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1 -I value morality since the resolution is normative. Every agent has a practical identity that is the source of value.
2 -Christine M. Korsgaard 92, professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. “The Sources of Normativity”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
3 -Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think
4 -AND
5 -identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.
6 -The content of normative claims has to be contained within themselves—the nature of obligation is what gives us the ability to deduct what obligations we have.
7 -David Velleman 05 (Professor of Philosophy at New York University). “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. 2005.
8 -Kant reasoned that if moral requirements don't derive their force from any external authority,
9 -AND
10 -that a requirement would carry authority simply by virtue of requiring that thing.
11 -Thus, the standard is consistency in the rational will.
12 -Prefer it independently:
13 -
14 -Absent a rational will, actions become unintelligible since the intent determines the action.
15 -Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014
16 - “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,”
17 -AND
18 -to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.”
19 -3. Anything being good commits us to valuing it unconditionally.
20 -Christine M. Korsgaard 06 ( Professor at Harvard) “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt”. Pg. 7 RC
21 -“If practical reasons are public, however, it must be possible for us
22 -AND
23 -reasons, then it turns out to be something like Kant’s moral law.”
24 -Also means that only my framework gives reason for action and thus guide agents to act in certain ways.
25 -Contention
26 -I advocate that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I’ll defend consequentialist impacts, but they’re not relevant under my framework since I just need to need to show that the maxim of the aff is consistent with the rational will.
27 -First,
28 -Second, there is a distinction between right and virtue. Right refers to external freedom, i.e. your ability to not be coerced, whereas virtue refers to a more internal freedom, i.e. you being internally motivated to make an ethical choice. Restricting free speech prevents being from being able to truly act on ethical choices.
29 -Helga Varden 10 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
30 -The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality as
31 -AND
32 -to both internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced.
33 -Third, it’s impossible for words to violate someone’s external freedom since it is up to the listener to believe them or not.
34 -Helga Varden 2 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
35 -This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains
36 -AND
37 -cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
38 -Moreover, simply saying something immoral or reprehensible is different from coercion via threats.
39 -Helga Varden 3 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
40 -Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech.
41 -AND
42 -me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view.
43 -Underview
44 -Silencing bigots only re-entrenches their position and galvanizes their opposition to social justice movements
45 -Levinovitz 16 Alan Levinovitz, assistant professor of religion at James Madison University, “How Trigger Warnings Silence Religious Students,” The Atlantic, August 30, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/silencing-religious-students-on-campus/497951/
46 - There is no doubt that in America, the perspective of white, heterosexual
47 -AND
48 -deeply held beliefs. It would be a shame to execute him again.
49 -Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech.
50 -ACLU Hate Speech On Campus, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
51 -Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more
52 -AND
53 -, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance.
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1 -Part 1: Framework
2 -Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
3 -
4 -There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
5 -Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
6 -“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
7 -Implications:
8 -A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. Mills Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
9 -“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
10 -2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
11 -Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
12 -“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
13 -Impacts:
14 -A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
15 -B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
16 -Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
17 -“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
18 -And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
19 -The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.
20 -Mouffe 2k Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
21 -"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
22 -Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
23 -Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
24 -Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
25 -“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives.
26 -2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
27 -A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
28 -B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
29 -C. It’s a no risk issue- they have to justify that something can be uncontestable in order to prove antagonism is good for ethics.
30 -3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
31 -4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
32 -Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
33 -The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
34 -Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
35 -Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
36 -"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
37 -Part 2: Advocacy
38 -I defend the resolution as a generl principle.
39 -Part 3: Contention
40 -Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
41 -Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
42 -Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
43 -Thus, affirm:
44 -Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
45 -Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
46 -I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
47 -This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
48 -Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
49 - Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
50 -Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
51 -Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
52 -Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
53 -Free speech was written into the constitution explicitly to be a counter-majoritarian right to promote agonistic discourse
54 -Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
55 -According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
56 -Adversarial democracy entails protection of constitutional speech. Also justifies why cooperative conceptions of democracy fail in the context of free speech.
57 -Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
58 -Acceptance of the premises of adversary democracy has important implications for the scope of the theory of free expression. Post and Meiklejohn were both correct in positing a symbiotic intersection between democracy and free expression. Recognition of both the normative and empirical superiority of the adversary model of democracy, however, suggests that the First Amendment's domain extends significantly farther than either Post or Meiklejohn's theories would permit. Adversary democracy, it should be recalled, posits that democracy invariably involves an adversarial competition among competing personal, social, or economic interests. Individuals are able to protect their own interests or to achieve their ideological goals by (1) participating in the proc- ess of governing by exercise of the vote, and (2) attempting, through exercise of their expressive powers, to persuade others to accept their positions. The First Amendment, therefore, must protect (1) all speech that facilitates the individual's democratic decisionmaking; (2) all lawful advocacy;3° ' (3) all speech that facilitates the individual's awareness of her self-interest; and (4) all speech that facilitates the individual's ability to maintain and develop her individuality in spite of collective life. Notably, this does not mean that the government is absolutely barred from regulating speech that falls in these four categories. It simply means that it can do so only when the regulation survives strict scrutiny. While the adversary theory of the First Amendment would protect all of the speech that Meiklejohn's and Post's theories would protect, it would also protect much of the expression these theories exclude. As previously noted, both Meiklejohn and Post strained their theories' claims to being democratic in order to exclude certain forms of self-interested speech. Meiklejohn not only violated the core principle of epistemological humility to justify his exclusion of economically self-interested speech from the First Amendment, he also excluded such self-interested speech despite its potential to inform democratic decisionmaking, which he believed to be the sole constitutional purpose for protecting speech in the first place. Post likewise casts off or at least devalues core aspects of democratic autonomy, such as the vote and the information that makes it more informed, despite the fact that doing so concomitantly undermines his theory's ability to secure democratic legitimacy, the value it purportedly protects. Perhaps it is inevitable that cooperative theories of democracy would struggle to articulate a coherent theory of free speech, precisely because of their inherent rejection of the adversary premise and its centrality to core notions of democracy. Based on their theoretical premise that democracy is an exercise of collective self-determination in pursuit of shared objectives, cooperative theories of the First Amendment might always be faced with something of a difficult choice. They could remain true to their First Amendment premises for protecting speech-listener autonomy in Meiklejohn's model, for instance. But to the extent they do so, they might necessarily violate a theoretical premise of the underlying cooperative democratic theory, such as Meiklejohn's premise that self-government should pursue the common good rather than private self-interest. Put differently, cooperative theories of democracy are fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of epistemological humility that the First Amendment embodies because, either implicitly or explicitly, they reflect predetermined conclusions about how autonomy should be exercised. In this manner, both theories suffer from the oxymoronic concept of externally determined autonomy. Adversary democracy does not suffer from the same problem because it contains no underlying premise as to how or why autonomy should be exercised.3 "' Instead, it commits these choices to the individual. Thus, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue the course of action he thinks is in the best interests of the community or the nation, adversary democracy authorizes him to do so. On the other hand, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue what he thinks is in his own private self-interest, adversary democracy says he may do so. Because adversary democracy is consistent with these process-based autonomy decisions, one employing the adversary theory of the First Amendment is never tempted to exclude speech otherwise logically included within the amendment's scope simply because its speaker is not acting in accordance with some predetermined ideal of political behavior. More importantly, the adversary theory of free expression is preferable to Meiklejohn's and Post's theories because it equally protects all aspects of democratic autonomy, rather than selectively privileging some aspects over others. Assuming that the purpose of a democratic theory of the First Amendment is, indeed, to facilitate democracy, which in turn necessarily implies the notions of epistemological humility and true voter autonomy, such comprehensive protection for all aspects of process-based autonomy is crucial to a theory's success. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, which categorically excludes speaker autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy, and unlike Post's theory, which systematically underprotects listener autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy that do not facilitate the emergence of a common will, the adversary theory of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all its manifestations.
59 -Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
60 -Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
61 -Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.
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1 -Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken cases and evidence that they’ve read during the year on the NDCA wiki.
2 -
3 -Interpretation: Debaters may not read a conditional advoacy
4 -
5 -Interpretation: Debaters may not read counterplans that include the aff’s advocacy with an exception. In the context of this topic, it means the neg cannot defend a ban on all reactors, except for a specific type of reactor.
6 -
7 -Interpretation – If the aff clarifies this advocacy in the form of a text in the 1AC then the negative must have an explicit text in the 1NC clarifying their advocacy with a solvency advocate in the topic literature.
8 -
9 -Interpretation: If the Negative reads an alternative to a K in the 1NC, they must textually delineate whether the alternative is implemented hypothetically in a post-fiat world, or if the alternative is a method/strategy under which the NC does not defend implementation.
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1 -Inherency
2 -Police officers handle massive numbers of IPV cases and aren’t providing sufficient protection Schuerman 16
3 -Incidents of IPV domestic violence occur against women in the United States at epidemic rates.' Up to 60 of all married women suffer physical abuse at the hands of their spouses at some time during marriage.2 The fact that police officers spend more time responding to IPV domestic disturbances than to murders, rapes, and aggravated assaults reflects the pervasiveness of this problem. 3 At the same time, however, commentators often cite ineffective police response is as a chief reason for continuing high rates of IPV domestic violence.4 Traditionally, police response is limited to mediation, having the batterer temporarily leave the home, or referral to local community service agencies for counseling. 5 Most states make arrests are discretionary.6 As a consequence, it is rarely the favored response.7 Because city police departments deal with the majority of domestic violence calls, the problem is compounded by the fact that municipalities are generally immune from tort liability.8 Specifically, municipalities are and commonly not liable for the failure to provide police protection to individual members of the public.
4 -Plan
5 -Thus the plan: Resolved: The US congress ought model the Okin decision as federal policy in order to provide a clearly established limitation on qualified immunity Shtelmakher 10 :
6 -In cases arising from domestic-violence IPV complaints, federal courts apply the state-created danger doctrine inconsistently. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation establishing a standard for determining whether an individual police officer's conduct constitutes state-created danger. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg provides states with federal grants to combat violent crimes against women."' The purpose of § 3796gg is to help states "to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women." 1 2 To further this purpose, Congress should make the adoption of the state-created danger law a condition of states receiving grants under 3796gg. The most important aspect of the law is that it should reflect the sensitive and unique nature of IPV domestic violence." 3 To this end, the law should be modeled after the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin.1 Specifically, the law should state that state-created danger exists when a police officer's affirmative act or omission creates or enhances the danger to the victim. However, the affirmative act or omission does not have to be explicit. Instead, an affirmative act by law enforcement may be implicit, such as when officers' conduct communicates to an abuser that the officers will not interfere to stop the private violence. Additionally, the law should reflect that state-created danger does not exist when the only action taken by an officer is responding to a domestic-violence call, with no interaction between the officer and the victim or the abuser. Furthermore, courts should not apply the state-created danger doctrine where doing so would place officers in a predicament that subjects them to liability whether they take action or fail to do so.
7 -
8 -Establishing a standard is key to allowing IPV survivors to sue Shtelmakher 2
9 -Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against IPV domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation. Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct
10 -This is a limit of qualified immunity in that it reinforces the clearly established standard by create more specificities and limitations for police officers conduct in certain situations especially whent hey omit from action, thus any violation of the standard means that the officer can be brought to trial in the situation of IPV.
11 -Advantage
12 -Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Schwartz 11
13 -Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
14 -The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
15 -LAWSUITS LEAD TO REFORMS and areNOT DEPENDENT ON A DETERRENT EFFECT
16 -Schwartz, Joanna (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
17 -My findings illustrate a previously overlooked vision of lawsuits’ role in performance improvement: as a source of information. Lawsuits identify allegations of misconduct that are investigated to determine whether officer discipline is appropriate, and are considered with other data for possible trends. The evidence developed in discovery and trial can offer a detailed picture of underlying events that is used to identify personnel and policy failures. Closed case files, compared with internal investigations, can identify weaknesses in internal procedures. And trends in settlements and judgments, like initial claim trends, can identify units or procedures that should be more carefully reviewed. Viewed in isolation or in conjunction with other data, lawsuits can offer insights about the incidence and causes of individual and organizational failings. And with these insights, departments can – and do – identify ways to improve. This view of litigation – as a source of information that can be used to identify and reduce harm and error – is distinct from prevailing understandings of the effect of lawsuits on decisionmaking. Lawsuits are generally believed to influence behavior through the incentivizing effects of deterrence.113 In oversimplified terms, the expectation is that threatened or actual penalties will discourage future misbehavior so long as the costs of harm avoidance are lower than the costs of liability. And, generally speaking – though not always – the costs of liability are viewed in terms of the dollars spent to satisfy settlements and judgments.114 So, the – again, oversimplified – logic goes, the higher the expected or exacted damages, the greater the care that will be taken to prevent those sorts of injuries in the future. The lower the damages, the lower the care.
18 -Not allowing for violations and having IPV sensitive laws is the first step to providing equal justice for LGBTQ communities. Also means that the AC is nesseceary to change police bias towards IPV and allow them to see that It is intersectional. Crumrine writes :
19 -. Adopt nondiscrimination and zero tolerance harassment policies in departments, educate officers on the policies, and hold them accountable for violating these policies. Consider creating LGBTQ liaisons, either as sworn or civilian employees of the department, who reach out to the LGBTQ community, listen to their concerns, and actively work toward solving issues. Reframe law enforcement’s thinking about IPV and sexual assault. Start by believing victims when they report, conducting thorough impartial investigations, and following the evidence. Leave preconceived myths or prejudices toward IPV, sexual assault, and the LGBTQ community out of the response and investigation. Train officers on how to identify the predominate aggressor in an IPV case and how to recognize the use of coercive control in the relationship. Understand the neurobiology of trauma and its effect on memory. Be compassionate in realizing that a victim’s lack of memory or disjointed memory in an IPV or sexual assault case is often the result of the biological effects of trauma, not his or her unwillingness to cooperate. Be sensitive to the unique reporting barriers and challenges present in the LGBTQ community such as fears of being marginalized, outed, abused, not believed, or ridiculed as a transgender person; lack of recognizing the abuse for what it is; and inability to accept that men can be victimized in an IPV case or that a woman can be as much of an aggressor as a man. Realize that the LGBTQ community is a close-knit community; when a victim reports, it is not uncommon for many in the community to know they filed a report and what type of response they received from law enforcement. Take steps to provide a safe and nurturing environment for LGBTQ victims to stay, as is done for heterosexual victims. Some communities do not have facilities that house male victims; therefore, they are placed in a hotel or motel in an effort to keep them safe. For many in the LGBTQ community, their support system is the community to which they belong. Isolating them in a hotel away from this community distances them from their support system and may lead to them failing to continue in the criminal justice process. Consider the accessibility of LGBTQ abusers to their victims. Since many LGBTQ victims and abusers are of the same sex, they both have equal access to facilities like bathrooms, gyms, and social settings. This accessibility may allow abusers to continue terrorizing their victims without law enforcement’s knowledge. Officers should be aware of this access and take steps to protect victims from their abusers. Be sensitive to the reluctance of some in the LGBTQ community to acknowledge or address IPV in an effort to avoid unfavorable political or societal scrutiny of LGBTQ families. Remember the first interaction between law enforcement and LGBTQ victims of IPV and sexual assault is crucial in establishing respect and trust and keeping the victim engaged in the criminal justice system so that perpetrators are held accountable. For years, the members of LGBTQ community have felt as though they were second-class citizens in the eyes of many in U.S. society; including the police. If law enforcement professionals want to effect a change in that perception and providing equal justice to all survivors victims of IPV, they need to change how officers interact with the LGBTQ community. With the June 2015 marriage equality decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, there will be an increase in victims being empowered to report their abuse.12 Law enforcement has an obligation to treat LGBTQ survivors victims with the same dignity and respect given to other citizens when they have the courage to report. All reports of IPV should be taken seriously and investigated in an impartial and unbiased manner by following the evidence and holding perpetrators accountable in order to provide equal justice to the entire community. ♦
20 -The aff is key to accurate reporting since people won’t report to the police if they don’t trust them and the only way to break the cycle is to report. Other CPs can’t solve without police involvement. Shtelmakher 4:
21 -When police officers have a more sensitive and understanding attitude toward domestic violence, their response to victims' calls for help will improve. In turn, victims survivors will have more trust in the police and, therefore, will call on them whenever violence erupts.127 This is extremely significant because one of the biggest problems with IPV domestic violence is that victims survivors do not report all the instances of abuse that they suffer.'28 Domestic violence is often described as a cycle.'29 The common notion that an unhappy victim would simply leave her abuser is a misconception."30 Victims stay for various reasons, including but not limited to lacking the financial means to leave,"' fearing retaliation by the abuser and others,'32 or being ashamed that society will judge them.'3 3 But when violence is reported, it increases the chances of breaking the cycle.' 34 Additionally, reporting is important because domestic violence IPV tends to escalates, and it is crucial for police to intervene early, before serious injury or even death results.' Finally, accurate reporting leads to accurate statistics, which allow governments to address IPV domestic-violence issues as effectively as possible.
22 -Affirming changes the cultural values in society and the police to better address intimate partner violence : Schtelmaker :
23 -Proving state-created danger is only the first step in successfully alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to § 1983. In addition, a domestic-violence victim IPV survivor has to demonstrate that the officer's conduct shocked the conscience. 45 This requirement exists because § 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state actor, such as a police officer, but does not create substantive rights or define what type of conduct creates a cause of action.46 The requirement also ensures that a constitutional violation does not occur "whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm" 47 and prevents the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."48 As a result, liability thresholds for depriving an individual of constitutional rights must be stricter than state tort thresholds. 49 The lowest common denominator for tort liability is negligence, which is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.so On the other hand, the highest common denominator of tort liability, intentional conduct, is most likely enough." For actions that fall between the two ends of the spectrum, constitutional liability may occur when the state actor's conduct can be classified as deliberately indifferent.52 What constitutes deliberate indifference or shocks the conscience, however, is highly dependent on the circumstances of each case" and differs from court to court.54 Establishing a national standard for the state-created danger caused by officers responding inadequately to IPV domestic violence would heighten awareness about the dangers and prevalence of IPV domestic violence. Such awareness would force police officers, judges, and society as a whole to view the issues of IPV domestic violence differently. And in light of this new awareness, conduct that was once considered negligent or grossly negligent would, hopefully, be considered to shock the conscience. Nevertheless, victims survivors would still have another hurdle to overcome the police officers' defense of qualified immunity. C. The Qualified-Immunity Defense Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation." Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct.
24 -IPV is perpetuated by a lack of education – educational spaces must condemn IPV to start prevention – this has tangible impacts. Wolfe and Jaffe 99
25 -Wolfe, David A. Research Professor and Scholar, Western University, and Peter G. Jaffe Peter Jaffe is the Founding Director (1975-2001) and Special Advisor on Violence Prevention of the Centre for Children and Families in the Justice System of the London Family Court Clinic; member of the Clinical Adjunct Faculty for the Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Western Ontario; former chair of the Board of Directors of the Battered Women's Advocacy Centre; and past Chairperson and a founding board member of the Board of Directors for the Centre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children. He gives presentations on violence and facilitates over 50 workshops a year for teachers, students, lawyers, judges, police, doctors, clergy and various community groups. Dr. Jaffe is the recipient of many awards and grants, author of numerous research articles, and co-author of four books dealing with children exposed to domestic violence. "Emerging strategies in the prevention of domestic violence." The future of children (1999): 133-144.
26 -This perspective suggests that domestic violence IPV is learned behavior that is modeled, rewarded, and supported by families and/or the broader culture. Analyses based on this theory focus on the ways children learn that aggression is appropriate to resolve conflicts, especially within the context of intimate relationships.11 Researchers have found that batterers are much more likely to have had violent fathers than are nonbatterers.12 Developmental research shows that early intervention with children from violent households may restore normal developmental processes, such as empathy and selfcontrol, and minimize the risk of further harm caused by exposure to abusive adult models.13 Societal Structure Theory According to this view, domestic violence IPV is caused by an underlying power imbalance that can be understood only by examining society as a whole. The analysis focuses on patriarchy or male domination over women and children through physical, economic, and political control. Domestic violence IPV reflects women’s inequality in the culture and the reinforcement of this reality by various institutions.14 Commonalities Across Causation Theories Despite the diversity of views regarding the underlying causes of domestic violence, there are some beliefs common to all these theories. They include: (1) that domestic violence IPV has been ignored as a major social problem until recently and remains poorly understood;15 (2) that domestic violence is a complex problem impacted by multiple variables;16 (3) that childhood trauma, either through exposure to violence or some other trauma, influences the likelihood of domestic violence;17 and (4) that as long as domestic violence is condoned as its accepted behavior by public attitudes and institutions, there is little chance of preventing it involves attempts to minimize the course of a problem once it is already clearly evident and causing harm. Primary prevention strategies can introduce to particular population groups new values, thinking processes, and relationship skills that are incompatible with violence and that promote healthy, nonviolent relationships. For example, resources can be used to focus on respect, trust, and supportive growth in relationships.19 These efforts can be targeted at populations that may be at risk for violence in their intimate relationships but who have not yet shown symptoms of concern, or they can be directed universally at broad population groups, such as school-age children or members of a particular community. In contrast to a population-based focus, secondary prevention efforts in domestic violence address identified individuals who have exhibited particular behaviors associated with domestic violence. An example of secondary prevention is a clear protocol for the way teachers can assist students who have discussed witnessing domestic violence in their homes but who do not show serious signs of harm.20 Tertiary prevention efforts are the most common and emphasize the identification of domestic violence and its perpetrators and victims, control of the behavior and its harms, punishment and/or treatment for the perpetrators, and support for the victims. Intensive collaboration and coordinated services across agencies may be vital in tertiary prevention efforts to address chronic domestic violence and to help prevent future generations of batterers and victims. However, tertiary efforts can be very expensive and often show only limited success in stopping domestic violence, addressing long-term harms, and preventing future acts of violence.21 Table 1 uses the primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention paradigm to categorize a broad range of domestic violence prevention strategies. Several of the strategies mentioned in the table are described in greater detail in the following section, which discusses innovative primary and secondary prevention strategies currently being tried in the United States and Canada. (For information regarding tertiary prevention efforts for children exposed to domestic violence, see the articles by Lemon, by Findlater and Kelly, by Saathoff and Stoffel, by Culross, and by Groves in this journal issue.) Innovative Primary and Secondary Prevention Efforts Existing primary prevention efforts are often directed toward particular population groups, and secondary efforts toward identified individuals within those groups. Programs for children typically target specific age groups and utilize, in their design, what is known about child development at that particular age. As a result, programs for very young children are markedly different from programs for adolescents, for example. Unfortunately, there is no information currently available regarding the total number of primary and secondary prevention programs that address domestic violence. The programs described below are highlighted because they illustrate the points being discussed, not because they necessarily represent the most successful programs. Comprehensive, evaluative information with regard to domestic violence prevention programs is also very limited but is presented when available. Infants and Preschool-Age Children (0 to 5 Years) Primary and secondary prevention strategies for infants and preschool children focus on ensuring that children receive a healthy start, including freedom from emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, and from the trauma of witnessing domestic violence. Development of such strategies begins by defining the principles of a healthy childrearing environment. Though there are differing opinions about the details of such a healthy environment,22 all experts agree that in order for very young children to thrive and grow to be nonviolent, productive adults, they must be cared for by supportive and nurturing adults, have opportunities for socialization, and have the freedom within protective boundaries to explore their world.23 Prevention programs targeting infants and preschool children have developed from the public health and nursing fields. They involve efforts to provide support for new parents through home visiting programs.24 (For more information on home visiting programs, see the spring/summer 1999 issue of The Future of Children.) Home visiting support and assistance can be delivered on a universal basis whereby all new parents receive basic in-home services for a specified time period. However, no pro grams with a universal approach currently exist in North America.25 Alternatively, home visiting services can be delivered to selected groups, such as families or neighborhoods, that are at greater risk for domestic violence. There are home visiting programs that currently target families identified as being at risk for child abuse,26 and include efforts to improve parenting skills27 and to prevent social isolation.28 Hawaii’s Healthy Start Program is a wellknown example of a prevention effort, with home visits provided to infants born to high-risk families to help prevent the incidence of child abuse and to promote other aspects of healthy child development. (See Box 1.) To date, home visitation programs have not focused on domestic violence prevention. Yet, such programs hold promise in this area because of their emphasis on creating a healthy environment for children and because many of the families served who are at risk for child abuse are also at risk for domestic violence. Moreover, families at risk for domestic violence may be more receptive to home visitation, with its focus on healthy relationships and family strengths, than to more directive or punitive approaches through child welfare services or law enforcement.20 However, there are potential problems with the use of home visiting programs to address domestic violence. These include concern for the safety of the home visitor and the victim, and the possibility that any trust between the home visitor and the family will be breached if domestic violence is discussed.29 School-Age Children (6 to 12 Years) Schools are ideal places in which to introduce primary prevention programs to wide ranges of children, because most children attend school. In addition, much of children’s social learning takes place in schools, and research has shown that social learning can play a role in the development of behaviors and attitudes that support domestic violence. Teachers, who typically represent the second most important influence in the lives of children, are in an ideal position to motivate students to consider new ways of thinking and behaving.30 In a 1998 comprehensive review of model programs for battered mothers and their children, several community agencies reported the development of primary prevention efforts in collaboration with schools.31 One of the key values inherent in all of these primary prevention programs is the belief that every student needs to be aware of domestic violence and related forms of abuse. Even if students never become victims or perpetrators of domestic violence, they may have opportunities in the future, as community members, to help others in preventing or stopping it.32 Because these programs consider domestic violence a community and societal problem, many of them also involve parents and other members of the broader community. One of the first programs to document efforts to prevent domestic violence by working with children in the schools was implemented by the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.33 (See Box 2.) The ideas and successes of this early program have spawned similar efforts across North America.34 Preliminary evaluations of these newer programs are promising and indicate that key elements of successful school-based programs include: identifying relationship violence as a form of societal violence; acknowledging that domestic violence is an abuse of power and control; creating a high enough level of trust so that children can disclose exposure to domestic violence and teachers can make appropriate referrals; teaching safety skills about what to do when domestic violence occurs; and encouraging the development of social skills such as anger management and conflict resolution as alternatives to violence.35 Adolescents (13 to 18 Years) Adolescence is a time of important cognitive and social development. Teens learn to think more rationally and become capable of thinking hypothetically. They also develop a greater understanding of the possible risks and consequences of their behaviors and learn to balance their own interests with those of their peers and family members. Conformity to parental opinions gradually decreases throughout adolescence, while peers become increasingly influential until late adolescence.36 Romantic relationships become more important by mid-adolescence.37 Thus, early- and mid-adolescence offer unique windows of opportunity for primary prevention efforts that make teens aware of the ways in which violence in relationships can occur, and that teach healthy ways to form intimate relationships.38 When offered opportunities to explore the richness and rewards of relationships, youths become eager to learn about choices and responsibilities. Clear messages about personal responsibility and boundaries, delivered in a blame-free manner, are generally acceptable to this age group, whereas lectures and warnings are less helpful.39 Primary prevention programs delivered universally through high schools often involve activities aimed at increasing awareness and dispelling myths about relationship violence. Such activities might include school auditorium presentations involving videotapes, plays, professional theater groups, or speeches from domestic violence or teen dating violence survivors; classroom discussions facilitated by teachers or domestic violence services professionals; programs and curricula that encourage students to examine attitudes and behaviors that promote or tolerate violence; and peer support groups. Some school-based programs have resulted in youth-initiated prevention activities such as theatrical presentations to younger children, and marches and other social protests against domestic violence.40 Preliminary data from evaluations of six school-based dating violence prevention programs report increases in knowledge about dating violence issues, positive changes in attitudes about dating violence, and self-reported decreases in the perpetration of dating violence. Though preliminary, these data indicate that adolescents are receptive to school-based prevention programs.41 In addition to school-based programs for adolescents, there are also community based programs with primary prevention goals similar to those of the school-based programs. Many of the community based programs also provide secondary prevention services to teens who have displayed early signs of violence. (See Box 3.)
27 -
28 -Framework
29 -The role of the judge is to vote for the debater that provides the best post-fiat policy option for reducing violence. Smith ’13: (Elijah Smith. “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013)
30 -At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation away from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.
31 -Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
32 -Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
33 -I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
34 -
35 -Focus on the empirical world means that the debate needs to be a question of resolving material injustice. Pappas 16
36 -Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
37 -In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
38 -To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
39 -King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
40 -I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
41 -Debate should seek to design concrete alternatives.
42 -Bryant 12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
43 -The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri and Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
44 -The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
45 -Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
46 -Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
47 -Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
48 -The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
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1 +Interpretation: Debaters may not read counterplans that include the aff’s advocacy with an exception. In the context of this topic, it means the neg cannot defend a ban on all reactors, except for a specific type of reactor.
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1 +2016-09-18 00:29:09.0
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1 +Newark Science OA
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1 +Inherency
2 +Police officers handle massive numbers of IPV cases and aren’t providing sufficient protection Schuerman 16
3 +Incidents of IPV domestic violence occur against women in the United States at epidemic rates.' Up to 60 of all married women suffer physical abuse at the hands of their spouses at some time during marriage.2 The fact that police officers spend more time responding to IPV domestic disturbances than to murders, rapes, and aggravated assaults reflects the pervasiveness of this problem. 3 At the same time, however, commentators often cite ineffective police response is as a chief reason for continuing high rates of IPV domestic violence.4 Traditionally, police response is limited to mediation, having the batterer temporarily leave the home, or referral to local community service agencies for counseling. 5 Most states make arrests are discretionary.6 As a consequence, it is rarely the favored response.7 Because city police departments deal with the majority of domestic violence calls, the problem is compounded by the fact that municipalities are generally immune from tort liability.8 Specifically, municipalities are and commonly not liable for the failure to provide police protection to individual members of the public.
4 +Plan
5 +Thus the plan: Resolved: The US congress ought model the Okin decision as federal policy in order to provide a clearly established limitation on qualified immunity Shtelmakher 10 :
6 +In cases arising from domestic-violence IPV complaints, federal courts apply the state-created danger doctrine inconsistently. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation establishing a standard for determining whether an individual police officer's conduct constitutes state-created danger. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg provides states with federal grants to combat violent crimes against women."' The purpose of § 3796gg is to help states "to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women." 1 2 To further this purpose, Congress should make the adoption of the state-created danger law a condition of states receiving grants under 3796gg. The most important aspect of the law is that it should reflect the sensitive and unique nature of IPV domestic violence." 3 To this end, the law should be modeled after the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin.1 Specifically, the law should state that state-created danger exists when a police officer's affirmative act or omission creates or enhances the danger to the victim. However, the affirmative act or omission does not have to be explicit. Instead, an affirmative act by law enforcement may be implicit, such as when officers' conduct communicates to an abuser that the officers will not interfere to stop the private violence. Additionally, the law should reflect that state-created danger does not exist when the only action taken by an officer is responding to a domestic-violence call, with no interaction between the officer and the victim or the abuser. Furthermore, courts should not apply the state-created danger doctrine where doing so would place officers in a predicament that subjects them to liability whether they take action or fail to do so.
7 +
8 +Establishing a standard is key to allowing IPV survivors to sue Shtelmakher 2
9 +Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against IPV domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation. Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct
10 +This is a limit of qualified immunity in that it reinforces the clearly established standard by create more specificities and limitations for police officers conduct in certain situations especially whent hey omit from action, thus any violation of the standard means that the officer can be brought to trial in the situation of IPV.
11 +Advantage
12 +Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Schwartz 11
13 +Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
14 +The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
15 +LAWSUITS LEAD TO REFORMS and areNOT DEPENDENT ON A DETERRENT EFFECT
16 +Schwartz, Joanna (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
17 +My findings illustrate a previously overlooked vision of lawsuits’ role in performance improvement: as a source of information. Lawsuits identify allegations of misconduct that are investigated to determine whether officer discipline is appropriate, and are considered with other data for possible trends. The evidence developed in discovery and trial can offer a detailed picture of underlying events that is used to identify personnel and policy failures. Closed case files, compared with internal investigations, can identify weaknesses in internal procedures. And trends in settlements and judgments, like initial claim trends, can identify units or procedures that should be more carefully reviewed. Viewed in isolation or in conjunction with other data, lawsuits can offer insights about the incidence and causes of individual and organizational failings. And with these insights, departments can – and do – identify ways to improve. This view of litigation – as a source of information that can be used to identify and reduce harm and error – is distinct from prevailing understandings of the effect of lawsuits on decisionmaking. Lawsuits are generally believed to influence behavior through the incentivizing effects of deterrence.113 In oversimplified terms, the expectation is that threatened or actual penalties will discourage future misbehavior so long as the costs of harm avoidance are lower than the costs of liability. And, generally speaking – though not always – the costs of liability are viewed in terms of the dollars spent to satisfy settlements and judgments.114 So, the – again, oversimplified – logic goes, the higher the expected or exacted damages, the greater the care that will be taken to prevent those sorts of injuries in the future. The lower the damages, the lower the care.
18 +Not allowing for violations and having IPV sensitive laws is the first step to providing equal justice for LGBTQ communities. Also means that the AC is nesseceary to change police bias towards IPV and allow them to see that It is intersectional. Crumrine writes :
19 +. Adopt nondiscrimination and zero tolerance harassment policies in departments, educate officers on the policies, and hold them accountable for violating these policies. Consider creating LGBTQ liaisons, either as sworn or civilian employees of the department, who reach out to the LGBTQ community, listen to their concerns, and actively work toward solving issues. Reframe law enforcement’s thinking about IPV and sexual assault. Start by believing victims when they report, conducting thorough impartial investigations, and following the evidence. Leave preconceived myths or prejudices toward IPV, sexual assault, and the LGBTQ community out of the response and investigation. Train officers on how to identify the predominate aggressor in an IPV case and how to recognize the use of coercive control in the relationship. Understand the neurobiology of trauma and its effect on memory. Be compassionate in realizing that a victim’s lack of memory or disjointed memory in an IPV or sexual assault case is often the result of the biological effects of trauma, not his or her unwillingness to cooperate. Be sensitive to the unique reporting barriers and challenges present in the LGBTQ community such as fears of being marginalized, outed, abused, not believed, or ridiculed as a transgender person; lack of recognizing the abuse for what it is; and inability to accept that men can be victimized in an IPV case or that a woman can be as much of an aggressor as a man. Realize that the LGBTQ community is a close-knit community; when a victim reports, it is not uncommon for many in the community to know they filed a report and what type of response they received from law enforcement. Take steps to provide a safe and nurturing environment for LGBTQ victims to stay, as is done for heterosexual victims. Some communities do not have facilities that house male victims; therefore, they are placed in a hotel or motel in an effort to keep them safe. For many in the LGBTQ community, their support system is the community to which they belong. Isolating them in a hotel away from this community distances them from their support system and may lead to them failing to continue in the criminal justice process. Consider the accessibility of LGBTQ abusers to their victims. Since many LGBTQ victims and abusers are of the same sex, they both have equal access to facilities like bathrooms, gyms, and social settings. This accessibility may allow abusers to continue terrorizing their victims without law enforcement’s knowledge. Officers should be aware of this access and take steps to protect victims from their abusers. Be sensitive to the reluctance of some in the LGBTQ community to acknowledge or address IPV in an effort to avoid unfavorable political or societal scrutiny of LGBTQ families. Remember the first interaction between law enforcement and LGBTQ victims of IPV and sexual assault is crucial in establishing respect and trust and keeping the victim engaged in the criminal justice system so that perpetrators are held accountable. For years, the members of LGBTQ community have felt as though they were second-class citizens in the eyes of many in U.S. society; including the police. If law enforcement professionals want to effect a change in that perception and providing equal justice to all survivors victims of IPV, they need to change how officers interact with the LGBTQ community. With the June 2015 marriage equality decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, there will be an increase in victims being empowered to report their abuse.12 Law enforcement has an obligation to treat LGBTQ survivors victims with the same dignity and respect given to other citizens when they have the courage to report. All reports of IPV should be taken seriously and investigated in an impartial and unbiased manner by following the evidence and holding perpetrators accountable in order to provide equal justice to the entire community. ♦
20 +The aff is key to accurate reporting since people won’t report to the police if they don’t trust them and the only way to break the cycle is to report. Other CPs can’t solve without police involvement. Shtelmakher 4:
21 +When police officers have a more sensitive and understanding attitude toward domestic violence, their response to victims' calls for help will improve. In turn, victims survivors will have more trust in the police and, therefore, will call on them whenever violence erupts.127 This is extremely significant because one of the biggest problems with IPV domestic violence is that victims survivors do not report all the instances of abuse that they suffer.'28 Domestic violence is often described as a cycle.'29 The common notion that an unhappy victim would simply leave her abuser is a misconception."30 Victims stay for various reasons, including but not limited to lacking the financial means to leave,"' fearing retaliation by the abuser and others,'32 or being ashamed that society will judge them.'3 3 But when violence is reported, it increases the chances of breaking the cycle.' 34 Additionally, reporting is important because domestic violence IPV tends to escalates, and it is crucial for police to intervene early, before serious injury or even death results.' Finally, accurate reporting leads to accurate statistics, which allow governments to address IPV domestic-violence issues as effectively as possible.
22 +Affirming changes the cultural values in society and the police to better address intimate partner violence : Schtelmaker :
23 +Proving state-created danger is only the first step in successfully alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to § 1983. In addition, a domestic-violence victim IPV survivor has to demonstrate that the officer's conduct shocked the conscience. 45 This requirement exists because § 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state actor, such as a police officer, but does not create substantive rights or define what type of conduct creates a cause of action.46 The requirement also ensures that a constitutional violation does not occur "whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm" 47 and prevents the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."48 As a result, liability thresholds for depriving an individual of constitutional rights must be stricter than state tort thresholds. 49 The lowest common denominator for tort liability is negligence, which is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.so On the other hand, the highest common denominator of tort liability, intentional conduct, is most likely enough." For actions that fall between the two ends of the spectrum, constitutional liability may occur when the state actor's conduct can be classified as deliberately indifferent.52 What constitutes deliberate indifference or shocks the conscience, however, is highly dependent on the circumstances of each case" and differs from court to court.54 Establishing a national standard for the state-created danger caused by officers responding inadequately to IPV domestic violence would heighten awareness about the dangers and prevalence of IPV domestic violence. Such awareness would force police officers, judges, and society as a whole to view the issues of IPV domestic violence differently. And in light of this new awareness, conduct that was once considered negligent or grossly negligent would, hopefully, be considered to shock the conscience. Nevertheless, victims survivors would still have another hurdle to overcome the police officers' defense of qualified immunity. C. The Qualified-Immunity Defense Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation." Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct.
24 +IPV is perpetuated by a lack of education – educational spaces must condemn IPV to start prevention – this has tangible impacts. Wolfe and Jaffe 99
25 +Wolfe, David A. Research Professor and Scholar, Western University, and Peter G. Jaffe Peter Jaffe is the Founding Director (1975-2001) and Special Advisor on Violence Prevention of the Centre for Children and Families in the Justice System of the London Family Court Clinic; member of the Clinical Adjunct Faculty for the Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Western Ontario; former chair of the Board of Directors of the Battered Women's Advocacy Centre; and past Chairperson and a founding board member of the Board of Directors for the Centre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children. He gives presentations on violence and facilitates over 50 workshops a year for teachers, students, lawyers, judges, police, doctors, clergy and various community groups. Dr. Jaffe is the recipient of many awards and grants, author of numerous research articles, and co-author of four books dealing with children exposed to domestic violence. "Emerging strategies in the prevention of domestic violence." The future of children (1999): 133-144.
26 +This perspective suggests that domestic violence IPV is learned behavior that is modeled, rewarded, and supported by families and/or the broader culture. Analyses based on this theory focus on the ways children learn that aggression is appropriate to resolve conflicts, especially within the context of intimate relationships.11 Researchers have found that batterers are much more likely to have had violent fathers than are nonbatterers.12 Developmental research shows that early intervention with children from violent households may restore normal developmental processes, such as empathy and selfcontrol, and minimize the risk of further harm caused by exposure to abusive adult models.13 Societal Structure Theory According to this view, domestic violence IPV is caused by an underlying power imbalance that can be understood only by examining society as a whole. The analysis focuses on patriarchy or male domination over women and children through physical, economic, and political control. Domestic violence IPV reflects women’s inequality in the culture and the reinforcement of this reality by various institutions.14 Commonalities Across Causation Theories Despite the diversity of views regarding the underlying causes of domestic violence, there are some beliefs common to all these theories. They include: (1) that domestic violence IPV has been ignored as a major social problem until recently and remains poorly understood;15 (2) that domestic violence is a complex problem impacted by multiple variables;16 (3) that childhood trauma, either through exposure to violence or some other trauma, influences the likelihood of domestic violence;17 and (4) that as long as domestic violence is condoned as its accepted behavior by public attitudes and institutions, there is little chance of preventing it involves attempts to minimize the course of a problem once it is already clearly evident and causing harm. Primary prevention strategies can introduce to particular population groups new values, thinking processes, and relationship skills that are incompatible with violence and that promote healthy, nonviolent relationships. For example, resources can be used to focus on respect, trust, and supportive growth in relationships.19 These efforts can be targeted at populations that may be at risk for violence in their intimate relationships but who have not yet shown symptoms of concern, or they can be directed universally at broad population groups, such as school-age children or members of a particular community. In contrast to a population-based focus, secondary prevention efforts in domestic violence address identified individuals who have exhibited particular behaviors associated with domestic violence. An example of secondary prevention is a clear protocol for the way teachers can assist students who have discussed witnessing domestic violence in their homes but who do not show serious signs of harm.20 Tertiary prevention efforts are the most common and emphasize the identification of domestic violence and its perpetrators and victims, control of the behavior and its harms, punishment and/or treatment for the perpetrators, and support for the victims. Intensive collaboration and coordinated services across agencies may be vital in tertiary prevention efforts to address chronic domestic violence and to help prevent future generations of batterers and victims. However, tertiary efforts can be very expensive and often show only limited success in stopping domestic violence, addressing long-term harms, and preventing future acts of violence.21 Table 1 uses the primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention paradigm to categorize a broad range of domestic violence prevention strategies. Several of the strategies mentioned in the table are described in greater detail in the following section, which discusses innovative primary and secondary prevention strategies currently being tried in the United States and Canada. (For information regarding tertiary prevention efforts for children exposed to domestic violence, see the articles by Lemon, by Findlater and Kelly, by Saathoff and Stoffel, by Culross, and by Groves in this journal issue.) Innovative Primary and Secondary Prevention Efforts Existing primary prevention efforts are often directed toward particular population groups, and secondary efforts toward identified individuals within those groups. Programs for children typically target specific age groups and utilize, in their design, what is known about child development at that particular age. As a result, programs for very young children are markedly different from programs for adolescents, for example. Unfortunately, there is no information currently available regarding the total number of primary and secondary prevention programs that address domestic violence. The programs described below are highlighted because they illustrate the points being discussed, not because they necessarily represent the most successful programs. Comprehensive, evaluative information with regard to domestic violence prevention programs is also very limited but is presented when available. Infants and Preschool-Age Children (0 to 5 Years) Primary and secondary prevention strategies for infants and preschool children focus on ensuring that children receive a healthy start, including freedom from emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, and from the trauma of witnessing domestic violence. Development of such strategies begins by defining the principles of a healthy childrearing environment. Though there are differing opinions about the details of such a healthy environment,22 all experts agree that in order for very young children to thrive and grow to be nonviolent, productive adults, they must be cared for by supportive and nurturing adults, have opportunities for socialization, and have the freedom within protective boundaries to explore their world.23 Prevention programs targeting infants and preschool children have developed from the public health and nursing fields. They involve efforts to provide support for new parents through home visiting programs.24 (For more information on home visiting programs, see the spring/summer 1999 issue of The Future of Children.) Home visiting support and assistance can be delivered on a universal basis whereby all new parents receive basic in-home services for a specified time period. However, no pro grams with a universal approach currently exist in North America.25 Alternatively, home visiting services can be delivered to selected groups, such as families or neighborhoods, that are at greater risk for domestic violence. There are home visiting programs that currently target families identified as being at risk for child abuse,26 and include efforts to improve parenting skills27 and to prevent social isolation.28 Hawaii’s Healthy Start Program is a wellknown example of a prevention effort, with home visits provided to infants born to high-risk families to help prevent the incidence of child abuse and to promote other aspects of healthy child development. (See Box 1.) To date, home visitation programs have not focused on domestic violence prevention. Yet, such programs hold promise in this area because of their emphasis on creating a healthy environment for children and because many of the families served who are at risk for child abuse are also at risk for domestic violence. Moreover, families at risk for domestic violence may be more receptive to home visitation, with its focus on healthy relationships and family strengths, than to more directive or punitive approaches through child welfare services or law enforcement.20 However, there are potential problems with the use of home visiting programs to address domestic violence. These include concern for the safety of the home visitor and the victim, and the possibility that any trust between the home visitor and the family will be breached if domestic violence is discussed.29 School-Age Children (6 to 12 Years) Schools are ideal places in which to introduce primary prevention programs to wide ranges of children, because most children attend school. In addition, much of children’s social learning takes place in schools, and research has shown that social learning can play a role in the development of behaviors and attitudes that support domestic violence. Teachers, who typically represent the second most important influence in the lives of children, are in an ideal position to motivate students to consider new ways of thinking and behaving.30 In a 1998 comprehensive review of model programs for battered mothers and their children, several community agencies reported the development of primary prevention efforts in collaboration with schools.31 One of the key values inherent in all of these primary prevention programs is the belief that every student needs to be aware of domestic violence and related forms of abuse. Even if students never become victims or perpetrators of domestic violence, they may have opportunities in the future, as community members, to help others in preventing or stopping it.32 Because these programs consider domestic violence a community and societal problem, many of them also involve parents and other members of the broader community. One of the first programs to document efforts to prevent domestic violence by working with children in the schools was implemented by the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.33 (See Box 2.) The ideas and successes of this early program have spawned similar efforts across North America.34 Preliminary evaluations of these newer programs are promising and indicate that key elements of successful school-based programs include: identifying relationship violence as a form of societal violence; acknowledging that domestic violence is an abuse of power and control; creating a high enough level of trust so that children can disclose exposure to domestic violence and teachers can make appropriate referrals; teaching safety skills about what to do when domestic violence occurs; and encouraging the development of social skills such as anger management and conflict resolution as alternatives to violence.35 Adolescents (13 to 18 Years) Adolescence is a time of important cognitive and social development. Teens learn to think more rationally and become capable of thinking hypothetically. They also develop a greater understanding of the possible risks and consequences of their behaviors and learn to balance their own interests with those of their peers and family members. Conformity to parental opinions gradually decreases throughout adolescence, while peers become increasingly influential until late adolescence.36 Romantic relationships become more important by mid-adolescence.37 Thus, early- and mid-adolescence offer unique windows of opportunity for primary prevention efforts that make teens aware of the ways in which violence in relationships can occur, and that teach healthy ways to form intimate relationships.38 When offered opportunities to explore the richness and rewards of relationships, youths become eager to learn about choices and responsibilities. Clear messages about personal responsibility and boundaries, delivered in a blame-free manner, are generally acceptable to this age group, whereas lectures and warnings are less helpful.39 Primary prevention programs delivered universally through high schools often involve activities aimed at increasing awareness and dispelling myths about relationship violence. Such activities might include school auditorium presentations involving videotapes, plays, professional theater groups, or speeches from domestic violence or teen dating violence survivors; classroom discussions facilitated by teachers or domestic violence services professionals; programs and curricula that encourage students to examine attitudes and behaviors that promote or tolerate violence; and peer support groups. Some school-based programs have resulted in youth-initiated prevention activities such as theatrical presentations to younger children, and marches and other social protests against domestic violence.40 Preliminary data from evaluations of six school-based dating violence prevention programs report increases in knowledge about dating violence issues, positive changes in attitudes about dating violence, and self-reported decreases in the perpetration of dating violence. Though preliminary, these data indicate that adolescents are receptive to school-based prevention programs.41 In addition to school-based programs for adolescents, there are also community based programs with primary prevention goals similar to those of the school-based programs. Many of the community based programs also provide secondary prevention services to teens who have displayed early signs of violence. (See Box 3.)
27 +
28 +Framework
29 +The role of the judge is to vote for the debater that provides the best post-fiat policy option for reducing violence. Smith ’13: (Elijah Smith. “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013)
30 +At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation away from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.
31 +Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
32 +Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
33 +I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
34 +
35 +Focus on the empirical world means that the debate needs to be a question of resolving material injustice. Pappas 16
36 +Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
37 +In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
38 +To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
39 +King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
40 +I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
41 +Debate should seek to design concrete alternatives.
42 +Bryant 12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
43 +The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri and Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
44 +The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
45 +Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
46 +Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
47 +Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
48 +The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
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1 +Part 1: Framework
2 +Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
3 +
4 +There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
5 +Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
6 +“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
7 +Implications:
8 +A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. Mills Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
9 +“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
10 +2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
11 +Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
12 +“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
13 +Impacts:
14 +A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
15 +B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
16 +Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
17 +“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
18 +And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
19 +The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.
20 +Mouffe 2k Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
21 +"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
22 +Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
23 +Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
24 +Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
25 +“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives.
26 +2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
27 +A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
28 +B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
29 +C. It’s a no risk issue- they have to justify that something can be uncontestable in order to prove antagonism is good for ethics.
30 +3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
31 +4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
32 +Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
33 +The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
34 +Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
35 +Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
36 +"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
37 +Part 2: Advocacy
38 +I defend the resolution as a generl principle.
39 +Part 3: Contention
40 +Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
41 +Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
42 +Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
43 +Thus, affirm:
44 +Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
45 +Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
46 +I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
47 +This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
48 +Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
49 + Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
50 +Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
51 +Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
52 +Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
53 +Free speech was written into the constitution explicitly to be a counter-majoritarian right to promote agonistic discourse
54 +Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
55 +According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
56 +Adversarial democracy entails protection of constitutional speech. Also justifies why cooperative conceptions of democracy fail in the context of free speech.
57 +Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
58 +Acceptance of the premises of adversary democracy has important implications for the scope of the theory of free expression. Post and Meiklejohn were both correct in positing a symbiotic intersection between democracy and free expression. Recognition of both the normative and empirical superiority of the adversary model of democracy, however, suggests that the First Amendment's domain extends significantly farther than either Post or Meiklejohn's theories would permit. Adversary democracy, it should be recalled, posits that democracy invariably involves an adversarial competition among competing personal, social, or economic interests. Individuals are able to protect their own interests or to achieve their ideological goals by (1) participating in the proc- ess of governing by exercise of the vote, and (2) attempting, through exercise of their expressive powers, to persuade others to accept their positions. The First Amendment, therefore, must protect (1) all speech that facilitates the individual's democratic decisionmaking; (2) all lawful advocacy;3° ' (3) all speech that facilitates the individual's awareness of her self-interest; and (4) all speech that facilitates the individual's ability to maintain and develop her individuality in spite of collective life. Notably, this does not mean that the government is absolutely barred from regulating speech that falls in these four categories. It simply means that it can do so only when the regulation survives strict scrutiny. While the adversary theory of the First Amendment would protect all of the speech that Meiklejohn's and Post's theories would protect, it would also protect much of the expression these theories exclude. As previously noted, both Meiklejohn and Post strained their theories' claims to being democratic in order to exclude certain forms of self-interested speech. Meiklejohn not only violated the core principle of epistemological humility to justify his exclusion of economically self-interested speech from the First Amendment, he also excluded such self-interested speech despite its potential to inform democratic decisionmaking, which he believed to be the sole constitutional purpose for protecting speech in the first place. Post likewise casts off or at least devalues core aspects of democratic autonomy, such as the vote and the information that makes it more informed, despite the fact that doing so concomitantly undermines his theory's ability to secure democratic legitimacy, the value it purportedly protects. Perhaps it is inevitable that cooperative theories of democracy would struggle to articulate a coherent theory of free speech, precisely because of their inherent rejection of the adversary premise and its centrality to core notions of democracy. Based on their theoretical premise that democracy is an exercise of collective self-determination in pursuit of shared objectives, cooperative theories of the First Amendment might always be faced with something of a difficult choice. They could remain true to their First Amendment premises for protecting speech-listener autonomy in Meiklejohn's model, for instance. But to the extent they do so, they might necessarily violate a theoretical premise of the underlying cooperative democratic theory, such as Meiklejohn's premise that self-government should pursue the common good rather than private self-interest. Put differently, cooperative theories of democracy are fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of epistemological humility that the First Amendment embodies because, either implicitly or explicitly, they reflect predetermined conclusions about how autonomy should be exercised. In this manner, both theories suffer from the oxymoronic concept of externally determined autonomy. Adversary democracy does not suffer from the same problem because it contains no underlying premise as to how or why autonomy should be exercised.3 "' Instead, it commits these choices to the individual. Thus, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue the course of action he thinks is in the best interests of the community or the nation, adversary democracy authorizes him to do so. On the other hand, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue what he thinks is in his own private self-interest, adversary democracy says he may do so. Because adversary democracy is consistent with these process-based autonomy decisions, one employing the adversary theory of the First Amendment is never tempted to exclude speech otherwise logically included within the amendment's scope simply because its speaker is not acting in accordance with some predetermined ideal of political behavior. More importantly, the adversary theory of free expression is preferable to Meiklejohn's and Post's theories because it equally protects all aspects of democratic autonomy, rather than selectively privileging some aspects over others. Assuming that the purpose of a democratic theory of the First Amendment is, indeed, to facilitate democracy, which in turn necessarily implies the notions of epistemological humility and true voter autonomy, such comprehensive protection for all aspects of process-based autonomy is crucial to a theory's success. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, which categorically excludes speaker autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy, and unlike Post's theory, which systematically underprotects listener autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy that do not facilitate the emergence of a common will, the adversary theory of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all its manifestations.
59 +Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
60 +Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
61 +Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.
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