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  • Caselist.RoundClass[11]
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Caselist.RoundClass[11]

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Cites

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	1	+Part 1: Framework
	2	+Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
	3	+
	4	+There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
	5	+Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
	6	+“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
	7	+Implications:
	8	+A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. Mills Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
	9	+“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
	10	+2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
	11	+Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
	12	+“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
	13	+Impacts:
	14	+A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
	15	+B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
	16	+Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
	17	+“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
	18	+And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
	19	+The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy.
	20	+Mouffe 2k Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	21	+"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
	22	+Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
	23	+Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
	24	+Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
	25	+“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives.
	26	+2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
	27	+A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
	28	+B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
	29	+C. It’s a no risk issue- they have to justify that something can be uncontestable in order to prove antagonism is good for ethics.
	30	+3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
	31	+4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
	32	+Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
	33	+The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
	34	+Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
	35	+Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	36	+"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
	37	+Part 2: Advocacy
	38	+I defend the resolution as a generl principle.
	39	+Part 3: Contention
	40	+Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
	41	+Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
	42	+Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
	43	+Thus, affirm:
	44	+Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
	45	+Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	46	+I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
	47	+This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
	48	+Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
	49	+ Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
	50	+Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
	51	+Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
	52	+Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
	53	+Free speech was written into the constitution explicitly to be a counter-majoritarian right to promote agonistic discourse
	54	+Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
	55	+According to Mansbridge, "the framers of the American Constitution explicitly espoused a philosophy of adversary democracy built on selfinterest,"'2 which shaped the Constitution in several ways. First, by putting certain individual rights beyond the reach of majoritarian enactments, the Bill of Rights actually enshrines and protects conflict. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, for instance, protect religious diversity and the divergent ideas of the "good life" that result from different religious beliefs. The Free Speech Clause likewise protects the liberty of the individual to speak pursuant to her own will, even though her speech conflicts with the existing order and ideas of the "common good" that the majority accepts. The Constitution's countermajoritarian protections, in other words, reject the ideal of widespread societal consensus. To the contrary, out of respect for individual autonomy, they constitutionalize individual interest and the conflict it may produce.
	56	+Adversarial democracy entails protection of constitutional speech. Also justifies why cooperative conceptions of democracy fail in the context of free speech.
	57	+Redish and Mollen 09 Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Abby Marie Mollen, B.A. 2001, J.D. 2008, Northwestern University, “UNDERSTANDING POST'S AND MEIKLEJOHN'S MISTAKES: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY IN THE THEORY OF FREE EXPRESSION,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 103, No. 3, 2009 JW
	58	+Acceptance of the premises of adversary democracy has important implications for the scope of the theory of free expression. Post and Meiklejohn were both correct in positing a symbiotic intersection between democracy and free expression. Recognition of both the normative and empirical superiority of the adversary model of democracy, however, suggests that the First Amendment's domain extends significantly farther than either Post or Meiklejohn's theories would permit. Adversary democracy, it should be recalled, posits that democracy invariably involves an adversarial competition among competing personal, social, or economic interests. Individuals are able to protect their own interests or to achieve their ideological goals by (1) participating in the proc- ess of governing by exercise of the vote, and (2) attempting, through exercise of their expressive powers, to persuade others to accept their positions. The First Amendment, therefore, must protect (1) all speech that facilitates the individual's democratic decisionmaking; (2) all lawful advocacy;3° ' (3) all speech that facilitates the individual's awareness of her self-interest; and (4) all speech that facilitates the individual's ability to maintain and develop her individuality in spite of collective life. Notably, this does not mean that the government is absolutely barred from regulating speech that falls in these four categories. It simply means that it can do so only when the regulation survives strict scrutiny. While the adversary theory of the First Amendment would protect all of the speech that Meiklejohn's and Post's theories would protect, it would also protect much of the expression these theories exclude. As previously noted, both Meiklejohn and Post strained their theories' claims to being democratic in order to exclude certain forms of self-interested speech. Meiklejohn not only violated the core principle of epistemological humility to justify his exclusion of economically self-interested speech from the First Amendment, he also excluded such self-interested speech despite its potential to inform democratic decisionmaking, which he believed to be the sole constitutional purpose for protecting speech in the first place. Post likewise casts off or at least devalues core aspects of democratic autonomy, such as the vote and the information that makes it more informed, despite the fact that doing so concomitantly undermines his theory's ability to secure democratic legitimacy, the value it purportedly protects. Perhaps it is inevitable that cooperative theories of democracy would struggle to articulate a coherent theory of free speech, precisely because of their inherent rejection of the adversary premise and its centrality to core notions of democracy. Based on their theoretical premise that democracy is an exercise of collective self-determination in pursuit of shared objectives, cooperative theories of the First Amendment might always be faced with something of a difficult choice. They could remain true to their First Amendment premises for protecting speech-listener autonomy in Meiklejohn's model, for instance. But to the extent they do so, they might necessarily violate a theoretical premise of the underlying cooperative democratic theory, such as Meiklejohn's premise that self-government should pursue the common good rather than private self-interest. Put differently, cooperative theories of democracy are fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of epistemological humility that the First Amendment embodies because, either implicitly or explicitly, they reflect predetermined conclusions about how autonomy should be exercised. In this manner, both theories suffer from the oxymoronic concept of externally determined autonomy. Adversary democracy does not suffer from the same problem because it contains no underlying premise as to how or why autonomy should be exercised.3 "' Instead, it commits these choices to the individual. Thus, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue the course of action he thinks is in the best interests of the community or the nation, adversary democracy authorizes him to do so. On the other hand, if an individual wishes to vote and advocate in order to pursue what he thinks is in his own private self-interest, adversary democracy says he may do so. Because adversary democracy is consistent with these process-based autonomy decisions, one employing the adversary theory of the First Amendment is never tempted to exclude speech otherwise logically included within the amendment's scope simply because its speaker is not acting in accordance with some predetermined ideal of political behavior. More importantly, the adversary theory of free expression is preferable to Meiklejohn's and Post's theories because it equally protects all aspects of democratic autonomy, rather than selectively privileging some aspects over others. Assuming that the purpose of a democratic theory of the First Amendment is, indeed, to facilitate democracy, which in turn necessarily implies the notions of epistemological humility and true voter autonomy, such comprehensive protection for all aspects of process-based autonomy is crucial to a theory's success. Unlike Meiklejohn's theory, which categorically excludes speaker autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy, and unlike Post's theory, which systematically underprotects listener autonomy and all forms of individual autonomy that do not facilitate the emergence of a common will, the adversary theory of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all its manifestations.
	59	+Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
	60	+Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
	61	+Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.

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