Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[14]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[24]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[14]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-11 16:24:58.517
	1	+2016-10-11 16:24:58.0

Caselist.CitesClass[24]

Cites

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	1	+Only constitutivism can bind agents to ethical actions. Kastafanas Katsafanas, Paul. “Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzchean Version of Constitutivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. Boston University: 2011.:
	2	+Enter a third theory, which attempts to do just that: constitutivism. According to constitutivism, there is an element of truth in both the internalist and the externalist positions. For the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that the truth of a normative claim depends on the agent’s aims, in the sense that the agent must possess a certain aim in order for the normative claim to be true. But the constitutivist constitutivism traces the authority of norms to an aim that has a special status, an aim that is constitutive of being an agent. This constitutive aim is not optional; if you lack the aim, you are not an agent at all. So the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that practical reasons derive from the agent’s aims; but the constitutivist holds that the relevant aim is one that is intrinsic to being an agent. Accordingly, the constitutivist gets the conclusion that the externalist wanted: there are non-optional reasons for acting. Put differently, there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent.
	3	+And, agency is a constitutive feature of all people. Ferrero Luca Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009.(https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-constitutivism.pdf‎) Professor of Philosophy, University of Wesconsin at Milwaukee. 7/21/13:
	4	+3.1 The initial appeal of the shmagency objection rests on the impression that there is a close analogy between agency and ordinary enterprises. If one can stand outside of chess and question whether there is any reason to play this game, why couldnʼt one stand outside of agency and wonder whether there is any reason to play the agency game? The problem with this suggestion is that the analogy does not hold. Agency is a very special enterprise. Agency is distinctively ʻinescapable.ʼ This is what sets agency apart from all other enterprises and explains why constitutivism is focused on it rather than on any other enterprise. 3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.133.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15 3.4 To sum up, agency is special because of two distinctive features. First, agency is not the only game in town, but it is the biggest possible one. In addition to instances of bare intentional agency, any engagement in an ordinary enterprise is ipso facto an engagement in the enterprise of agency. Second, agency is closed under rational reflection. It is closed under the self- directed application of its distinctive discursive operation, the asking for and the giving of reasons for action. The combination of these features is what makes agency inescapable. This is the kind of nonoptionality that supports the viability of constitutivism.
	5	+Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of agency. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent. Korsgaard“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard:The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.
	6	+This means maxims must be universal. One maxim that is not universal is assaulting the freedom of others. Engstrom Stephen, “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”. (www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem//engstrom_vortrag.pdf‎),
	7	+Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency.Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deems ing good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom. These judgments are inconsistent insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom
	8	+Thus, the standard is consistency with equal freedoms, defined as not inhibiting the ends of others as long as they respect others’ ends.
	9	+Prefer additionally- all frameworks dictate freedom- you making arguments against liberty presupposes your ability to make arguments while free from coercion. Hoppe 98 Hans Hermann (professor of business, UNLV) Liberty magazine, September 1998 http://www.libertyunbound.com/sites/files/printarchive/Liberty_Magazine_September_1988.pdf, 21 Second, it must be noted that argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of ac-tion requirees ing the employment of scarce means; and furthermore that the means, which a person demonstrates by preferring to engages in propositional exchange are those of private property. No one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become con- vinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if one's right to make exclusive use of one's physical body were not already presupposed. It is one's recognition of another's mutual- ly exclusive control over his own body which explains the distinctive character- istic of propositional exchanges: while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. And it is obvious, too, that such a property right in one's own body must be said to be justified a priori. Anyone who would try to justify any norm of whatever content must already presuppose an exclusive right of control over his or her body simply in order to say "I propose such and such." And anyone disputing such a right, then, would become caught up in a practical contradiction, since in arguing so one would already implicitly have accepted the very norm that one was disputing.
	10	+And, only intents matter under the framework. Agents cannot be responsible for the consequences, because they did not will those consequences.
	11	+I contend that banning nuclear power with equal freedoms since the government would be violating the freedom of nuclear plant owners by interfering with their property and restricting their ability to have nuclear power. Ripstein Arthur Ripstein, “Beyond the Harm Principle,” University of Toronto, http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/beyond_harm_principle The fact that the despots in question act through an elected legislature doesn’t solve the problem. It just serves as a reminder, in case anyone needed one, that legislatures are despotic if they advance private purposes rather than public ones. That possibility isn’t limited to paternalism: any criminal prohibition that doesn’t protect sovereignty is a despotic violation of it. Your neighbour cannot decide which ends you may pursue; nor can the majority of your neighbours, acting through the state. As a special case of this, they can’t act through the state to prohibit you from doing something that isn’t objectionable as a means of preventing you, or someone else, from doing something that is. That is liberalism’s core insight: Against the private choices of others, the individual’s sovereignty is, as Mill says, absolute.
	12	+
	13	+No empirical object is intrinsically valuable. Their value lies only in relationship to rational agency. KANT:
	14	+Immanuel Kant founder of analytic philosophy “Critique of Pure Reason” 1781
	15	+“We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances objects they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving him or her, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which is alone given to us.” (168)

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-11 16:24:59.275

Judge

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	1	+Abbey Chapman, Lawrence Zhou, Rory Jacobson

Opponent

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	1	+Edgemont ML

ParentRound

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	1	+14

Round

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	1	+Doubles

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

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	1	+SO - NC - Kant

Tournament

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	1	+Grapevine