Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[27]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[27]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[27]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-02-22 20:19:50.548
	1	+2017-02-22 20:19:50.0

Caselist.CitesClass[27]

Cites

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	1	+I value morality since the resolution is normative. Every agent has a practical identity that is the source of value.
	2	+Christine M. Korsgaard 92, professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. “The Sources of Normativity”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
	3	+Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different rea- son. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self- consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of our- selves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a meta- physical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliber- ate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself. An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will deter- mine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theo- retical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.
	4	+And, reason is inescapable—even asking for reason uses reason. Any attempt to make a coherent argument is still evaluated from reason which means agency is confined by reason.
	5	+And, truth exist independent of human experience since certain things are self-proving, i.e. a triangle has three sides. It doesn’t matter whether we call it something since the truth of the statement is contained within itself. In contrast, things that are true by observation are just true by matter of chance. For example, we conceive of a world in which I have blue hair since it is only by chance that I have brown hair. Reject a posteriori truth since they are just arbitrary states, not constitutive of our ethical theories.
	6	+The content of normative claims has to be contained within themselves—the nature of obligation is what gives us the ability to deduct what obligations we have.
	7	+David Velleman 05 (Professor of Philosophy at New York University). “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. 2005.
	8	+Kant reasoned that if moral requirements don't derive their force from any external authority, then they must carry their authority with them, simply by virtue of what they require. That's why Kant thought that he could derive the content of our obligations from the very concept of an obligation. The concept of an obligation, he argued, is the concept of an intrinsically authoritative requirement—a requirement that, simply by virtue of what it requires, forestalls any question as to its authority. So if we want to know what we're morally required to do, we must find something such that a requirement to do it would not be open to question. We must find something such that a requirement would carry authority simply by virtue of requiring that thing.
	9	+That means only my framework can be binding—agents can try reject other normative metrics if unless the value of the obligation is contained within itself.
	10	+Second Analytic
	11	+Thus, the standard is consistency in the rational will.
	12	+Prefer it independently:
	13	+1. Absent a rational will, actions become unintelligible since the intent determines the action.
	14	+Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014
	15	+ “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,” if that just means a bodily movement, has any moral value. Suppose that you are starving, and I am about to eat a sandwich when I learn about this. And suppose that just then I am attacked by a series of involuntary muscle spasms that cause me to make exactly the same physical movements I would make if I were giving you my sandwich. No one would claim that this “external performance” has any moral value. An act must be done with a certain proximate or immediate intention in order to count as an act at all. And that proximate or immediate intention is already part of an action’s motive. So in order to even count as “giving you my sandwich” I have to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.”
	16	+2. The ability to rationally will an end is prerequisite to any moral theory because it allows to choose moral actions in the first place and adhere to ethical codes. This coopts ethical theories like util because the ability to pursue pleasure is a prerequisite to achieving pleasure.
	17	+3. Anything being good commits us to valuing it unconditionally.
	18	+Christine M. Korsgaard 06 ( Professor at Harvard) “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt”. Pg. 7 RC
	19	+“If practical reasons are public, however, it must be possible for us to share them: that is, to share in their normative force. Any reasons that I assign to you must also be ones that I can share with you and can take to have normative force for me. In that case I cannot will to steal an object from you unless I could possibly will that you should in similar circumstances steal the object from me. Assuming that I cannot do that, consistent with my end of possessing the object, I find that I cannot will this maxim as a universal law. And therefore I conclude that my wanting something cannot provide a sufficient reason for stealing it. So if the universal law universalizes over all rational beings and yields public reasons, then it turns out to be something like Kant’s moral law.”
	20	+Also means that only my framework gives reason for action and thus guide agents to act in certain ways.
	21	+Contention
	22	+I advocate that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I’ll defend consequentialist impacts, but they’re not relevant under my framework since I just need to need to show that the maxim of the aff is consistent with the rational will. And, the aff is omission since public colleges and universities are not taking an action, whereas the neg has to defend the proactive measure of restricting free speech.
	23	+First Analytic
	24	+Second, there is a distinction between right and virtue. Right refers to external freedom, i.e. your ability to not be coerced, whereas virtue refers to a more internal freedom, i.e. you being internally motivated to make an ethical choice. Restricting free speech prevents being from being able to truly act on ethical choices.
	25	+Helga Varden 10 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
	26	+The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality as such is beyond its proper grasp. Right concerns only external freedom, which is limited to what can be hindered in space and time (coerced), whereas morality also requires internal freedom. That is to say, morality encompasses both right and virtue, and virtue requires what Kant calls freedom with regard to “internal use of choice”. Internal freedom requires a person both to act on universalizable maxims and to do so from the motivation of duty (6: 220f) – and neither can be coercively enforced. This is why Kant argues that only freedom with regard to interacting persons’ external use of choice (right) can be coercively enforced; freedom with regard to both internal (virtue) and external use of choice – morality – cannot be coercively enforced (ibid.). Because morality requires freedom with regard to both internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced.
	27	+That’s creates inconsistency in the rational will—people will ethical actions from unethical motivations which leads to contradiction.
	28	+Third, it’s impossible for words to violate someone’s external freedom since it is up to the listener to believe them or not.
	29	+Helga Varden 2 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
	30	+This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them the listeners whether they want to believe her him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coer- cion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
	31	+And, yes, while in some instances words can be used coerce others, i.e. fighting words, that simply justifies limiting free speech in that particular instance, not as general principle.
	32	+Moreover, simply saying something immoral or reprehensible is different from coercion via threats.
	33	+Helga Varden 3 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
	34	+Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech. When you threaten me, you tell me that you do not intend to interact rightfully with me in the future. Simply saying so does not deprive me of anything that is mine, of course, but if you are serious and have the ability to make a strike against me, that is, if you really are threatening me, then you intend to back up your words with physical force. When you really threaten me, neither are you uttering ‘empty words’ nor are you taking yourself to be doing so. For example, assume that instead of yielding to your threat, I begin to walk away. You then move forward to block my retreat. This signals your intention to follow through with the threat. In fact, you might engage in other acts to signal that the threat is not empty. Perhaps you crush my hat under your foot or take a baseball bat to my car. In cases like these the words con- tained in the threat no longer function merely as speech but take on the role of communicating an intended future wrongdoing against me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-22 20:19:54.543

Judge

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	1	+David Branse

Opponent

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	1	+American Heritage Boca Delray EM

ParentRound

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	1	+27

Round

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	1	+6

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Li Aff

Title

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	1	+JF - Kant AC

Tournament

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	1	+Harvard