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  • Caselist.CitesClass[94]
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Caselist.CitesClass[94]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-03-15 19:00:14.664
	1	+2017-03-15 19:00:14.0

Caselist.CitesClass[95]

Cites

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	1	+Deconstructive logic is constitutive of metaphysics. All concepts, identities, and judgements are constructed in opposition to their negative. There can be no conception of good without bad, friendship without betrayal, promises without promise breaking. Ontological violence is foundational to any ethical or political framework.
	2	+Hagglund “THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
	3	+“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, political, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all.
	4	+
	5	+Next, if cultural conflict is inevitable, then the sovereign must be the one defining meaning in the economy of violence to make the final discriminative judgement, otherwise we have absolute violence.
	6	+Parrish Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish
	7	+All of the foregoing pints to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace “is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign.” Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that “one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which people men try to conduct their social lives.” “The whole purpose raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic is to defuseing of interpretive clashes,” without which humans would “fly off in all directions” and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.
	8	+Thus, the standard is adhering to the will of the sovereign.
	9	+1. The sovereign is impossible to avoid. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed.
	10	+Parrish 2 Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish
	11	+But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible ~-~- they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among persons in the state of nature there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning.
	12	+This outweighs- individuals are always ontologically self-interested, meaning we are key to ethical motivation.
	13	+Mercer 01 In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism.: Mark Mercer. Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 217-23
	14	+To begin: To understand what another has done is both to have a particular sort of true description of the his action he has performed, one that reveals it to be intentional, and to know the agent's his practical reason for performing that action. In turn, to know an agent's reason for performing particular action involves understanding their motivation in doing it. An interpreter cannot, though, really understand an agent's motivation in performing an action unless she sees that motivation as a motivation, unless she is cognizant of its force as a motivation. It is not enough, that is to say, to understand what a person who intentionally sips from a saucer of mud has done to note merely that he had the desire to sip from a saucer of mud, and believed himself both possessed of a saucer of mud and able to sip from it. An interpreter has also to comprehend what in desiring to sip from a saucer of mud was attractive to him.
	15	+
	16	+Contention (Note: did not read this contention in round, instead extemped an analytic reason that hobbes meant revolution was unjustified)
	17	+To have a right assumes the ability to make a claim of obligation against someone. So for the resolution to make the claim the US ought to grant a right assumes that we can make a claim against the sovereign.
	18	+Curran 02 https://kar.kent.ac.uk/533/1/Hobbes's_theory_of_rights_12NOV07DP.pdf Hobbes’s Theory of Rights – A Modern Interest Theory Eleanor Curran, The Journal of Ethics, 6 (1) pp 63 – 8
	19	+A claim right is a right that is correlated with the duties of another or others. These duties consist in either refraining from actions that would impede the rightholder in her exercise of the right or, sometimes, of performing actions that will give the rightholder the thing she has a right to or help her to have or do the thing she has a right to. So, if A has a claim right to X against B, then B has a correlative duty to A to refrain from interfering with A’s having or doing X, or sometimes, a duty to give X to A or to help A to have or do X.
	20	+However, individuals don’t have rights against the state, so this claim is never justifiable.
	21	+Feinburg 80 Première publication dans The journal of Value Inquiry, Vol.4 (1970), pp.243-57; repris dans Joel Feinberg,
	22	+Rights, justice, and the bounds of Liberty, Priceton University Press, Priceton, 1980, pp.159-184. La version
	23	+originale de cet article contient des italiques omis par cette version numérique.Surely, one might ask, rights have to come in somewhere, if we are to have even moderately complex forms of social organization. Without rules that confer rights and impose obligations, how can we can have ownership of property, bargains and deals, promises and contracts, appointments and loans, marriages and partnerships? Very well, let us introduce all of these social and economic practices into Nowheresville, but with one big twist. With them I should like to introduce the curious notion of a "sovereign right-monopoly." You will recall that the subjects in Hobbes's Leviathan had no rights whatever against their sovereign. He could do as he liked with them, even gratuitously harm them, but this gave them no valid grievance against him. The sovereign, to be sure, had a certain duty to treat his subjects well, but this duty was owed not to the subjects directly, but to God, just as we might have a duty to a person to treat his property well, but of course no duty to the property itself but only to its owner. Thus, while the sovereign was quite capable of harming his subjects, he could commit no wrong against them that they could complain about, since they had no prior claims against his conduct. The only party wronged by the sovereign’s mistreatment of his subjects was God, the supreme lawmaker. Thus, in repenting cruelty to his subjects, the sovereign might say to God, as David did after killing Uriah, "to Thee only have I sinned."4 Even in the Leviathan, however, ordinary people had ordinary rights against one another. They played roles, occupied offices, made agreements, and signed contracts. In a genuine "sovereign right-monopoly," as I shall be using that phrase. they will do all those things too, and thus incur genuine obligations toward one another; but the obligations (here is the twist) will not be owed directly to promises, creditors, parents, and the like, but rather to God alone, or to the members of some elite, or to a single sovereign under God. Hence, the rights correlative to the obligations that derive from these transactions are all owned by some "outside" authority. As far as I know, no philosopher has ever suggested that even our role and contract obligations (in this, our actual world) are all owed directly to a divine intermediary, but some theologians have approached such extreme moral occasionalism. I have in mind the familiar phrase in certain widely distributed religious tracts that "it takes three to marry." which suggests that marital vows are not made between bride and groom directly but between each spouse and God, so that if one breaks his vow, the other cannot rightly complain of being wronged, since only God could have claimed performance of the marital duties as his own due; and hence God alone had a claimright violated by nonperformance. If John breaks his vow to God, he might then properly repent in the words of David: "To Thee only have I sinned."

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-03-15 19:00:15.779

Judge

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	1	+Sims, Melin, Wright

Opponent

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	1	+Westwood RM

ParentRound

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	1	+49

Round

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	1	+Octas

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

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	1	+MA - NC - Hobbes

Tournament

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	1	+TFA