Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[31]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[57]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[31]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-12-04 04:57:20.813
	1	+2016-12-04 04:57:20.0

Caselist.CitesClass[57]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,28 @@
	1	+The standard is consistency with universal freedom.
	2	+
	3	+First, an agent’s will acts on a law that it gives to itself. If pleasure were a law to you, then you would straightaway do the pleasurable act, but since you’re autonomous, you can reason about taking the action. Thus a condition of action is that the will is self-determined. KORSGAARD:
	4	+“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard LW-DD
	5	+“Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: : to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123)
	6	+
	7	+And, a rational will must set ends within a system of reciprocal constraints. Anything else justifies that someone could impede your ability to achieve your end in the first place, which also means reason constrains end-based frameworks. SIYAR:
	8	+Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999 LW-DD
	9	+“Recall that insofar as I represent a rationally determined end, I represent it having rational and hence objective worth. That is—as noted above—I represent my end as to be done just in virtue of the perfectly general rational grounds that I take to be decisive for its adoption. I will now argue that I must also represent my objectively worthy end as recognizable as such by all other subjects—this is just what my representation of communicability consists in. Now, when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of actions, precluding other actions, etc. Thus, my ends and function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can or must do (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that others subjects can also recognize my end it as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, in representing an end, I in effect demand recognition for it from others subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that if I am committed to some end, e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, I cannot be indifferent to the attitudes and actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am in fact committed to realizing my end, i.e. if I represent an end at all, I must demand that the worth of my end, its status as to be done, be recognized by others. For instance, my ice cream eating policy entails the demand that where practically possible, others not hinder my actions in its service. Further, at least in principle, the actions and attitudes of any other subject could have some bearing on my pursuit of my end. Hence, my demand for recognition must be fully general: it must be directed to rational beings per se. In representing an end, I must demand that this end in effect function as a law for all rational beings. I must demand, in other words, that all other subjects recognize and represent my end as constraining their actions just as I represent it as constraining my actions.” (80-81)
	10	+
	11	+Second, analytics
	12	+And, and a violation of freedom can’t be true since its a contradiction. Engstrom
	13	+Stephen Engstrom (PhD, Professor of Ethics at University of Pittsburg). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”. Pg. 19-20 RC
	14	+“Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. 19In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to shares the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.”
	15	+
	16	+Third, analytics.
	17	+
	18	+Impact Calc: analytics
	19	+
	20	+Freedom requires an omnilateral will to resolve inherent rights disputes. RIPSTEIN:
	21	+“Kant on Law and Justice” by Arthur Ripstein
	22	+“Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think that you have performed an act establishing a right, you are entitled to stand by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your claim might be. The solution to disputes about rights is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes can be resolved in a way that is consistent with rightful honor if the parties to it are subject to the authority of an impartial judge, and an enforcer who can carry out the decision. The state is a generalized version of this structure. It is a common authority, charged with making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it.” (13)
	23	+
	24	+And, law enforcement is an extension of an omnilateral will acting on the intent to serve the public interest. RIPSTEIN 2:
	25	+“Force and Freedom Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy” Arthur Ripstein Harvard University Press 2009
	26	+“Kant’s solution to these difficulties is not to find some other principle of private ordering, because no principle of private ordering can do the job. Instead, he works through the implications of the idea that “the best constitution is that in which power belongs not to humans beings but to the laws.”11 His basic strategy is to show that a rightful condition can give authority to laws rather than human beings, so that the actions of particular human beings in making, enforcing, and applying laws can be exercises of public rather than private power, and so are instances of an omnilateral will. Institutions can do so because they incorporate a distinction between the offices they create and the officials carrying them out.” (191)
	27	+
	28	+That negates, analytics

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-12-04 04:57:23.230

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Drew Burd

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Southlake Carroll RP

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+31

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Triples

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+ND - NC - Kant

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+UT