Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[52]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[53]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[52]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-03 04:23:10.810
	1	+2016-12-03 04:23:10.0

Caselist.CitesClass[53]

Cites

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	1	+Limiting QI triggers an increase in indemnification- governments need people entering service
	2	+Fallon 11 Fallon, Richard H. Jr. "Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity" Ralph S. Tyler Jr, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Fordham Law Review. 2011. http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/3
	3	+The difficulty in answering this question arises because it is impossible, as a practical matter, to imagine a world without official immunity in which nothing else changes. Even critics of current immunity doctrine so recognize. When they contemplate a world in which some or all officials lack immunity, they anticipate two changes, both of which they understandably regard as desirable. First, victims of constitutional rights violations who now go uncompensated would receive compensation.36 Second, threats of individual liability would deter a number of constitutional violations that otherwise would have occurred.37 I once imagined a third change that I also thought normatively attractive: the abolition of official immunity would effectively force governments to indemnify their officials.38 Otherwise, I reasoned, too many people would be deterred from entering government service. If so, a de facto regime of strict governmental liability for injuries caused by officials’ constitutional violations would not only ensure compensation to victims, but also create powerful incentives for the government to take greater care to train and supervise its employees.39
	4	+Police don’t pay legal fees, are unaware of complains and potential liability doesn’t alter actions.
	5	+De Stefan 16 Lindsey de Stefan, JD Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, “No Man is Above the Law and No Man is Below It: How Qualified Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct,” Seton Hall Law Student Scholarship, July 26, 2016 (2017 Academic Year)
	6	+The Court specifically fears that financial liability, in the form of paying compensatory damages to victims whose constitutional rights an officer has violated, will be a vehicle of overdeterrence.97 But the widespread practice of indemnification means that individual officers are almost never financially responsible for civil judgments against them, practically eliminating any fiscal motivation for avoiding harmful conduct.98 In fact, in many instances, even the police department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial consequences because police litigation costs and damages awards are often paid from a city or insurer’s general budget.99 The police department is not financially penalized, and thus has no incentive to discipline the officer or attempt to prevent him from repeating the unconstitutional behavior in the future. And because law en- forcement officials are often unaware of the allegations set forth in lawsuits filed against them or their employees, officers’ conduct often goes uninvestigated and undisciplined, and allegations of unconstitutional conduct do not affect performance reviews or opportunities for promotion. 100 Finally, although many law enforcement officers claim that the threat of incurring liability deters them from misconduct, studies contrarily indicate that potential liability does not actually alter most officers’ on-the-job actions.101
	7	+
	8	+Poor communities have to pay for indemnification, turns the case
	9	+Phillip 15 Abby Phillip, The Washington Post “Why the poor often pay for police misconduct with their pocketbooks.” 2015
	10	+There is a bitter irony to the situation, but it’s not unusual that the very people who are most beset by police violence are the ones who wind up paying for it with their pocketbooks. When victims or their families are paid out by cities and municipalities in excessive-force cases that are settled or tried, taxpayers pay every time, highlighting the direct relationship between the social and financial costs of police violence. In Chicago: $84 million in one year. Los Angeles: $54 million. Philadelphia: $40 million in cases brought since 2009. In Inkster, the sum is small and deals with just one case. But for its residents, the reality will be unavoidable: The tax will amount to a $178.67 on a home valued at about $55,400, the Free Press estimates. “The price of this is enormous, and it proba bly is hardest on those who can least afford it and whose communities are most egregiously beset with the misconduct problems,” noted Andy Shaw, president and CEO of the Better Government Association, which has studied the high financial and social costs of police misconduct in Chicago. In Chicago, police-related settlements over the last decade cost the city more than $500 million according to a study published by the group last year.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-03 04:23:11.359

Judge

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	1	+Kim Hsun

Opponent

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	1	+Stony Point FB

ParentRound

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	1	+29

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

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	1	+ND - DA - Indemnification

Tournament

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	1	+UT