Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[55]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[107]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[55]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2017-03-15 22:20:34.449
	1	+2017-03-15 22:20:34.0

Caselist.CitesClass[107]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,10 @@
	1	+Analytics
	2	+
	3	+And, the intent determines the action, so foreseen harms are irrelevant.
	4	+Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014
	5	+ “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,” if that just means a bodily movement, has any moral value. Suppose that you are starving, and I am about to eat a sandwich when I learn about this. And suppose that just then I am attacked by a series of involuntary muscle spasms that cause me to make exactly the same physical movements I would make if I were giving you my sandwich. No one would claim that this “external performance” has any moral value. An act must be done with a certain proximate or immediate intention in order to count as an act at all. And that proximate or immediate intention is already part of an action’s motive. So in order to even count as “giving you my sandwich” I have to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.”
	6	+Thus, the standard is maintaining consistency in the rational will.
	7	+Also, means act/omission distinction: when you will something, you must test whether or not it coheres with universal law, but if you simply omit an action, you are not willing anything.
	8	+Qualified immunity prevents individuals from being held accountable when there is a good will, they don't know they're in violation of the law at the time. Zipursky n.d.:
	9	+Zipursky, Benjamin. “Reasonableness in and Out of Negligence Law.” No Date. Pg. 11 and 12.
	10	+In certain parts of the criminal law of some jurisdictions and in certainconstitutional torts, whether a defendant’s breach of a legal rule is actionable will turn on whether it would have been reasonable to believe, under those circumstances, that the legal rule was not being breached. 33 An important subset of these are “reasonable mistake of fact” cases. The Model Penal Code and the Supreme Court of California (in People v. Hernandez34),for example, famously declared that a defendant’s reasonable belief that his sexual partner was over the age of consent could exculpate him from charges of statutory rape.35 Certain cases of self-defense involve a defendant who mistakenly believed he was being attacked with deadly force. In those cases, the reasonableness of the mistaken belief is essential to whether the defense truly exculpates, or merely mitigates, the defendant’s use of deadly force.36 “Reasonableness” of belief here has nothing whatsoever to do with deference, but it is epistemic and it does pertain to proper exercises of judgment. This utilization of reasonableness actually presupposes that there is a true answer to the question (e.g., whether the woman eighteen years of age yet), and the defendant missed it. Nonetheless, whether it was or was not due to a faulty exercise of judgment is an important question. Although there was, in an important sense, a legal wrong committed, certain jurisdictions have decided, in these circumstances, not to hold the defendant responsible for having committed it if he or she had the good faith belief and his having the belief was not attributable to a faulty exercise of judgment. Remarkably, the United States Supreme Court expanded its form of qualified immunity in § 1983 claims to be significantly broader than this.37 The torts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation include a qualified reliance requirement sometimes labeled a “reasonable reliance” requirement and sometimes labeled a “justifiable reliance” requirement. As this pairing indicates, reasonableness in this context is much the same as justifiability.38 Where the reliance stems from a poor, defective, or ungrounded decision to rely on another’s statement, the putatively injured party is not entitled to redress the putative injury. It is not quite right to pin the harm done on the party inducing the reliance, where the party who was in fact deceived was unwarranted in having relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation. Reasonableness is used to pick out epistemic defensibility, as in the case of reasonable mistake.

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2017-03-15 22:20:36.722

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Panel

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Harrison RP

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+55

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Doubles

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+ND - NC - Kant

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Apple Valley