify further if asked in CX. I’ll defend implementation through normal means.
	12	+Normal means entails phase out, shifting to climate friendly energy, and alleviating negative economic effects of removing nuclear power
	13	+CCNE 13 Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy, Organization Aiming at Fundamental Reform of Nuclear Energy Policy, “Our path to a nuclear-free Japan: an interim report Executive Summary,” October 2013
	14	+3.2 Review of nuclear liability regime The current compensation scheme for nuclear damage is defective and therefore should be reformed. There is a need for a new system to provide sufficient compensation for the damage caused by nuclear accidents and to provide relief for all the accident victims. The Nuclear Liability Law should be amended so that nuclear operators are liable for all damage compensation, thus factoring the risk of nuclear accidents into market calculations. As for compensation for damage caused by the disaster at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi plant, the aim should be full compensation, with aid in the form of active government involvement to deal with the current crisis as an exception. 3.3 An energy system for a sustainable society Existing energy policy should be radically reviewed, with a view to shifting the energy system to one that will lead to a sustainable society. An energy shift should be strongly promoted through policies concerning both supply and demand sides of power generation. This shift should have the following objectives: 1. Achieve a total shutdown of all nuclear power plants: speedily establish a society that can flourish without any nuclear power plants. 2. Mitigate climate change: mitigate climate change because of its long-term and catastrophic consequences; bring energy policy in line with long-term measures on global warming. 3. Achieve energy self-sufficiency (both at the national and regional levels): reduce dependence of Japan’s energy supply on other countries and achieve national energy security; promote the use of local distributed energy, and strive to achieve energy independence at the local level. 3.4 Easing impacts on electricity supply and on the economy In the course of phasing out nuclear power, appropriate measures should be applied to alleviate short-term impacts on power supply. In order to meet current electricity demand without nuclear power generation, use of fossil fuels has increased. However, it is desirable that serious efforts be made to reduce absolute power demand. To this end, a power-saving plan with clear targets combined with varying electricity prices depending on the consumption rate should be considered. It is often argued that two factors are pressing the management of electric utilities: increasing cost of procuring fossil fuel, and costs related to nuclear power plants – for maintenance and safety precautions. By phasing out nuclear power, the latter cost will no longer be incurred. Adverse impacts on the economy can be further alleviated with policies promoting electricity saving and the introduction of renewable energy. To recapitulate, the vision is twofold: on the one hand, power consumption will be curbed with serious power-saving plans; while on the other hand local distributed renewable energy business will stimulate the local economy. To ease economic impacts on municipalities with nuclear power plants and other affiliated industries, it is important to understand the reasons why those local authorities hosted nuclear power plants in the first place. A good understanding of such matters will be the key to effectively facilitating support policies that can revive primary industry (agriculture, forestry and fishing), that make full use of resources available in the regions, and that promote local-led energy policy, especially focusing on renewable energy sources. 3.5 Decommissioning of nuclear stations and liquidation of electric utilities and related nuclear energy companies The following proposal is offered in regard to the “decommissioning process” and management issues associated with electric power companies. It is addressed to TEPCO and the eight other general electric utilities2 operating nuclear power plants in Japan. Generally, taking responsibility for mismanagement ultimately implies going bankrupt. The electric power industry is a public-utility industry. In Japan, however, private companies have been in charge of this industry. As long as the electric companies are private enterprises, they cannot avoid taking responsibility as private businesses.
	15	+COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR POWER IS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED EMISSIONS AND DECREASED COMMITMENT TO RENEWABLE ENERGY. The AC the best known way to reduce emissions. Germanos 8/23
	16	+Andrea Germanos (senior editor and staff writer for Common Dreams, a progressive news source), New Study Casts Doubt on the Future of Nuclear Power, 8/23/2016, Ecowatch.
	17	+While it's been touted by some energy experts as a so-called "bridge" to help slash carbon emissions, a new study suggests that a commitment to nuclear power may in fact be a path towards climate failure. For their study, researchers at the University of Sussex and the Vienna School of International Studies grouped European countries by levels of nuclear energy usage and plans, and compared their progress with part of the European Union's 2020 Strategy.
	18	+
	19	+That 10-year strategy, proposed in 2010, calls for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by least 20 percent compared to 1990 levels and increasing the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20 percent. The researchers found that "progress in both carbon emissions reduction and in adoption of renewables appears to be inversely is related to the strength of continuing nuclear commitments." For the study, the authors looked at three groupings. First is those with no nuclear energy. Group 1 includes Denmark, Ireland and Portugal. Group 2, which counts Germany and Sweden among its members, includes those with some continuing nuclear commitments, but also with plans to decommission existing nuclear plants. The third group, meanwhile, includes countries like Hungary and the UK which have plans to maintain current nuclear units or even expand nuclear capacity. "With reference to reductions in carbon emissions and adoption of renewables, clear relationships emerge between patterns of achievement in these 2020 Strategy goals and the different groupings of nuclear use," they wrote. For non-nuclear Group 1 countries, the average percentage of reduced emissions was 6 percent and they had an average of a 26 percent increase in renewable energy consumption. Group 2 had the highest average percentage of reduced emissions at 11 percent and they also boosted renewable energy to 19 percent. Pro-nuclear Group 3, meanwhile, had their emissions on average go up 3 percent and they had the smallest increase in renewables shares—16 percent. "Looked at on its own, nuclear power is sometimes noisily propounded as an attractive response to climate change," said Andy Stirling, professor of science and technology policy at the University of Sussex, in a media statement. "Yet if alternative options are rigorously compared, questions are raised about cost-effectiveness, timeliness, safety and security." "Looking in detail at historic trends and current patterns in Europe, this paper substantiates further doubts," he continued. "By suppressing better ways to meet climate goals, evidence suggests entrenched commitments to nuclear power may actually be counterproductive." The new study focused on Europe and Benjamin Sovacool, professor of energy policy and director of the Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex, stated, "If nothing else, our paper casts doubt on the likelihood of a nuclear renaissance in the near-term, at least in Europe."
	20	+Contention - Radiation
	21	+Nuclear radiation and waste causes acute poisoning, cancer, and death in nearby areas. Kyne et al 16 Dean Kyne, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Bob Bolin, School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, “Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, July 12, 2016
	22	+In general, individuals living around nuclear power plants face potential health risks posed by complex nuclear technologies. There are two categories of risks: those stemming from day-to-day operations and those arising from catastrophic failures. In case of acute failures, large areas around the nuclear plants face potential exposure to highly toxic radioactive releases, soil and water contamination, radiation from melted fuels, and large exclusion zones of uninhabitable land (as in both Chernobyl and Fukushima). The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 is the most recent reminder that nuclear power plants are subject to catastrophic failures with the potential to produce radiation-related diseases, as well displace hundreds of thousands of people and render large areas contaminated for centuries. And while these extreme events are relatively infrequent, when they occur multiple generations will be burdened with the environmental and health costs of these disasters, as Chernobyl has amply demonstrated (see 20). Reactors pose environmental and health risks even during routine operation in the form of low level radioactive emissions from a variety of sources 21. Further, with the U.S. commercial nuclear reactor aging, concerns exist that the likelihood of cooling system leaks, contamination events, plant fires, and other “normal accidents” could increase in frequency with aging and degrading plant infrastructure 7,22. Individuals living near nuclear power plants are potentially exposed to various sources of ionizing radiation. Every reactor releases radioactive gases that are routinely vented through stacks in the reactor roof and from the steam generators; every hour about 100 cubic feet of radioactive gases are released; purging of radioactive materials in pipes is conducted frequently (22 purges per year are allowed per reactor); discharging radioactive water into surrounding areas when it is too hazardous for plant workers to handle; using 20,000 gallons of water for cooling the reactor core every minute, with the cooling water becoming contaminated by radioactive tritium (tritiated water). Of this, 5000 gallons of tritiated water per minute are released into adjacent lakes, rivers, or the ocean, and an additional 15,000 gallons are vented into the atmosphere as steam 20. (The potential health effects of exposure to radionuclides include (1) tritium or tritiated water becoming a part of bodily fluids within one or two hours of exposure; (2) plutonium-23 causing blood cancers such as lymphoma or leukemia; (3) iodine-131 which is quickly absorbed by the thyroid causing thyroid cancer; (4) strontium-90 which the body treats like calcium staying in the breast causing breast cancer; (5) Cesium-137 which is absorbed by muscle cells causing cancer; and (6) radioactive noble gases causing mutations in eggs and sperm 23). The World Nuclear Association claimed that it is difficult to detect the cancer in the individuals who are exposed to less than 100 mSv 24. The U.S. NRC has also claimed that biological effects from exposure to low level radiation are small and may not be detectable 25. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided guidelines to evacuate or remain in shelter when the radiation dose reaches between 1 and 5 rems (10 mSv to 50 mSv) projected dose over four days in the early stage of nuclear power accident 26. Nevertheless, in the past 30 years, scientists in Europe and the USA have repeatedly studied and confirmed that normal operation of reactors causes cancer, especially in children 27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46.
	23	+
	24	+Any risk of nuclear leakage is a risk not worth taking. Fukushima’s consequences have been undercovered for years. Michael 15
	25	+Fukushima: the Extinction-Level Event that no one is Talking About. Doug Michael. March 30, 2015
	26	+Japan is a nation containing many nuclear reactors which produce roughly 30 of the nation’s electricity.3 The majority of operable nuclear reactors are right along the coast, in one of the most seismically active areas on the entire planet! The powerful tsunami caused complete devastation of three of the six nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi facility, the cores of which melted within the first three days. In November 2011, the Japanese Science Ministry reported that radioactive cesium had contaminated 11,580 twelve thousand square miles of the land surface of Japan,4 with an additional 4,500 square miles contaminated.5 The destroyed reactor sites have been dumping hundreds of tons of radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean, every single day for the past four years and the devastating results are now becoming plainly obvious. Radioactive cesium (an alkali metal) rapidly contaminates an ecosystem and poisons the entire food chain, and this waste offshoot has been detected in Japanese foodstuffs over a 200 mile radius of the Daiichi facility.6 Cesium and other radioactive waste products are bioaccumulative, meaning that they accumulate in an organism at a rate faster than the organism can eliminateinge it. Of course the Japanese government and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) have blatantly lied about the amount of radioactive waste that has been leaking into the Pacific, however, the devastating results have been impossible to ignore. I’ve wondered since the beginning of this disaster-which has already shown to be far worse that the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine, in 1986-why the world’s top, leading scientists have not come together to figure out how to stop the leaking radiation. The reason is because no one knows how to deal with this catastrophe. In March of 2015, it was reported in the Times of London, that Akira Ono, the chief of the Fukushima power station admitted that the technology needed to decommission the three melted-down reactors does not exist, and he has no idea how it will be developed.7 More recently, Naohiro Masuda, the decommissioning chief of the Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning Company, also stated that the technology does not exist to remove the highly radioactive debris from the damaged reactors:
	27	+
	28	+Only a ban can resolve risks. Lucas 12 Caroline Lucas, MP for Brighton Pavilion and a member of the cross-party parliamentary environment audit committee, “Why we must phase out nuclear power,” The Guardian, February 17, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/17/phase-out-nuclear-power Fukushima, like Chernobyl 25 years before it, has shown us that while the likelihood of a nuclear disaster occurring may be low, the potential impact is enormous. The inherent risk in the use of nuclear energy, as well as the related proliferation of nuclear technologies, can and does have disastrous consequences. The only certain way to eliminate this potentially devastating risk is to phase out nuclear power altogether. Some countries appear to have learnt this lesson. In Germany, the government changed course in the aftermath of Fukushima and decided to go ahead with a previously agreed phase out of nuclear power. Many scenarios now foresee Germany sourcing 100 of its power needs from renewables by 2030. Meanwhile Italian citizens voted against plans to go nuclear with a 90 majority. The same is not yet true in Japan. Although only three out of its 54 nuclear reactors are online and generating power, while the Japanese authorities conduct "stress tests", the government hopes to reopen almost all of these and prolong the working life of a number of its ageing reactors by to up to 60 years. The Japanese public have made their opposition clear however. Opinion polls consistently show a strong majority of the population is now against nuclear power. Local grassroots movements opposing nuclear power have been springing up across Japan. Mayors and governors in fear of losing their power tend to follow the majority of their citizens. The European level response has been to undertake stress tests on nuclear reactors across the union. However, these stress tests appear to be little more than a PR exercise to encourage public acceptance in order to allow the nuclear industry to continue with business as usual. The tests fail to assess the full risks of nuclear power, ignoring crucial factors such as fires, human failures, degradation of essential infrastructure or the impact of an airplane crash.
	29	+Nuclear reactors and waste disposal sites cause massive death rates for workers and people living nearby. Alldred et al 09 Mary Alldred and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/final-pdf-ej-nuke-siting-wi-Alldred_08-0544.pdf
	30	+In stages (2)–(5) of the nuclear fuel cycle, tens of millions of radiation workers, including nearly two million in the United States, also have faced environmental injustice EIJ. US nuclear-facility owners legally may expose workers to annual radiation doses up to 50 times higher than those allowed for members of the public, although there is no safe dose of ionizing radiation. Yet radiation workers typically receive no hazard pay or compensating wage differential. Often they also do not voluntarily accept dangerous nuclear jobs but take them because of economic necessity, because government falsification of worker radiation doses has mislead them, or because flawed radiation standards, flawed risk disclosure, and flawed workplace-radiation monitoring cause them to underestimate risks. Yet the risks are substantial. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) shows roughly 1 additional fatal cancer each time 60 people are exposed to the maximum-allowable, annual occupational-radiation dose of 50 Sieverts mSv. US nuclear-waste policies in stages (8)–(9), radioactive waste transport/storage, likewise have already caused EIJ (as serious contamination at Hanford, Maxey Flats, Sa- vannah River, and other cases have shown), and EIJ also is likely when future waste-containment canisters fail— long before the million years that (the US National Academy of Sciences says) nuclear wastes must be completely secured. Because the US government has falsified and manipulated data on radioactive-waste risk (much of which will be borne by Appalachian, Latino, and Native-American populations, who live in higher proportions near existing and proposed nuclear-waste-storage sites), United Nations and nuclear-industry studies warn that the US government may underestimate future waste- repository-radiation doses by 9–12 orders of magnitude. Yet even if proposed future US nuclear-waste standards are met, their leniency likely will impose EIJ on future generations. After 10,000 years, they would allow expo- sures of 100 millirems/year (limits 1,000 percent higher than current standards for US Department of Energy fa- cilities). They also use only mean or average dose to as- sess regulatory compliance. This means that, provided that the average person’s exposure is no more than 100 millirems, many other people would be allowed to receive higher, even fatal, doses.8,26
	31	+Transporting nuclear waste exposes large population centers to radiation- takes out any dump site CP. Kyne et al 2 Dean Kyne, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Bob Bolin, School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, “Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, July 12, 2016
	32	+The primary concern of activists, tribes, and communities opposing these two sites is the sheer volume of nuclear waste that will traverse highways and railways through population centers in transit from nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons sites 12. New DOE plans referenced above would still require the large scale movement of wastes through population centers. Given the recent history of oil train accidents in North America, legitimate concerns exist as to the environmental and human health consequences should a highway or rail accident result in the release of highly toxic radioactive material in a population center. While the DOE asserts that it is “impossible” for canisters containing highly radioactive materials to rupture, the recent fire and container breach at the WIPP site suggests otherwise. Currently, with no site open to accept high level or transuranic waste, nuclear waste transportation safety issues are temporarily reduced. Of course, Yucca mountain remains a federal mandate under the NWPAA, however ill-advised the location appears in site characterization studies 17. The tail end of the nuclear fuel cycle—specifically permanent, safe burial—remains an unsolved technical problem, a deeply controversial political issue, and a significant transgenerational environmental justice concern.
	33	+
	34	+Probability of high impact accident spiraling out of control.
	35	+Verbruggen 08 Aviel Verbruggen, Full professor at the University of Antwerp, Energy and Environmental Economist, "Renewable and nuclear power: A common future?" Energy Policy 36, 2008, 4036–4047
	36	+As in the case of climate change, there is evidence about the convex growth of the externality costs even when uncertainty about numbers cannot be resolved. Fig. 4 shows two curves that grow steeply with the expansion of nuclear installations and the number of sites. The bottom curve expresses the likelihood of major nuclear accidents when more and more countries would engage in nuclear activities and the number of installations grows. The probability that somewhere a major accident occurs is increasing faster than linearly, also because less-acquainted countries will enter the nuclear area. The damage costs follow a steeper pattern because of the collateral damage triggered by a single accident on the other nuclear activities. Combining the two factors (probability and consequences) into a single risk measure (Covello and Merkhofer, 1993), and applying the standards of risk acceptability, the combination of a nonnegligible and growing likelihood with the immeasurable high damages of a major nuclear accident or nuclear warfare, will conclude that nuclear power falls into the non-acceptable domain of human enterprising. While the impacts of nuclear technologies, their failures and abuses, can have devastating consequences of similar size and irreversibility as climate change impacts, there are important differences between both challenges that make public understanding and policy reactions different. Carbon emission sources are continuous and numerous, globally spread and controlled by billions of decision-makers. Also the various effects are building up continuously, globally spread and fall—although unevenly—yet on all people on earth. Nuclear technologies and sources are concentrated and controlled by a few (and for security and safety reasons the few should become fewer and preferably zero), and the most harmful effects are punctual in time with effects spreading unpredictably from the point of impact (accidents, nuclear bombs). Risk assessment of the nuclear option is more extreme than risk assessment of climate change damages. The probabilities of particular events are smaller but the consequences of one single event are more catastrophic. One can learn from accidents, nearaccidents and incidents that happened and continue to happen. Although the learning processes are not well structured and characterized by opposite interpretations (nuclear advocates versus nuclear critics), a majority of the public evaluates nuclear risks higher than the benefits delivered by the power output of nuclear plants (Turkenburg, 2004; Eurobarometer, 2007). Nuclear advocates call this attitude ‘barriers’ of public acceptance (IEA, 2006a, p. 134) and the nuclear sector invested and invests lots of money to convince the public and politicians to change their mind and balloting
	37	+
	38	+Nuclear waste harms future generations. Rendall 1:
	39	+“Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation” / Dr. Matthew Rendall/ School of Politics and International Relations Intergenerational justice deals with our obligations to past or future generations, particularly those with which our own lives do not overlap.  Certain actions – such as cutting down forests or producing radioactive waste – let us make gains at our descendants’ expense.  Tax cuts now, debt repayments later can be a winning formula for re-election, as recent U.S. history shows.  “In many intergenerational situations … it is less costly in the short term to ignore the problem,” observes Kimberly Wade-Benzoni.  “… In the long run, however, it ends up costing more – but those costs accrue to a different set of people.”  Intergenerational exploitation is particularly common in the environmental sphere.  Nuclear power raises many of the same distributive issues as nuclear deterrence.  We enjoy the electricity now; future generations face most of the risks.  We exploit our descendants by creating an externality in our favor, since “future generations must bear very significant costs without having received the benefits of the activities prior to the accident.”  So too with nuclear deterrence.  The objection that “no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved” applies at least as much to nuclear weapons as to nuclear waste.  Does any reasonable person, let alone a realist, expect deterrence to work for millennia without catastrophic “accidents”?
	40	+The violation is the worst because future generations are the most vulnerable. Agents in current generation are alive and have a chance of acting to ameliorate their situation and are thus include in willing the means to any end, whereas future generation don’t exist.
	41	+
	42	+Obligation not to harm future generations is based on minimizing harm- we outweigh under util.
	43	+Taebi 11
	44	+Behnam Taebi, prof of philosophy @ Delft University, “The Morally Desirable Option for Nuclear Power Production” Philos. Technol. (2011) 24. Following Barry's principle of vital interest to the effect that “the vital interests of people in the future have the same priority as the vital interests of people in the present” (Barry 1999, 97–99), I present the obligation not to negatively influence the vital interests of future generations by safeguarding their safety and security. This can alternatively be termed the obligation “not to harm” posterity. There is something that has to be said about the origins and the applications of this principle. One of the fundamental ethical obligations underscoring all human interaction is that of avoiding harm to others. In social interaction between people, for instance, it has been argued that an individual is sovereign as long as he is not harming another individual (Mill 1859/1998: 14). This no harm principle is also a leading creed for health care professionals; the related maxim that is frequently invoked in health care is thus: “to do no harm above all else” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009: Ch. 5). In environmental policy making, too, this principle is becoming increasingly influential, for instance, where it inspires the Precautionary Principle: namely “when an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”, as stipulated in the Wingspread Statement.6 What is particularly interesting about the precautionary principle is that it shifts the burden of proof; so, we should refrain from an activity (e.g., developing or applying a technology) unless there is enough evidence that it will not cause severe harm (Jonas 1984). Critics argue that this principle sets the bar so high that it could hamper technological innovation, but the question of where to set the bar is a matter of how to interpret the precautionary principle in the face of uncertainty. The precautionary principle has, above all else, “a purposeful role in guiding future political and regulatory action” (O’Riordan and Cameron 1994, 16). The no harm duty as advocated here resembles the precautionary principle in that it urges us to refrain from action whenever our actions might result in harm being inflicted upon future generations. So, in this interpretation, we would not guarantee future generations’ “equal opportunity”; rather, we should refrain from action if such action could endanger posterity’s “equal opportunity.”
	45	+High magnitude focus precludes debate’s potential to discuss meaningful systematic issues - Assume DA’s have a 1 risk before I answer them, low risk is no risk
	46	+Cohn 13, Nate, staff writer for The New Republic , Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate, 2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic
	47	+So let me offer another possibility: the problem isn’t the topic, but modern policy debate. The unrealistic scenarios, exclusive focus on policy scholarship, and inability to engage systemic impacts and philosophical questions. And so long as these problems characterize modern policy debate, teams will feel compelled to avoid it. It might be tempting to assign the blame to “USFG should.” But these are bugs, not features of plan-focused, USFG-based, active voice topics. These bugs result from practices and norms that were initially and independently reasonable, but ultimately and collectively problematic. I also believe that these norms can and should be contested. I believe it would be possible for me to have a realistic, accessible, and inclusive discussion about the merits of a federal policy with, say, Amber Kelsie. Or put differently, I’m not sure I agree with Jonah that changing the topic is the only way to avoid being “a bunch of white folks talking about nuke war.” The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s a serious indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological questions or arguments about why “predictions fail.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction. There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability.But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact. Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be doesn’t replicateing areal world policy assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, disadvantages are underpinned by dozens or perhaps hundreds of discrete assumptions each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.” And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war. I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content. Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4. Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? are Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math results in (.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=..01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even before the affirmative offers a direct responses. Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and it doesn’t take much more too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction.

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-09-27 18:39:11.153

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Chris Vincent

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Marcus KL

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Strake Jesuit Li Aff

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+SO - Radiation AC

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Grapevine