Changes for page Strake Jesuit Herrera Aff

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1 -Interpretation: Debaters may not read counterplans that include the aff’s advocacy with an exception. In the context of this topic, it means the neg cannot defend a ban on all reactors, except for a specific type of reactor.
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1 -Strake Jesuit Herrera Aff
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1 -Framework
2 -Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
3 -Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
4 -I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
5 -This approach to ethics justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence. Morality isn’t just something that we strive for in a vaccum, rather, we resolve it based on the empirical world. Pappas 16
6 -Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
7 -In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
8 -Thus, the standard is resolving material conditions of violence. Prefer additionally:
9 -First, recognizing and combatting the structures of racism is a pre-condition to making ethical action possible- even if your ethic is true in the abstract, we need the AC framework first. Memmi 2K
10 -Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 2000
11 -The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
12 -Plan
13 -Resolved: The United States should limit qualified immunity for police officers by removing the “clearly established” element from the Qualified Immunity Doctrine as method to increase accountability for officers. I’m willing to clarify T interps in CX. Wright 15
14 - (Journalist and PHD in Law. "Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity." http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/)
15 -In order to truly hold police accountable for bad acts, civilians must be able to bring, and win, civil rights suits themselves — not rely on the Department of Justice, or special prosecutors, or civilian review boards to hold officers accountable. And in order to both bring and win civil rights suits, civilians need a level playing field in court. Right now, they don’t have one. Instead, police officers have recourse to the broad protections of the judicially established doctrine of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, state actors are protected from suit even if they’ve violated the law by, say, using excessive force, or performing an unwarranted body cavity search — as long as their violation was not one of “clearly established law, of which a reasonable officer would be aware.” In other words, if there’s not already a case where a court has held that an officer’s identical or near-identical conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation there’s a good chance that even an obviously malfeasant officer will avoid liability — will avoid accountability. To bring about true accountability and change police behavior, this needs to change. And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts? That’s just a start. There are plenty of other reforms that could open up civil rights lawsuits and help ensure police accountability for bad conduct. Two posts (one, two) at Balkinization by City University of New York professor Lynda Dodd provide a good overview. Campaign Zero should consider adding civil rights litigation reform to its platform, our policymakers should consider making civil rights litigation more robust, and, if we want to see justice done, we should push to make it happen.
16 -
17 -Analytic
18 -Advantage 1 – 4th Amendment
19 -SCOTUS’s interpretation of the fourth Amendment gives police incredible search power.
20 -Carbado 16
21 -Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
22 -By prohibiting the government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose constraints on the police. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment in ways that empower, rather than constrain, the police. More precisely, the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to force engagement with African-Americans with little or no basis. To put the point more provocatively, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect police officers, not black people.130 Indeed, we might think of the Fourth Amendment as a Privileges and Immunities Clause for police officers—it confers tremendous power and discretion to police officers with respect to when they can engage people (the “privilege” protection of the Fourth Amendment) and protects them from criminal and civil sanction with respect to how they engage people (the “immunities” protection of the Fourth Amendment).
23 -The impact is that fourth Amendment power has become non-existent- only the plan solves. Carbado 16
24 -Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
25 -With respect to whether the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the standard, as in the criminal context, centers on reasonableness: whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary.195 And, as in the criminal context, juries will often defer to an officer’s claim that he/she employed deadly force because he/she feared for his/her life.196 Moreover, implicit and explicit biases can inform their decision making.197 With respect to the “clearly established” doctrine, there are two problems with the standard. First, courts often avoid deciding the question of whether the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution and rule instead on whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established.198 The Supreme Court has made clear that lower courts are free to proceed in this way,199 making it relatively easy for courts to make the defense of qualified immunity available to a police officer without having to decide whether the officer violated a constitutional right.200 This avoidance compounds the extent to which the law is unsettled. And, the greater the uncertainty about the law, the greater the doctrinal space for a police officer to argue that particular rights were not “clearly established” at the time the officer acted.201 In other words, the more courts avoid weighing in on the sub stantive question of whether police conduct violates the Constitution, the more leeway police officers have to argue that their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. Consider, for example, Stanton v. Sims.202 There, the Court avoided the question of whether an officer’s entrance into a yard to effectuate the arrest of a misdemeanant violated the Fourth Amendment, but ruled that the right to avoid such an intrusion was not clearly established.203 Unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules that, absent exigent circumstances, one has a right to be free from warrantless entry into one’s yard, courts will likely grant qualified immunity in cases involving such arrests.204 A second problem with the “clearly established” doctrine pertains to how courts apply it. According to the Supreme Court, in applying the “clearly established” standard, the inquiry is whether the right is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he/she is doing violates that right.’”205 This standard creates rhetorical room for police officers to argue that not “every” reasonable officer would have understood that the right in question was clearly established.206 The standard is also, as Karen Blum observes, “riddled with contradictions and complexities.” 207 Eleventh Circuit Judge Charles Wilson puts the point this way: The way in which courts frame the question, “was the law clearly established,” virtually guarantees the outcome of the qualified immunity inquiry. Courts that permit the general principles enunciated in cases factually distinct from the case at hand to “clearly establish” the law in a particular area will be much more likely to deny qualified immunity to government actors in a variety of contexts. Conversely, those courts that find the law governing a particular area to be clear ly established only in the event that a factually identical case can be found, will find that government actors enjoy qualified immunity in nearly every context.208 When one adds the difficulties of the “clearly established” standard to the other dimensions of the qualified immunity doctrine, it becomes clear that the qualified immunity regime erects a significant doctrinal hurdle to holding police officers accountable for acts of violence.
26 -These impacts particularly harm the poor and form structural violence.
27 -Carbado 16
28 -Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
29 -Group vulnerability increases the likelihood that the police will target African- Americans, particularly those who are marginalized both inside and outside of the black community, such as LGBTQ people.83 Marginalized groups are more vulnerable to police contact and violence because members of these groups often have non-normative identities to which stereotypes of criminality and presumptions of disorder apply.84 Additionally, people with vulnerable identities are less likely to report instances of police abuse and less likely to be believed when they do. That is to say, members of vulnerable groups are impossible witnesses to their own victimization and lack the social standing and credibility to articulate it.
30 -Advantage 2 – Reform
31 -Qualified immunity destroys accountability for police officers-limitations are key. Bernick 15 Evan Bernick, https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
32 -The sad fact is that it is often effectively impossible to hold police officers accountable for unconstitutional acts. That fact is attributable in large part to a potent well of unchecked power that many Americans have never heard of. You will not find it in the Constitution. You will not find it in any federal law. It is a judge-made doctrine, invented by the Supreme Court. It is called qualified immunity. And if those charged with enforcing the law are to be kept within the bounds of their rightful authority, it must be abolished. Section 1983, the federal law that allows citizens to sue for constitutional violations, is broad, unequivocal, and unambiguous. It says that “every person” who is acting “under color of” law who causes a “deprivation of any rights… secured by the Constitution and laws” “shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983 embodies a foundational principle of justice that resonates with Americans who have never heard of Marbury v. Madison: where there is a right, there is a remedy.But for decades, we have had rights without remedies. In the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court held that police officers sued for constitutional violations can raise “qualified immunity” as a defense, and thereby escape paying out of their own pockets, even if they violated a person’s constitutional rights. This decision was unabashedly policy-oriented: it was thought that government officials would not vigorously fulfill their obligations if they could be held accountable for actions taken in good faith. Under current law, the general rule is that victims of rights violations pay the costs of their own injuries. In practice, qualified immunity provides a near-absolute defense to all but the most outrageous conduct. The Ninth Circuit has held that throwing a flash-bang grenade “blindly” into a house, injuring a toddler, isn’t outrageous enough. Just last year, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Supreme Court decided that firing 15 bullets at a motorist is a reasonable method to end the driver’s flight from the police. So much for “every person” “shall be liable.” Qualified immunity shields police misconduct not only from liability but also from meaningful judicial scrutiny. Private lawsuits are an essential tool in uncovering the truth about police misconduct. The discovery process can yield information that makes broader policy changes within police departments possible. At trial, judicial engagement — an impartial, evidence-based determination of the constitutionality of the officer’s actions — can take place.
33 -Allowing police violence perpetuates systems of racism in the squo. Hadden et al 16
34 -(Bernadette R. Hadden, MSW, PHD, is Assistant professor in the MSW program at Hunter College School of Social Work New York. Willie Tolliver, PhD. Associate Professor at Silberman School of Social Work. Fabienne Snowden PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social Work. and Robyn Brown Manning, PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social "An authentic discourse: Recentering race and racism as factors that contribute to police violence against unarmed Black or African American men, Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment" http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10911359.2015.1129252#abstract)
35 -Police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men are occurring at alarming rates (Wihbey, 2014) and are indicative of a national trend of excessive force used by law enforcement agents on the bodies of people of color (American Civil Liberties Union ACLU, 2014). These incidents are happening inside and outside of Black and Hispanic neighborhoods (Carroll and Gonzalez, 2014), to low-income and middle-class Blacks or African Americans (Jones-Brown, 2009), and are frequently the result of routine encounters (ACLU, 2014). One of several challenges in obtaining an accurate count of the number of the police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men in the United States is that there are no nationally consistent measures of collecting these data (Department of Justice, 2015). This lack of standardized reporting, accompanied by public outrage, civil unrest, and community activism, calls for investigations into, and law enforcement reporting of, fatal police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men. Suggestions of racial profiling in police shootings have been presented as an explanation of the phenomenon of the disproportionate shooting of unarmed Black or African American men by law enforcement agents (Amajor, Sandars, and Pitts, 1999). In 2007 researchers found that in 10 of the United States’s largest cities, Blacks or African Americans were overly represented among victims of police shootings (Lowerstein, 2007). These findings were most visible in New York City, Las Vegas, and San Diego (Lowerstein, 2007). At a 2010 hearing calling for the investigation of police-involved shootings in Oakland, California, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) reported that from 2004 and 2008, 37 of the 45 police shootings in that city were at Black or African American suspects (Bulwa, 2010). A report from the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) illustrates that between 2000 and 2013, 97 Blacks or African Americans, 41 Hispanics, and 21 Whites were killed by NYPD police officers (NYCPD, 2014). In other words, from 2000 to 2013, more Blacks or African Americans were killed by NYCPD weapon discharges than Latinos and Whites combined. These reports identify and document the phenomenon of Black or African American men being shot and/ or killed by police officers, despite the limitations in data tracking police shootings (Graham, 2015). However, they do not inform us of the incidence or prevalence of this phenomenon
36 -Qualified immunity is structurally violent- it forces deliberation to occur through the interpretation of the oppressor, as opposed to allowing contestation of these views in court. Senkel 99 ( Tara. Attorney in New York. Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police: Let's Handcuff Police Brutality 15 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 385 (1998-1999). http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=falseandhandle=hein.journals/nylshr15andpage=385andcollection=journals#)
37 -While victims of police brutality can bring an action under section 1983217 against the police officer and the municipality, the police officer and municipality are each subject to liability under two different theories.218 Police officers are found liable iUnder the statute if, "while acting under color of state law, their actions violate a person's constitutional rights. 219 Municipalities are not liable under the theory of respondeat superior, but may be found liable if the police officer's conduct follows an official policy or practice of the municipality.220 There are differences between an action brought against a police officer and an action brought against a municipality, such as the defenses that can be asserted.2 Once a victim brings an excessive force claim against a police officer under section 1983, the officer may assert a defense of qualified immunity.222 In Graham, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. 223 However, the Court did discuss the qualified immunity defense in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 224 In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald sued Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, Richard Nixon's White House aides, alleging they had been involved in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights.225 The Court held that the aides were protected by a qualified immunity. 226 The Court stated that: Bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject governmental officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not clearly violate, established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 227 The Court went on to state that by defining the limits of the qualified immunity doctrine in objective terms, it was not authorizing lawless conduct.228 Rather, the objective reasonableness of an official's acts protects the public interest by discouraging unlawful conduct and compensating victims. 229 If an official could be expected to know that an act would violate statutory or constitutional rights, the officer should not perform the act, and if a person was injured by the act, that person should have a cause of action. 230 However, if the official's duties require action be taken in which clearly established rights are not involved, "the public interest may be better served by action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences.' 231 The objective reasonableness standard was also used in Anderson v. Creighton.232 In Anderson, FBI agent Russell Anderson was working with other law enforcement officers involved in a warrantless search of Robert Creighton's home.233 The search was performed because the FBI agent believed that a bank robbery suspect might be in the house.2 34 Creighton brought an action in state court against Anderson, asserting a Fourth Amendment violation.235 Anderson removed the suit to federal court and then filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the claim was barred by his qualified immunity.236 However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Anderson's motion, finding that Creighton demonstrated that Anderson violated Creighton's right to be protected from warrantless searches of his home. An exception from this constitutional right, the court noted, was if officers have probable cause or in situations where there are exigent circumstances.237 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that it was concerned about the test of "clearly established law"238 because if the test were applied to cases at this level of generality, it would not have any relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness., 239 The Court also stated that plaintiffs would be able to change the rule of qualified immunity "into a rule of virtually unqualified liability of government agents by alleging a violation of extremely abstract rights." 240 The right must be clear enough that a reasonable governmental official would know that his conduct violates that right. 241 The question that must be asked is an objective, albeit fact specific one, whether a reasonable officer would violate others rights or could find that Anderson's search was lawful, "in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.' '242 The court found that Anderson's "subjective belief about the search were irrelevant." 243 Furthermore,. in Owens v. City of Independence,244 the Court held that a municipality cannot allege a qualified immunity defense. The Court stated that "many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense." 245 Therefore, a municipality can only escape liability if it claims that a constitutional violation did not occur or that the police officer was not acting in good faith "pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the municipality. 246 Thus, if a police brutality victim brings an action against the police officer and municipality under section 1983, the Court will examine the claim under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonable standard to determine whether the police officer's conduct was excessive or unreasonable. Although police officers may assert a qualified immunity defense to the claim, municipalities are not afforded this defense.
38 -Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Cheh 96
39 -Mary Cheh (Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School), Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE, 248 (William Geller and Hans Toch eds., Yale University Press 1996).
40 -By contrast, the civil law, because of its greater flexibility and scope, has the potential to serve as the instrument of systemic reform. In adjusting rights and settling wrongs, civil remedies generally offer distinct advantages over criminal sanctions. First, a victim of police misconduct can sue on his or her their own behalf and need not await the government's decision to go forward. Second, an injured party need not overcome the heightened procedural protections afforded the criminally accused. For example, a plaintiff can prevail under a preponderance of evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, although the civil law, like the criminal law, can punish via its potential for imposition of punitive damages, the civil law provides compensation to victims who have been harmed by police misconduct. Recompense is beneficial in itself, and damage awards can spur reform if the costs of misbehavior are high. Fourth, civil lawsuits permit broad discovery of information and may provide a means to uncover police misbehavior and stir public reaction. Finally, the civil law offers various possibilities for framing relief which go beyond punishment or compensation and include remediation. That is, the civil law offers equitable relief, via court injunction and specific orders, that can force a deficient department not only to pay for harm caused but to reform so that the harm is not likely to be repeated.
41 -Analytic
42 -1.
43 -2.
44 -Independent of deterrence, lawsuits lead to political reform for the better.
45 -Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
46 -The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
47 -
48 -Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
49 -Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
50 -The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
51 -Impact Framing
52 -To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
53 -King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
54 -I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
55 -
56 -Method Framing
57 -The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
58 -Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
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1 -Inherency
2 -Police officers handle massive numbers of IPV cases and aren’t providing sufficient protection Schuerman 16
3 -Incidents of IPV domestic violence occur against women in the United States at epidemic rates.' Up to 60 of all married women suffer physical abuse at the hands of their spouses at some time during marriage.2 The fact that police officers spend more time responding to IPV domestic disturbances than to murders, rapes, and aggravated assaults reflects the pervasiveness of this problem. 3 At the same time, however, commentators often cite ineffective police response is as a chief reason for continuing high rates of IPV domestic violence.4 Traditionally, police response is limited to mediation, having the batterer temporarily leave the home, or referral to local community service agencies for counseling. 5 Most states make arrests are discretionary.6 As a consequence, it is rarely the favored response.7 Because city police departments deal with the majority of domestic violence calls, the problem is compounded by the fact that municipalities are generally immune from tort liability.8 Specifically, municipalities are and commonly not liable for the failure to provide police protection to individual members of the public.
4 -Plan
5 -Thus the plan: Resolved: The US congress ought model the Okin decision as federal policy in order to provide a clearly established limitation on qualified immunity Shtelmakher 10 :
6 -In cases arising from domestic-violence IPV complaints, federal courts apply the state-created danger doctrine inconsistently. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation establishing a standard for determining whether an individual police officer's conduct constitutes state-created danger. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg provides states with federal grants to combat violent crimes against women."' The purpose of § 3796gg is to help states "to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women." 1 2 To further this purpose, Congress should make the adoption of the state-created danger law a condition of states receiving grants under 3796gg. The most important aspect of the law is that it should reflect the sensitive and unique nature of IPV domestic violence." 3 To this end, the law should be modeled after the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin.1 Specifically, the law should state that state-created danger exists when a police officer's affirmative act or omission creates or enhances the danger to the victim. However, the affirmative act or omission does not have to be explicit. Instead, an affirmative act by law enforcement may be implicit, such as when officers' conduct communicates to an abuser that the officers will not interfere to stop the private violence. Additionally, the law should reflect that state-created danger does not exist when the only action taken by an officer is responding to a domestic-violence call, with no interaction between the officer and the victim or the abuser. Furthermore, courts should not apply the state-created danger doctrine where doing so would place officers in a predicament that subjects them to liability whether they take action or fail to do so.
7 -
8 -Establishing a standard is key to allowing IPV survivors to sue Shtelmakher 2
9 -Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against IPV domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation. Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct
10 -This is a limit of qualified immunity in that it reinforces the clearly established standard by create more specificities and limitations for police officers conduct in certain situations especially whent hey omit from action, thus any violation of the standard means that the officer can be brought to trial in the situation of IPV.
11 -Advantage
12 -Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Schwartz 11
13 -Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
14 -The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
15 -LAWSUITS LEAD TO REFORMS and areNOT DEPENDENT ON A DETERRENT EFFECT
16 -Schwartz, Joanna (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
17 -My findings illustrate a previously overlooked vision of lawsuits’ role in performance improvement: as a source of information. Lawsuits identify allegations of misconduct that are investigated to determine whether officer discipline is appropriate, and are considered with other data for possible trends. The evidence developed in discovery and trial can offer a detailed picture of underlying events that is used to identify personnel and policy failures. Closed case files, compared with internal investigations, can identify weaknesses in internal procedures. And trends in settlements and judgments, like initial claim trends, can identify units or procedures that should be more carefully reviewed. Viewed in isolation or in conjunction with other data, lawsuits can offer insights about the incidence and causes of individual and organizational failings. And with these insights, departments can – and do – identify ways to improve. This view of litigation – as a source of information that can be used to identify and reduce harm and error – is distinct from prevailing understandings of the effect of lawsuits on decisionmaking. Lawsuits are generally believed to influence behavior through the incentivizing effects of deterrence.113 In oversimplified terms, the expectation is that threatened or actual penalties will discourage future misbehavior so long as the costs of harm avoidance are lower than the costs of liability. And, generally speaking – though not always – the costs of liability are viewed in terms of the dollars spent to satisfy settlements and judgments.114 So, the – again, oversimplified – logic goes, the higher the expected or exacted damages, the greater the care that will be taken to prevent those sorts of injuries in the future. The lower the damages, the lower the care.
18 -Not allowing for violations and having IPV sensitive laws is the first step to providing equal justice for LGBTQ communities. Also means that the AC is nesseceary to change police bias towards IPV and allow them to see that It is intersectional. Crumrine writes :
19 -. Adopt nondiscrimination and zero tolerance harassment policies in departments, educate officers on the policies, and hold them accountable for violating these policies. Consider creating LGBTQ liaisons, either as sworn or civilian employees of the department, who reach out to the LGBTQ community, listen to their concerns, and actively work toward solving issues. Reframe law enforcement’s thinking about IPV and sexual assault. Start by believing victims when they report, conducting thorough impartial investigations, and following the evidence. Leave preconceived myths or prejudices toward IPV, sexual assault, and the LGBTQ community out of the response and investigation. Train officers on how to identify the predominate aggressor in an IPV case and how to recognize the use of coercive control in the relationship. Understand the neurobiology of trauma and its effect on memory. Be compassionate in realizing that a victim’s lack of memory or disjointed memory in an IPV or sexual assault case is often the result of the biological effects of trauma, not his or her unwillingness to cooperate. Be sensitive to the unique reporting barriers and challenges present in the LGBTQ community such as fears of being marginalized, outed, abused, not believed, or ridiculed as a transgender person; lack of recognizing the abuse for what it is; and inability to accept that men can be victimized in an IPV case or that a woman can be as much of an aggressor as a man. Realize that the LGBTQ community is a close-knit community; when a victim reports, it is not uncommon for many in the community to know they filed a report and what type of response they received from law enforcement. Take steps to provide a safe and nurturing environment for LGBTQ victims to stay, as is done for heterosexual victims. Some communities do not have facilities that house male victims; therefore, they are placed in a hotel or motel in an effort to keep them safe. For many in the LGBTQ community, their support system is the community to which they belong. Isolating them in a hotel away from this community distances them from their support system and may lead to them failing to continue in the criminal justice process. Consider the accessibility of LGBTQ abusers to their victims. Since many LGBTQ victims and abusers are of the same sex, they both have equal access to facilities like bathrooms, gyms, and social settings. This accessibility may allow abusers to continue terrorizing their victims without law enforcement’s knowledge. Officers should be aware of this access and take steps to protect victims from their abusers. Be sensitive to the reluctance of some in the LGBTQ community to acknowledge or address IPV in an effort to avoid unfavorable political or societal scrutiny of LGBTQ families. Remember the first interaction between law enforcement and LGBTQ victims of IPV and sexual assault is crucial in establishing respect and trust and keeping the victim engaged in the criminal justice system so that perpetrators are held accountable. For years, the members of LGBTQ community have felt as though they were second-class citizens in the eyes of many in U.S. society; including the police. If law enforcement professionals want to effect a change in that perception and providing equal justice to all survivors victims of IPV, they need to change how officers interact with the LGBTQ community. With the June 2015 marriage equality decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, there will be an increase in victims being empowered to report their abuse.12 Law enforcement has an obligation to treat LGBTQ survivors victims with the same dignity and respect given to other citizens when they have the courage to report. All reports of IPV should be taken seriously and investigated in an impartial and unbiased manner by following the evidence and holding perpetrators accountable in order to provide equal justice to the entire community. ♦
20 -The aff is key to accurate reporting since people won’t report to the police if they don’t trust them and the only way to break the cycle is to report. Other CPs can’t solve without police involvement. Shtelmakher 4:
21 -When police officers have a more sensitive and understanding attitude toward domestic violence, their response to victims' calls for help will improve. In turn, victims survivors will have more trust in the police and, therefore, will call on them whenever violence erupts.127 This is extremely significant because one of the biggest problems with IPV domestic violence is that victims survivors do not report all the instances of abuse that they suffer.'28 Domestic violence is often described as a cycle.'29 The common notion that an unhappy victim would simply leave her abuser is a misconception."30 Victims stay for various reasons, including but not limited to lacking the financial means to leave,"' fearing retaliation by the abuser and others,'32 or being ashamed that society will judge them.'3 3 But when violence is reported, it increases the chances of breaking the cycle.' 34 Additionally, reporting is important because domestic violence IPV tends to escalates, and it is crucial for police to intervene early, before serious injury or even death results.' Finally, accurate reporting leads to accurate statistics, which allow governments to address IPV domestic-violence issues as effectively as possible.
22 -Affirming changes the cultural values in society and the police to better address intimate partner violence : Schtelmaker :
23 -Proving state-created danger is only the first step in successfully alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to § 1983. In addition, a domestic-violence victim IPV survivor has to demonstrate that the officer's conduct shocked the conscience. 45 This requirement exists because § 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state actor, such as a police officer, but does not create substantive rights or define what type of conduct creates a cause of action.46 The requirement also ensures that a constitutional violation does not occur "whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm" 47 and prevents the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."48 As a result, liability thresholds for depriving an individual of constitutional rights must be stricter than state tort thresholds. 49 The lowest common denominator for tort liability is negligence, which is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.so On the other hand, the highest common denominator of tort liability, intentional conduct, is most likely enough." For actions that fall between the two ends of the spectrum, constitutional liability may occur when the state actor's conduct can be classified as deliberately indifferent.52 What constitutes deliberate indifference or shocks the conscience, however, is highly dependent on the circumstances of each case" and differs from court to court.54 Establishing a national standard for the state-created danger caused by officers responding inadequately to IPV domestic violence would heighten awareness about the dangers and prevalence of IPV domestic violence. Such awareness would force police officers, judges, and society as a whole to view the issues of IPV domestic violence differently. And in light of this new awareness, conduct that was once considered negligent or grossly negligent would, hopefully, be considered to shock the conscience. Nevertheless, victims survivors would still have another hurdle to overcome the police officers' defense of qualified immunity. C. The Qualified-Immunity Defense Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation." Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct.
24 -IPV is perpetuated by a lack of education – educational spaces must condemn IPV to start prevention – this has tangible impacts. Wolfe and Jaffe 99
25 -Wolfe, David A. Research Professor and Scholar, Western University, and Peter G. Jaffe Peter Jaffe is the Founding Director (1975-2001) and Special Advisor on Violence Prevention of the Centre for Children and Families in the Justice System of the London Family Court Clinic; member of the Clinical Adjunct Faculty for the Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Western Ontario; former chair of the Board of Directors of the Battered Women's Advocacy Centre; and past Chairperson and a founding board member of the Board of Directors for the Centre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children. He gives presentations on violence and facilitates over 50 workshops a year for teachers, students, lawyers, judges, police, doctors, clergy and various community groups. Dr. Jaffe is the recipient of many awards and grants, author of numerous research articles, and co-author of four books dealing with children exposed to domestic violence. "Emerging strategies in the prevention of domestic violence." The future of children (1999): 133-144.
26 -This perspective suggests that domestic violence IPV is learned behavior that is modeled, rewarded, and supported by families and/or the broader culture. Analyses based on this theory focus on the ways children learn that aggression is appropriate to resolve conflicts, especially within the context of intimate relationships.11 Researchers have found that batterers are much more likely to have had violent fathers than are nonbatterers.12 Developmental research shows that early intervention with children from violent households may restore normal developmental processes, such as empathy and selfcontrol, and minimize the risk of further harm caused by exposure to abusive adult models.13 Societal Structure Theory According to this view, domestic violence IPV is caused by an underlying power imbalance that can be understood only by examining society as a whole. The analysis focuses on patriarchy or male domination over women and children through physical, economic, and political control. Domestic violence IPV reflects women’s inequality in the culture and the reinforcement of this reality by various institutions.14 Commonalities Across Causation Theories Despite the diversity of views regarding the underlying causes of domestic violence, there are some beliefs common to all these theories. They include: (1) that domestic violence IPV has been ignored as a major social problem until recently and remains poorly understood;15 (2) that domestic violence is a complex problem impacted by multiple variables;16 (3) that childhood trauma, either through exposure to violence or some other trauma, influences the likelihood of domestic violence;17 and (4) that as long as domestic violence is condoned as its accepted behavior by public attitudes and institutions, there is little chance of preventing it involves attempts to minimize the course of a problem once it is already clearly evident and causing harm. Primary prevention strategies can introduce to particular population groups new values, thinking processes, and relationship skills that are incompatible with violence and that promote healthy, nonviolent relationships. For example, resources can be used to focus on respect, trust, and supportive growth in relationships.19 These efforts can be targeted at populations that may be at risk for violence in their intimate relationships but who have not yet shown symptoms of concern, or they can be directed universally at broad population groups, such as school-age children or members of a particular community. In contrast to a population-based focus, secondary prevention efforts in domestic violence address identified individuals who have exhibited particular behaviors associated with domestic violence. An example of secondary prevention is a clear protocol for the way teachers can assist students who have discussed witnessing domestic violence in their homes but who do not show serious signs of harm.20 Tertiary prevention efforts are the most common and emphasize the identification of domestic violence and its perpetrators and victims, control of the behavior and its harms, punishment and/or treatment for the perpetrators, and support for the victims. Intensive collaboration and coordinated services across agencies may be vital in tertiary prevention efforts to address chronic domestic violence and to help prevent future generations of batterers and victims. However, tertiary efforts can be very expensive and often show only limited success in stopping domestic violence, addressing long-term harms, and preventing future acts of violence.21 Table 1 uses the primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention paradigm to categorize a broad range of domestic violence prevention strategies. Several of the strategies mentioned in the table are described in greater detail in the following section, which discusses innovative primary and secondary prevention strategies currently being tried in the United States and Canada. (For information regarding tertiary prevention efforts for children exposed to domestic violence, see the articles by Lemon, by Findlater and Kelly, by Saathoff and Stoffel, by Culross, and by Groves in this journal issue.) Innovative Primary and Secondary Prevention Efforts Existing primary prevention efforts are often directed toward particular population groups, and secondary efforts toward identified individuals within those groups. Programs for children typically target specific age groups and utilize, in their design, what is known about child development at that particular age. As a result, programs for very young children are markedly different from programs for adolescents, for example. Unfortunately, there is no information currently available regarding the total number of primary and secondary prevention programs that address domestic violence. The programs described below are highlighted because they illustrate the points being discussed, not because they necessarily represent the most successful programs. Comprehensive, evaluative information with regard to domestic violence prevention programs is also very limited but is presented when available. Infants and Preschool-Age Children (0 to 5 Years) Primary and secondary prevention strategies for infants and preschool children focus on ensuring that children receive a healthy start, including freedom from emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, and from the trauma of witnessing domestic violence. Development of such strategies begins by defining the principles of a healthy childrearing environment. Though there are differing opinions about the details of such a healthy environment,22 all experts agree that in order for very young children to thrive and grow to be nonviolent, productive adults, they must be cared for by supportive and nurturing adults, have opportunities for socialization, and have the freedom within protective boundaries to explore their world.23 Prevention programs targeting infants and preschool children have developed from the public health and nursing fields. They involve efforts to provide support for new parents through home visiting programs.24 (For more information on home visiting programs, see the spring/summer 1999 issue of The Future of Children.) Home visiting support and assistance can be delivered on a universal basis whereby all new parents receive basic in-home services for a specified time period. However, no pro grams with a universal approach currently exist in North America.25 Alternatively, home visiting services can be delivered to selected groups, such as families or neighborhoods, that are at greater risk for domestic violence. There are home visiting programs that currently target families identified as being at risk for child abuse,26 and include efforts to improve parenting skills27 and to prevent social isolation.28 Hawaii’s Healthy Start Program is a wellknown example of a prevention effort, with home visits provided to infants born to high-risk families to help prevent the incidence of child abuse and to promote other aspects of healthy child development. (See Box 1.) To date, home visitation programs have not focused on domestic violence prevention. Yet, such programs hold promise in this area because of their emphasis on creating a healthy environment for children and because many of the families served who are at risk for child abuse are also at risk for domestic violence. Moreover, families at risk for domestic violence may be more receptive to home visitation, with its focus on healthy relationships and family strengths, than to more directive or punitive approaches through child welfare services or law enforcement.20 However, there are potential problems with the use of home visiting programs to address domestic violence. These include concern for the safety of the home visitor and the victim, and the possibility that any trust between the home visitor and the family will be breached if domestic violence is discussed.29 School-Age Children (6 to 12 Years) Schools are ideal places in which to introduce primary prevention programs to wide ranges of children, because most children attend school. In addition, much of children’s social learning takes place in schools, and research has shown that social learning can play a role in the development of behaviors and attitudes that support domestic violence. Teachers, who typically represent the second most important influence in the lives of children, are in an ideal position to motivate students to consider new ways of thinking and behaving.30 In a 1998 comprehensive review of model programs for battered mothers and their children, several community agencies reported the development of primary prevention efforts in collaboration with schools.31 One of the key values inherent in all of these primary prevention programs is the belief that every student needs to be aware of domestic violence and related forms of abuse. Even if students never become victims or perpetrators of domestic violence, they may have opportunities in the future, as community members, to help others in preventing or stopping it.32 Because these programs consider domestic violence a community and societal problem, many of them also involve parents and other members of the broader community. One of the first programs to document efforts to prevent domestic violence by working with children in the schools was implemented by the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.33 (See Box 2.) The ideas and successes of this early program have spawned similar efforts across North America.34 Preliminary evaluations of these newer programs are promising and indicate that key elements of successful school-based programs include: identifying relationship violence as a form of societal violence; acknowledging that domestic violence is an abuse of power and control; creating a high enough level of trust so that children can disclose exposure to domestic violence and teachers can make appropriate referrals; teaching safety skills about what to do when domestic violence occurs; and encouraging the development of social skills such as anger management and conflict resolution as alternatives to violence.35 Adolescents (13 to 18 Years) Adolescence is a time of important cognitive and social development. Teens learn to think more rationally and become capable of thinking hypothetically. They also develop a greater understanding of the possible risks and consequences of their behaviors and learn to balance their own interests with those of their peers and family members. Conformity to parental opinions gradually decreases throughout adolescence, while peers become increasingly influential until late adolescence.36 Romantic relationships become more important by mid-adolescence.37 Thus, early- and mid-adolescence offer unique windows of opportunity for primary prevention efforts that make teens aware of the ways in which violence in relationships can occur, and that teach healthy ways to form intimate relationships.38 When offered opportunities to explore the richness and rewards of relationships, youths become eager to learn about choices and responsibilities. Clear messages about personal responsibility and boundaries, delivered in a blame-free manner, are generally acceptable to this age group, whereas lectures and warnings are less helpful.39 Primary prevention programs delivered universally through high schools often involve activities aimed at increasing awareness and dispelling myths about relationship violence. Such activities might include school auditorium presentations involving videotapes, plays, professional theater groups, or speeches from domestic violence or teen dating violence survivors; classroom discussions facilitated by teachers or domestic violence services professionals; programs and curricula that encourage students to examine attitudes and behaviors that promote or tolerate violence; and peer support groups. Some school-based programs have resulted in youth-initiated prevention activities such as theatrical presentations to younger children, and marches and other social protests against domestic violence.40 Preliminary data from evaluations of six school-based dating violence prevention programs report increases in knowledge about dating violence issues, positive changes in attitudes about dating violence, and self-reported decreases in the perpetration of dating violence. Though preliminary, these data indicate that adolescents are receptive to school-based prevention programs.41 In addition to school-based programs for adolescents, there are also community based programs with primary prevention goals similar to those of the school-based programs. Many of the community based programs also provide secondary prevention services to teens who have displayed early signs of violence. (See Box 3.)
27 -
28 -Framework
29 -The role of the judge is to vote for the debater that provides the best post-fiat policy option for reducing violence. Smith ’13: (Elijah Smith. “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013)
30 -At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation away from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.
31 -Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
32 -Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
33 -I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
34 -
35 -Focus on the empirical world means that the debate needs to be a question of resolving material injustice. Pappas 16
36 -Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
37 -In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
38 -To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
39 -King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
40 -I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
41 -Debate should seek to design concrete alternatives.
42 -Bryant 12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
43 -The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri and Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
44 -The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
45 -Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
46 -Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
47 -Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
48 -The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
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1 -Part 1: Framework
2 -Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
3 -
4 -There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
5 -Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
6 -“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
7 -Implications:
8 -A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. Mills Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
9 -“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
10 -2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
11 -Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
12 -“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
13 -Impacts:
14 -A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
15 -B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
16 -Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
17 -“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
18 -And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
19 -The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.
20 -Mouffe 2k Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
21 -"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
22 -Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
23 -Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
24 -Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
25 -“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives.
26 -2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
27 -A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
28 -B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
29 -C. It’s a no risk issue- they have to justify that something can be uncontestable in order to prove antagonism is good for ethics.
30 -3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
31 -4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
32 -Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
33 -The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
34 -Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
35 -Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
36 -"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
37 -Part 2: Advocacy
38 -I defend the resolution as a generl principle.
39 -Part 3: Contention
40 -Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
41 -Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
42 -Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
43 -Thus, affirm:
44 -Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
45 -Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
46 -I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
47 -This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
48 -Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
49 - Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
50 -Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
51 -Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
52 -Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
53 -Free speech was written into the constitution explicitly to be a counter-majoritarian right to promote agonistic discourse
54 -Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
55 -According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
56 -Adversarial democracy entails protection of constitutional speech. Also justifies why cooperative conceptions of democracy fail in the context of free speech.
57 -Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
58 -Acceptance of the premises of adversary democracy has important implications for the scope of the theory of free expression. Post and Meiklejohn were both correct in positing a symbiotic intersection between democracy and free expression. Recognition of both the normative and empirical superiority of the adversary model of democracy, however, suggests that the First Amendment's domain extends significantly farther than either Post or Meiklejohn's theories would permit. Adversary democracy, it should be recalled, posits that democracy invariably involves an adversarial competition among competing personal, social, or economic interests. Individuals are able to protect their own interests or to achieve their ideological goals by (1) participating in the proc- ess of governing by exercise of the vote, and (2) attempting, through exercise of their expressive powers, to persuade others to accept their positions. The First Amendment, therefore, must protect (1) all speech that facilitates the individual's democratic decisionmaking; (2) all lawful advocacy;3° ' (3) all speech that facilitates the individual's awareness of her self-interest; and (4) all speech that facilitates the individual's ability to maintain and develop her individuality in spite of collective life. Notably, this does not mean that the government is absolutely barred from regulating speech that falls in these four categories. It simply means that it can do so only when the regulation survives strict scrutiny. While the adversary theory of the First Amendment would protect all of the speech that Meiklejohn's and Post's theories would protect, it would also protect much of the expression these theories exclude. As previously noted, both Meiklejohn and Post strained their theories' claims to being democratic in order to exclude certain forms of self-interested speech. Meiklejohn not only violated the core principle of epistemological humility to justify his exclusion of economically self-interested speech from the First Amendment, he also excluded such self-interested speech despite its potential to inform democratic decisionmaking, which he believed to be the sole constitutional purpose for protecting speech in the first place. Post likewise casts off or at least devalues core aspects of democratic autonomy, such as the vote and the information that makes it more informed, despite the fact that doing so concomitantly undermines his theory's ability to secure democratic legitimacy, the value it purportedly protects. Perhaps it is inevitable that cooperative theories of democracy would struggle to articulate a coherent theory of free speech, precisely because of their inherent rejection of the adversary premise and its centrality to core notions of democracy. Based on their theoretical premise that democracy is an exercise of collective self-determination in pursuit of shared objectives, cooperative theories of the First Amendment might always be faced with something of a difficult choice. They could remain true to their First Amendment premises for protecting speech-listener autonomy in Meiklejohn's model, for instance. But to the extent they do so, they might necessarily violate a theoretical premise of the underlying cooperative democratic theory, such as Meiklejohn's premise that self-government should pursue the common good rather than private self-interest. Put differently, cooperative theories of democracy are fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of epistemological humility that the First Amendment embodies because, either implicitly or explicitly, they reflect predetermined conclusions about how autonomy should be exercised. In this manner, both theories suffer from the oxymoronic concept of externally determined autonomy. Adversary democracy does not suffer from the same problem because it contains no underlying premise as to how or why autonomy should be exercised.3 "' Instead, it commits these choices to the individual. Thus, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue the course of action he thinks is in the best interests of the community or the nation, adversary democracy authorizes him to do so. On the other hand, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue what he thinks is in his own private self-interest, adversary democracy says he may do so. Because adversary democracy is consistent with these process-based autonomy decisions, one employing the adversary theory of the First Amendment is never tempted to exclude speech otherwise logically included within the amendment's scope simply because its speaker is not acting in accordance with some predetermined ideal of political behavior. More importantly, the adversary theory of free expression is preferable to Meiklejohn's and Post's theories because it equally protects all aspects of democratic autonomy, rather than selectively privileging some aspects over others. Assuming that the purpose of a democratic theory of the First Amendment is, indeed, to facilitate democracy, which in turn necessarily implies the notions of epistemological humility and true voter autonomy, such comprehensive protection for all aspects of process-based autonomy is crucial to a theory's success. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, which categorically excludes speaker autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy, and unlike Post's theory, which systematically underprotects listener autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy that do not facilitate the emergence of a common will, the adversary theory of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all its manifestations.
59 -Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
60 -Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
61 -Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.
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1 +I value morality since the resolution is normative. Every agent has a practical identity that is the source of value.
2 +Christine M. Korsgaard 92, professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. “The Sources of Normativity”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
3 +Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think
4 +AND
5 +identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.
6 +The content of normative claims has to be contained within themselves—the nature of obligation is what gives us the ability to deduct what obligations we have.
7 +David Velleman 05 (Professor of Philosophy at New York University). “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. 2005.
8 +Kant reasoned that if moral requirements don't derive their force from any external authority,
9 +AND
10 +that a requirement would carry authority simply by virtue of requiring that thing.
11 +Thus, the standard is consistency in the rational will.
12 +Prefer it independently:
13 +
14 +Absent a rational will, actions become unintelligible since the intent determines the action.
15 +Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014
16 + “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,”
17 +AND
18 +to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.”
19 +3. Anything being good commits us to valuing it unconditionally.
20 +Christine M. Korsgaard 06 ( Professor at Harvard) “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt”. Pg. 7 RC
21 +“If practical reasons are public, however, it must be possible for us
22 +AND
23 +reasons, then it turns out to be something like Kant’s moral law.”
24 +Also means that only my framework gives reason for action and thus guide agents to act in certain ways.
25 +Contention
26 +I advocate that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I’ll defend consequentialist impacts, but they’re not relevant under my framework since I just need to need to show that the maxim of the aff is consistent with the rational will.
27 +First,
28 +Second, there is a distinction between right and virtue. Right refers to external freedom, i.e. your ability to not be coerced, whereas virtue refers to a more internal freedom, i.e. you being internally motivated to make an ethical choice. Restricting free speech prevents being from being able to truly act on ethical choices.
29 +Helga Varden 10 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
30 +The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality as
31 +AND
32 +to both internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced.
33 +Third, it’s impossible for words to violate someone’s external freedom since it is up to the listener to believe them or not.
34 +Helga Varden 2 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
35 +This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains
36 +AND
37 +cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
38 +Moreover, simply saying something immoral or reprehensible is different from coercion via threats.
39 +Helga Varden 3 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC
40 +Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech.
41 +AND
42 +me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view.
43 +Underview
44 +Silencing bigots only re-entrenches their position and galvanizes their opposition to social justice movements
45 +Levinovitz 16 Alan Levinovitz, assistant professor of religion at James Madison University, “How Trigger Warnings Silence Religious Students,” The Atlantic, August 30, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/silencing-religious-students-on-campus/497951/
46 + There is no doubt that in America, the perspective of white, heterosexual
47 +AND
48 +deeply held beliefs. It would be a shame to execute him again.
49 +Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech.
50 +ACLU Hate Speech On Campus, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
51 +Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more
52 +AND
53 +, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance.
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1 +Part 1: Framework
2 +Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
3 +
4 +There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
5 +Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
6 +“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
7 +Implications:
8 +A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. Mills Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
9 +“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
10 +2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
11 +Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
12 +“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
13 +Impacts:
14 +A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
15 +B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
16 +Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
17 +“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
18 +And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
19 +The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.
20 +Mouffe 2k Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
21 +"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
22 +Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
23 +Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
24 +Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
25 +“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives.
26 +2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
27 +A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
28 +B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
29 +C. It’s a no risk issue- they have to justify that something can be uncontestable in order to prove antagonism is good for ethics.
30 +3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
31 +4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
32 +Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
33 +The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
34 +Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
35 +Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
36 +"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
37 +Part 2: Advocacy
38 +I defend the resolution as a generl principle.
39 +Part 3: Contention
40 +Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
41 +Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
42 +Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
43 +Thus, affirm:
44 +Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
45 +Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
46 +I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
47 +This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
48 +Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
49 + Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
50 +Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
51 +Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
52 +Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
53 +Free speech was written into the constitution explicitly to be a counter-majoritarian right to promote agonistic discourse
54 +Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
55 +According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
56 +Adversarial democracy entails protection of constitutional speech. Also justifies why cooperative conceptions of democracy fail in the context of free speech.
57 +Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
58 +Acceptance of the premises of adversary democracy has important implications for the scope of the theory of free expression. Post and Meiklejohn were both correct in positing a symbiotic intersection between democracy and free expression. Recognition of both the normative and empirical superiority of the adversary model of democracy, however, suggests that the First Amendment's domain extends significantly farther than either Post or Meiklejohn's theories would permit. Adversary democracy, it should be recalled, posits that democracy invariably involves an adversarial competition among competing personal, social, or economic interests. Individuals are able to protect their own interests or to achieve their ideological goals by (1) participating in the proc- ess of governing by exercise of the vote, and (2) attempting, through exercise of their expressive powers, to persuade others to accept their positions. The First Amendment, therefore, must protect (1) all speech that facilitates the individual's democratic decisionmaking; (2) all lawful advocacy;3° ' (3) all speech that facilitates the individual's awareness of her self-interest; and (4) all speech that facilitates the individual's ability to maintain and develop her individuality in spite of collective life. Notably, this does not mean that the government is absolutely barred from regulating speech that falls in these four categories. It simply means that it can do so only when the regulation survives strict scrutiny. While the adversary theory of the First Amendment would protect all of the speech that Meiklejohn's and Post's theories would protect, it would also protect much of the expression these theories exclude. As previously noted, both Meiklejohn and Post strained their theories' claims to being democratic in order to exclude certain forms of self-interested speech. Meiklejohn not only violated the core principle of epistemological humility to justify his exclusion of economically self-interested speech from the First Amendment, he also excluded such self-interested speech despite its potential to inform democratic decisionmaking, which he believed to be the sole constitutional purpose for protecting speech in the first place. Post likewise casts off or at least devalues core aspects of democratic autonomy, such as the vote and the information that makes it more informed, despite the fact that doing so concomitantly undermines his theory's ability to secure democratic legitimacy, the value it purportedly protects. Perhaps it is inevitable that cooperative theories of democracy would struggle to articulate a coherent theory of free speech, precisely because of their inherent rejection of the adversary premise and its centrality to core notions of democracy. Based on their theoretical premise that democracy is an exercise of collective self-determination in pursuit of shared objectives, cooperative theories of the First Amendment might always be faced with something of a difficult choice. They could remain true to their First Amendment premises for protecting speech-listener autonomy in Meiklejohn's model, for instance. But to the extent they do so, they might necessarily violate a theoretical premise of the underlying cooperative democratic theory, such as Meiklejohn's premise that self-government should pursue the common good rather than private self-interest. Put differently, cooperative theories of democracy are fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of epistemological humility that the First Amendment embodies because, either implicitly or explicitly, they reflect predetermined conclusions about how autonomy should be exercised. In this manner, both theories suffer from the oxymoronic concept of externally determined autonomy. Adversary democracy does not suffer from the same problem because it contains no underlying premise as to how or why autonomy should be exercised.3 "' Instead, it commits these choices to the individual. Thus, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue the course of action he thinks is in the best interests of the community or the nation, adversary democracy authorizes him to do so. On the other hand, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue what he thinks is in his own private self-interest, adversary democracy says he may do so. Because adversary democracy is consistent with these process-based autonomy decisions, one employing the adversary theory of the First Amendment is never tempted to exclude speech otherwise logically included within the amendment's scope simply because its speaker is not acting in accordance with some predetermined ideal of political behavior. More importantly, the adversary theory of free expression is preferable to Meiklejohn's and Post's theories because it equally protects all aspects of democratic autonomy, rather than selectively privileging some aspects over others. Assuming that the purpose of a democratic theory of the First Amendment is, indeed, to facilitate democracy, which in turn necessarily implies the notions of epistemological humility and true voter autonomy, such comprehensive protection for all aspects of process-based autonomy is crucial to a theory's success. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, which categorically excludes speaker autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy, and unlike Post's theory, which systematically underprotects listener autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy that do not facilitate the emergence of a common will, the adversary theory of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all its manifestations.
59 +Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
60 +Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
61 +Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.
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1 +Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken cases and evidence that they’ve read during the year on the NDCA wiki.
2 +
3 +Interpretation: Debaters may not read a conditional advoacy
4 +
5 +Interpretation: Debaters may not read counterplans that include the aff’s advocacy with an exception. In the context of this topic, it means the neg cannot defend a ban on all reactors, except for a specific type of reactor.
6 +
7 +Interpretation – If the aff clarifies this advocacy in the form of a text in the 1AC then the negative must have an explicit text in the 1NC clarifying their advocacy with a solvency advocate in the topic literature.
8 +
9 +Interpretation: If the Negative reads an alternative to a K in the 1NC, they must textually delineate whether the alternative is implemented hypothetically in a post-fiat world, or if the alternative is a method/strategy under which the NC does not defend implementation.
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1 +Inherency
2 +Police officers handle massive numbers of IPV cases and aren’t providing sufficient protection Schuerman 16
3 +Incidents of IPV domestic violence occur against women in the United States at epidemic rates.' Up to 60 of all married women suffer physical abuse at the hands of their spouses at some time during marriage.2 The fact that police officers spend more time responding to IPV domestic disturbances than to murders, rapes, and aggravated assaults reflects the pervasiveness of this problem. 3 At the same time, however, commentators often cite ineffective police response is as a chief reason for continuing high rates of IPV domestic violence.4 Traditionally, police response is limited to mediation, having the batterer temporarily leave the home, or referral to local community service agencies for counseling. 5 Most states make arrests are discretionary.6 As a consequence, it is rarely the favored response.7 Because city police departments deal with the majority of domestic violence calls, the problem is compounded by the fact that municipalities are generally immune from tort liability.8 Specifically, municipalities are and commonly not liable for the failure to provide police protection to individual members of the public.
4 +Plan
5 +Thus the plan: Resolved: The US congress ought model the Okin decision as federal policy in order to provide a clearly established limitation on qualified immunity Shtelmakher 10 :
6 +In cases arising from domestic-violence IPV complaints, federal courts apply the state-created danger doctrine inconsistently. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation establishing a standard for determining whether an individual police officer's conduct constitutes state-created danger. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg provides states with federal grants to combat violent crimes against women."' The purpose of § 3796gg is to help states "to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women." 1 2 To further this purpose, Congress should make the adoption of the state-created danger law a condition of states receiving grants under 3796gg. The most important aspect of the law is that it should reflect the sensitive and unique nature of IPV domestic violence." 3 To this end, the law should be modeled after the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin.1 Specifically, the law should state that state-created danger exists when a police officer's affirmative act or omission creates or enhances the danger to the victim. However, the affirmative act or omission does not have to be explicit. Instead, an affirmative act by law enforcement may be implicit, such as when officers' conduct communicates to an abuser that the officers will not interfere to stop the private violence. Additionally, the law should reflect that state-created danger does not exist when the only action taken by an officer is responding to a domestic-violence call, with no interaction between the officer and the victim or the abuser. Furthermore, courts should not apply the state-created danger doctrine where doing so would place officers in a predicament that subjects them to liability whether they take action or fail to do so.
7 +
8 +Establishing a standard is key to allowing IPV survivors to sue Shtelmakher 2
9 +Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against IPV domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation. Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct
10 +This is a limit of qualified immunity in that it reinforces the clearly established standard by create more specificities and limitations for police officers conduct in certain situations especially whent hey omit from action, thus any violation of the standard means that the officer can be brought to trial in the situation of IPV.
11 +Advantage
12 +Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Schwartz 11
13 +Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
14 +The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
15 +LAWSUITS LEAD TO REFORMS and areNOT DEPENDENT ON A DETERRENT EFFECT
16 +Schwartz, Joanna (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
17 +My findings illustrate a previously overlooked vision of lawsuits’ role in performance improvement: as a source of information. Lawsuits identify allegations of misconduct that are investigated to determine whether officer discipline is appropriate, and are considered with other data for possible trends. The evidence developed in discovery and trial can offer a detailed picture of underlying events that is used to identify personnel and policy failures. Closed case files, compared with internal investigations, can identify weaknesses in internal procedures. And trends in settlements and judgments, like initial claim trends, can identify units or procedures that should be more carefully reviewed. Viewed in isolation or in conjunction with other data, lawsuits can offer insights about the incidence and causes of individual and organizational failings. And with these insights, departments can – and do – identify ways to improve. This view of litigation – as a source of information that can be used to identify and reduce harm and error – is distinct from prevailing understandings of the effect of lawsuits on decisionmaking. Lawsuits are generally believed to influence behavior through the incentivizing effects of deterrence.113 In oversimplified terms, the expectation is that threatened or actual penalties will discourage future misbehavior so long as the costs of harm avoidance are lower than the costs of liability. And, generally speaking – though not always – the costs of liability are viewed in terms of the dollars spent to satisfy settlements and judgments.114 So, the – again, oversimplified – logic goes, the higher the expected or exacted damages, the greater the care that will be taken to prevent those sorts of injuries in the future. The lower the damages, the lower the care.
18 +Not allowing for violations and having IPV sensitive laws is the first step to providing equal justice for LGBTQ communities. Also means that the AC is nesseceary to change police bias towards IPV and allow them to see that It is intersectional. Crumrine writes :
19 +. Adopt nondiscrimination and zero tolerance harassment policies in departments, educate officers on the policies, and hold them accountable for violating these policies. Consider creating LGBTQ liaisons, either as sworn or civilian employees of the department, who reach out to the LGBTQ community, listen to their concerns, and actively work toward solving issues. Reframe law enforcement’s thinking about IPV and sexual assault. Start by believing victims when they report, conducting thorough impartial investigations, and following the evidence. Leave preconceived myths or prejudices toward IPV, sexual assault, and the LGBTQ community out of the response and investigation. Train officers on how to identify the predominate aggressor in an IPV case and how to recognize the use of coercive control in the relationship. Understand the neurobiology of trauma and its effect on memory. Be compassionate in realizing that a victim’s lack of memory or disjointed memory in an IPV or sexual assault case is often the result of the biological effects of trauma, not his or her unwillingness to cooperate. Be sensitive to the unique reporting barriers and challenges present in the LGBTQ community such as fears of being marginalized, outed, abused, not believed, or ridiculed as a transgender person; lack of recognizing the abuse for what it is; and inability to accept that men can be victimized in an IPV case or that a woman can be as much of an aggressor as a man. Realize that the LGBTQ community is a close-knit community; when a victim reports, it is not uncommon for many in the community to know they filed a report and what type of response they received from law enforcement. Take steps to provide a safe and nurturing environment for LGBTQ victims to stay, as is done for heterosexual victims. Some communities do not have facilities that house male victims; therefore, they are placed in a hotel or motel in an effort to keep them safe. For many in the LGBTQ community, their support system is the community to which they belong. Isolating them in a hotel away from this community distances them from their support system and may lead to them failing to continue in the criminal justice process. Consider the accessibility of LGBTQ abusers to their victims. Since many LGBTQ victims and abusers are of the same sex, they both have equal access to facilities like bathrooms, gyms, and social settings. This accessibility may allow abusers to continue terrorizing their victims without law enforcement’s knowledge. Officers should be aware of this access and take steps to protect victims from their abusers. Be sensitive to the reluctance of some in the LGBTQ community to acknowledge or address IPV in an effort to avoid unfavorable political or societal scrutiny of LGBTQ families. Remember the first interaction between law enforcement and LGBTQ victims of IPV and sexual assault is crucial in establishing respect and trust and keeping the victim engaged in the criminal justice system so that perpetrators are held accountable. For years, the members of LGBTQ community have felt as though they were second-class citizens in the eyes of many in U.S. society; including the police. If law enforcement professionals want to effect a change in that perception and providing equal justice to all survivors victims of IPV, they need to change how officers interact with the LGBTQ community. With the June 2015 marriage equality decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, there will be an increase in victims being empowered to report their abuse.12 Law enforcement has an obligation to treat LGBTQ survivors victims with the same dignity and respect given to other citizens when they have the courage to report. All reports of IPV should be taken seriously and investigated in an impartial and unbiased manner by following the evidence and holding perpetrators accountable in order to provide equal justice to the entire community. ♦
20 +The aff is key to accurate reporting since people won’t report to the police if they don’t trust them and the only way to break the cycle is to report. Other CPs can’t solve without police involvement. Shtelmakher 4:
21 +When police officers have a more sensitive and understanding attitude toward domestic violence, their response to victims' calls for help will improve. In turn, victims survivors will have more trust in the police and, therefore, will call on them whenever violence erupts.127 This is extremely significant because one of the biggest problems with IPV domestic violence is that victims survivors do not report all the instances of abuse that they suffer.'28 Domestic violence is often described as a cycle.'29 The common notion that an unhappy victim would simply leave her abuser is a misconception."30 Victims stay for various reasons, including but not limited to lacking the financial means to leave,"' fearing retaliation by the abuser and others,'32 or being ashamed that society will judge them.'3 3 But when violence is reported, it increases the chances of breaking the cycle.' 34 Additionally, reporting is important because domestic violence IPV tends to escalates, and it is crucial for police to intervene early, before serious injury or even death results.' Finally, accurate reporting leads to accurate statistics, which allow governments to address IPV domestic-violence issues as effectively as possible.
22 +Affirming changes the cultural values in society and the police to better address intimate partner violence : Schtelmaker :
23 +Proving state-created danger is only the first step in successfully alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to § 1983. In addition, a domestic-violence victim IPV survivor has to demonstrate that the officer's conduct shocked the conscience. 45 This requirement exists because § 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state actor, such as a police officer, but does not create substantive rights or define what type of conduct creates a cause of action.46 The requirement also ensures that a constitutional violation does not occur "whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm" 47 and prevents the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."48 As a result, liability thresholds for depriving an individual of constitutional rights must be stricter than state tort thresholds. 49 The lowest common denominator for tort liability is negligence, which is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.so On the other hand, the highest common denominator of tort liability, intentional conduct, is most likely enough." For actions that fall between the two ends of the spectrum, constitutional liability may occur when the state actor's conduct can be classified as deliberately indifferent.52 What constitutes deliberate indifference or shocks the conscience, however, is highly dependent on the circumstances of each case" and differs from court to court.54 Establishing a national standard for the state-created danger caused by officers responding inadequately to IPV domestic violence would heighten awareness about the dangers and prevalence of IPV domestic violence. Such awareness would force police officers, judges, and society as a whole to view the issues of IPV domestic violence differently. And in light of this new awareness, conduct that was once considered negligent or grossly negligent would, hopefully, be considered to shock the conscience. Nevertheless, victims survivors would still have another hurdle to overcome the police officers' defense of qualified immunity. C. The Qualified-Immunity Defense Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6 According to the Supreme Court, "qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established" analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been aware of the law.63 Part of the battle against domestic violence is to make adequate, and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most effective way to handle domestic-violence situations. For example, a county in northern California has organized a program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the police department has given six officers specialized training to improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This training is especially useful when officers respond to situations where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation." Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities that utilize them.69 Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct.
24 +IPV is perpetuated by a lack of education – educational spaces must condemn IPV to start prevention – this has tangible impacts. Wolfe and Jaffe 99
25 +Wolfe, David A. Research Professor and Scholar, Western University, and Peter G. Jaffe Peter Jaffe is the Founding Director (1975-2001) and Special Advisor on Violence Prevention of the Centre for Children and Families in the Justice System of the London Family Court Clinic; member of the Clinical Adjunct Faculty for the Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of Western Ontario; former chair of the Board of Directors of the Battered Women's Advocacy Centre; and past Chairperson and a founding board member of the Board of Directors for the Centre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children. He gives presentations on violence and facilitates over 50 workshops a year for teachers, students, lawyers, judges, police, doctors, clergy and various community groups. Dr. Jaffe is the recipient of many awards and grants, author of numerous research articles, and co-author of four books dealing with children exposed to domestic violence. "Emerging strategies in the prevention of domestic violence." The future of children (1999): 133-144.
26 +This perspective suggests that domestic violence IPV is learned behavior that is modeled, rewarded, and supported by families and/or the broader culture. Analyses based on this theory focus on the ways children learn that aggression is appropriate to resolve conflicts, especially within the context of intimate relationships.11 Researchers have found that batterers are much more likely to have had violent fathers than are nonbatterers.12 Developmental research shows that early intervention with children from violent households may restore normal developmental processes, such as empathy and selfcontrol, and minimize the risk of further harm caused by exposure to abusive adult models.13 Societal Structure Theory According to this view, domestic violence IPV is caused by an underlying power imbalance that can be understood only by examining society as a whole. The analysis focuses on patriarchy or male domination over women and children through physical, economic, and political control. Domestic violence IPV reflects women’s inequality in the culture and the reinforcement of this reality by various institutions.14 Commonalities Across Causation Theories Despite the diversity of views regarding the underlying causes of domestic violence, there are some beliefs common to all these theories. They include: (1) that domestic violence IPV has been ignored as a major social problem until recently and remains poorly understood;15 (2) that domestic violence is a complex problem impacted by multiple variables;16 (3) that childhood trauma, either through exposure to violence or some other trauma, influences the likelihood of domestic violence;17 and (4) that as long as domestic violence is condoned as its accepted behavior by public attitudes and institutions, there is little chance of preventing it involves attempts to minimize the course of a problem once it is already clearly evident and causing harm. Primary prevention strategies can introduce to particular population groups new values, thinking processes, and relationship skills that are incompatible with violence and that promote healthy, nonviolent relationships. For example, resources can be used to focus on respect, trust, and supportive growth in relationships.19 These efforts can be targeted at populations that may be at risk for violence in their intimate relationships but who have not yet shown symptoms of concern, or they can be directed universally at broad population groups, such as school-age children or members of a particular community. In contrast to a population-based focus, secondary prevention efforts in domestic violence address identified individuals who have exhibited particular behaviors associated with domestic violence. An example of secondary prevention is a clear protocol for the way teachers can assist students who have discussed witnessing domestic violence in their homes but who do not show serious signs of harm.20 Tertiary prevention efforts are the most common and emphasize the identification of domestic violence and its perpetrators and victims, control of the behavior and its harms, punishment and/or treatment for the perpetrators, and support for the victims. Intensive collaboration and coordinated services across agencies may be vital in tertiary prevention efforts to address chronic domestic violence and to help prevent future generations of batterers and victims. However, tertiary efforts can be very expensive and often show only limited success in stopping domestic violence, addressing long-term harms, and preventing future acts of violence.21 Table 1 uses the primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention paradigm to categorize a broad range of domestic violence prevention strategies. Several of the strategies mentioned in the table are described in greater detail in the following section, which discusses innovative primary and secondary prevention strategies currently being tried in the United States and Canada. (For information regarding tertiary prevention efforts for children exposed to domestic violence, see the articles by Lemon, by Findlater and Kelly, by Saathoff and Stoffel, by Culross, and by Groves in this journal issue.) Innovative Primary and Secondary Prevention Efforts Existing primary prevention efforts are often directed toward particular population groups, and secondary efforts toward identified individuals within those groups. Programs for children typically target specific age groups and utilize, in their design, what is known about child development at that particular age. As a result, programs for very young children are markedly different from programs for adolescents, for example. Unfortunately, there is no information currently available regarding the total number of primary and secondary prevention programs that address domestic violence. The programs described below are highlighted because they illustrate the points being discussed, not because they necessarily represent the most successful programs. Comprehensive, evaluative information with regard to domestic violence prevention programs is also very limited but is presented when available. Infants and Preschool-Age Children (0 to 5 Years) Primary and secondary prevention strategies for infants and preschool children focus on ensuring that children receive a healthy start, including freedom from emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, and from the trauma of witnessing domestic violence. Development of such strategies begins by defining the principles of a healthy childrearing environment. Though there are differing opinions about the details of such a healthy environment,22 all experts agree that in order for very young children to thrive and grow to be nonviolent, productive adults, they must be cared for by supportive and nurturing adults, have opportunities for socialization, and have the freedom within protective boundaries to explore their world.23 Prevention programs targeting infants and preschool children have developed from the public health and nursing fields. They involve efforts to provide support for new parents through home visiting programs.24 (For more information on home visiting programs, see the spring/summer 1999 issue of The Future of Children.) Home visiting support and assistance can be delivered on a universal basis whereby all new parents receive basic in-home services for a specified time period. However, no pro grams with a universal approach currently exist in North America.25 Alternatively, home visiting services can be delivered to selected groups, such as families or neighborhoods, that are at greater risk for domestic violence. There are home visiting programs that currently target families identified as being at risk for child abuse,26 and include efforts to improve parenting skills27 and to prevent social isolation.28 Hawaii’s Healthy Start Program is a wellknown example of a prevention effort, with home visits provided to infants born to high-risk families to help prevent the incidence of child abuse and to promote other aspects of healthy child development. (See Box 1.) To date, home visitation programs have not focused on domestic violence prevention. Yet, such programs hold promise in this area because of their emphasis on creating a healthy environment for children and because many of the families served who are at risk for child abuse are also at risk for domestic violence. Moreover, families at risk for domestic violence may be more receptive to home visitation, with its focus on healthy relationships and family strengths, than to more directive or punitive approaches through child welfare services or law enforcement.20 However, there are potential problems with the use of home visiting programs to address domestic violence. These include concern for the safety of the home visitor and the victim, and the possibility that any trust between the home visitor and the family will be breached if domestic violence is discussed.29 School-Age Children (6 to 12 Years) Schools are ideal places in which to introduce primary prevention programs to wide ranges of children, because most children attend school. In addition, much of children’s social learning takes place in schools, and research has shown that social learning can play a role in the development of behaviors and attitudes that support domestic violence. Teachers, who typically represent the second most important influence in the lives of children, are in an ideal position to motivate students to consider new ways of thinking and behaving.30 In a 1998 comprehensive review of model programs for battered mothers and their children, several community agencies reported the development of primary prevention efforts in collaboration with schools.31 One of the key values inherent in all of these primary prevention programs is the belief that every student needs to be aware of domestic violence and related forms of abuse. Even if students never become victims or perpetrators of domestic violence, they may have opportunities in the future, as community members, to help others in preventing or stopping it.32 Because these programs consider domestic violence a community and societal problem, many of them also involve parents and other members of the broader community. One of the first programs to document efforts to prevent domestic violence by working with children in the schools was implemented by the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.33 (See Box 2.) The ideas and successes of this early program have spawned similar efforts across North America.34 Preliminary evaluations of these newer programs are promising and indicate that key elements of successful school-based programs include: identifying relationship violence as a form of societal violence; acknowledging that domestic violence is an abuse of power and control; creating a high enough level of trust so that children can disclose exposure to domestic violence and teachers can make appropriate referrals; teaching safety skills about what to do when domestic violence occurs; and encouraging the development of social skills such as anger management and conflict resolution as alternatives to violence.35 Adolescents (13 to 18 Years) Adolescence is a time of important cognitive and social development. Teens learn to think more rationally and become capable of thinking hypothetically. They also develop a greater understanding of the possible risks and consequences of their behaviors and learn to balance their own interests with those of their peers and family members. Conformity to parental opinions gradually decreases throughout adolescence, while peers become increasingly influential until late adolescence.36 Romantic relationships become more important by mid-adolescence.37 Thus, early- and mid-adolescence offer unique windows of opportunity for primary prevention efforts that make teens aware of the ways in which violence in relationships can occur, and that teach healthy ways to form intimate relationships.38 When offered opportunities to explore the richness and rewards of relationships, youths become eager to learn about choices and responsibilities. Clear messages about personal responsibility and boundaries, delivered in a blame-free manner, are generally acceptable to this age group, whereas lectures and warnings are less helpful.39 Primary prevention programs delivered universally through high schools often involve activities aimed at increasing awareness and dispelling myths about relationship violence. Such activities might include school auditorium presentations involving videotapes, plays, professional theater groups, or speeches from domestic violence or teen dating violence survivors; classroom discussions facilitated by teachers or domestic violence services professionals; programs and curricula that encourage students to examine attitudes and behaviors that promote or tolerate violence; and peer support groups. Some school-based programs have resulted in youth-initiated prevention activities such as theatrical presentations to younger children, and marches and other social protests against domestic violence.40 Preliminary data from evaluations of six school-based dating violence prevention programs report increases in knowledge about dating violence issues, positive changes in attitudes about dating violence, and self-reported decreases in the perpetration of dating violence. Though preliminary, these data indicate that adolescents are receptive to school-based prevention programs.41 In addition to school-based programs for adolescents, there are also community based programs with primary prevention goals similar to those of the school-based programs. Many of the community based programs also provide secondary prevention services to teens who have displayed early signs of violence. (See Box 3.)
27 +
28 +Framework
29 +The role of the judge is to vote for the debater that provides the best post-fiat policy option for reducing violence. Smith ’13: (Elijah Smith. “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013)
30 +At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation away from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.
31 +Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
32 +Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
33 +I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
34 +
35 +Focus on the empirical world means that the debate needs to be a question of resolving material injustice. Pappas 16
36 +Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
37 +In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
38 +To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
39 +King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
40 +I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
41 +Debate should seek to design concrete alternatives.
42 +Bryant 12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
43 +The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri and Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
44 +The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
45 +Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
46 +Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
47 +Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
48 +The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
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1 +Framework
2 +Morality must start from the non-ideal circumstances we have inherited. We can never achieve the ideal consequences that ethical theories aspire for without a focus on social reality
3 +Mills 05 Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
4 +I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.
5 +This approach to ethics justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence. Morality isn’t just something that we strive for in a vaccum, rather, we resolve it based on the empirical world. Pappas 16
6 +Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
7 +In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.
8 +Thus, the standard is resolving material conditions of violence. Prefer additionally:
9 +First, recognizing and combatting the structures of racism is a pre-condition to making ethical action possible- even if your ethic is true in the abstract, we need the AC framework first. Memmi 2K
10 +Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 2000
11 +The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
12 +Plan
13 +Resolved: The United States should limit qualified immunity for police officers by removing the “clearly established” element from the Qualified Immunity Doctrine as method to increase accountability for officers. I’m willing to clarify T interps in CX. Wright 15
14 + (Journalist and PHD in Law. "Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity." http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/)
15 +In order to truly hold police accountable for bad acts, civilians must be able to bring, and win, civil rights suits themselves — not rely on the Department of Justice, or special prosecutors, or civilian review boards to hold officers accountable. And in order to both bring and win civil rights suits, civilians need a level playing field in court. Right now, they don’t have one. Instead, police officers have recourse to the broad protections of the judicially established doctrine of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, state actors are protected from suit even if they’ve violated the law by, say, using excessive force, or performing an unwarranted body cavity search — as long as their violation was not one of “clearly established law, of which a reasonable officer would be aware.” In other words, if there’s not already a case where a court has held that an officer’s identical or near-identical conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation there’s a good chance that even an obviously malfeasant officer will avoid liability — will avoid accountability. To bring about true accountability and change police behavior, this needs to change. And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts? That’s just a start. There are plenty of other reforms that could open up civil rights lawsuits and help ensure police accountability for bad conduct. Two posts (one, two) at Balkinization by City University of New York professor Lynda Dodd provide a good overview. Campaign Zero should consider adding civil rights litigation reform to its platform, our policymakers should consider making civil rights litigation more robust, and, if we want to see justice done, we should push to make it happen.
16 +
17 +Analytic
18 +Advantage 1 – 4th Amendment
19 +SCOTUS’s interpretation of the fourth Amendment gives police incredible search power.
20 +Carbado 16
21 +Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
22 +By prohibiting the government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose constraints on the police. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment in ways that empower, rather than constrain, the police. More precisely, the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to force engagement with African-Americans with little or no basis. To put the point more provocatively, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect police officers, not black people.130 Indeed, we might think of the Fourth Amendment as a Privileges and Immunities Clause for police officers—it confers tremendous power and discretion to police officers with respect to when they can engage people (the “privilege” protection of the Fourth Amendment) and protects them from criminal and civil sanction with respect to how they engage people (the “immunities” protection of the Fourth Amendment).
23 +The impact is that fourth Amendment power has become non-existent- only the plan solves. Carbado 16
24 +Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
25 +With respect to whether the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the standard, as in the criminal context, centers on reasonableness: whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary.195 And, as in the criminal context, juries will often defer to an officer’s claim that he/she employed deadly force because he/she feared for his/her life.196 Moreover, implicit and explicit biases can inform their decision making.197 With respect to the “clearly established” doctrine, there are two problems with the standard. First, courts often avoid deciding the question of whether the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution and rule instead on whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established.198 The Supreme Court has made clear that lower courts are free to proceed in this way,199 making it relatively easy for courts to make the defense of qualified immunity available to a police officer without having to decide whether the officer violated a constitutional right.200 This avoidance compounds the extent to which the law is unsettled. And, the greater the uncertainty about the law, the greater the doctrinal space for a police officer to argue that particular rights were not “clearly established” at the time the officer acted.201 In other words, the more courts avoid weighing in on the sub stantive question of whether police conduct violates the Constitution, the more leeway police officers have to argue that their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. Consider, for example, Stanton v. Sims.202 There, the Court avoided the question of whether an officer’s entrance into a yard to effectuate the arrest of a misdemeanant violated the Fourth Amendment, but ruled that the right to avoid such an intrusion was not clearly established.203 Unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules that, absent exigent circumstances, one has a right to be free from warrantless entry into one’s yard, courts will likely grant qualified immunity in cases involving such arrests.204 A second problem with the “clearly established” doctrine pertains to how courts apply it. According to the Supreme Court, in applying the “clearly established” standard, the inquiry is whether the right is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he/she is doing violates that right.’”205 This standard creates rhetorical room for police officers to argue that not “every” reasonable officer would have understood that the right in question was clearly established.206 The standard is also, as Karen Blum observes, “riddled with contradictions and complexities.” 207 Eleventh Circuit Judge Charles Wilson puts the point this way: The way in which courts frame the question, “was the law clearly established,” virtually guarantees the outcome of the qualified immunity inquiry. Courts that permit the general principles enunciated in cases factually distinct from the case at hand to “clearly establish” the law in a particular area will be much more likely to deny qualified immunity to government actors in a variety of contexts. Conversely, those courts that find the law governing a particular area to be clear ly established only in the event that a factually identical case can be found, will find that government actors enjoy qualified immunity in nearly every context.208 When one adds the difficulties of the “clearly established” standard to the other dimensions of the qualified immunity doctrine, it becomes clear that the qualified immunity regime erects a significant doctrinal hurdle to holding police officers accountable for acts of violence.
26 +These impacts particularly harm the poor and form structural violence.
27 +Carbado 16
28 +Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
29 +Group vulnerability increases the likelihood that the police will target African- Americans, particularly those who are marginalized both inside and outside of the black community, such as LGBTQ people.83 Marginalized groups are more vulnerable to police contact and violence because members of these groups often have non-normative identities to which stereotypes of criminality and presumptions of disorder apply.84 Additionally, people with vulnerable identities are less likely to report instances of police abuse and less likely to be believed when they do. That is to say, members of vulnerable groups are impossible witnesses to their own victimization and lack the social standing and credibility to articulate it.
30 +Advantage 2 – Reform
31 +Qualified immunity destroys accountability for police officers-limitations are key. Bernick 15 Evan Bernick, https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
32 +The sad fact is that it is often effectively impossible to hold police officers accountable for unconstitutional acts. That fact is attributable in large part to a potent well of unchecked power that many Americans have never heard of. You will not find it in the Constitution. You will not find it in any federal law. It is a judge-made doctrine, invented by the Supreme Court. It is called qualified immunity. And if those charged with enforcing the law are to be kept within the bounds of their rightful authority, it must be abolished. Section 1983, the federal law that allows citizens to sue for constitutional violations, is broad, unequivocal, and unambiguous. It says that “every person” who is acting “under color of” law who causes a “deprivation of any rights… secured by the Constitution and laws” “shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983 embodies a foundational principle of justice that resonates with Americans who have never heard of Marbury v. Madison: where there is a right, there is a remedy.But for decades, we have had rights without remedies. In the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court held that police officers sued for constitutional violations can raise “qualified immunity” as a defense, and thereby escape paying out of their own pockets, even if they violated a person’s constitutional rights. This decision was unabashedly policy-oriented: it was thought that government officials would not vigorously fulfill their obligations if they could be held accountable for actions taken in good faith. Under current law, the general rule is that victims of rights violations pay the costs of their own injuries. In practice, qualified immunity provides a near-absolute defense to all but the most outrageous conduct. The Ninth Circuit has held that throwing a flash-bang grenade “blindly” into a house, injuring a toddler, isn’t outrageous enough. Just last year, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Supreme Court decided that firing 15 bullets at a motorist is a reasonable method to end the driver’s flight from the police. So much for “every person” “shall be liable.” Qualified immunity shields police misconduct not only from liability but also from meaningful judicial scrutiny. Private lawsuits are an essential tool in uncovering the truth about police misconduct. The discovery process can yield information that makes broader policy changes within police departments possible. At trial, judicial engagement — an impartial, evidence-based determination of the constitutionality of the officer’s actions — can take place.
33 +Allowing police violence perpetuates systems of racism in the squo. Hadden et al 16
34 +(Bernadette R. Hadden, MSW, PHD, is Assistant professor in the MSW program at Hunter College School of Social Work New York. Willie Tolliver, PhD. Associate Professor at Silberman School of Social Work. Fabienne Snowden PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social Work. and Robyn Brown Manning, PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social "An authentic discourse: Recentering race and racism as factors that contribute to police violence against unarmed Black or African American men, Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment" http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10911359.2015.1129252#abstract)
35 +Police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men are occurring at alarming rates (Wihbey, 2014) and are indicative of a national trend of excessive force used by law enforcement agents on the bodies of people of color (American Civil Liberties Union ACLU, 2014). These incidents are happening inside and outside of Black and Hispanic neighborhoods (Carroll and Gonzalez, 2014), to low-income and middle-class Blacks or African Americans (Jones-Brown, 2009), and are frequently the result of routine encounters (ACLU, 2014). One of several challenges in obtaining an accurate count of the number of the police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men in the United States is that there are no nationally consistent measures of collecting these data (Department of Justice, 2015). This lack of standardized reporting, accompanied by public outrage, civil unrest, and community activism, calls for investigations into, and law enforcement reporting of, fatal police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men. Suggestions of racial profiling in police shootings have been presented as an explanation of the phenomenon of the disproportionate shooting of unarmed Black or African American men by law enforcement agents (Amajor, Sandars, and Pitts, 1999). In 2007 researchers found that in 10 of the United States’s largest cities, Blacks or African Americans were overly represented among victims of police shootings (Lowerstein, 2007). These findings were most visible in New York City, Las Vegas, and San Diego (Lowerstein, 2007). At a 2010 hearing calling for the investigation of police-involved shootings in Oakland, California, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) reported that from 2004 and 2008, 37 of the 45 police shootings in that city were at Black or African American suspects (Bulwa, 2010). A report from the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) illustrates that between 2000 and 2013, 97 Blacks or African Americans, 41 Hispanics, and 21 Whites were killed by NYPD police officers (NYCPD, 2014). In other words, from 2000 to 2013, more Blacks or African Americans were killed by NYCPD weapon discharges than Latinos and Whites combined. These reports identify and document the phenomenon of Black or African American men being shot and/ or killed by police officers, despite the limitations in data tracking police shootings (Graham, 2015). However, they do not inform us of the incidence or prevalence of this phenomenon
36 +Qualified immunity is structurally violent- it forces deliberation to occur through the interpretation of the oppressor, as opposed to allowing contestation of these views in court. Senkel 99 ( Tara. Attorney in New York. Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police: Let's Handcuff Police Brutality 15 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 385 (1998-1999). http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=falseandhandle=hein.journals/nylshr15andpage=385andcollection=journals#)
37 +While victims of police brutality can bring an action under section 1983217 against the police officer and the municipality, the police officer and municipality are each subject to liability under two different theories.218 Police officers are found liable iUnder the statute if, "while acting under color of state law, their actions violate a person's constitutional rights. 219 Municipalities are not liable under the theory of respondeat superior, but may be found liable if the police officer's conduct follows an official policy or practice of the municipality.220 There are differences between an action brought against a police officer and an action brought against a municipality, such as the defenses that can be asserted.2 Once a victim brings an excessive force claim against a police officer under section 1983, the officer may assert a defense of qualified immunity.222 In Graham, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. 223 However, the Court did discuss the qualified immunity defense in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 224 In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald sued Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, Richard Nixon's White House aides, alleging they had been involved in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights.225 The Court held that the aides were protected by a qualified immunity. 226 The Court stated that: Bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject governmental officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not clearly violate, established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 227 The Court went on to state that by defining the limits of the qualified immunity doctrine in objective terms, it was not authorizing lawless conduct.228 Rather, the objective reasonableness of an official's acts protects the public interest by discouraging unlawful conduct and compensating victims. 229 If an official could be expected to know that an act would violate statutory or constitutional rights, the officer should not perform the act, and if a person was injured by the act, that person should have a cause of action. 230 However, if the official's duties require action be taken in which clearly established rights are not involved, "the public interest may be better served by action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences.' 231 The objective reasonableness standard was also used in Anderson v. Creighton.232 In Anderson, FBI agent Russell Anderson was working with other law enforcement officers involved in a warrantless search of Robert Creighton's home.233 The search was performed because the FBI agent believed that a bank robbery suspect might be in the house.2 34 Creighton brought an action in state court against Anderson, asserting a Fourth Amendment violation.235 Anderson removed the suit to federal court and then filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the claim was barred by his qualified immunity.236 However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Anderson's motion, finding that Creighton demonstrated that Anderson violated Creighton's right to be protected from warrantless searches of his home. An exception from this constitutional right, the court noted, was if officers have probable cause or in situations where there are exigent circumstances.237 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that it was concerned about the test of "clearly established law"238 because if the test were applied to cases at this level of generality, it would not have any relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness., 239 The Court also stated that plaintiffs would be able to change the rule of qualified immunity "into a rule of virtually unqualified liability of government agents by alleging a violation of extremely abstract rights." 240 The right must be clear enough that a reasonable governmental official would know that his conduct violates that right. 241 The question that must be asked is an objective, albeit fact specific one, whether a reasonable officer would violate others rights or could find that Anderson's search was lawful, "in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.' '242 The court found that Anderson's "subjective belief about the search were irrelevant." 243 Furthermore,. in Owens v. City of Independence,244 the Court held that a municipality cannot allege a qualified immunity defense. The Court stated that "many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense." 245 Therefore, a municipality can only escape liability if it claims that a constitutional violation did not occur or that the police officer was not acting in good faith "pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the municipality. 246 Thus, if a police brutality victim brings an action against the police officer and municipality under section 1983, the Court will examine the claim under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonable standard to determine whether the police officer's conduct was excessive or unreasonable. Although police officers may assert a qualified immunity defense to the claim, municipalities are not afforded this defense.
38 +Civil lawsuits are empirically capable of holding officers accountable. Cheh 96
39 +Mary Cheh (Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School), Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE, 248 (William Geller and Hans Toch eds., Yale University Press 1996).
40 +By contrast, the civil law, because of its greater flexibility and scope, has the potential to serve as the instrument of systemic reform. In adjusting rights and settling wrongs, civil remedies generally offer distinct advantages over criminal sanctions. First, a victim of police misconduct can sue on his or her their own behalf and need not await the government's decision to go forward. Second, an injured party need not overcome the heightened procedural protections afforded the criminally accused. For example, a plaintiff can prevail under a preponderance of evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, although the civil law, like the criminal law, can punish via its potential for imposition of punitive damages, the civil law provides compensation to victims who have been harmed by police misconduct. Recompense is beneficial in itself, and damage awards can spur reform if the costs of misbehavior are high. Fourth, civil lawsuits permit broad discovery of information and may provide a means to uncover police misbehavior and stir public reaction. Finally, the civil law offers various possibilities for framing relief which go beyond punishment or compensation and include remediation. That is, the civil law offers equitable relief, via court injunction and specific orders, that can force a deficient department not only to pay for harm caused but to reform so that the harm is not likely to be repeated.
41 +Analytic
42 +1.
43 +2.
44 +Independent of deterrence, lawsuits lead to political reform for the better.
45 +Joanna Schwartz 11 (Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.) "What Police Learn from Lawsuits." Cardozo L. Rev. 33 (2011): 841.
46 +The practices of the departments in my study are distinct in two significant ways from expectations about the uses of litigation data underlying theories of deterrence. Deterrence theorists generally expect that settlements and judgments – financial penalties – inspire performance improvement efforts. Yet the police departments in my study that gather and analyze litigation data do not focus solely – or even primarily – on settlements and judgments. Instead, they pay particular attention to the allegations of misconduct in claims and lawsuits when they are first filed, and the information developed during the course of litigation. To be sure, departments in my study also pay attention to the resolution of suits in various ways. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department tracks trends in settlements and judgments and has reviewed practices and units responsible for large payouts.115 And large settlements and judgments may focus attention on particular cases, particularly if they attract press or political attention.116 But the five departments in my study pay attention to lawsuits at the beginning and middle – as well as the end – of the litigation process. Second, deterrence theory expects that officials deciding which course of action to take weigh the costs of litigation against the benefits of the underlying conduct.117 Yet, the policies in place in the departments in my study do not facilitate this sort of weighing. Departments would not, for example, track lawsuits alleging chokeholds and then decide whether to retrain their officers about the impropriety of chokeholds based on the costs of these suits.118 Instead, departments in my study would use lawsuits, with other data, to identify chokeholds as behavior that triggered a concentration of suits, civilian complaints, and/or use of force reports. The department then would conduct an investigation and identify ways to address the underlying policy, training, or personnel problems.119 And when a department looks for trends in payouts, officials do not weigh those judgments and settlements against the costs of potential policy changes. Instead, the concentration of settlements and judgments is treated as an indication of an underlying problem that is then investigated and analyzed. By differentiating department practices from prevailing understandings of deterrence, I do not mean to suggest that these departments are immune to lawsuits’ deterrent effects. Indeed, the LASD’s elaborate efforts to track and reduce misconduct can be understood as a kind of end-product of deterrence. When the Board of Supervisors appointed the Kolts Commission to review LASD practices, they were motivated in part by a Los Angeles Times story that reported $32 million paid in settlements and judgments against the LASD over a five-year period.120 The Kolts Commission was instructed to find ways to reduce the costs of litigation against the department121 and a significant aim of Merrick Bobb’s reviews of the department remains to monitor the costs of lawsuits brought against the LASD.122 But the policies put in place by the Kolts Commission and Merrick Bobb reduce the costs of liability by understanding and addressing the underlying causes of police error and misconduct. And to achieve this understanding, the LASD and Bobb focus attention on the lessons that can be learned from lawsuits, regardless of an individual suit’s financial or political ramifications. The practices of departments in my study are more akin to those encouraged by those focused on the identification and reduction of error. Cognitive psychologists, organizational theorists, and systems engineers who study human error emphasize the importance of gathering and analyzing data about past performance at a systems level as a way of identifying the types of problems that lead to harm.123 A systems analysis approach has been used to improve safety in a number of fields including aviation safety, nuclear power, and medical care.124 In each industry, information about accidents and “near misses” is collected and analyzed for safety implications. As with efforts to improve safety in aviation, hospitals, and other industries, the departments in my study review information about past behavior from a variety of sources to identify personnel and policy failings and possible ways to improve.
47 +
48 +Meta-studies prove that police accountability and legitimacy stops the culture of fear and spillovers to decrease overall violence.
49 +Mazerolle et al 13, Lorraine, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning, 2013, Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, http://thecapartnership.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/02/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review-1.pdf
50 +The systematic search found 163 studies that reported on police led interventions, and a final set of 30 studies contained data suitable for meta-analysis. The direct outcomes analyzed were legitimacy, procedural justice, and citizen cooperation/compliance and satisfaction/confidence in the police. In addition, an indirect outcome, reoffending, was also analyzed. The main finding of this review is that police interventions that comprised dialogue with a procedural justice component (or stated specifically that the intervention sought to increase legitimacy) did indeed enhance citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the police, with all direct outcomes apart from legitimacy itself being statistically significant. Our review shows that by police adopting procedurally just dialogue, they can use a variety of interventions to enhance legitimacy, reduce reoffending, and promote citizen satisfaction, confidence, compliance and cooperation with the police.
51 +Impact Framing
52 +To say that the “aff is a bad idea” because it causes white people to backlash and vote for Trump deflects blame and locks us into the status quo. Politics scenarios just re-entrench anti-blackness and inhibit the struggle for freedom.
53 +King 63 (Martin Luther King Jr. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail King, Jr." April 1963 AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)
54 +I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward of freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. "I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured." "In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning of time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: stating "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity."
55 +
56 +Method Framing
57 +The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
58 +Coverstone 05 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point.
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1 +First, necessary enablers are the only way to structure action- If I have an obligation to X, and doing Y is necessary to do X, I have an obligation to do Y.
2 +Sinnott-Armstrong. Walter, "An argument for consequentialism." Philosophical Perspectives (1992): 399-421. Page 400
3 +“Since general substitutability works for other kinds of reasons for action, we would need a strong argument to deny that it holds also for moral reasons. If moral reasons obeyed different principles, it would be hard to understand why moral reasons are also called ‘reasons’ and how moral reasons interact with other reasons when they apply to the same action. Nonetheless, this extension has been denied, so we have to look at moral reasons carefully. I have a moral reason to feed my child tonight, both because I promised my wife to do so, and also because of my special relation to my child along with the fact that she will go hungry if I don’t feed her. I can’t feed my child tonight without going home soon, and going home soon will enable me to feed her tonight. Therefore, there is a moral reason for me to go home soon. It need not be imprudent or ugly or sacrilegious or illegal for me not to feed her, but the requirements of morality give me a moral reason to feed her. This argument assumes a special case of substitutability: (MS) If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. I will call this ‘the principle of moral substitutability’, or just ‘moral substitutability’. This principle is confirmed by moral reasons with negative structures. I have a moral reason to help a friend this afternoon. I cannot do so if I play golf this afternoon. Not playing golf this afternoon will enable me to help my friend. So I have a moral reason not to play golf this afternoon. Similarly, I have a moral reason not to endanger other drivers (beyond acceptable limits). I can’t drink too much before I drive without endangering other drivers. Not drinking too much will enable me to avoid endangering other drivers. Therefore, I have a moral reason not to drink too much before I drive. The validity of such varied arguments confirms moral substitutability.”
4 +And, this structure of action necessitates consequentialism or NEC.
5 +Sinnott-Armstrong 2. Walter, "An argument for consequentialism." Philosophical Perspectives (1992): 399-421. Page 400
6 + “All of this leads to necessary enabler consequentialism or NEC. NEC claims that all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing harm or promoting good. All moral reasons on this theory are consequential reasons, but there are tow kinds. Some moral reasons are prevention reasons, because they are facts that an act is a necessary enabler for preventing harm or loss. For example, if giving Alice food is necessary and enables me to prevent her from starving, then that fact is a moral reason to give her food. In this case, I would not cause her death even if I let her starve, but other moral prevention reasons are reasons to avoid causing harm. For example, if turning my car to the left is necessary and enablers me to avoid killing Bobby, that is a moral reason to turn my car to the left. The other kind of moral reason is a promotion reason. This kind of reason occurs when doing something is necessary and enables me to promote (or maximize) some good. For example, I have a moral reason to throw a surprise party for Susan if this is necessary and enables me to make her happy. Because of substitutability, these moral reasons for actions also yield moral reasons against contrary actions. There are then also moral reasons not to do what will cause harm or ensure a failure to prevent harm or promote good. What makes these facts moral reasons is that they can make an otherwise immoral act moral. If I have a moral reason to feed my child, then it might be immoral to give my only food to Alice, who is a stranger. But his would not be immoral if giving Alice good is necessary and enables me to prevent Alice from starving, as long as my child will not starve also. Similarly, it is normally immoral to lie to Susan, but a lie can be moral if it is necessary and enables me to keep my party for Susan a surprise, and if this is also necessary and enables me to make her happy. Thus, NEC fits nicely into the above theory of moral reasons. NEC can provide a natural explanation of moral substitutability for both kinds of reasons. I have a prevention moral reason to give someone food when doing so is necessary and enables me to prevent that person from starving. Suppose that buying food is a necessary enabler for giving the person food, and getting in my car is a necessary enabler for buying food. Moral substitutability warrants the conclusion that I have a moral reason to get in my car. And this act of getting in my car does have the property of being a necessary enabler for preventing starvation. Thus, the necessary enabler has the same property that provided the moral reason to give the food in the first place. This explains why substitutability holds for moral prevention reasons. The other kind of moral reason covers necessary enabler for promoting good. In my example above, if a surprise party is a necessary enabler for making Susan happy, and letting people know about the party is a necessary enabler for having a party, then letting people know is a necessary enabler for making Susan happy. The very fact that provides a moral reason to have the party also provides a moral reason to let people know about it. Thus, NEC can explain why moral substitutability holds for every kind of reason that is includes. Similarly explanations work for moral reasons not to do certain acts, and this explanatory power is a reason to favor NEC. Of course, this should come as no surprise. NEC was intentionally structured to that it would explain moral substitutability. But this does not detract from its explanatory force. The point is that moral substitutability remains a mystery unless we restrict our substantive theory to moral reasons that obey moral substitutability by their very nature. The crucial advantage of NEC lies in its unity. Other theories claim that my reason to do what I promised is just that this fulfills my promise or that promise keeping is intrinsically good. However, I did not promise to start the mower, and starting the mower is not intrinsically good. Thus, my reason to start the mower derives from a different property than my reason to keep my promise. In contrast, NEC makes my reasons to keep my promise, to mow the lawn, and to start the mower derive from the very same property: being a necessary enabler of preventing harm or promoting good. This makes NEC's explanation more coherent and better. A critic might complain that NEC just postpones the problem, since NEC will eventually need to explain why certain things are good or bad, and some will be good or bad as means, but others will not. However, if what is good or bad intrinsically are states (such as pleasure and freedom or pain and death) rather than acts, then they are not the kind of thing that can be done, so there cannot be any question of a reason to do them. This makes it possible for all reasons for acts to have the same nature or derive from the same property. NEC will still have to explain why certain states are good or bad, but so will every other moral theory. The difference is that other theories will also have to explain why there are two kinds of reasons for acts and how these reasons are connected. This is what other theories cannot explain. This additional explanatory gap is avoided by the unified nature of reasons in NEC.” (415-
7 +Second, util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework-
8 +a. Analytic
9 +b. Analytic
10 +Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being.
11 +Advocacy
12 +I defend the whole resolution – i.e., a world in which public colleges do not restrict any constitutionally protected free speech.
13 +No speech can be restricted on the basis of utility since the truth of an opinion is part of its utility—that is, whether it will be useful for people to believe a certain thing is in itself a "matter of opinion" which must be discussed.
14 +Mill 63 John Stuart Mill "Utilitarianism" 1863, http://www.justiceharvard.org/resources/j-s-mill-utilitarianism-1863/
15 +Questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required of this doctrine- what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil- to make good its claim to be believed? The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.
16 +Advantage – Racism
17 +Advantage one is racism-
18 +The 1AC’s endorsing of free speech eliminates structures of oppression –
19 +a) it allows us to identify racists so that we can persuade them otherwise; this solves the root cause of oppression.
20 +b) It also leads to a bystander effect whereby people in the middle can also be convinced to stay away from that mindset though debate
21 +ACLU 16. American Civil Liberties Union. For almost 100 years, the ACLU has worked to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States., “Hate Speech on Campus”, ACLU, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
22 +Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech ~-~- not less ~-~- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance.
23 +Britain empirically proves you can’t eliminate bigotry by banning it so any limitation empirically causes more violence.
24 +Malik 12 Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/
25 +And in practice, you cannot reduce or eliminate bigotry simply by banning it. You simply let the sentiments fester underground. As Milton once put it, to keep out ‘evil doctrine’ by licensing is ‘like the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his Park-gate’. Take Britain. In 1965, Britain prohibited incitement to racial hatred as part of its Race Relations Act. The following decade was probably the most racist in British history. It was the decade of ‘Paki-bashing’, when racist thugs would seek out Asians to beat up. It was a decade of firebombings, stabbings, and murders. In the early 1980s, I was organizing street patrols in East London to protect Asian families from racist attacks. Nor were thugs the only problem. Racism was woven into the fabric of public institutions. The police, immigration officials – all were openly racist. In the twenty years between 1969 and 1989, no fewer than thirty-seven blacks and Asians were killed in police custody – almost one every six months. The same number again died in prisons or in hospital custody. When in 1982, cadets at the national police academy were asked to write essays about immigrants, one wrote, ‘Wogs, nignogs and Pakis come into Britain take up our homes, our jobs and our resources and contribute relatively less to our once glorious country. They are, by nature, unintelligent. And can’t at all be educated sufficiently to live in a civilised society of the Western world’. Another wrote that ‘all blacks are pains and should be ejected from society’. So much for incitement laws helping create a more tolerant society. Today, Britain is a very different place. Racism has not disappeared, nor have racist attacks, but the open, vicious, visceral bigotry that disfigured the Britain when I was growing up has largely ebbed away. It has done so not because of laws banning racial hatred but because of broader social changes and because minorities themselves stood up to the bigotry and fought back. Of course, as the British experience shows, hatred exists not just in speech but also has physical consequences. Is it not important, critics of my view ask, to limit the fomenting of hatred to protect the lives of those who may be attacked? In asking this very question, they are revealing the distinction between speech and action.
26 +The aff creates a spillover effect – challenging oppression in everyday discussions is key to shaping larger cultural landscapes.
27 +Malik 2 Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/
28 +Much of what we call hate speech consists, however, of claims that may be contemptible but yet are accepted by many as morally defensible. Hence I am wary of the argument that some sentiments are so immoral they can simply be condemned without being contested. First, such blanket condemnations are often a cover for the inability or unwillingness politically to challenge obnoxious sentiments. Second, in challenging obnoxious sentiments, we are not simply challenging those who spout such views; we are also challenging the potential audience for such views. Dismissing obnoxious or hateful views as not worthy of response may not be the best way of engaging with such an audience. Whether or not an obnoxious claim requires a reply depends, therefore, not simply on the nature of the claim itself, but also on the potential audience for that claim.
29 +Silencing bigots only re-entrenches their position and galvanizes their opposition to social justice movements
30 +Levinovitz 16 Alan Levinovitz, assistant professor of religion at James Madison University, “How Trigger Warnings Silence Religious Students,” The Atlantic, August 30, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/silencing-religious-students-on-campus/497951/
31 + There is no doubt that in America, the perspective of white, heterosexual Christian males has enjoyed disproportionate emphasis, particularly in higher education. Trigger warnings, safe spaces, diversity initiatives, and attention to social justice: all of these are essential for pushing back against this lopsided power dynamic. But there is a very real danger that these efforts will become overzealous and render opposing opinions taboo. Instead of dialogues in which everyone is fairly represented, campus conversations about race, gender, and religion will devolve into monologues about the virtues of tolerance and diversity. I have seen it happen, not only at the University of Chicago, my alma mater, but also at the school where I currently teach, James Madison University, where the majority of students are white and Christian. The problem, I’d wager, is fairly widespread, at least at secular universities. Silencing these voices is not a good thing for anyone, especially the advocates of marginalized groups who hope to sway public opinion. Take for example the idea that God opposes homosexuality, a belief that some students still hold. On an ideal campus, these students would feel free to voice their belief. They would then be confronted by opposing arguments, spoken, perhaps, by the very people whose sexual orientation they have asserted is sinful. At least in this kind of environment, these students would have an opportunity to see the weaknesses in their position and potentially change their minds. But if students do not feel free to voice their opinions, they will remain silent, retreating from the classroom to discuss their position on homosexuality with family, friends, and other like-minded individuals. They will believe, correctly in some cases, that advocates of gay rights see them as hateful, intolerant bigots who deserve to be silenced, and which may persuade them to cling with even greater intensity to their convictions. A more charitable interpretation of the University of Chicago letter is that it is meant to inoculate students against allergy to argument. Modern, secular, liberal education is supposed to combine a Socratic ideal of the examined life with a Millian marketplace of ideas. It is boot camp, not a hotel. In theory, this will produce individuals who have cultivated their intellect and embraced new ideas via communal debate—the kind of individuals who make good neighbors and citizens. The communal aspect of the debate is important. It demands patience, open-mindedness, empathy, the courage to question others and be questioned, and above all, attempting to see things as others do. But even though academic debate takes place in a community, it is also combat. Combat can hurt. It is literally offensive. Without offense there is no antagonistic dialogue, no competitive marketplace, and no chance to change your mind. Impious, disrespectful Socrates was executed in Athens for having the temerity to challenge people’s most deeply held beliefs. It would be a shame to execute him again.
32 +Perceived assault on free speech drives voters to the right wing which leads to disasters like the Trump presidency.
33 +Soave 16 Robby Soave, Associate editor at Reason.com, enjoys writing about college news, education policy, criminal justice reform, and television, “Trump Won Because Leftist Political Correctness Inspired a Terrifying Backlash”, Nov. 9, 2016, http://reason.com/blog/2016/11/09/trump-won-because-leftist-political-corr
34 +Trump won because of a cultural issue that flies under the radar and remains stubbornly difficult to define, but is nevertheless hugely important to a great number of Americans: political correctness. More specifically, Trump won because he convinced a great number of Americans that he would destroy political correctness. I have tried to call attention to this issue for years. I have warned that political correctness actually is a problem on college campuses, where the far-left has gained institutional power and used it to punish people for saying or thinking the wrong thing. And ever since Donald Trump became a serious threat to win the GOP presidential primaries, I have warned that a lot of people, both on campus and off it, were furious about political-correctness-run-amok—so furious that they would give power to any man who stood in opposition to it. I have watched this play out on campus after campus. I have watched dissident student groups invite Milo Yiannopoulos to speak—not because they particularly agree with his views, but because he denounces censorship and undermines political correctness. I have watched students cheer his theatrics, his insulting behavior, and his narcissism solely because the enforcers of campus goodthink are outraged by it. It's not about his ideas, or policies. It's not even about him. It's about vengeance for social oppression. Trump has done to America what Yiannopoulos did to campus. This is a view Yiannopoulos shares. When I spoke with him about Trump's success months ago, he told me, "Nobody votes for Trump or likes Trump on the basis of policy positions. That's a misunderstanding of what the Trump phenomenon is." He described Trump as "an icon of irreverent resistance to political correctness." Correctly, I might add. What is political correctness? It's notoriously hard to define. I recently appeared on a panel with CNN's Sally Kohn, who described political correctness as being polite and having good manners. That's fine—it can mean different things to different people. I like manners. I like being polite. That's not what I'm talking about. The segment of the electorate who flocked to Trump because he positioned himself as "an icon of irreverent resistance to political correctness" think it means this: smug, entitled, elitist, privileged leftists jumping down the throats of ordinary folks who aren't up-to-date on the latest requirements of progressive society. Example: A lot of people think there are only two genders—boy and girl. Maybe they're wrong. Maybe they should change that view. Maybe it's insensitive to the trans community. Maybe it even flies in the face of modern social psychology. But people think it. Political correctness is the social force that holds them in contempt for that, or punishes them outright. If you're a leftist reading this, you probably think that's stupid. You probably can't understand why someone would get so bent out of shape about being told their words are hurtful. You probably think it's not a big deal and these people need to get over themselves. Who's the delicate snowflake now, huh? you're probably thinking. I'm telling you: your failure to acknowledge this miscalculation and adjust your approach has delivered the country to Trump. There's a related problem: the boy-who-cried-wolf situation. I was happy to see a few liberals, like Bill Maher, owning up to it. Maher admitted during a recent show that he was wrong to treat George Bush, Mitt Romney, and John McCain like they were apocalyptic threats to the nation: it robbed him of the ability to treat Trump more seriously. The left said McCain was a racist supported by racists, it said Romney was a racist supported by racists, but when an actually racist Republican came along—and racists cheered him—it had lost its ability to credibly make that accusation. This is akin to the political-correctness-run-amok problem: both are examples of the left's horrible over-reach during the Obama years. The leftist drive to enforce a progressive social vision was relentless, and it happened too fast. I don't say this because I'm opposed to that vision—like most members of the under-30 crowd, I have no problem with gender neutral pronouns—I say this because it inspired a backlash that gave us Trump. My liberal critics rolled their eyes when I complained about political correctness. I hope they see things a little more clearly now. The left sorted everyone into identity groups and then told the people in the poorly-educated-white-male identity group that that's the only bad one. It mocked the members of this group mercilessly. It punished them for not being woke enough. It called them racists. It said their video games were sexist. It deployed Lena Dunham to tell them how horrible they were. Lena Dunham! I warned that political-correctness-run-amok and liberal overreach would lead to a counter-revolution if unchecked. That counter-revolution just happened. There is a cost to depriving people of the freedom (in both the legal and social senses) to speak their mind.
35 +Advantage – State Control
36 +Advantage two is state control-
37 +Putting restrictions on free speech creates a dangerous slippery slope and leads to co-option of movements that lead to silencing of voices. Universities should not be the arbiters of communication.
38 +Fisher 16 Anthony L. Fisher, Dec 13, 2016, “Opposition to “offensive” speech on campuses will ultimately burn dissidents”, http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-speech-pen-america-campus-censorship
39 +In perhaps the most cogent line of the entire report, the authors write: “Overreaction to problematic speech may impoverish the environment for speech for all.” In the name of social justice, some students are demanding administrators become the arbiters of what speech is legitimate and what isn’t. These students don’t seem to grasp that by granting authority figures the power to adjudicate which speakers have the right to be heard, they will inevitably find their own speech silenced when opponents claim offense, fear, or discomfort. Calls for crackdowns on “offensive” speech inevitably boomerang It’s already happening. Just ask the Palestinian activists whose boycott campaigns against Israel have been deemed hate speech by a number of public universities, and whose future political activities could be endangered by an act of Congress. Just this month, the Senate unanimously passed the "Anti-Semitism Awareness Act,” which directs the Department of Education to use the bill's contents as a guideline when adjudicating complaints of anti-Semitism on campus. Among the speech-chilling components of the bill, the political (and subjective) act of judging Israel by an "unfair double standard" could be considered hate speech. To cite other examples of unintended consequences of the crackdown on “offensive” speech, a black student at the University of Michigan was punished for calling another student “white trash,” and conservative law students at Georgetown claimed they were “traumatized” when an email critical of deceased Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia landed in their inboxes.
40 +Any risk of restriction is just another instance on of the sovereign encroaching on life—the state maintains a monopoly on power and dictates who is and is not political.
41 +Smith 11 Mick, Department of Philosophy and School of Environmental Studies , Queen's University , Kingston, Canada). “Against ecological sovereignty: Agamben, politics and globalization”. 23 Feb 2011.
42 +Schmitt’s Political Theology (2005, p. 5) opens with his famous definition – ‘the sovereign is he who decides on the exception’; that is to say, it is the ultimate mark of sovereign power to be able to suspend the normal rule of law and political order by declaring a ‘state of emergency’ (exception). What is more, since such a suspension is paradigmatically only envisaged under exceptional circumstances (at times of political crisis) the precise conditions of its imposition cannot be pre-determined (and hence codified in law or a procedural politics) but depends precisely upon an extra-legal/procedural decision made by the very power that thereby awards itself a monopoly on political power/action. Agamben, like Schmitt, emphasises how the possibility of this ultimately arbitrary decisionistic assumption of absolute territorial power underlies all claims of state sovereignty, no matter what kind of political constitution such states espouse. Paradoxically, then, the (state of) exception is precisely that situation that (ap)proves the sovereign power’s rule. ‘What the ‘‘ark’’ of power contains at its center is the state of exception – but this is essentially an empty space’ (Agamben 2005, p. 86). The declaration of a state of emergency is both the ultimate political act and simultaneously the abrogation of politics per se. Here, participation in the ‘political realm’ which, from Hannah Arendt’s (1958, p. 198) and Agamben’s (which owes much to Arendt) perspective, ‘rises directly out of acting together, the ‘‘sharing of words and deeds’’’, is denied, by a political decision, to some or all of the population of a given territory, thereby reducing them to a state that Agamben refers to as ‘bare-life’, that is, human existence stripped of its ethico-political possibilities
43 +This opens up space for the worst atrocities imaginable—the state deems the human as non-human, clearing the way for genocide.
44 +Edkins 2000 Department of International Politics, University of Wales). “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp”. 2000.
45 +The camp is exemplary as a location of a zone of indistinction. Although in general the camp is set up precisely as part of a state of emergency or martial law, under Nazi rule this becomes not so much a state of exception in the sense of an external and provi- sional state of danger as but a means of establishing the Nazi state itself. The camp is "the space opened up when the state of exception begins to becomes the rule."17 In the camp, the distinction between the rule of law and chaos disappears: decisions about life and death are entirely arbitrary, and everything is possible. A zone of indistinction appears between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit. What happened in the twentieth century in the West, and paradigmatically since the advent of the camp, was that the space of the state of exception transgressed its bound- aries and started to coincide with the normal order. The zone of indistinction expanded from a space of exclusion within the nor- mal order to take over that order entirely. In the concentration camp, inhabitants are stripped of every political status, and the arbitrary power of the camp attendants confronts nothing but what Agamben calls bare life, or homo sacer, a creature who can be killed but not sacrificed.18 This figure, an essential figure in modern politics, is constituted by and constitu- tive of sovereign power. Homo sacer is produced by the sovereign ban and is subject to two exceptions: he is excluded from human law (killing him does not count as homicide) and he is excluded from divine law (killing him is not a ritual killing and does not count as sacrilege). He is set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law. This double exclusion of course also counts as a double inclusion: "homo sacer belongs to God in the form of unsacrificability and is included in the com- munity in the form of being able to be killed."19 This exposes homo sacer to a new kind of human violence such as is found in the camp and constitutes the political as the double exception: the ex- clusion of both the sacred and the profane.
46 +Constitutionally protected speech is key- it was meant to be a counter-majoritarian right to break down institutions.
47 +Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009
48 +According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
49 +Free speech is key to preventing mass government violence endless warfare- this is a gateway to any other util impact.
50 +D’Souza 96 Frances, Prof. Anthropology Oxford, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/19960425/droi/freedom_en.htm?textMode=on
51 +There are undoubted connections between access to information, or rather the lack of it, and war, as indeed there are between poverty, the right to freedom of expression and development. One can argue that democracy aims to increase participation in political and other decision-making at all levels. In this sense democracy empowers people. The poor are denied access to information on decisions which deeply affect their lives, are thus powerless and have no voice; the poor are not able to have influence over their own lives, let alone other aspect of society. Because of this essential powerlessness, the poor are unable to influence the ruling elite in whose interests it may be to initiate conflict and wars in order to consolidate their own power and position. Of the 126 developing countries listed in the 1993 Human Development Report, war was ongoing in 30 countries and severe civil conflict in a further 33 countries. Of the total 63 countries in conflict, 55 are towards the bottom scale of the human development index which is an indicator of poverty. There seems to be no doubt that there is a clear association between poverty and war. It is reasonably safe to assume that the vast majority of people do not ever welcome war. They are normally coerced, more often than not by propaganda, into fear, extreme nationalist sentiments and war by their governments. If the majority of people had a democratic voice they would undoubtedly object to war. But voices are silenced. Thus, the freedom to express one's views and to challenge government decisions and to insist upon political rather than violent solutions, are necessary aspects of democracy which can, and do, avert war. Government sponsored propaganda in Rwanda, as in former Yugoslavia, succeeded because there weren't the means to challenge it. One has therefore to conclude that it is impossible for a particular government to wage war in the absence of a compliant media willing to indulge in government propaganda. This is because the government needs civilians to fight wars for them and also because the media is needed to re-inforce government policies and intentions at every turn. In a totalitarian state where the expression of political views, let alone the possibility of political organis-ation, is strenuously suppressed, one has to ask what other options are open to a genuine political movement intent on introducing justice. All too often the only perceived option is terrorist attack and violence because it is, quite literally, the only method available to communicate the need for change.
52 +Underview
53 +Restrictions on hate speech fail – they’ll just repackage the message using a dog-whistle that avoids the restriction but causes the same intended harm.
54 +Malik 3 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
55 +Kenan Malik: I am not sure that ‘hate speech’ is a particularly useful concept. Much is said and written, of course, that is designed to promote hatred. But it makes little sense to lump it all together in a single category, especially when hatred is such a contested concept. In a sense, hate speech restriction has become a means not of addressing specific issues about intimidation or incitement, but of enforcing general social regulation. This is why if you look at hate speech laws across the world, there is no consistency about what constitutes hate speech. Britain bans abusive, insulting, and threatening speech. Denmark and Canada ban speech that is insulting and degrading. India and Israel ban speech that hurts religious feelings and incites racial and religious hatred. In Holland, it is a criminal offense deliberately to insult a particular group. Australia prohibits speech that offends, insults, humiliates, or intimidates individuals or groups. Germany bans speech that violates the dignity of, or maliciously degrades or defames, a group. And so on. In each case, the law defines hate speech in a different way. One response might be to say: Let us define hate speech much more tightly. I think, however, that the problem runs much deeper. Hate speech restriction is a means not of tackling bigotry but of rebranding certain, often obnoxious, ideas or arguments as immoral. It is a way of making certain ideas illegitimate without bothering politically to challenge them. And that is dangerous.
56 +Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
57 +Ward 90 David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87
58 +Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
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1 +Harms
2 +Welcome to the housing renaissance- ordinances are the new Jim Crow as undocumented migrants face rising challenges towards adequate housing.
3 +Lal 13 Lal, Prerna, You Cannot Live Here — Restrictive Housing Ordinances as the New Jim Crow (June 1, 2013)
4 +Following the failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007, local leaders in over a hundred municipalities considered ordinances to control immigration populations, particularly the growth of Latinos in their neighborhoods. These ordinances varied in aggression but the gist of these policies was to prohibit undocumented immigrants from renting in the jurisdiction, impose civil and monetary penalties for landlords who rented to undocumented immigrants, deny business licenses to those employers who hired undocumented immigrants, and adopt English as the official language (Oliveri, 2009; Romero, 2008). Varsanyi (2008) explains this proliferation of anti-immigrant ordinances by pointing to Immigrant-driven demographics, which has generated social and cultural changes that seem threatening to many people, and these perceived threats have resulted in legislation aimed at controlling or expelling new residents. Ramakrishnan and Wong (2007) contend that the rise in local immigration legislation is a result of Republican Party dominance at the local level since most of the jurisdictions adopting restrictive ordinances were not experiencing an influx of new immigrants. What is missing from these explanations is a sustained inquiry into the role of race in explaining state and local efforts to limit immigrants in their jurisdiction. I contend that the proliferation of local anti-immigrant restrictive housing ordinances in predominantly white residential areas was motivated by racial animus towards Latinos, and parallelsed Jim Crow era racial zoning laws and sundown towns.
5 +At the heart of these ordinances is a drive to construct all immigrants as a threat to white suburban living- ordinances are just an excuse for racist sentiments.
6 +Bono Marisa. “ Don't You Be My Neighbor: Restrictive Housing Ordinances as the New Jim Crow.” The Modern American, SummerFall, 2007, 29-38.
7 +A closer examination of the reasons set forth by public officials to justify targeting undocumented immigrants, reveals that they are not only unfounded, but do not distinguish between undocumented immigrants and Latinos in general. Furthermore, localities do not avail themselves of alternative solutions that refrain from targeting subordinated groups of people. Put simply, in light of these considerations, the only conclusion a critical observer can reach is that these justifications are pretexts for racial exclusion. When Farmers Branch councilmember O’Hare stated publicly that it was necessary to protect property values,68 the city failed to offer any connection between immigration status and problems related to health, safety, welfare, or declining property values. Worse, Farmers Branch did not show that those problems even existed.69 Neither O’Hare nor other proponents of the ordinance pointed to any studies, reports, or statistics to support a correlation between immigration status and societal ills. In fact, at the same time as the touted increase in the Farmers Branch Latino population, the total number of criminal offenses in Farmers Branch declined – from 1,413 in 2003 to 1,306 in 2005.70 The Texas Educational Agency recently recognized schools in the Carrolton Farmers Branch School District for academic excellence in the 2004-2005 school year, an achievement those schools had not obtained in recently preceding years.71 Furthermore, O’Hare’s public comments did not distinguish between undocumented immigrants and Latinos. To explain fluctuations in property values, O’Hare reasoned that “what I would call less desirable people move into the neighborhoods, people who don’t value education, people who don't value taking care of their properties....”72 He claimed that retail operations cater to low-income and Spanish-speaking customers, leaving “no place for people with a good income to shop.”73 Yet, his statements again fail to discern between undocumented immigrants and Latinos in general.74 Similarly, the City of Escondido based its ordinance on findings that “the harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units in the City, and crime committed by illegal aliens, harm the health, safety and welfare of legal residents in the City.”75 Unlike the City of Farmers Branch, Escondido relied on a June 2006 study by the National Latino Research Center at California State University San Marcos (hereafter “NLRC study”) addressing housing conditions in the Mission Park area of Escondido.76 The NLRC study, however, found that the causes for substandard housing in Escondido were the high costs of housing and the unavailability of affordable subsidized housing in Escondido – not the presence of “illegal aliens.”77 In Hazleton, Mayor Ray Barletta insisted “that illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, contributes to overcrowded classrooms and failing schools, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care, and destroys our neighborhoods and diminishes our overall quality of life.”78 Yet, he has also publicly admitted that he does not know how many “illegal aliens” live, work, or attend school in the city, or how many Hazleton crimes have been committed by “illegal immigrants,” legal residents, or citizens.79 Furthermore, according to statistics compiled by the Pennsylvania State Police Uniform Crime Reporting System, there has been a reduction of total arrests in Hazleton over the past five years, including a reduction in serious crimes such as rapes, robberies, homicides, and assaults.80 Under Hazleton’s violent crime index (VCI), undocumented immigrants committed no violent crime until 2006, when three such cases were reported out of 1,397.81 Barletta also claimed that Hazleton’s budget was “buckling under the strain of illegal immigrants,” but admitted that he was unaware how many undocumented workers contributed to the city’s budget by paying taxes.82 In 2000, Hazleton had a $1.2 million deficit, in stark contrast to the surplus it enjoys today.83 The town also saw its largest increase in property values last year.84 Its net assets are up 18, and its bond rating is AAA.85 Amidst the baseless assertions about immigrants, legal alternatives exist that would more directly address the tribulations claimed by public officials. For example, it is not clear why a city, without evidence showing the cause-and-effect between blight-like overcrowding and a certain class of residents, would not pursue remedies that did not target that group of residents. Where concerns about property values arise, a city could enforce stricter penalties for landlords who were not keeping their buildings up to code. Where the occurrence of crime is shown to be increasing, a city could fund community watch programs in appropriate areas, if not train and hire additional police officers. There are myriad alternative solutions to these alleged societal woes. Yet none are being utilized by cities that turn to restrictive housing ordinances. Thus, municipalities with restrictive housing ordinances fail to show a connection between the presence of immigrant populations and alleged societal harms. They also ignore less restrictive solutions that would more directly address those harms to the extent that they actually exist. Moreover, municipalities that pass restrictive housing ordinances simultaneously incur overwhelming legal and economic costs that they are often unable to afford. For example, after Riverside, New Jersey, passed a restrictive ordinance in the fall of 2006, thousands of Latinos fled the community, creating a forceful blow to the local economy. Local businesses floundered, and many were forced to close.86 By the time Riverside voted to rescind the ordinance a year later, it had already spent $82,000 in attorney’s fees fending off a legal challenge to its law.87 It is likely that Riverside would have spent many times that amount had it seen the challenge through to conclusion. Thus, the record of these cities reveals the intent behind the legal exclusion of the undocumented. In short, local governments’ willingness to engage in certain behavior – ignoring the variety of obvious legal solutions, willingly incurring staggering economic and legal costs, and simultaneously admitting to the nonexistence of evidence that linkings predominantly Latino undocumented immigrant populations to threatened safety or welfare – speaks for itself. The intent behind exclusionary ordinances is to use immigration status as a pretext for the racial exclusion of Latinos.
8 +It’s only going to get worse under Donald Trump’s attempts to “Make America Great Again”. Ben Carson, for example don’t even believe in the anti-discrimination laws that exist in the squo.
9 +Williams 2-1 Jumaane D. Williams (Deputy leader, New York City Council), Ben Carson is dangerous for HUD. He got the job anyway because Trump has normalized incompetence, Quartz, 2/1/2017. https://qz.com/899568/donald-trumps-cabinet-confirmations-ben-carsons-hud-secretary-confirmation-is-a-dangerous-normalization-of-incompetence/
10 +One example is his opposition on a HUD staple: the fair housing rule. This country has a long history of systematically denying housing to black and brown Americans. Indeed, US president Donald Trump and his father have also been accused of housing discrimination. The Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing program exists to address these issues by requiring local communities to examine patterns of income and racial discrimination in housing. Yet Carson believes these types of preventive measures against discrimination are “mandated social-engineering schemes.” Further, he believes it is not the role of the government to “legislate racial equality,” which in his words can be “downright dangerous.” Another cause for major concern is Caron’s belief that poverty is a choice. HUD oversees federal rental assistance programs that serve more than five million of the country’s lowest-income families. The agency is also provides federal government funding for the nation’s public housing developments. A great number of these families live in New York, including the country’s largest public housing system.
11 +The root of the justifications lies in a loophole in federal policy- currently, even through the Fair Housing Act would render ordinances unconstitutional, they are permitted under the guise of state rights.
12 +Batson 08 Todd D. Batson, No Vacancy: Why Immigrant Housing Ordinances Violate FHA and Section 1981, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2008). Available at: http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss1/5
13 +The United States has always faced immigration challenges. After the Pilgrims established the first U.S. colony in New England,2 an ensuing immigration stream grew the U.S. population to over 300 million people within 386 years.3 This population growth has increased the demands for social services and the costs required to maintain infrastructure.4 As one response to these rising costs and other immigration concerns, state and municipal governments have enacted local laws to regulate immigrant housing.'
14 +Yet while Congress has exclusive power to regulate immigration, there is no per se federal preemption of every state and municipal immigration law.6 Rather, federal immigration laws only preempt those state and municipal laws that specify which immigrants may enter the United States and the conditions under which those immigrants may remain.7 In Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch,' the Northern District of Texas enjoined a municipal
15 +ordinance that regulated immigrant housing.9 The court held that federal authority preempted the municipal ordinance because the ordinance enacted a locally prescribed framework to determine which immigrants could rent apartments. ° However, the court suggested that it would affirm an ordinance that deferred to federal immigration standards." Such deference is problematic because while border communities might prioritize immigration concerns, regulation of immigrant housing is a national problem that requires a uniform, federal approach. 2 It directly implicates political functions involving foreign affairs and relations, 3 an area where federal courts typically defer to the Executive Branch.
16 +Plan
17 +Plan Text: The United States Federal Government should remove all restricting housing ordinances and end all legal administrations that curtail immigrant access to housing by expanding the jurisdiction of the Fair Housing Act to apply to states’ obligations to protect immigrants.
18 +Batson 08 Todd D. Batson, No Vacancy: Why Immigrant Housing Ordinances Violate FHA and Section 1981, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2008). Available at: http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss1/5
19 +
20 +State and municipal governments may neither slam their front doors shut, nor gate-keep their communities by determining which immigrants may enter and remain. 7 4 Unlawful immigration does impose costs on state and municipal governments, and border communities may very well bear those costs disproportionately. However, exporting immigration costs to neighboring communities is no solution.'75 Rather, state and municipal governments should coalesce around a unified plan and lobby Congress to address the immigration problem comprehensively. A comprehensive regulatory framework would avoid inconsistent regulation from state and local governments. The framework would be more likely to provide tenants and property owners notice of their legal obligations, and would provide adequate and meaningful review. Congress has the power to articulate a standard of scrutiny that addresses equal protection concerns for immigrants. A federal statute, moreover, would represent the cooperation and contributions of the nation as a whole. Since immigration policies directly implicate political functions involving foreign affairs and relations,'76 a nationally accountable Congress is the appropriate body to address these concerns. Congress may take longer to act than state and municipal governments would like. Thus, in the interim, state and municipal communities are likely to elect at least some politicians running "tough on immigration" campaigns. These politicians are likely to encourage state and municipal regulations of immigrant housing. Yet this Note has discussed the legal deficiencies with local regulations.'77 Because of these legal deficiencies, local residents must challenge immigrant housing ordinances under FHA and Section 1981 V' In the end, a comprehensive, well-reasoned approach to immigration will best address the national problem, while ensuring that the United States' doors to the "tempest-tost"'79 remain open.
21 +Advantage 1 is Cultural Shift
22 +Rejecting immigration restrictions transforms landscapes by re-shaping social values through disruption of racial narratives and contestation of political norms.
23 +Lal 13 Lal, Prerna, You Cannot Live Here — Restrictive Housing Ordinances as the New Jim Crow (June 1, 2013)
24 +A great influx of Latino immigration has transformed how place and race is lived in America. Latino immigrants challenge the black/white binary that has long shaped U.S. race relations, and their continued migration to suburbs will likely play a transformative role in changing the urban/suburban landscape (Price, 2012). While many Latinos continue to face concentrated poverty and live in highly segregated areas (Logan Prerna Lal 17 2010; Massey, 2007), mass migration can radically transform both the city and suburban landscape. As immigrant workers continue to increase in the American workforce over the next few decades, both cities and suburbs will become new spaces of political contestation. As Latinos move from cities to suburbs, they can expand labor market and cultural networks, and help to integrate newly arriving immigrants into both the urban and suburban landscape.
25 +Independent of anything else, the 1AC leads to a spillover effect- rights based approach to housing is key to spurring more positive policy reform,
26 +Adams 08, Kristen David (Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law). "Do we need a right to housing." Nev. LJ 9 (2008): 275.
27 +Rights are more powerful than goals, policies, commitments, and other non-rights. One illustration of this truth is that the United States has recognized a commitment to “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family” dating back to 1949.162 This resolution came from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union Address, in which he urged the adoption of a “Second Bill of Rights” that would include a right to housing.163 Congress officially adopted Roosevelt’s housing goal in 1949.164 Thus, a commitment to housing for all persons in the United States is not an entirely new concept, but creating an affirmative right to housing would take Congress’ previous commitment to a whole new level and require that it be met. The 1949 commitment lacked specific goals that would have made it enforceable and meaningful.165 Currently, the United States falls far short of providing housing to every family in America who needs it; instead, only about one-fourth of those who qualify for housing assistance actually receive it.166 The 1949 commitment can therefore be seen as an example of why affordable housing goals are not sufficient. Instead, rights are required.167 Rights, unlike goals, tend to provide the level of specificity needed to motivate follow through. Unlike goals, rights also create grounds for litigation if no follow through is forthcoming.168 In addition to having greater power than non-rights, rights create legitimacy for programs to enforce those rights.169 Having a right to housing should put the brakes on continual budget cuts for housing programs i
28 +
29 +n the legislative appropriations process.170 Making housing a right may also motivate increased construction of affordable housing.171
30 +Redlining’s impacts still affect Latino and black communities today. Housing ordinances perpetuates mass income inequality. There is a historical obligation to reject racist ordinances.
31 +Boak 16 For minorities, pain is severe decade after housing peaked By JOSH BOAK Jun. 20, 2016 2:47 PM EDT bigstory.ap.org/article/b8ceee210bb344e68bebe95ab73faf5a/10-years-after-housing-bubble-damage-lingers-minorities
32 +The problem is most pronounced among minorities who already had lower ownership rates before the bubble. Actions such as "redlining" — which for decades denied loans to minorities — excluded black neighborhoods from government-backed mortgages. This made it harder for minorities to buy even as the U.S. economy surged after World War II and overall home ownership rates climbed. Many minority homeowners who bought or refinanced during the bubble eventually became trapped by predatory mortgages, some requiring no money down and monthly payments that eventually ballooned.
33 +Advantage 2 is Legal Spillover
34 +The 1AC would provide strong legal backing for potential lawsuits, setting a legal precedent in favor of immigrants.
35 +Batson 08 Todd D. Batson, No Vacancy: Why Immigrant Housing Ordinances Violate FHA and Section 1981, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2008). Available at: http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss1/5
36 +
37 +CHALLENGING IMMIGRANT HOUSING ORDINANCES IS MOST PRACTICAL UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND SECTION 1981 This Note argues that because of the legal deficiencies with immigrant housing ordinances, 4 the most practical challenges to them arise under FHA and Section 1981. FHA prohibits housing practices that have a discriminatory effect on parties because of race, color, or national origin."' Thus, while an equal protection challenge requires proof of discriminatory intent,"' courts have interpreted FHA more broadly." 7 Additionally, Section 1981 prohibits parties from restricting any person's right to enter a contract because of race, ethnicity, or national origin.2 8 As a result, Section 1981 prohibits any state or municipal law that forbids a property owner or manager from entering leases with unlawful immigrants." 9 This Note argues that in comparison to a preemption, due process or equal protection challenge, plaintiffs face a lower bar to establish wrongdoing under FHA and Section 1981. It follows that the most practical means to challenge these immigrant housing ordinances are FHA and Section 1981. By doing so, plaintiffs can defeat local piecemeal efforts to regulate immigrant housing and thereby encourage a uniform, national approach to a common problem.
38 +Congress enacted FHA13° to provide fair housing throughout the nation and to prohibit all public and private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of real property. 3' The reach of FHA is broad, covering most dwellings and protecting any person seeking to rent or purchase a dwelling, regardless of immigration status.'32 While there is a limited exemption for single-family homes, the exemption does not extend to apartment complexes."' Thus, apartment complex owners and managers must comply with FHA provisions. Immigrant housing ordinances injure both tenants and property owners, and both groups have standing to challenge the ordinances under FHA.'34 The ordinances harm tenants because they disparately impact minority renters. Further, the ordinances infringe on tenants' rights to enjoy a diverse community.'35 They harm property owners and managers, in contrast, because they are too vague.'36 Property owners and managers lack sufficient notice and guidance regarding their new legal obligations.'37 Thus, in an effort to comply with local regulations, they may incidentally violate federal laws. Property owners and managers face a basic dilemma: they may abide by federal laws and risk violating local ordinances, or they may abide by local ordinances and risk violating federal laws.
39 +Winning lawsuits can be a massive leg-up for marginalized communities stuck in poverty- between 1990 and 2001 that lead to over 150 million dollars in recovery.
40 +Wiki n.d. Housing discrimination (United States), From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Housing_discrimination_(United_States)
41 +The federal government has passed other initiatives in addition to the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 and Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 helped with discrimination in mortgage lending and lenders' problems with credit needs.12 The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 was passed to give the federal government the power to enforce the original Fair Housing Act to correct past problems with enforcement.13 The amendment established a system of administrative law judges to hear cases brought to them by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and to levy fines.14 Because of the relationship between housing discrimination cases and private agencies, the federal government passed the two initiatives. The Fair Housing Assistance Program of 1984 was passed to assist public agencies with processing complaints, and the Fair Housing Initiatives program of 1986 supported private and public fair housing agencies in their activities, such as auditing.13 Between 1990 and 2001 these two programs have resulted in over one thousand housing discrimination lawsuits and over $155 million in financial recovery.13 However, the lawsuits and financial recoveries generated from fair housing discrimination cases only scratches the surface of all instances of discrimination. Silverman and Patterson concluded that the underfunding and poor implementation of federal, state and local policies designed to address housing discrimination results in less than 1 of all instances of discrimination being addressed.15 Moreover, they found that local nonprofits and administrators responsible for enforcing fair housing laws had a tendency to downplay discrimination based on family status and race when designing implementation strategies.16
42 +The 1AC causes a social change that moves people onto the side of immigrants.
43 +David Schultz, Vice President, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union and Stephen E. Gottlieb, Cleveland-Marshall School of Law, “Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?” JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY v. 12, Winter 1996, p. 63+.
44 +Further, since law imposes social costs n90 and affects incentives, n91 the decision itself, without extra-judicial assistance, raised new obstacles to segregation. n92 What once was a nearly costless behavior suddenly entailed increased litigation costs, fines, and injunctions; the threat of executive action against segregation now was increasingly real; and it now was likely that other related behaviors also would be similarly burdened.
45 +Independent of victory, case studies prove that litigation spurs legislation.
46 +Richard A. L. Gambitta, Chair of the Political Science and Geography Department, University of Texas-San Antonio, GOVERNING THROUGH THE COURTS, ed. Gambitta, May, and Foster, 1981, p. 275-276.
47 +Similar to the aftermath of the “winning” litiation in Serrano and Robinson, the losing litigation in Rodriguez was followed by positive, though limited, policy reform and relative equalization. How did the Rodriguez litigaton contribute to the policy reform and expenditure change? I suggest, in ways similar to Serrano and Robinson. The litigation process performed a legislative agenda-setting function. All three cases contributed to setting a legislative agenda that otherwise would not have 276 transpired. Additionally, the litigation processes bolstered the political positions of the advocates of change, though the policy outcomes were tempered by, as they are always subject to and at least partially determined by, the inherent compromises of the majoritarian processes and institutions (Casper, 1972; Clune, 1979; Horowitz, 1977; Lehn, 1978; Scheingold, 1974).
48 +Framework
49 +The standard is rejecting structural oppression.
50 +The nature of governments necessitates pragmatic policy.
51 +Martin Rhonheimer. “The Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place of Natural Law in Public Reason: Rawls's "Political Liberalism" Revisited” http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1364andcontext=ajj
52 +“It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. Political philosophy belongs to ethics, which is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore, it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of political institutions and action must be understood as embedded in concrete cultural and, therefore, historical contexts and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the "idea of the good" or of "the just" (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such a purely metaphysical view, however, is doomed to failure. As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 4 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. Moreover, unlike moral norms in general-natural law included-which rule the actions of a person-"my acting" and pursuing the good-the logic of the political is characterized by acts like framing institutions
53 +
54 +and establishing legal rules by which not only personal actions but the actions of a multitude of persons are regulated by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. Political actions are, thus, both actions of the whole of the body politic and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 5 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the "domestic" and the "political" kind of rule 6: unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially "despotic," political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers. Thus, unlike individual ethics, which is concerned with the goodness, fulfillment and flourishing of human persons, political ethics and philosophy-as a conception of political action and the political, that is, the common good -must be right from the beginning, and even on the level of basic principles, prudential in a specific way: it is a principled kind of prudence, based on the specific subject matter of the political, that guides actions-e.g., lawmaking—chosen for, and in many cases in behalf of, a multitude of free persons the results of which are enforced by means of the coercive apparatus of what we nowadays call "the state." This principled kind of political prudence and its inherent logic of specifically political justification constitute "public reason." “
55 +This means that a) you reject abstract ethical theories—at the end of the day, no one cares whether they willed a contradiction or not, but rather the government concerns itself with outcomes of its actions, and b) absent of the neg explaining why they link to political philosophy, you default my framework.
56 +Governments have an obligation to reject forms of structural oppression—it prevents voices from being heard and comes first under any framework.
57 +WINTER AND LEIGHTON – D. D. Winter and Dana Leighton. “STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE SECTION INTRODUCTION”. 6/1/99 http://sites.saumag.edu/danaleighton/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/09/SVintro-2.pdf
58 +“Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. “
59 +Prefer this because ethics can’t be grounded in ideal theory. Dreaming of a nonexistent perfect world does nothing to actually create change, it just leaves content with the flawed status quo.
60 +Charles Mills 05. “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. 2005. http://www.douglasficek.com/teaching/phi-102/mills.pdf RC
61 +“I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then ideal theory the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved. It is no accident that historically subordinated groups have always been deeply skeptical of ideal theory, generally see its glittering ideals as remote and unhelpful, and are attracted to nonideal theory, or what significantly overlaps it, “naturalized” theory. In the same essay cited above, Jaggar identifies a “unity of feminist ethics in at least one dimension,” a naturalism “characteristic, though not definitive, of it” (Jaggar 2000, 453). Marxism no longer has the appeal it once did as a theory of oppression, but it was famous for emphasizing, as in The German Ideology, the importance of descending from the idealizing abstractions of the Young Hegelians to a focus on “real, active men,” not “men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived,” but “as they actually are,” in (class) relations of domination (Marx and Engels 1976, 35–36). And certainly black Americans, and others of the racially oppressed, have always operated on the assumption that the natural and most illuminating starting point is the actual conditions of nonwhites, and the discrepancy between them and the vaunted American ideals. Thus Frederick Douglass’s classic 1852 speech, “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?” points out the obvious, that the inspiring principles of freedom and independence associated with the celebration are not equally extended to black slaves: “I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. . . . The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. . . . This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn” (1996, 116, emphasis in original). So given this convergence in gender, class, and race theory on the need to make theoretically central the existence and functioning of the actual non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the ideal, what defensible arguments for abstracting away from these realities could there be?”
62 +Failing to adopt a non-ideal theory allows for use to ignore hypocrisy in our own philosophy.
63 +Charles Mills 05. “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. 2005. http://www.douglasficek.com/teaching/phi-102/mills.pdf RC
64 +“Or consider a (today) far more respectable ideal, that of autonomy. This notion has been central to ethical theory for hundreds of years, and is, of course, famously most developed in Kant’s writings. But recent work in feminist theory has raised questions as to whether it is an attractive ideal at all, or just a reflection of male privilege. Human beings are dependent upon others for a long time before they can become adult, and if they live to old age, are likely to be dependent upon others for many of their latter years. But traditionally, this work has been done by women, and so it has been invisible or taken for granted, not theorized. Some feminist ethicists have argued for the simple abandonment of autonomy as an attractive value, but others have suggested that it can be redeemed once it is reconceptualized to take account of this necessarily inter- relational aspect (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000). So the point is that idealization here obfuscates the reality of care giving that makes any achievement of autonomy possible in the first place, and only through nonideal theory are we sensitized to the need to balance this value against other values, and rethink it. Somewhat similarly, think of the traditional left critique of a liberal concept of freedom that focuses simply on the absence of juridical barriers, and ignores the many ways in which economic constraints can make working-class liberties largely nominal rather than substantive.”
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