Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[32]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[61]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[32]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-18 16:55:55.863
	1	+2016-12-18 16:55:55.0

Caselist.CitesClass[61]

Cites

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	1	+The standard is consistency with universal freedom.
	2	+First, an agent’s will acts on a law that it gives to itself. If pleasure were a law to you, then you would straightaway do the pleasurable act, but since you’re autonomous, you can reason about taking the action. Thus a condition of action is that the will is self-determined. KORSGAARD:
	3	+“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard
	4	+“Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: : to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. Yo regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123)
	5	+And, a rational will must set ends within a system of reciprocal constraints. Anything else justifies that someone could impede your ability to achieve your end in the first place, which also means reason constrains end-based frameworks. SIYAR:
	6	+Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999 LW-DD
	7	+“Recall that insofar as I represent a rationally determined end, I represent it having rational and hence objective worth. That is—as noted above—I represent my end as to be done just in virtue of the perfectly general rational grounds that I take to be decisive for its adoption. I will now argue that I must also represent my objectively worthy end as recognizable as such by all other subjects—this is just what my representation of communicability consists in. Now, when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of actions, precluding other actions, etc. Thus, my ends and function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can or must do (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that others subjects can also recognize my end it as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, in representing an end, I in effect demand recognition for it from others subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that if I am committed to some end, e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, I cannot be indifferent to the attitudes and actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am in fact committed to realizing my end, i.e. if I represent an end at all, I must demand that the worth of my end, its status as to be done, be recognized by others. For instance, my ice cream eating policy entails the demand that where practically possible, others not hinder my actions in its service. Further, at least in principle, the actions and attitudes of any other subject could have some bearing on my pursuit of my end. Hence, my demand for recognition must be fully general: it must be directed to rational beings per se. In representing an end, I must demand that this end in effect function as a law for all rational beings. I must demand, in other words, that all other subjects recognize and represent my end as constraining their actions just as I represent it as constraining my actions.” (80-81)
	8	+
	9	+Second, action theory (analytic)
	10	+
	11	+Third, freedom is key to all frameworks (analytic)
	12	+
	13	+Impact Calc: This is means based.
	14	+
	15	+Contention:
	16	+Freedom implies an innate right to determine the course of your actions. In the state of nature, might rather than right governs these judgments. Absent of a public authority, rights violations are inevitable. VARDEN:
	17	+“A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 // LM-DD
	18	+“The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right with this claim: however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individuals human beings... can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6 There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might (‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private prop- erty, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is representative in this way – by being “united a priori ” or by being an “omnilateral” will (6: 263) – it can regulates on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.” (46-47)
	19	+And, according to Cornell Law, the Brandenburg v. Ohio U.S. Supreme Court decision maintains that seditious speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it does not indicate an “imminent” threat.
	20	+https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 But, seditious speech is never compatible with an omnilateral will and must be restricted. The intent requires the right to destroy the state, which justifies the annihilation of all rights. VARDEN 2:
	21	+“A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 // LM-DD
	22	+“To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does considers seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).” (52)

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-18 16:55:59.601

Judge

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	1	+Sullivan, Graham

Opponent

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	1	+Lake Highland MK

ParentRound

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	1	+32

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

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	1	+JF - Kant NC

Tournament

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	1	+Strake RR