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-I value morality since the resolution is normative. Every agent has a practical identity that is the source of value. |
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-Christine M. Korsgaard 92, professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. “The Sources of Normativity”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values |
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-Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think |
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-identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids. |
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-The content of normative claims has to be contained within themselves—the nature of obligation is what gives us the ability to deduct what obligations we have. |
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-David Velleman 05 (Professor of Philosophy at New York University). “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. 2005. |
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-Kant reasoned that if moral requirements don't derive their force from any external authority, |
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-that a requirement would carry authority simply by virtue of requiring that thing. |
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-Thus, the standard is consistency in the rational will. |
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-Prefer it independently: |
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-1. Absent a rational will, actions become unintelligible since the intent determines the action. |
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-Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014 |
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- “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,” |
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-to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.” |
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-3. Anything being good commits us to valuing it unconditionally. |
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-Christine M. Korsgaard 06 ( Professor at Harvard) “Morality and the Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt”. Pg. 7 RC |
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-“If practical reasons are public, however, it must be possible for us |
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-reasons, then it turns out to be something like Kant’s moral law.” |
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-Also means that only my framework gives reason for action and thus guide agents to act in certain ways. |
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-Contention |
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-I advocate that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I’ll defend consequentialist impacts, but they’re not relevant under my framework since I just need to need to show that the maxim of the aff is consistent with the rational will. |
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-First, |
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-Second, there is a distinction between right and virtue. Right refers to external freedom, i.e. your ability to not be coerced, whereas virtue refers to a more internal freedom, i.e. you being internally motivated to make an ethical choice. Restricting free speech prevents being from being able to truly act on ethical choices. |
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-Helga Varden 10 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC |
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-The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality as |
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-to both internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced. |
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-Third, it’s impossible for words to violate someone’s external freedom since it is up to the listener to believe them or not. |
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-Helga Varden 2 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC |
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-This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains |
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-cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right. |
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-Moreover, simply saying something immoral or reprehensible is different from coercion via threats. |
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-Helga Varden 3 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”. Springer, 22 May 2010. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4 RC |
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-Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech. |
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-me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view. |
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-Underview |
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-Silencing bigots only re-entrenches their position and galvanizes their opposition to social justice movements |
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-Levinovitz 16 Alan Levinovitz, assistant professor of religion at James Madison University, “How Trigger Warnings Silence Religious Students,” The Atlantic, August 30, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/silencing-religious-students-on-campus/497951/ |
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- There is no doubt that in America, the perspective of white, heterosexual |
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-deeply held beliefs. It would be a shame to execute him again. |
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-Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech. |
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-ACLU Hate Speech On Campus, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus |
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-Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more |
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-, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance. |