Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[44]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[84]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[44]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2017-03-10 02:15:21.633
	1	+2017-03-10 02:15:21.0

Caselist.CitesClass[84]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,11 @@
	1	+Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the resolution as a state of affairs- i.e. that the government has an obligation to guarantee the right in the abstract.
	2	+
	3	+Violation:
	4	+
	5	+Vote Neg:
	6	+1. limits
	7	+2. textuality
	8	+King 03 King, Peter. "Housing as a Freedom Right." Housing Studies 18.5 (2003): 661-72. Web.
	9	+Before proceeding any further there is a need to make a terminological distinction, and in so doing, separate out statutory and philosophical notions of rights. This paper is more properly discussing the ‘right to housing’. This is a moral right that may or may not exist. It is a normative condition that relates to the legitimate interests that individuals have. This is to be distinguished from ‘housing rights’, which relate to conditions granted by statute. The notion of housing rights is, of course, quite commonly referred to. Indeed, there are many texts that aim to explain what rights individuals have to housing and associated benefits, usually produced by professional and lobbying bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Housing and Shelter. Whilst these are obviously useful, they are concerned with what could be called ‘statutory rights’. They seek to elucidate what an individual might be entitled to in law, with the specific aim of acting as guides for practitioners. However, what this practice-based literature does not do is discuss how rights to housing are grounded. These texts cannot tell us why rights themselves are important. This work has already been assumed to have been done, in the sense that it was deemed necessary to enact statutes. Nor can this statutory notion tell us whether rights are, of themselves, a sufficient condition. More practically, they are also unable to inform us of what grounds there might be to extend or to reduce statutory rights, except in the narrow sense of whether particular statutes are effective. Discussions on statutory rights tend to be question-begging, in that they take for granted that rights exist, and that therefore action is necessary by the state to institutionalise them and then to act upon them. But what we need to know is why rights exist and thus why it is that governments have felt the need to legislate for them. This initially necessitates an abstract discussion, which defines rights and how they might be categorised.
	10	+
	11	+Voters: same as t entitlements

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2017-03-10 02:15:24.269

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Forrest Hebron

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Clear Brook DW

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+44

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+4

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+MA - T - Affairs

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+TFA