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+Discourse affects our ability to effect change meaning the CP is logically prior |
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+ Haste writes: |
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+Helen Haste, PhD of Psychology at the University of Bath, “Communitarianism and the Social Construction of Morality”, 1998. NC |
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+Communitarian thinkers start from a very different psychological tradition. They emphasise the primacy of language and social interaction in the generation of meaning is important. Taylor argues that human life is ‘fundamentally dialogic …. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.’ (1991 p 32). This aligns the communitarian ontological position with social constructionists like John Shotter (1993) and Rom HarrZ (HarrZ and Gillett, 1994) who argue that the primary human reality is face-to-face conversation. If social interaction is the crucible of meaning, then the child learns about morality through discourse and through social practices, both explicit and implicit. The ‘meaning’ of something – including the meaning of our own identity and our morality – depends on what is comprehensible and recognized within our social community. Social beings create their identity through shared discourse and language (Shotter, 1993). Communities are multiple; we are members of many communities which each offer us identity, and personal meaning, and within each different elements and skills are salient. Cultural narratives, stories and traditions feed directly into our identity, signaling valued attributes and behaviours, and giving an explanation for our past and present. Crucially, we also recognize that these are shared by those whom we thus define as members of our community. A moral obligation can only have meaning within a social context. Richard Shweder describes taboos and practices found amongst rural Hindus in India which are quite morally meaningless to Americans, because they are associated with beliefs about pollution which are not shared (Shweder et al, 1987). However practices may be widely condemned, but for different reasons – believing that rape is wrong because it defiles the victim’s purity, is very different from seeing it as wrong because treats her as an object rather than a person. |
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+the term DV excludes LGBT victims- California empirically proves |
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+Fountain 2: |
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+Kim Fountain et al PH.D, Deputy Director New York City Anti-Violence Project, "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Domestic violence in the united states in 2008" The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs www.avp.org/documents/2008NCAVPLGBTQDVReportFINAL.pdf FD |
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+―Intimate Partner Violence‖ and ―Domestic Violence‖ - Distinctions Between the Terms Use of the term “domestic violence” to describe violence in LGBTQ intimate relationships has been disfavored by some feminist researchers. They contend that the language of “domesticity” reflects the patriarchy and hetero-normative tendencies of the law from which it springs, obscuring the dimensions of gender and power at play. These tendencies have various expressions in state law, but even those with provisions around LGBTQ intimate partnerships tend exhibit some form of sanctioned discrimination in either text or practice. For example, in order to access a legal remedy under in California‟s Domestic Violence Protection Act (“DVPA”), one must fall into one of the Act‟s categories of “protected persons,” as well as demonstrate, to the Court‟s satisfaction, “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” Categories of “protected persons” under the Act include being the Spouse, Cohabitant, Co-parent, Child, or Blood relative to the alleged perpetrator, or sharing a Dating or Engagement Relationship with the alleged perpetrator. Thus, there is no conduct which alone is sufficient to satisfy the extension of domestic civil protection orders; whatever proofs the alleged victim provides of a past act (or acts) of abuse by the alleged perpetrator, no protection order will be granted without establishing also that the relationship between the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator is one which the Act anticipated in crafting the law. |
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+That turns case because LGBTQ intimate partnerships are excluded from the law, so they aren’t protected, increasing discriminatory abuse. |
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+the term “domestic” justifies continued violence against the victim because it makes people think it is a private matter that is not our business |
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+ Rivera: |
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+Jenny Rivera Professor of Law at the City University of New York Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movement,”, 1995. FD |
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+Violence against women by intimate partners is commonly referred to as “domestic violence.” In previous articles, I have voiced my opposition to the use of the word “domestic” as a qualifier for this category of violence because it characterizes violence against women by current and former spouces and lovers as sufficiently distinct from all other forms of violence so as to justify wholly different, sometimes, inadequate, sanctionings of such violence. See Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. Third World L.J.231, 232 n.5 (1994) hereinafter domestic Violene against Latinas; Jenny Rivera, Puerto Rico’s Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law and the United States Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Limitations of Legislative Responses, 5 Colum. J. Gender and L. 78, 79 n.8 (1995) hereinafter Puerto Rico’s Domestic Violence Law. Undeniably, violence against women by these categories of perpretrators is different from other violence crimes commited by strangers or nonintimate acquantances and relatives. However, the use of “domestic” as a qualifying term does more than simply categorize based on the status of the abuser. This terminology has, in effect, “domesticized” the very act of violence and facilitated the insulation of this violence from public scrutiny and criminalized. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 24 CONN. L. Rev. 973, 977 (1991) (“thus, in the so-called private sphere of “domestic” and family life, which is purportedly immune from law, there is always the selective application of law. Signifincantly, the selective application of law invokes ‘privacy’ a a rationalte for immunity in order to protect male domination.”) |
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+This empirically causes us to ignore “domestic violence” and greater harms |
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+Angela Battery explains: |
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+Angela j. hattery “intimate partner violenc” |
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+On april 16, 2007 the worst school shooting in the history of the united states – to date – took place when a gunman shot thirty-two members of the Virginia tech university campus community before turning the gun on himself and becoming the third third “victim”. Early speculation about the motive focused on a possible domestic dispute. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this situation is the fact that many accounts of the morning of april 16, 2007, indicate that Virginia Tech’s the campus police did not immediately recognize the risk that the shooter presented to the entire Virginia tech campus because the first homicide committed that morning was believed to be a “domestic violence” homicide. Virginia tech president Charles steger said authorities believed that the shooting at the dorm was a “domestic dispute” and mistakenly thought the gunman had fled the campus. We they had no reason to suspect any other incident was going to occur he said. The events surrounding the Virginia tech shooting are troubling for many reasons, first and foremost because the decision by the Virginia tech president implies that “domestic violence” homicide is nothing to take too seriously, and certainly it does not constitute a threat to public safety in the larger community. And yet in many cases of domestic violence homicide, other victims are maimed and or murdered. Even more troubling is the fact that in examining other school shootings, a clear and disturbing pattern emerges. Beginning with the texas tower shootings at the university of texas, Austin, in 1966, many school shootings either began with or involved domestic violence homicide. In the texas tower shootings, the shooter, Charles Whitman, murdered his wife and his mother the night before the terrible rampage in Austin. Luke woodham, the school shooter in pearl, missipppiip, also began his rampge by shooting his girlfriend and mother. And, of course, the most recent tragedy at Virginia tech as believed to begin with a domestic violence homicide. In all of these cases, had law enforcement and meergecny responders taken the initla domestic violence homicide as a matter obf public safety, perhaps the greater targedies would have been avoided. |