Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[25]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[25]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-11-29 17:18:31.367
	1	+2016-11-29 17:18:31.0

Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,128 @@
	1	+Obviously I can read framework on other topics so the interp will be slightly different, but the idea is that you should prob be topical.
	2	+Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the prohibiting the production of nuclear power.
	3	+Prohibition implies legal implementation: Prohibit is defined
	4	+as:http://www.dictionary.com/browse/prohibit
	5	+“to forbid (an action, activity, etc.) by authority or law”
	6	+Violation: You just defend “misfitting”, not the resolution.
	7	+Prefer:
	8	+1. Topical version of the aff
	9	+2. Limits
	10	+Only limited topics protect participants from overload which materially
	11	+affects our lives outside of round.
	12	+Harris 13
	13	+Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic
	14	+Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums.
	15	+http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655
	16	+The limits debate is an argument that has real
	17	+AND
	18	+I feel their impact in my everyday existence.
	19	+Limits turn solvency. Research shows that research overload leads to
	20	+superficial education, meaning we won’t learn about the aff or anything
	21	+else.
	22	+Chokshi 10 Niraj Chokshi is a former staff editor at TheAtlantic.com, where he wrote about technology. He is currently
	23	+freelancing How Do We Stop the Internet From Making Us Stupid? JUN 8 2010
	24	+http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/how-do-we-stop-the-internet-from-making-us-stupid/57796/
	25	+When it comes to focus, turning on the spotlight
	26	+AND
	27	+how do we fight back? Carr offers some advice:
	28	+3. Agnostic Constraints
	29	+In the political realm, a stable point is needed to begin discussion.
	30	+Mouffe 1 (Chantal Mouffe, “The Democratic Paradox,” pgs. 19-20; 2000)
	31	+Once pluralism is recognized as the defining feature of modern democracy, we can ask what is the best way to approach the scope and nature of a pluralist democratic politics. My contention is that it isonly
	32	+in the context of a perspective according to which 'difference' is construed as the condition of
	33	+possibility of being that a radical democratic project informed by pluralism can be adequately formulated. Indeed, I
	34	+submit that all forms of pluralism that depend on a logic of the social that implies the idea of 'being as presence, and sees 'objectivity' as belonging to the 'things themselves', necessarily lead to the reduction of plurality and to its
	35	+ultimate negation. This is indeed the case with the main forms of liberal pluralism, which generally start by stressing what they call 'the fact of pluralism', and then go on to find procedures to deal with differences whose objective
	36	+is actually to make those differences irrelevant and to relegate pluralism to the sphere of the private. Envisaged from an anti-essentialist theoretical perspective, on the contrary, pluralism is not merely
	37	+a fact, something that we must bear grudgingly or try to reduce, but an axiological principle. It is taken to be constitutive at the conceptual level of the very nature of modern
	38	+democracy and considered as something that we should celebrate and enhance. This is why the type of pluralism that I am advocating gives a positive
	39	+status to differences and questions the objective of unanimity and homogeneity, which
	40	+is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion. However, such a view does not allow a total pluralism and it is important
	41	+to recognize the limits to pluralism which are required by a democratic politics that aims at challenging a wide range of
	42	+relations of subordination. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the position I am defending here from the type of extreme pluralism that emphasizes heterogeneity and incommensurability and according to which pluralism
	43	+— understood as valorization of all differences — should have no limits. I consider that, despite its claim to be more democratic, such a no limits perspective
	44	+prevents us from recognizing how certain differences are constructed as relations of subordination and should
	45	+therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics. There is only a multiplicity of identities without any common denominator, and it is impossible to distinguish between
	46	+differences that exist but should not exist and differences that do not exist but should exist.
	47	+The resolution is the best starting point because it an accepted dividing point where
	48	+debaters base their positions on dividing the issue presented in the resolution. Meaning
	49	+there is an aff and a neg definitionally to partake in defending sides of the discussion
	50	+around the resolution as the stable point.
	51	+The affirmative failure to be topical means they are justifying the
	52	+stasis point unilaterally—this re-entrenches violence the affirmative
	53	+claims to solve. Also destroys any productive discussion.
	54	+Mouffe 2 (Chantal Mouffe, “The Democratic Paradox,” pgs. 21-22; 2000)
	55	+When we envisage democratic politics from such an anti-essentialist perspective, we can begin to understand that, for democracy to exist, no social agent should be able to claim any mastery of the foundation of society. This
	56	+signifies that the relation between social agents becomes more democratic only as far as
	57	+they accept the particularity and the limitation of their claims; that is, only in so far as they recognize their mutual relation as one from which
	58	+power is ineradicable. The democratic society cannot be conceived any more as a society that would have realized the dream of a perfect harmony in social relations. Its democratic character can only be given by the fact that
	59	+no limited social actor can attribute to herself or himself the representation of
	60	+the totality. The main question of democratic politics becomes then not how to eliminate power, but how to constitute forms of power which are compatible with democratic values. To
	61	+acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, while renouncing the illusion that we could
	62	+free ourselves completely from power — this is what is specific to the project that we have called 'radical and plural
	63	+democracy'. Such a project recognizes that the specificity of modern pluralist democracy — even a well-ordered one — does not
	64	+reside in the absence of domination and of violence but in the establishment of a set of institutions
	65	+through which they it can be limited and contested. To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and to aim
	66	+at a universal rational consensus — this is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can leads to violence being unrecognized and
	67	+hidden behind appeals to 'rationality', as is often the case in liberal thinking which disguises the necessary frontiers and forms of exclusion behind
	68	+pretences of 'neutrality'
	69	+Engagement is an independent voter which is pre-requisite to K
	70	+impacts- if debaters can’t even participate in the round without it,
	71	+then we cannot further any critical discussion. Mouffe 3
	72	+Mouffe 4 (Chantal Mouffe, “The Democratic Paradox,” pgs. 85; 2000)
	73	+Another point of convergence between the two versions of deliberative democracy is their common insistence on the possibility of
	74	+groundsing authority and legitimacy on some forms of public reasoning and their shared belief in a form of rationality
	75	+which is not merely instrumental but has a normative dimension: the 'reasonable' for Rawls. 'communicative rationality' for Haber- mas. In both cases a strong
	76	+separation is established between 'mere agreement' and 'rational
	77	+consensus'. and the proper field of politics is identified with the exchange of arguments among reasonable persons guided by the principle of impartiality.
	78	+Both Habermas and Rawls believe that we can find in the institutions of liberal democracy the idealized content of practi- cal rationality. Where they diverge is in their
	79	+elucidation of the form of practical reason embodied in democratic institutions. Rawls emphasizes the role of principles of justice reached through the device of the 'original
	80	+position' that forces the participants to leave aside all their panicularities and interests. His conception of 'justice as fairness' - which states the priority of basic liberal principles
	81	+- jointly with the 'constitutional essentials' provides the framework for the exercise of 'free public reason'. As far as Habermas is concerned. he defends what he claims to be a
	82	+strictly proceduralist approach in which no limits are put on the scope and content of the deliberation. It is the procedural constraints of the ideal speech situation that will
	83	+eliminate the positions which cannot be agreed to by the participants in the moral 'discourse'. As recalled by Benhabib, the features of such a discourse are the following:
	84	+(I) participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and
	85	+symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, and to question, to
	86	+interrogate, and to open debate; (2) all have the right to question the assigned topics of the conversation; and (3) all have the right to initiate reflexive
	87	+arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied and
	88	+carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, or the identity of the panicipanrs, as long as any excluded person or group can justifiably
	89	+show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question.'
	90	+For this perspective the basis of legitimacy of democratic institutions derives from the fact that the
	91	+instances which claim obligatory power do so on the presumption that their
	92	+decisions represent an impartial standpoint which is equally in the interests of all. Cohen, after stating that
	93	+democratic legitimacy arises from collective decisions among equal
	94	+members, declares: 'According to a tklibmztivt conception, a decision is collective just in case it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choices that
	95	+establish conditions of flu public reasoning among equals who are governed by the Jedsions.'IO
	96	+In such a view it is not enough for a democratic procedure to take account of the interests of all
	97	+and to reach a compromise that will establish a modus vivendi. The aim is to generate
	98	+'communicative power' and this requires establishing the conditions for a
	99	+freely given assent of all concerned, hence the importance of finding procedures that would guarantee moral impartiality.
	100	+Only then can one be sure that the consensus that is obtained is a rational
	101	+one and not a mere agreement. This is why the accent is put on the nature of the deliberative pro- cedure and on the types of reasons
	102	+that are deemed acceptable for compctent participants. Benhabib puts it in the following way:
	103	+4. Fairness
	104	+Violations of competitive equity prevent effective dialogue and
	105	+participation.
	106	+Galloway 7 Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and
	107	+Debate, Vol. 28, 2007
	108	+Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a
	109	+relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their
	110	+position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness
	111	+requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous,
	112	+taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The
	113	+negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and
	114	+critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side
	115	+sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share,
	116	+competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other
	117	+involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood
	118	+of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a
	119	+fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes
	120	+the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage,
	121	+fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of
	122	+preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude
	123	+particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully
	124	+participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power
	125	+(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
	126	+
	127	+Drop the debater
	128	+Competing Interps

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-11-29 17:18:32.888

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Preetham

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Bronx ZP

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+25

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+6

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1 - Framework

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Valley