Changes for page Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

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Summary

Details

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1 -Here's some interps I might read
2 -
3 -1. Spec status of CP in NC itself
4 -2. Prioritize K vs T in NC itself
5 -3. NIBs Bad
6 -4. Conditional PICs bad
7 -5. PICs Bad (in spec context usually)
8 -6. Must have advocacy text
9 -7. Disclosure theory
10 -8. the negative must have one stable advocacy in which they outline all conpro speech restrictions and defend those restrictions unconditionally
11 -9. for any DA the neg reads about a type of conpro speech, they must disclose a cite indicating this is indeed conpro speech before the TOC
12 -10. the negative cannot break new PICs at TOC- they need to be on the wiki before hand
13 -11. the negative must disclose round reports including all past 2nrs on their wiki
14 -12. The aff burden is to prove that speech has no intrinsic meaning and the negative burden is to prove that speech has intrinsic meaning.
15 -Obviously the interps will be more nuanced than this, but this is the general idea.
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1 -Interp Greenhill R1:
2 -Interpretation: The negative cannot read multiple conditional advocacies and defend the status quo as a third option.
3 -Interps Greenhill Doubles:
4 -Interpretation: Debaters can only advocate for drop the argument on fairness and education voters.
5 -Interpretation: Debaters cannot read interps with abuse linking to a lack of specification without checking in CX.
6 -Interp UT R4
7 -Interpretation: The negative cannot read a counter-plan that defends abolishing qualified immunity.
8 -Interp Strake RR R4-
9 -Interpretation: If the negative reads a conditional kritik alternative, they must clarify in a delineated text in the 1N what the other possible world they defend is.
10 -Interp UH R5
11 -Interpretation – If the aff clarifies this advocacy in the form of a text in the 1AC then the negative must have an explicit text in the 1NC clarifying their advocacy.
12 -Interp HW Octas
13 -Interpretation: If the negative reads a counterplan that fiats the supreme court doing the aff, they must provide a test case.
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1 +Kandi King RR R2 1AC
2 +Framing
3 +ROB
4 +The role of the ballot is to compare the simulated consequences of the affirmative policy vs the negative to best combat oppression.
5 +Debate should deal with real world consequences of oppression, which comes first.
6 +Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,
7 +Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definitiocan with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, there is a conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to we must reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the oppressed worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
8 +Use particularism- root cause claims and focus on overarching structures ignore application to material injustice.
9 +Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 Texas AandM University “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016,
10 +The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ Pragmatism only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ If injustice is an illness, then the pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation.
11 +The aff deploys the state to learn scenario planning- even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills
12 +Barma et al 16 May 2016, Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19,
13 +What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.
14 +Institutions are inevitable and learning to pragmatically engage them best facilitates change
15 +Themba-Nixon 2K – Makani Themba-Nixon, “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing,” Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000. Vol. 3, Iss. 2; pg. 12
16 +In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.
17 +Advantage
18 +Plan
19 +The alt right is energized in the status quo—limits on free speech are just being used to sustain white supremacy, meaning disads are non-unique and the case outweighs.
20 +Harkinson 12/6 (Josh, reporter @ mother jones, “The Push to Enlist "Alt-Right" Recruits on College Campuses,” December 6, 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/richard-spencer-alt-right-college-activism/)
21 +How much support is there for the loose-knit coalition of white nationalists and other far-right extremists known as the "alt-right"? Despite a spike in media coverage for the movement in the wake of Donald Trump's victory, a recent conference hosted by white nationalist Richard Spencer, who coined the term "alt-right," drew only about 275 attendees in Washington, DC. And after a video from the event went viral, showing audience members giving Nazi salutes to Spencer's cry of "hail Trump," the movement faced a fierce backlash. Although Trump named alt-right hero Stephen Bannon as his chief White House strategist, the president-elect went on to disavow the alt-right—in general terms, at least—in an interview with the New York Times. The movement gained momentum online in 2016 but is no longer just about social media, says Spencer; he sees a need to prove that the alt-right can attract supporters in the real world. And he says the best place to do that is on college campuses, starting with a speech he plans to deliver on Tuesday on the campus of Texas AandM University. "People in college are at this point in their lives where they are actually open to alternative perspectives, for better and for worse," Spencer says. "I think you do need to get them while they are young. I think rewiring the neurons of someone over 50 is effectively impossible." Recruiting on college campuses has long been a goal for "academic racists" such as Jared Taylor and Peter Brimelow, a white nationalist whom Spencer helped bring to Duke University for an event in 2007, when Spencer was a student there. In May, Spencer and other white nationalists set up a "safe space" on the University of California-Berkeley's Sproul Plaza to discuss "how race affects people of European heritage."
22 +Thus, I defend the resolution as a general principle- I will defend all constitutionally protected speech should be restricted, what that means is up for debate.
23 +
24 +Subpoint A is Speech Code Failure
25 +Attempts to restrict free speech cause more problems and cannot work. 6 independent reasons-
26 +1) The idea that the authority figures become the arbiter of acceptable speech causes a crack down on dissent and kills minority views from even being heard in the first place.
27 +Fisher 17 (Anthony L. Fisher, associate editor at Reason.com, where his beats include criminal justice, civil liberties, free speech, and foreign affairs. He is also a sports and culture columnist at The Week.). “The free speech problem on campus is real. It will ultimately hurt dissidents”. Vox, Jan 2, 2017. http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-speech-pen-america-campus-censorship
28 +It’s already happening. Just ask the Palestinian activists whose boycott campaigns against Israel have has been deemed hate speech by a number of public universities, and whose future political activities could be endangered by an act of Congress. Just this month, the Senate unanimously passed the "Anti-Semitism Awareness Act,” which directs the Department of Education to use the bill's contents as a guideline when adjudicating complaints of anti-Semitism on campus. Among the speech-chilling components of the bill, the political (and subjective) act of judging Israel by an "unfair double standard" could be considered hate speech. To cite other examples of unintended consequences of the crackdown on “offensive” speech, a black student at the University of Michigan was punished for calling another student “white trash,” and conservative law students at Georgetown claimed they were “traumatized” when an email critical of deceased Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia landed in their inboxes. The PEN America report also notes the Foundation for Individual Rights’ analysis of hundreds of campuses with “severely restrictive” speech codes. While a number of these campuses don't aggressively enforce their speech codes, the rules remain on the books; more than a dozen such codes have been overturned in the courts. What’s even more concerning is the increasingly popular notion that some ideas, such as opposition to abortion, should simply be “non-platformed" — that is, deemed unworthy of even being heard on campus. Although the trend of denying contentious speakers such as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice or refugee turned Dutch politician and critic of Islam Ayaan Hirsi Ali public platforms by "disinviting" them from campus is disconcerting, it is not censorship. However, a pro-choice group physically blocking the display of a pro-life group on the campus of the University of Georgia is a form of censorship. As is the case of University of California Santa Barbara professor Mireille Miller-Young, who assaulted a young woman holding a pro-life placard including graphic imagery in a "free speech" zone on campus and stole her sign. When the young woman objected to the theft of her property, Miller-Young replied, "I may be a thief, but you're a terrorist." Like it or not, almost half of all Americans consider themselves pro-life. Banning their perspective from campus won't win over converts, and it’s both immoral and counterproductive to declare completely legitimate political perspectives beyond the pale. Think of antiwar protests or demonstrations in support of integration when both causes were broadly unpopular, and then try to consider a majority on campus declaring their school a "safe space" from such "offensive" expressions of free speech.
29 +2) Empirics flow aff- speech codes on college campuses were policy failures.
30 +Friedersdorf 15, 12-10-2015, "The Lessons of Bygone Free-Speech Fights," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/what-student-activists-can-learn-from-bygone-free-speech-fights/419178/
31 +He was writing after the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin, and Stanford implemented speech codes targeted at racist and sexist speech. These were efforts to respond to increasing diversity on campuses, where a number of students spewed racist and sexist speech that most everyone in this room would condemn. But those speech codes were policy failures. There is no evidence that hate speech or bigotry decreased on any campus that adopted them. At Michigan, the speech code was analyzed by Marcia Pally, a professor of multicultural studies, who found that “black students were accused of racist speech in almost 20 cases. Students were punished only twice under the code’s anti-racist provisions, both times for speech by or on behalf of blacks.”
32 +Outweighs: A. Probability – it’s empirically verified, outweighs analytics since that’s what actually happens in the real world. B. Turns arguments about minority speech restrictions in the status quo—free speech isn’t exclusionary, only restrictions. The ability to for minorities to speak freely is restricted in the squo because anti-racist policies are used against the same groups themselves.
33 +3) The attempt to close political space is always imperfect and engenders resistance – censoring speech doesn’t change minds but redirects them – that threatens institutions and leaves supporters less prepared to defend their gains. Resistance to abortion proves.
34 +Bonnie Honig 93, Nancy Duke Lewis Professor in the departments of Modern Culture and Media (MCM) and Political Science at Brown, 4-15-1993, "Political Theory And The Displacement Of Politics," Cornell University Press.
35 +When a woman’s right to choose was first recognized in 1973 by a very different Court in Roe v. Wade, many citizens celebrated the Court‘s decision as the end of a battle. Those opposed to the decision, however, vowed to roll back Roe v. Wade and. nineteen years later, they have had great success.6 The battle is being refought in the Court and in the state houses. Those who thought it was won in 1973 were surprised by this sequence of events. Many assumed that, once juridically recognized, the right to abort a pregnancy would never be returned to the space of political contest. In the past two decades they went on to fight other battles, doing relatively little to mobilize citizens and communities to protect and stabilize this new right, leaving pro-life organizations relatively free to repoliticize and redefine the issues. In response to the juridical settlement of a woman's right to choose, pro-lifers focused on the fetus and the family and on the relations of obligation and responsibility that tie women to them. Soon abortion became known as baby killing. pro-choice became antifamily, and pregnant single women became icons of danger whose wanton, (literally) unregulated sexuality threatens the safety and the identity of the American family. These identities and identifications are not stable. But in the absence of resistance to them, they could be stabilized. That realization has energized pro-choice citizens into action in the last few years. and the sites of the battle are proliferating. ¶ These observations are by no means meant to imply that it would be better not to entrench a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy—that is a different debate, one that turns on considerations of political strategy and equal justice. My point is that there is a lesson to be learned from the experience of those who misread Roe as the end of a battle and later found themselves ill equipped and unprepared to stabilize and secure their still unstable rights when they were repoliticized and contested by their opponents. In their mistaken belief that the agon had been successfully shut down by law, pro-choice citizens ceded the agon to their opponents and found, years later, that the terms of the contest had shifted against them. Disempowered by their belief that the law had settled the issue without remainder, they failed to engage the concerns of moderate citizens who harbored doubts about the morality of abortion, leaving them and their doubts to be mobilized and radicalized by those who had no doubts about the practice‘s immorality and who were determined to see it outlawed again.7 ¶ To affirm the perpetuity of contest is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest. even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimensions of contestation. It is to see that the always imperfect closure of political space tends to engender remainders and that, if those remainders are not engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize the very closures that deny their existence.
36 +Outweighs: A. Probability – empirical examples of Trump and abortion closing the opposing political space is only counterproductive in real life, B. Scope – this attitude of non-engagement is a paradigmatic issue, so the Aff helps all social justice communities by encouraging more engagement through dialogue everywhere. Even if free speech might not be the perfect solution, it is comparatively better to any other alternative—restrictions just make the problem worse.
37 +Kenan Malik 12 (Indian-born English writer, lecturer and broadcaster, trained in neurobiology and the history of science.). “Why Hate Speech Should Not Be Banned”. Pandemonium, 2012. https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/
38 +And in practice, you cannot reduce or eliminate bigotry simply by banning it. You simply lets the sentiments fester underground. As Milton once put it, to keep out ‘evil doctrine’ by licensing is ‘like the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his Park-gate’. Take Britain. In 1965, Britain prohibited incitement to racial hatred as part of its Race Relations Act. The following decade was probably the most racist in British history. It was the decade of ‘Paki-bashing’, when racist thugs would seek out Asians to beat up. It was a decade of firebombings, stabbings, and murders. In the early 1980s, I was organizing street patrols in East London to protect Asian families from racist attacks. Nor were thugs the only problem. Racism was woven into the fabric of public institutions. The police, immigration officials – all were openly racist. In the twenty years between 1969 and 1989, no fewer than thirty-seven blacks and Asians were killed in police custody – almost one every six months. The same number again died in prisons or in hospital custody. When in 1982, cadets at the national police academy were asked to write essays about immigrants, one wrote, ‘Wogs, nignogs and Pakis come into Britain take up our homes, our jobs and our resources and contribute relatively less to our once glorious country. They are, by nature, unintelligent. And can’t at all be educated sufficiently to live in a civilised society of the Western world’. Another wrote that ‘all blacks are pains and should be ejected from society’. So much for incitement laws helping create a more tolerant society. Today, Britain is a very different place. Racism has not disappeared, nor have racist attacks, but the open, vicious, visceral bigotry that disfigured the Britain when I was growing up has largely ebbed away. It has done so not because of laws banning racial hatred but because of broader social changes and because minorities themselves stood up to the bigotry and fought back.
39 +4) Censoring speech makes it more attractive – psychological studies prove.
40 +Mattimore 15: PATRICK MATTIMORE member of the Society of Professional Journalists and has written commentaries for a variety of publications, daily newspapers, professional magazines, and weeklies. His areas of expertise are law, psychology, and education. He taught high school psychology for many years in the US, and was an adjunct professor of law in the Temple University/Tsinghua University LLM program in Beijing, where he also taught psychology at a private college. “Guest commentary: If you want to make something more desired, make sure it gets censored” December 10, 2015. http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2015/12/10/guest-commentary-if-you-want-to-make-something-more-desired-make-sure-it-gets-censored/
41 +What makes government censorship of the press and resultant self-censorship by media itself even more baffling, is that psychological science suggests that it doesn’t work. If you want to make an idea, or nearly anything, more valuable to someone, make it less available by censoring it. For example, more than 40 years ago, when University of North Carolina students learned that a speech opposing coed dorms on campus would be banned, psychologists reported that the students became more opposed to the idea of coed dorms. Without ever hearing the speech, students became more sympathetic to its argument. Advertisers have long been aware of the power of prohibitory admonitions to promote products, enticing consumers by advising them to not taste the forbidden fruit. Before advertisers for Charmin bathroom tissue exhorted customers: “Please don’t squeeze the Charmin,” it’s likely no one ever had. By ordering stories covered up, the government ensures that those stories will be accorded more importance than they warrant. By limiting individuals’ access to information, that information becomes more attractive. Psychologist Robert Cialdini calls this the principle of scarcity. We want those things that are hard to get even though there is logically no more reason to want a scarce item than a plentiful one.
42 +5) People with the ideologies you want to censor are still out there and use the censorship apparatus against you, so censorship’s net benefit is non-unique.
43 +Bart Cammaerts ‘9, London School of Economics and Political Science, England, 11-2009, "Radical pluralism and free speech in online public spaces," International Journal of Cultural Studies,
44 +However, in a context where a powerful extreme right actively propagates such racist ideologies, both implicitly and explicitly, this becomes another issue altogether. And it is here that the limits of a radical plurality of voices within a democracy expose themselves. It is therefore to some extent understandable that some Belgian politicians from left to right, from federalists to nationalists are calling for more pro-active government intervention regarding online hate speech, preferably at a European level of governance. Of course, given the deeply offensive and repulsive nature of many of the comments being made online and the context in which they were produced, it is difficult to remain neutral here; rational detachment is not an option. Such vitriolic discourses should make any democratic person angry, demanding that something be done about this. The question remains what that something then is. Whilst laws and regulation or even technical solutions might be able to remove some of these discourses from the public space, therefore the ideas and ideology behind these discourses have not disappeared from the political. It might be useful in this regard to briefly recount Butler’s (1997) work on ‘excitable speech’ in which she uses Foucault’s History of Sexuality to argue that forbidding hate-speech all together through (state) censorship above all aids in proliferating these discourses further throughout society. This can also be related to what Mouffe calls the inherently conflictual nature of the political. Butler is not per se against limitations to the freedom of speech, but points to the need to be aware of the difficulties of combating hate speech through legal measures and the practical consequences of this. She refers to difficult questions such as: who defines what is hurtful, offensive, wounding or injurious speech and what is the context in which such language is being used? But whilst there might be an overall consensus that the discourses being discussed in this paper are totally unacceptable and do not belong in a democracy, not even from the perspective of a radical democracy or pluralism, the question of where and how we draw the line as a democracy between what is acceptable within a pluralist perspective and what is not? And how is this then implemented and enforced? Internet filtering and monitoring remain technical and policy options when it comes to combating hate speech on the internet. However, active censorship in a democracy tends to backfires in several ways. In relation to this case study, it could be argued that democracy might lose out in two ways. First, anti-democratic forces are able to construct democratic parties and institutions as ‘undemocratic’ on a continuous basic, claiming that they suppress ‘the true thoughts of the people’, using in effect the formal rules of democracy to destroy democratic culture arguing for a democratic right to be a racist. Second, how to guarantee that once a regime of content control online is in place, it will not be used to silence other voices that at some future moment in time are considered to be undesirable by a majority? And do we really want content on the internet controlled, monitored and filtered on a permanent basis? This is, however, by no means a plea for complacency and/or ignorance, but to carefully think through the implications of intervention to exclude voices from public spaces of communication and interaction all together. Efforts to combat the incitement of hatred through democratic and legal ways should be encouraged, ‘in order to to secure a minimum of civility’ (Rosenfeld, 2001: 63). Exposure in the mainstream media of those that produce such discourses and formal legal complaints by racism watchdogs are important and fairly effective tools for achieving that (except when anonymity is invoked). The embracement of censorship of online content by democratic societies in addition to this, would not only represent crossing the rubicon, but also focuses merely on removing some of the symptoms of racism, not the root causes of it.
45 +Subpoint B is Counter-speech
46 +Free speech, even if it’s not perfect, solves these harms better:
47 +1) Empirics prove it promotes inclusion needed for movements- this also responds to silencing turns since even if those targeted cannot speak up, the community can.
48 +Calleros 95 Calleros, Charles R. “Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun” (Professor of Law, Arizona State University). HeinOnline. Arizona State Law Journal. 1995
49 +However, campus communities that have creatively used this approach can attest to the surprising power of counterspeech. Examples of counterspeech to hateful racist and homophobic speech at Arizona State and Stanford Universities are especially illustrative.61 In an incident that attracted national attention, the campus community at Arizona State University ("A.S.U.") constructively and constitutionally responded to a racist poster displayed on the outside of the speaker's dormitory door in February 1991. Entitled "WORK APPLICATION," it contained a number of ostensibly employment-related questions that advanced hostile and demeaning racial stereotypes of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Carla Washington, one of a group of African- American women who found the poster, used her own speech to persuade a resident of the offending room voluntarily to take the poster down and allow her to photocopy it. After sending a copy of the poster to the campus newspaper along with an opinion letter deploring its racist stereotypes, she demanded action from the director of her residence hall. The director organized an immediate meeting of the dormitory residents to discuss the issues. In this meeting, I explained why the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and the women who found the poster eloquently described their pain and fears. One of the women, Nichet Smith, voiced her fear that all nonminorities on campus shared the hostile stereotypes expressed in the poster. Dozens of residents expressed their support and gave assurances that they did not share the hostile stereotypes, but they conceded that even the most tolerant among them knew little about the cultures of others and would 62 benefit greatly from multicultural education.
50 + The need for multicultural education to combat intercultural ignorance and stereotyping became the theme of a press conference and public rally organized by the student African-American Coalition leader, Rossie Turman, who opted for highly visible counterspeech despite demands from some students and staff to discipline the owner of the offending poster. The result was a series of opinion letters in the campus newspaper discussing the problem of racism, numerous workshops on race relations and free speech, and overwhelming approval in the Faculty Senate of a measure to add a course on American cultural diversity to the undergraduate breadth 63 requirement.
51 + The four women who initially confronted the racist poster were empowered by the meeting at the dormitory residence and later received awards from the local chapter of the NAACP for their activism.64 Rossie Turman was rewarded for his leadership skills two years later by becoming the first African-American elected President of Associated Students of A.S.U.,65 a student body that numbered approximately 40,000 students, only 66 2.3 percent of them African-American. Although Delgado and Yun are quite right that the African-American students should never have been burdened with the need to respond to such hateful speech, Hentoff is correct that the responses just described helped them develop a sense of self-reliance and constructive activism. Moreover, the students' counterspeech inspired a community response that lightened the students' burden and provided them with a sense of community support and empowerment. Indeed, the students received assistance from faculty and administrators, who helped organize meetings, wrote opinion letters, spoke before the Faculty Senate, or joined the students in issuing public statements at the press conference and public rally.67 Perhaps most important, campus administrators wisely refrained from disciplining the owners of the poster, thus directing public attention to the issue of racism and ensuring broad community support in denouncing the racist poster. Many members of the campus and surrounding communities might have leapt to the racist speaker's defense had the state attempted to discipline the speaker and thus had created a First Amendment issue. Instead, they remained united with the offended students because the glare of the public spotlight remained sharply focused on the racist incident without the distraction of cries of state censorship. Although the counterspeech was not aimed primarily at influencing the hearts and minds of the residents of the offending dormitory room, its vigor in fact caught the residents by surprise. 68 It prompted at least three of them to apologize publicly and to display curiosity about a civil rights movement that they were too young to have witnessed first hand. 69 This effective use of education and counterspeech is not an isolated instance at A.S.U., but has been repeated on several occasions, albeit on smaller scales.7°
52 +One year after the counterspeech at A.S.U., Stanford University responded similarly to homophobic speech. In that case, a first-year law student sought to attract disciplinary proceedings and thus gain First Amendment martyrdom by shouting hateful homophobic statements about a dormitory staff member. The dean of students stated that the speaker was not subject to discipline under Stanford's code of conduct but called on the university community to speak out on the issue, triggering an avalanche of counterspeech. Students, staff, faculty, and administrators expressed their opinions in letters to the campus newspaper, in comments on a poster board at the law school, in a published petition signed by 400 members of the law school community disassociating the law school from the speaker's epithets, and in a letter written by several law students reporting the incident to a prospective employer of the offending student.71 The purveyor of hate speech indeed had made a point about the power of speech, just not the one he had intended. He had welcomed disciplinary sanctions as a form of empowerment, but the Stanford community was alert enough to catch his verbal hardball and throw it back with ten times the force. Thus, the argument that counterspeech is preferable to state suppression of offensive speech is stronger and more fully supported by experience than is conceded by Delgado and Yun. In both of the cases described above, the targets of hateful speech were supported by a community united against bigotry. The community avoided splitting into factions because the universities eliminated the issue of censorship by quickly announcing that the hateful speakers were protected from disciplinary retaliation. Indeed, the counterspeech against the bigotry was so powerful in each case that it underscored the need for top administrators to develop standards for, and some limitations on, their participation in such partisan speech. 72 Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out against intolerance when it is isolated as an issue rather than diluted in muddied waters along with concerns of censorship. Just as the nonviolent demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., depended partly for their success on the consciences of the national and international audiences monitoring the fire hoses and attack dogs on their television sets and in the print media,73 the empowerment of the targets of hateful speech rests partly in the hands of members of the campus community who sympathize with them. One can hope that the counterspeech and educational measures used with success at A.S.U. and Stanford stand a good chance of preserving an atmosphere of civility in intellectual inquiry at any campus community in which compassionate, open minds predominate. On the other hand, counterspeech by the targets of hate speech could be less empowering on a campus in which the majority of students, faculty, and staff approve of hostile epithets directed toward members of minority groups. One hopes that such campuses are exceedingly rare; although hostile racial stereotyping among college students in the United States increased during the last decade, those students who harbored significant hostilities (as contrasted with more pervasive but less openly hostile, subconscious racism) still represented a modest fraction of all students.74 Moreover, even in a pervasively hostile atmosphere, counterspeech might still be more effective than broad restrictions on speech.
53 +2) Censorship prevents survival strategies and it requires using injurious speech in its own critique, meaning that the aff is key to personal liberation.
54 +Butler 97 “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997
55 +“Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a moment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning" those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context of legal speech. Paradoxically, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech.
56 +3) Even if you cannot convince the racists, there are people in the middle who can be convinced by free speech.
57 +Malik 12 Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/
58 +Second, in challenging obnoxious sentiments, we are not simply challenging those who spout such views; we are also challenging the potential audience for such views. Dismissing obnoxious or hateful views as not worthy of response may not be the best way of engaging with such an audience. Whether or not an obnoxious claim requires a reply depends, therefore, not simply on the nature of the claim itself, but also on the potential audience for that claim.
59 +4) Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech since it means everyone can be in the open to counter
60 +ACLU Hate Speech On Campus, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
61 +Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech ~-~- not less ~-~- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance. 
62 +Underview
63 +Theory
64 +1. Theory precludes the k
65 +a)
66 +b)
67 +2. Fairness precludes education
68 +a)
69 +b)
70 +3. Interpretation: Neg advocacies must defend the same actor as the aff
71 +a) ground -
72 +b) truth testability-
73 +Kritik
74 +Solutions to oppression need to be grounded in policy rather than abstraction. K’s must be tied to an implementable, political solution to be effective.
75 +Bryant 12: Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, Available Online at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/, Accessed 02-21-2014)
76 +Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri and Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
77 +The res is negative state action, which means the aff limits state power and doesn’t link to critiques of the state.
78 +Dempsey 9 Michelle, Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law, http://www.academia.edu/352923/Sex_Trafficking_and_Criminalization_In_Defense_of_Feminist_Abolitionism
79 +42 The unintended consequences of criminalizing the purchase of sex include the harms that may be suffered disproportionately by men who are already socially disem-powered. Given the negative uses of criminal law throughout history and still today, such as racist law-enforcement policies, there is reason to resist using the criminal law as a tool for positive social change. See generally M ICHAEL T ONRY , M ALIGN N EGLECT —R ACE , C RIME , AND P UNISHMENT IN A MERICA (1995) (discussing the disparate impact crime-control policies can have on disadvantaged communities); Angela J. Davis, Be- nign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System , 94 M ICH . L. R EV . 1660, 1663 (1996)(reviewing T ONRY , supra ) (discussing racial discrimination within the criminal justice system). Since racism is fundamentally inconsistent with feminist commitments to ab-olish all wrongful structural inequalities, feminists should resist any reforms that will tend to exacerbate racism. See D EMPSEY , supra note 9, at 129-35. This risk of unin-tended consequences poses a serious objection to feminist abolitionism. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that feminist-abolitionist reforms like the Swedish model, if adopted in the United States, would not expand the criminal law’s power; it would re-duce it. At present, in most jurisdictions throughout the United States, both sellers and buyers are criminalized. Feminist abolitionist reforms would therefore restrict the power of the criminal law by decriminalizing people who sell sex. Thus, to the extent that current criminal laws are being used in racist and other problematic ways (e.g., by targeting disempowered women of color who sell sex, while allowing relatively power-ful middle-class white men to go free), the proposed reforms would improve the criminal justice system by limiting its scope.
80 +The best statistical evidence empirically shows that we are progressing
81 +Feldscher 13, Karen, (Senior Writer/Project Manager at Harvard School of Public Health), “Progress, but challenges in reducing racial disparities,” Harvard School of Public Health, 9 September 2013. http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/progress-but-challenges-in-reducing-racial-disparities/
82 +September 19, 2013 — Disparities between blacks and whites in the U.S. remain pronounced—and health is no exception. A panel of experts at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) discussed these disparities—what they are, why they persist, and what to do about them—at a September 12, 2013 event titled “Dialogue on Race, Justice, and Public Health.” The event was held in Kresge G-1 and featured panelists Lisa Coleman, Harvard University’s chief diversity officer; David Williams, Florence Sprague Norman and Laura Smart Norman Professor of Public Health in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences; Chandra Jackson, Yerby Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the HSPH Department of Nutrition; and Zinzi Bailey, a fifth-year doctoral student in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Robert Blendon, Richard L. Menschel Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at HSPH, moderated the discussion. Gains, but pains Health care disparities are troubling, Coleman said. One study found that doctors recommended coronary revascularization—bypass surgery that replaces blocked blood vessels with new ones—among white patients with heart disease 50 of the time, but just 23 of the time for blacks. Black women are less likely to be given a bone marrow density test than white women, even when it’s known they’ve had prior fractures. And the black infant mortality rate is 2.3 times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. Each speaker acknowledged that racial minorities have made significant gains over the past half-century, but said there is much more work still to do. They cited statistics providing stark evidence of continuing disparities in health, wealth, education, income, arrest and incarceration rates, foreclosure rates, and poverty. Coleman called the data “disconcerting; in some cases, alarming.” Schools are desegregated, she said, but not integrated; median income is $50,000 per year for whites but $31,000 a year for blacks and $37,000 a year for Hispanics; since the 1960s, the unemployment rate among blacks has been two to two-and-a-half times higher than for whites; and one in three black men can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes. Blendon shared results from surveys that accentuate sharp differences of opinion about how well blacks are faring in the U.S. For instance, in a survey that asked participants if they thought that the lives of black Americans had changed dramatically over the past 50 years, 54 of whites said yes but only 29 of blacks did. Another survey asked whether or not people approved of the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial; 51 of whites approved but only 9 of blacks did. Reducing disparities through research, education Jackson talked about growing up in a segregated neighborhood in Atlanta and attending a school with 99 black students and inadequate resources. She became the first in her family to attend college. Now, through her research, she hopes to expose and reduce racial health disparities. In a recent study in the American Journal of Epidemiology, Jackson and colleagues reported that blacks—particularly black professionals—get less sleep than whites, which can have potentially negative impacts on health. Bailey discussed what’s known as the “school-to-prison pipeline”—a trajectory in which black teens do poorly in school, get held back a grade, drop out, commit a crime, then end up in jail. On the flip side, she said, there are “diversity pipelines” to recruit minority students into higher education. “Often these programs target students who have already avoided the school-to-prison pipeline,” Bailey said, noting that she would like to see higher education institutions connect with black students at earlier ages to steer them toward positive choices.
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1 +TOC R1 AC
2 +1AC
3 +Framework
4 +Reasoning cannot arise from a specific state of affairs, as empirical circumstances are not an accurate grounding for moral truth
5 +Hume Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html#4
6 +All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori. If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
7 +
8 +Implications: a) obligations can only be grounded in properties intrinsic to a state of affairs, meaning that morality can never be based on extrinsic understandings of the world, b) even if we can make predictions, that begs the question of why our reasoning would be valid in the first place. Saying prediction works relies on prediction, meaning that it’s logically fallacious
9 +The solution is appealing to intrinsic properties- things that explain the possibility of binding standard for adjudicating questions.
10 +Boyle and Lavin 10 Matthew and Douglas Lavin. 2010. Goodness and desire. In Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 32-33.
11 +“A certain standard of goodness for a thing follows inevitably from its belonging to a kind characterized by a functionally-organized system of powers: this, we suppose, is the crux of Aristotle’s famous “function argument.” If the objection to this is that it illegitimately infers an “ought” from an “is,” we are not sure that we understand the charge. The sort of “saying what a thing is” that is at issue here is: ascribesing to it a certain form, where a form is something that as such which involves directedness toward certain ends. If the question is supposed to be why the thing at issue ought to pursue those ends, we ask: from what standpoint is this question posed? If the thing in question genuinely is a bearer of such-and-such a form, then it is a pursuer of such-and-such ends, and essentially so. It can no more renounce these ends than it can cease to be itself. “
12 +Implication: restrictions on certain forms of speech depend on whether or not they are distinct by some ethical standard. since extrinsic properties are irrelevant, they have to be intrinsically distinct to negate.
13 +Independently, reject external factors as a metric for action:
14 +1. Affairs are also infinite and incomprehensible to humanity, meaning that using them is incoherent, even if we would predict things.
15 +Bostrom 09, Nick, Professor of Philosophy – Oxford University, “Infinite Ethics." 2009.
16 +“Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.” Bostrom 2 continues: “Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are thus threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.”
17 +2. Empirical circumstances can never make intrinsic claims- that means desire controls our actions, which is empirically contradictory.
18 +Korsgaard“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard
19 +“Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: : to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. Yo regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123)
20 +Thus, the only way we can justify restricting certain forms of speech is if that speech is intrinsically bad.
21 +a) If argument itself is not intrinsic, being able to speak out should be the default response to “bad speech”.
22 +Anderson 6 Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 289)
23 +Probyn's piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: preci, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas.sely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the book's content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas
24 +b) If we only care about intrinsic properties, then accounting for physical injury produced by speech cannot precede or occur independent from accounting for linguistic injury. Policies that censor speech based on their physical injury have misdiagnosed the problem.
25 +Butler 97 “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
26 +"Linguistic survival" implies that a certain kind of surviving takes place in language. Indeed, the discourse on hate speech continually makes such references. To claim that language injures or, to cite the phrase used by Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda, that "words wound" is to combine linguistic and physical vocabularies. The use of a term such as "wound" suggests that language can act in ways that parallel the infliction of physical pain and injury. Charles R. Lawrence III refers to racist speech as a "verbal assault;' underscoring that the effect of racial invective is "like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous':(68) Some forms of racial invective also "produce physical symptoms that temporarily disable the victim. . . :· (68) These formulations suggest that linguistic injury acts like physical injury, but the use of the simile suggests that this is, after all, a comparison of unlike things. Consider, though, that the comparison might just as well imply that the two can be compared only metaphorically. Indeed, it appears that there is no language specific to the problem of linguistic injury, which is, as it were, forced to draw its vocabulary from physical injury. In this sense, it appears that the metaphorical connection between physical and linguistic vulnerability is essential to the description of linguistic vulnerability itself..
27 +Thus, the aff burden is to prove that words have no intrinsic harm and the negative burden is to prove that words have intrinsic harms.
28 +Prefer independently:
29 +1. Phil education- every philosophical theory must question the question of meaning in order to derive a principle of action, otherwise it cannot determine whether or not something ascribes an obligation. My interp focuses the debate on questions of meaning is discourse, which are inherently philosophically productive questions. And, phil discussions under whole res are ultimately filtered by questions of speech’s intrinsic meaning, i.e. Kantianism says that because speech is not intrinsically bad the freedom violation outweighs, so whole res doesn’t nonunique phil education, but rather further justifies my interpretation. Phil education is most constitutive of debate since LD is value centered debate meant to engage in philosophy.
30 +2. Reciprocity- debating the topic as a question of policy action would lead to a terrible imbalance in terms of burdens. Either the aff defends a plan, in which case their offense is too specific to be turned or the negative cherry picks specific instances if bad speech to get NC’s and just outweighs the aff with what are essentially topic-justified floating PICs. The burden resolves this dilemma- if we just debate the topic as a question of intrinsic meaning, we have a 1:1 burden where we just read frameworks that prove the statement true or false.
31 +3. Prefer reasonable aff burdens. The judge should evaluate the burden structure debate with the brightline of a) one analytic warrant for why the burden could possibly prove the resolution true or false, regardless of whether it is won and b) whether or not the negative could get turn ground. If I meet these criteria ignore all negative contestation of the burden.
32 +a) Fairness- it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since allowing the neg to question the burden undermines the value of the AC because I have to restart in the 1AR – that’s bad for literally any standard; there’s less clash, the aff is screwed in the 1ar, etc. It’s especially bad since the 2NR can just dump on the restart and I have no args to leverage from the AC. Strat is key to forming a coherent ballot story.
33 +b) Education- you don’t have to engage and clash with the 1AC. Burden debates aren’t educational since we literally just debate about what we should debate about so it is better to debate under a marginally subpar burden.
34 +c) Empirics verify the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias of 61, meaning that I need constructive flex in defining the resolutional terms.
35 +Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/
36 +Advocacy
37 +I defend the general resolution that in the United States, public colleges and universities ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. The burden reinterprets what it means to affirm that resolution but if you want to specify a reasonable enforcement mechanism, actor, etc. I will. No link to implementation args cause I’ll defend those – they aren’t relevant to affirming/negating the burden.
38 +Contention 1 is Agency
39 +In order to establish ethical meaning, we need a conception of what agency is- that’s a precondition to meaning since without knowing what can create obligations, we don’t know what we have relational obligations to. This destroys the ability to find meaning since meaning is a question of what relationally matters to agents, which requires agency in the first place.
40 +Only agents are intrinsically valuable; concepts that describe the world, i.e. speech or pleasure, only have value relative to agents.
41 +Hill Thomas Hill, Jr. “Self-regarding suicide: A modified Kantian view,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 102-103.
42 +The second argument is roughly this: Most valuable things' have value only because valued sic by human beings. Their value is derivative from the fact that they serve our interests and desires. Even pleasure, which we value for its own sake, has only derivative value, that is, value dependent on the contingent fact that human beings want it. Now if valuers confer derivative value on things by their preferences and choices, those valuers must themselves have value. In fact, they must have value independent of, and superior to, the derivative values which they create. The guiding analogy is how we treat ends. We value certain means because they serve intermediate ends, which in turn we value because they contribute to our ultimate ends, that is, what we value for its own sake. The value of the means and the intermediate means is derivative from the value of the ultimate ends; unless we value the ultimate end, the means and intermediate ends would be worthless to us. So, it seems, the source of derivative value must be valuable for its own sake. Since the ultimate source of the value of our contingent ends, such as health, wealth, and even pleasure, is their being valued by human beings, human beings, as valuers, must be valued for their own sakes.
43 +To say that speech could have meaning that is non-derivative from humans valuing them is just to say that that object has some objective, non-relational value-making property. These properties are only perceptible through intuition, which begs the question of agency.
44 +Hill 2 Thomas Hill, Jr. “Self-regarding suicide: A modified Kantian view,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 102-103.
45 +The intrinsic goodness of something, he thought, was is an objective, nonrelational property of the thing, like its texture or color, but not a property perceivable by sense perception or detectable by scientific instruments. In theory at least, a single tree thriving alone in a universe without sentient beings, and even without God, could be intrinsically valuable. Since, according to Moore, our duty is to maximize intrinsic value, his theory could obviously be used to argue that we have reason not to destroy natural environments independently of how they affect human beings and animals. The survival of a forest might have worth beyond its worth to sentient beings. This approach, like the religious one, may appeal to some but is infested with problems. There are, first, the familiar objections to intuitionism, on which the theory depends. Metaphysical and epistemological doubts about nonnatural, intuited properties are hard to suppress, and many have argued that the theory rests on a misunderstanding of the words good, valuable, and the like.6 Second, even if we try to set aside these objections and think in Moore’s terms, it is far from obvious that everyone would agree that the existence of forests, etc., is intrinsically valuable. The test, says Moore, is determined by what we would say when we imagine a universe with just the thing in question, without any effects or accompaniments, and then we ask, “Would its existence be better than its nonexistence?” Be careful, Moore would remind us, not to construe this ques- tion as, “Would you prefer the existence of that universe to its nonexistence?” The question is, “Would its existence have the objective, nonrelational property, intrinsic goodness?” Now even among those who have no worries about whether this really makes sense, we might well get a diversity of answers. Those prone to destroy natural environments will doubtless give one answer, and nature lovers will likely give another. When an issue is as controversial as the one at hand, intuition is a poor arbiter.
46 +Contention 2 is Language
47 +Any application of words can never be verified because rules are indeterminate, as they require prior knowledge to understand them, which can never be the basis for truth- this proves there is no such a thing as intrinsic interpretation.
48 +Kripke “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982
49 +“Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) are compatible with any such finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding plus ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that plus ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of plus ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, these problems apply throughout language and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will to apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there?
50 +Truth and meaning are just arbitrary construction of humans that become socially normalized, meaning intrinsic meaning in language can never exist on it’s own.
51 +Parrish 04 Rick “Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract” Theory and Event 7:4 2004
52 +Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that "to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words." "For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality," so the "connections between names and objects are not natural." They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." Since "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil," these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts.
53 +Contention 3 is Wrongful Targeting
54 +Violence that befalls or results from speech is all created by social conditions, not the speech itself.
55 +Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellxsow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
56 +Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak End Page 286 about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law.
57 +ROB
58 +The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best meets their burden under a truth testing paradigm. This requires the AFF to prove the resolution true and the NEG to prove the resolution false.
59 +First, cross-apply Boyle and Lavin about binding features. And, truth testing is key to the features.
60 +1. Textuality: To affirm is defined as: “to say that something is true in a confident way” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm and to negate is defined as: “to deny the existence or truth of” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate So, the binding standards ascribed in the actions of affirming and negating assume a truth testing model.
61 +2. Debate intrinsically implies a clash over a proposition, otherwise it ceases to be a debate. This means each competitor attempts to prove their side of the issue to be true. So, the resolution is not an arbitrary statement, but a proposition up for debate under truth testing.
62 +Outweighs:
63 +A. We can always opt out of counter role of the ballots and still say we are participating in debate, but we can never opt out of an intrinsic features of debate and remain consistent with the activity so intrinsic features are most binding.
64 +B. If they say intrinsic features are not most binding, then this justifies infinite rules since we would base them on features that are arbitrary to the activity. So there is no reason to accept their role of the ballot over the AFF’s or another arbitrary starting point.
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1 +JF - 1AC - Intrinsic Properties
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1 +TOC
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1 +Here's some interps I might read
2 +
3 +1. Spec status of CP in NC itself
4 +2. Prioritize K vs T in NC itself
5 +3. NIBs Bad
6 +4. Conditional PICs bad
7 +5. PICs Bad (in spec context usually)
8 +6. Must have advocacy text
9 +7. Disclosure theory
10 +8. the negative must have one stable advocacy in which they outline all conpro speech restrictions and defend those restrictions unconditionally
11 +9. for any DA the neg reads about a type of conpro speech, they must disclose a cite indicating this is indeed conpro speech before the TOC
12 +10. the negative cannot brea k new PICs at TOC- they need to be on the wiki before hand
13 +11. the aff burden is to prove that words have no intrinsic harm and the negative burden is to prove that words have intrinsic harms.
14 +12. The negative cannot read a PIC unless their solvency advocate advocates the exact text of the PIC.
15 +13. Neg counterplans cannot defend getting rid of restrictions on constitutionally protected speech that is currently restricted.
16 +14. The negative must concede to the aff's paradigm choice in terms of how the judge should evaluate the debate.
17 +Obviously the interps will be more nuanced than this, but this is the general idea.
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1 +2017-04-30 02:07:06.0
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1 +78
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1 +Quads
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1 +Strake Jesuit Chen Aff
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1 +1 - Possible Interps List
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1 +Tournament
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1 +Interp Greenhill R1:
2 +Interpretation: The negative cannot read multiple conditional advocacies and defend the status quo as a third option.
3 +1. Strat Skew
4 +2. Reciprocity
5 +Interps Greenhill Doubles:
6 +Interpretation: Debaters can only advocate for drop the argument on fairness and education voters.
7 +1. Condemnation (voter was butler framework specific)
8 +Interpretation: Debaters cannot read interps with abuse linking to a lack of specification without checking in CX.
9 +1. Predictable Limits
10 +Interp UT R4
11 +Interpretation: The negative cannot read a counter-plan that defends abolishing qualified immunity.
12 +1. Truth Testability
13 +2. Ground
14 +Interp Strake RR R4-
15 +Interpretation: If the negative reads a conditional kritik alternative, they must clarify in a delineated text in the 1N what the other possible world they defend is.
16 +1. Stable Ground
17 +Interp UH R5
18 +Interpretation – If the aff clarifies this advocacy in the form of a text in the 1AC then the negative must have an explicit text in the 1NC clarifying their advocacy.
19 +1. Reciprocity
20 +2. Stable Ground
21 +Interp HW Octas
22 +Interpretation: If the negative reads a counterplan that fiats the supreme court doing the aff, they must provide a test case.
23 +1. real world education
24 +2. utopian fiat
25 +Interps Kandi King RR r3
26 +Interpretation: Neg advocacies must defend the same actor as the aff
27 +1.reciprocal ground-
28 +2.truth testability-
29 +Interpretation: Debaters must only defend counterplans as dispositional or unconditional. To clarify you cannot run a condo CP.
30 +1. Strat Skew
31 +Interp TOC R3
32 +Interpretation: If the negative reads T or theory indicting the fact that the affirmative for an omission, the interp must be checked in CX.
33 +1. predictability
34 +2. aff flex
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1 +78
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1 +Strake Jesuit Chen Aff
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1 +1 - Broken Interps List
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1 +Tournament
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1 +1AC
2 +Framework
3 +All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias
4 +Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/
5 +Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61 of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57 for the Neg and 43 for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:
6 +
7 +Also means presumption and permissibility flow aff- I did the better debating if the round is tied. But nothing in the case triggers presumption.
8 +Ought is defined as an obligation according to merriam webster. Prefer reasaonble aff definition otherwise they moot the entire aff with shitty trick definitions.
9 +https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought
10 +To give a full account of my agency is impossible. My body has a history that I cannot recollect, yet nonetheless it grounds who I am. Existence begins with bare vulnerability towards the Other.
11 +Butler:
12 +Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.                                                                    
13 +There are, then, several ways in which the account I may give of myself has the potential to break apart and to become undermined. My efforts to give an account of myself founder in part upon the fact of my exposure to you, an exposure in spoken language and, in a different way, in written address as well see Felman. This is a condition of my narration that I cannot fully thematize within any narrative I might provide, and that does not fully yield to a sequential account. There is a bodily referent here, a condition of me, that I can point to, but I cannot narrate precisely, even though there are no doubt stories about where my body went and what it did and did not do. But there is also a history to my body for which I can have no recollection, and there is as well a part of bodily experience-what is indexed by the word "exposure-that only with difficulty, if at all, can assume narrative form. On the other hand, exposure, like the operation of the norm, constitutes the conditions of my own emergence and knowability, and I cannot be present to a temporality that precedes my own capacity for self-reflection. This means that my narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make me and my story in language possible. And it means that my story always arrives late., reconstructing, even as I produce myself differently in the very act of telling. My account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I have no definitive story. I cannot explain exactly why I have emerged in this way, and my efforts at narrative reconstruction are always undergoing revision. There is that in me and of me for which I can give no account. But does this mean that I am not, in the moral sense, accountable for who I am and for what I do? And if I find that despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot make myself fully accountable to you, is this ethical failure? Or is it a failure that gives rise to a certain ethical disposition in the place of a full and satisfying notion of narrative accountability?
14 +
15 +The precarious exposure of the pre-subject to the other begins with language. After being enculturated into a linguistic scheme, we develop an interpretation of meaning in the world and become aware of our existence in our body. A body without an agent, for example that of an infant or an animal, experiences the world but is not aware of the meaning of the experience. Once inscribed in language, experiencing the spectacle of a body without an agent becomes impossible. Butler 2:
16 +“Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
17 +“Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal way; rather, it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body first becomes possible. To understand this, one must imagine an impossible scene, that of a body that has not yet been given social definition, a body that is, strictly speaking, not accessible to us, that nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion of an address, a call, an interpellation that does not "discover" this body, but constitutes it fundamentally. We may think that to be addressed one must first be recognized,
18 +but here the· Althusserian reversal of Hegel seems appropriate: the address constitutes a being within the possible circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection.” (Pg. 5)
19 +
20 +Consistency with the precariousness of linguistic ontology is categorically binding. The subject does not have jurisdiction over its own opacity so it cannot ignore obligations that stem from linguistic precariousness because they ground the subject in ways that cannot be repossessed in giving an account of one’s self. Butler 3:
21 +Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
22 +“In recent years, the critique of poststructuralism, itself loquacious, has held that the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding undermines the possibility of respon- sibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself. Critics have argued that the various critical reconsiderations of the subject, including those that do away with the theory of the subject altogether, cannot provide the basis for an account of responsibil- ity, that if we are, as it were, divided, ungrounded, or incoherent from the start, it will be impossible to ground a notion of personal or social responsibility on the basis of such a view. I would like to try to rebut this view in what follows, and to show how a theory of subject-formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge can work in the ser- vice of a conception of ethics and, indeed, of responsibility. If the subject is opaque to itself, it is not therefore licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its relations to others. Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of its relations to others that it is opaque to itself, and if those relations to others are precisely the venue for its ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue of the subject's opacity to itself that it sustains some of its most important ethical bonds.”
23 +
24 +Language is a performance of agency, but it is only as agents that we can think of language as agency itself. This substitution effect concedes the authority of linguistic ontology. The ability to think of language as agency itself affirms linguistic agency.
25 +BUTLER 4: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
26 +“Language is thought of "mostly as agency-an act with consequences; an extended doing, a performance with effects. This is some-
27 +thing short of a definition. Language is, after all, "thought of," that is, posited or constituted as "agency.' Yet it is as agency that it is thought; a figural substitution makes the thinking of the agency of language possible. Because this very formulation is offered in language, the "agency" of language is not only the theme of the formulation, but its very action. This positing as well as this figuring appear to exemplify the agency at issue.” (Pg. 7)
28 +
29 +
30 +Thus, the standard is consistency with linguistic ontology. Independently prefer:
31 +
32 +First, we are not fully autonomous subjects. Our ends are always mediated by a linguistic scheme that is not fully our own. Butler 5:
33 +Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
34 +In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over-looked the fact that the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening. This opening calls into question the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self becomes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue see Foucault. Whether or not the Other is singular, the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter. For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seriously that the recognition comes from me. But in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not singlehandedly make them, then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use.”
35 +                     
36 +Impact Calc:
37 +
38 +The impact calculus is contextualized by the internal links from the offense. And, the framework would justify a fluid conception of agency since language is inherently a social practice that changes over time. Multiple Implications:
39 +A. Reject static starting points. They violate fluid notions of agency since they start from the assumption of a universal relationship with the other, which remains the same over time.
40 +B. Static conceptions of oppression coopt resistance. Their method forecloses possibilities to understand fluid conceptions of what it means to be oppressed since static conceptions require rigid and unchanging borders. This means their method only suppressed those who they can’t understand.
41 +Pragmatic calculations like util fail to give life meaning or presume an ontological establishment. The AFF is a pre-requisite to even understanding consequences in the first place.
42 +BUTLER 09 (Judith, PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?”, Verso, 2009, pp. 180-1)
43 +“For the injunction to non-violence to make sense, it is first necessary to overcome the presumption of this very differential-a schematic and non-theorized inegalitarianism-that operates throughout perceptual life. If the injunction to non-violence is to avoid becoming meaningless, it must be allied with an critical intervention apropos the norms that differentiate between those lives that count as livable and grievable and those that do not. Only on the condition that lives are grievable (construed within the future anterior) does the call to non-violence avoid complicity with forms of epistemic inegalitarianism. The desire to commit violence is thus always attended by the anxiety of having violence returned, since all the potential actors in the scene are equally vulnerable. Even when such an insight follows from a calculation of the consequences of a violencet act, it testifies to an ontologyical interrelation that is prior to any calculation. Precariousness is not the effect of a certain strategy, but the generalized condition for any strategy whatsoever. A certain apprehension of equality thus follows from this invariably shared condition, one that is most difficult to hold fast in thought: non-violence is derived from the apprehension of equality in the midst of precariousness.
44 +
45 +Additionally, consequentialism is incoherent:
46 +a. Problem of induction-We have no evidence that the past can be used to predict the future.
47 +Vickers 14, John, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
48 +The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.
49 +b. Consequences have an infinite domino effect. There is no point where we could stop calculating meaning it’s impossible to determine if an action is good or bad under util.
50 +c. Consequences fail- we live in an infinite universe
51 +Bostrom 09, Nick, Professor of Philosophy – Oxford University, “Infinite Ethics." 2009.
52 +“Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.” Bostrom 2 continues: “Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are thus threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.”
53 +
54 +Offense
55 +
56 +I defend the resolution as a general principle- my offense justifies that any restriction is bad, of which restrictions on constitutionally protected speech are a subset of, meaning if my offense is true, the statement of the resolution as a general claim is also true. Now, affirm:
57 +First, through restrictions, censorship refuses to capture the events described in language. This form of linguistic violence attempts to erase a specific language, and in effect, erase the descriptions that follow the language. Not only does this miserably fail to erase the injurious speech, but the desire to manipulate language, to control the uncontrollable presence of its descriptions, propagates a quenching desire for statist censorship.
58 +BUTLER 6: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
59 +“Morrison's analogy suggests that language lives or dies as a living thing might live or die, and that the question of survival is central to the question of how language is used. She claims that "oppressive language . . . is violence,” not merely a representation of it. Oppressive language is not a substitute for the experience of violence. It enacts its own kind of violence. Language remains alive when it refuses to "encapsulate" (20) or "capture" (21) the events and lives it describes. But when it seeks to effect that capture, language not only loses its vitality, but acquires its own violent force, one that Morrison throughout the lecture associates with statist language and censorship. She writes, "the vitality of language lies in its ability to limn the actual, imagined and possible lives of its speakers, readers, writers. Although its poise is sometimes in displacing experience, it is not a substitute for it. It arcs toward the place where meaning may (20) And later: "its force, its felicity, is in its reach toward the ineffable:'(21) The violence of language consists in its effort to capture the ineffable and, hence, to destroy it, to seize hold of that which must remain elusive for language to operate as a living thing.” (Pg. 8-9)
60 +Outweighs-
61 +A. Strongest internal link back to the framework. The uncontrollable presence of language is a condition of linguistic agency. So, the attempt to manipulate language despite its impossibility is the attempt to destroy linguistic agency altogether.
62 +B. The argument concludes that any state restriction on speech, even one with good intentions for a specific instance, would eventually get coopted by the state and silence other movements in the process, which turns any net benefit restrictions could possibly have.
63 +Second, censorship is guaranteed failure. It prevents survival strategies and it requires using injurious speech in its own critique. This ensures recirculation.
64 +BUTLER 7: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
65 +“Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a moment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning" those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context of legal speech. Paradoxically, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech. The present discourse breaks with the prior ones, but not in any absolute sense. On the contrary, the present context and its apparent "break" with the past are themselves legible only in terms of the past from which it breaks. The present context does, however, elaborate a new context for such speech, a future context, not yet delineable and, hence, not yet precisely a context.” (Pg. 13-14)
66 +
67 +Implications:
68 +A. Censorship destroy legitimate forms of resistance and survival methods by closing off the ability to appropriate. So, censorship’s net benefit is non-unique.
69 +B. Censorship can’t solve for its own impacts. Using the rhetoric becomes necessary in criticism against the speech. This is particularly true in a legal context that proliferates the utterance in policy.
70 +C. This outweighs- directly kills any solvency censorship could have and it turns the link on a long-term basis. The recirculation of speech ensures its survival in language. This is specifically true in the context of censorship critique since it requires deploying the speech in its context. Instead we should appropriate.
71 +Third, censorship is an issue of interpretation. This ensures cooption.
72 +BUTLER 8: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
73 +“Indeed, recent efforts to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military or, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure.9 To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effect of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.” (Pg. 13)
74 +Fourth, injurious speech subjugates agents but paradoxically marks them as socially recognizable within language. This presents a site of linguistic reversibility. Since language is temporal, we can reverse the norms that make injurious speech possible.
75 +BUTLER 9: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
76 +“One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a named, one is also, paradoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one it injures. What is this force, and how might we come to understand its faultlines?” (Pg. 2)
77 +Underview
78 +Free speech, even if it’s not perfect, solves better than censorship : empirics prove.
79 +Calleros 95 Calleros, Charles R. “Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun” (Professor of Law, Arizona State University). HeinOnline. Arizona State Law Journal. 1995
80 +However, campus communities that have creatively used this approach can attest to the surprising power of counterspeech. Examples of counterspeech to hateful racist and homophobic speech at Arizona State and Stanford Universities are especially illustrative.61 In an incident that attracted national attention, the campus community at Arizona State University ("A.S.U.") constructively and constitutionally responded to a racist poster displayed on the outside of the speaker's dormitory door in February 1991. Entitled "WORK APPLICATION," it contained a number of ostensibly employment-related questions that advanced hostile and demeaning racial stereotypes of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Carla Washington, one of a group of African- American women who found the poster, used her own speech to persuade a resident of the offending room voluntarily to take the poster down and allow her to photocopy it. After sending a copy of the poster to the campus newspaper along with an opinion letter deploring its racist stereotypes, she demanded action from the director of her residence hall. The director organized an immediate meeting of the dormitory residents to discuss the issues. In this meeting, I explained why the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and the women who found the poster eloquently described their pain and fears. One of the women, Nichet Smith, voiced her fear that all nonminorities on campus shared the hostile stereotypes expressed in the poster. Dozens of residents expressed their support and gave assurances that they did not share the hostile stereotypes, but they conceded that even the most tolerant among them knew little about the cultures of others and would 62 benefit greatly from multicultural education.
81 + The need for multicultural education to combat intercultural ignorance and stereotyping became the theme of a press conference and public rally organized by the student African-American Coalition leader, Rossie Turman, who opted for highly visible counterspeech despite demands from some students and staff to discipline the owner of the offending poster. The result was a series of opinion letters in the campus newspaper discussing the problem of racism, numerous workshops on race relations and free speech, and overwhelming approval in the Faculty Senate of a measure to add a course on American cultural diversity to the undergraduate breadth 63 requirement.
82 + The four women who initially confronted the racist poster were empowered by the meeting at the dormitory residence and later received awards from the local chapter of the NAACP for their activism.64 Rossie Turman was rewarded for his leadership skills two years later by becoming the first African-American elected President of Associated Students of A.S.U.,65 a student body that numbered approximately 40,000 students, only 66 2.3 percent of them African-American. Although Delgado and Yun are quite right that the African-American students should never have been burdened with the need to respond to such hateful speech, Hentoff is correct that the responses just described helped them develop a sense of self-reliance and constructive activism. Moreover, the students' counterspeech inspired a community response that lightened the students' burden and provided them with a sense of community support and empowerment. Indeed, the students received assistance from faculty and administrators, who helped organize meetings, wrote opinion letters, spoke before the Faculty Senate, or joined the students in issuing public statements at the press conference and public rally.67 Perhaps most important, campus administrators wisely refrained from disciplining the owners of the poster, thus directing public attention to the issue of racism and ensuring broad community support in denouncing the racist poster. Many members of the campus and surrounding communities might have leapt to the racist speaker's defense had the state attempted to discipline the speaker and thus had created a First Amendment issue. Instead, they remained united with the offended students because the glare of the public spotlight remained sharply focused on the racist incident without the distraction of cries of state censorship. Although the counterspeech was not aimed primarily at influencing the hearts and minds of the residents of the offending dormitory room, its vigor in fact caught the residents by surprise. 68 It prompted at least three of them to apologize publicly and to display curiosity about a civil rights movement that they were too young to have witnessed first hand. 69 This effective use of education and counterspeech is not an isolated instance at A.S.U., but has been repeated on several occasions, albeit on smaller scales.7°
83 +One year after the counterspeech at A.S.U., Stanford University responded similarly to homophobic speech. In that case, a first-year law student sought to attract disciplinary proceedings and thus gain First Amendment martyrdom by shouting hateful homophobic statements about a dormitory staff member. The dean of students stated that the speaker was not subject to discipline under Stanford's code of conduct but called on the university community to speak out on the issue, triggering an avalanche of counterspeech. Students, staff, faculty, and administrators expressed their opinions in letters to the campus newspaper, in comments on a poster board at the law school, in a published petition signed by 400 members of the law school community disassociating the law school from the speaker's epithets, and in a letter written by several law students reporting the incident to a prospective employer of the offending student.71 The purveyor of hate speech indeed had made a point about the power of speech, just not the one he had intended. He had welcomed disciplinary sanctions as a form of empowerment, but the Stanford community was alert enough to catch his verbal hardball and throw it back with ten times the force. Thus, the argument that counterspeech is preferable to state suppression of offensive speech is stronger and more fully supported by experience than is conceded by Delgado and Yun. In both of the cases described above, the targets of hateful speech were supported by a community united against bigotry. The community avoided splitting into factions because the universities eliminated the issue of censorship by quickly announcing that the hateful speakers were protected from disciplinary retaliation. Indeed, the counterspeech against the bigotry was so powerful in each case that it underscored the need for top administrators to develop standards for, and some limitations on, their participation in such partisan speech. 72 Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out against intolerance when it is isolated as an issue rather than diluted in muddied waters along with concerns of censorship. Just as the nonviolent demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., depended partly for their success on the consciences of the national and international audiences monitoring the fire hoses and attack dogs on their television sets and in the print media,73 the empowerment of the targets of hateful speech rests partly in the hands of members of the campus community who sympathize with them. One can hope that the counterspeech and educational measures used with success at A.S.U. and Stanford stand a good chance of preserving an atmosphere of civility in intellectual inquiry at any campus community in which compassionate, open minds predominate. On the other hand, counterspeech by the targets of hate speech could be less empowering on a campus in which the majority of students, faculty, and staff approve of hostile epithets directed toward members of minority groups. One hopes that such campuses are exceedingly rare; although hostile racial stereotyping among college students in the United States increased during the last decade, those students who harbored significant hostilities (as contrasted with more pervasive but less openly hostile, subconscious racism) still represented a modest fraction of all students.74 Moreover, even in a pervasively hostile atmosphere, counterspeech might still be more effective than broad restrictions on speech.
84 +Allow 1ar theory, otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there would be no way to check back the skew. And it’s drop the debater
85 +Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline- we should set the best norms. 2. Collapses- you use offense-defense to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps- saying reasonability is reasonable is circular.
86 +
87 +No neg RVI's
EntryDate
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1 +2017-04-30 18:36:19.0
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1 +Tom Evnen
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1 +Kinkaid JY
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1 +79
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1 +5
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1 +Strake Jesuit Chen Aff
Title
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1 +JF - 1AC - Linguistic Ontology
Tournament
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1 +TOC
Caselist.CitesClass[89]
Cites
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1 +1AC
2 +Framework
3 +Ethics is divided between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ask what justice demands in a perfect world while non-ideal theory ask what justice demands in a world that is already unjust. Prefer non-ideal theory as a meta-ethical starting point:
4 +1. Social Reality- ideal theory ignores social realities, which in turn contradicts ideals. Normative ideals aren’t created separately from the social norms that govern us because those influence what we can count as an ideal in the first place.
5 +MILLS : Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
6 + “I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.” (170)
7 +
8 +2. Standpoint Epistemology: Ideal theory strips away questions of particularities and isolates a universal feature of agents. This normalizes a single experience and epistemically skews ethical theorizing.
9 +MILLS 2: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
10 +“The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.” (175)
11 +
12 +Thus, the standard is resisting material inequalities. Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field, we take steps to correct the material injustice. Prefer additionally-
13 +1. States have no act-omission distinction which means they are responsible for the state of affairs they bring about, so constraint based theories collapse to consequentialism.
14 +Sunstein and Vermule 05 (Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs,” Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17.)
15 +In our view, both the argument from causation and the argument from intention go wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action—for example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. If there is no act-omission distinction, then government is fully complicit with any harm it allows, so decisions are moral if they minimize harm. All means based and side constraint theories collapse because two violations require aggregation.
16 +
17 +2. Only naturalism is epistemically accessible
18 +Papinaeu 11 David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007
19 +Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For Beirne ngs like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.
20 +Experience is epistemic – it is how we empirically ground our existence. Pain is universally bad and pleasure is universally good.
21 +Nagel ‘86. Thomas “The View From Nowhere”, 1986
22 +I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter who’s they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just is a sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain… Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.
23 +3. Aggregation through looking at consequences is key to valuing the objective end of all rational beings.
24 +Cummiskey 90 David Cummiskey (professor of philosophy at Bates College, Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Washington College). “Kantian Consequentialism.” 1990. http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/kantian.pdf
25 +Now, according to Kant, the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negative and positive duties (GMM, p. 430; MEJ, p. 221; DV, pp. 448-51). In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense we treat persons as ends when we endeavor to help them realize their (legitimate) ends. Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own. Since, it one wills an end, one wills the necessary means (GMM, p. 417), it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite being” (CPR, p. 25; GMM, p. 415), we have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others. Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue (GMM, pp. 398, 423, 430; DV, pp. 384-387). Since Kant’s principle generates both positive and negative duties, and since there are many situations which involve, at least, prima facie conflicts of these duties, we need a rationale for giving priority to one duty rather than the other. Of course, according to Kant, there cannot be unresolvable conflicts of duty. The concept of duty involves the objective practical necessity of an action and since two conflicting actions cannot both be necessary, a conflict of duties is conceptually impossible. Kant, however, does not grant that “grounds of obligation” can conflict, even if obligations cannot. He is thus left with the priority problem at this level. Kant argues that in cases of conflict “the stronger ground of obligation prevails” (MEJ, p. 224). Although such a response is intuitively plausible, without an account of how one ground of obligation can be stronger than another, it does not provide any practical guidance.
26 +
27 +4. Moral substitutability is true and only consequentialism explains it.
28 +Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ’92 Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM
29 +Since general substitutability works for other kinds of reasons for action, we would need a strong argument to deny that it holds also for moral reasons. If moral reasons obeyed different principles, it would be hard to understand why moral reasons are also called 'reasons' and how moral reasons interact with other reasons when they apply to the same action. Nonetheless, this extension has been denied, so we have to look at moral reasons carefully. I have a moral reason to feed my child tonight, both because I promised my wife to do so, and also because of my special relation to my child along with the fact that she will go hungry if I don't feed her. I can't feed my child tonight without going home soon, and going home soon will enable me to feed her tonight. Therefore, there is a moral reason for me to go home soon. It need not be imprudent or ugly or sacrilegious or illegal for me not to feed her, but the requirements of morality give me a moral reason to feed her. This argument assumes a special case of substitutability: (MS) If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. I will call this 'the principle of moral substitutability', or just 'moral substitutability'.
30 +He continues:
31 +Of course, there are many other versions of deontology. I cannot discuss them all. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that it is the very nature of deontological reasons that makes deontological theories unable to explain moral substitutability. This comes out clearly if we start from the other side and ask which properties create the moral reasons that are derived by moral substitutability. What gives me a moral reason to start the mower is the consequences of starting the mower. Specifically, it has the consequence that I can am able to mow the grass. This reason cannot derive from the same property as my moral reason to mow the lawn unless what gives me a moral reason to mow the lawn is its consequences. Thus, any non-consequentialist moral theory will have to posit two distinct kinds of moral reasons: one for starting the mower and another for mowing the grass. Once these kinds of reasons are separated, we need to understand the connection between them. But this connection cannot be explained by the substantive principles of the theory. That is why all deontological theories must lack the explanatory coherence which is a general test of adequacy for all theories. I conclude that no deontological theory can adequately explain moral substitutability.
32 +He continues:
33 +All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides a moral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently of its consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialists or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitut- ability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.
34 +
35 +5. Inequality creates flawed epistemic conclusions, meaning you cannot fairly test their ethical claims without rectifying it first.
36 +Medina 11 Medina, J. (2011). Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism. Foucault Studies, 1(12), 9–35
37 +Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field. Different fields—or domains of discursive interaction—contain particular discursive regimes with their particular ways of producing knowledge. In the battle among power/ knowledge frameworks, some come on top and become dominant while others are displaced and become subjugated. Foucault’s methodology offers a way of exploiting that vibrant plurality of epistemic perspectives which always contains some bodies of experiences and memories that are erased or hidden in the hegemonic mainstream frameworks that become hegemonic after prevailing in sustained epistemic battles. What Foucault calls subjugated knowledges3 are forms of experiencing and remembering that are pushed to the margins and rendered unqualified and unworthy of epistemic respect by prevailing and hegemonic discourses. Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipatory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges.4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insurrection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to contestation.
38 +Plan
39 +I defend the resolution as a general principle- I will defend all constitutionally protected speech should be restricted, so all the neg has to do is read evidence that says some speech is conpro to get their DA link.
40 +Contention 1: Restrictions
41 +1) The idea that the authority figures become the arbiter of acceptable speech causes a crack down on dissent and kills minority views from even being heard in the first place.
42 +Fisher 17 (Anthony L. Fisher, associate editor at Reason.com, where his beats include criminal justice, civil liberties, free speech, and foreign affairs. He is also a sports and culture columnist at The Week.). “The free speech problem on campus is real. It will ultimately hurt dissidents”. Vox, Jan 2, 2017. http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-speech-pen-america-campus-censorship
43 +It’s already happening. Just ask the Palestinian activists whose boycott campaigns against Israel have has been deemed hate speech by a number of public universities, and whose future political activities could be endangered by an act of Congress. Just this month, the Senate unanimously passed the "Anti-Semitism Awareness Act,” which directs the Department of Education to use the bill's contents as a guideline when adjudicating complaints of anti-Semitism on campus. Among the speech-chilling components of the bill, the political (and subjective) act of judging Israel by an "unfair double standard" could be considered hate speech. To cite other examples of unintended consequences of the crackdown on “offensive” speech, a black student at the University of Michigan was punished for calling another student “white trash,” and conservative law students at Georgetown claimed they were “traumatized” when an email critical of deceased Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia landed in their inboxes. The PEN America report also notes the Foundation for Individual Rights’ analysis of hundreds of campuses with “severely restrictive” speech codes. While a number of these campuses don't aggressively enforce their speech codes, the rules remain on the books; more than a dozen such codes have been overturned in the courts. What’s even more concerning is the increasingly popular notion that some ideas, such as opposition to abortion, should simply be “non-platformed" — that is, deemed unworthy of even being heard on campus. Although the trend of denying contentious speakers such as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice or refugee turned Dutch politician and critic of Islam Ayaan Hirsi Ali public platforms by "disinviting" them from campus is disconcerting, it is not censorship. However, a pro-choice group physically blocking the display of a pro-life group on the campus of the University of Georgia is a form of censorship. As is the case of University of California Santa Barbara professor Mireille Miller-Young, who assaulted a young woman holding a pro-life placard including graphic imagery in a "free speech" zone on campus and stole her sign. When the young woman objected to the theft of her property, Miller-Young replied, "I may be a thief, but you're a terrorist." Like it or not, almost half of all Americans consider themselves pro-life. Banning their perspective from campus won't win over converts, and it’s both immoral and counterproductive to declare completely legitimate political perspectives beyond the pale. Think of antiwar protests or demonstrations in support of integration when both causes were broadly unpopular, and then try to consider a majority on campus declaring their school a "safe space" from such "offensive" expressions of free speech.
44 +2) Empirics flow aff- speech codes on college campuses were policy failures.
45 +Friedersdorf 15, 12-10-2015, "The Lessons of Bygone Free-Speech Fights," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/what-student-activists-can-learn-from-bygone-free-speech-fights/419178/
46 +He was writing after the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin, and Stanford implemented speech codes targeted at racist and sexist speech. These were efforts to respond to increasing diversity on campuses, where a number of students spewed racist and sexist speech that most everyone in this room would condemn. But those speech codes were policy failures. There is no evidence that hate speech or bigotry decreased on any campus that adopted them. At Michigan, the speech code was analyzed by Marcia Pally, a professor of multicultural studies, who found that “black students were accused of racist speech in almost 20 cases. Students were punished only twice under the code’s anti-racist provisions, both times for speech by or on behalf of blacks.”
47 +Outweighs: A. Probability – it’s empirically verified, outweighs analytics since that’s what actually happens in the real world. B. Turns arguments about minority speech restrictions in the status quo—free speech isn’t exclusionary, only restrictions. The ability to for minorities to speak freely is restricted in the squo because anti-racist policies are used against the same groups themselves.
48 +3) Even if free speech might not be the perfect solution, it is comparatively better to any other alternative—restrictions just make the problem worse.
49 +Kenan Malik 12 (Indian-born English writer, lecturer and broadcaster, trained in neurobiology and the history of science.). “Why Hate Speech Should Not Be Banned”. Pandemonium, 2012. https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/
50 +And in practice, you cannot reduce or eliminate bigotry simply by banning it. You simply lets the sentiments fester underground. As Milton once put it, to keep out ‘evil doctrine’ by licensing is ‘like the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his Park-gate’. Take Britain. In 1965, Britain prohibited incitement to racial hatred as part of its Race Relations Act. The following decade was probably the most racist in British history. It was the decade of ‘Paki-bashing’, when racist thugs would seek out Asians to beat up. It was a decade of firebombings, stabbings, and murders. In the early 1980s, I was organizing street patrols in East London to protect Asian families from racist attacks. Nor were thugs the only problem. Racism was woven into the fabric of public institutions. The police, immigration officials – all were openly racist. In the twenty years between 1969 and 1989, no fewer than thirty-seven blacks and Asians were killed in police custody – almost one every six months. The same number again died in prisons or in hospital custody. When in 1982, cadets at the national police academy were asked to write essays about immigrants, one wrote, ‘Wogs, nignogs and Pakis come into Britain take up our homes, our jobs and our resources and contribute relatively less to our once glorious country. They are, by nature, unintelligent. And can’t at all be educated sufficiently to live in a civilised society of the Western world’. Another wrote that ‘all blacks are pains and should be ejected from society’. So much for incitement laws helping create a more tolerant society. Today, Britain is a very different place. Racism has not disappeared, nor have racist attacks, but the open, vicious, visceral bigotry that disfigured the Britain when I was growing up has largely ebbed away. It has done so not because of laws banning racial hatred but because of broader social changes and because minorities themselves stood up to the bigotry and fought back.
51 +4) Censoring speech makes it more attractive – psychological studies prove.
52 +Mattimore 15: PATRICK MATTIMORE member of the Society of Professional Journalists and has written commentaries for a variety of publications, daily newspapers, professional magazines, and weeklies. His areas of expertise are law, psychology, and education. He taught high school psychology for many years in the US, and was an adjunct professor of law in the Temple University/Tsinghua University LLM program in Beijing, where he also taught psychology at a private college. “Guest commentary: If you want to make something more desired, make sure it gets censored” December 10, 2015. http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2015/12/10/guest-commentary-if-you-want-to-make-something-more-desired-make-sure-it-gets-censored/
53 +What makes government censorship of the press and resultant self-censorship by media itself even more baffling, is that psychological science suggests that it doesn’t work. If you want to make an idea, or nearly anything, more valuable to someone, make it less available by censoring it. For example, more than 40 years ago, when University of North Carolina students learned that a speech opposing coed dorms on campus would be banned, psychologists reported that the students became more opposed to the idea of coed dorms. Without ever hearing the speech, students became more sympathetic to its argument. Advertisers have long been aware of the power of prohibitory admonitions to promote products, enticing consumers by advising them to not taste the forbidden fruit. Before advertisers for Charmin bathroom tissue exhorted customers: “Please don’t squeeze the Charmin,” it’s likely no one ever had. By ordering stories covered up, the government ensures that those stories will be accorded more importance than they warrant. By limiting individuals’ access to information, that information becomes more attractive. Psychologist Robert Cialdini calls this the principle of scarcity. We want those things that are hard to get even though there is logically no more reason to want a scarce item than a plentiful one.
54 +
55 +Contention 2: Counterspeech
56 +Free speech, even if it’s not perfect, solves these harms better:
57 +1) Empirics prove it promotes inclusion needed for movements- this also responds to silencing turns since even if those targeted cannot speak up, the community can.
58 +Calleros 95 Calleros, Charles R. “Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun” (Professor of Law, Arizona State University). HeinOnline. Arizona State Law Journal. 1995
59 +However, campus communities that have creatively used this approach can attest to the surprising power of counterspeech. Examples of counterspeech to hateful racist and homophobic speech at Arizona State and Stanford Universities are especially illustrative.61 In an incident that attracted national attention, the campus community at Arizona State University ("A.S.U.") constructively and constitutionally responded to a racist poster displayed on the outside of the speaker's dormitory door in February 1991. Entitled "WORK APPLICATION," it contained a number of ostensibly employment-related questions that advanced hostile and demeaning racial stereotypes of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Carla Washington, one of a group of African- American women who found the poster, used her own speech to persuade a resident of the offending room voluntarily to take the poster down and allow her to photocopy it. After sending a copy of the poster to the campus newspaper along with an opinion letter deploring its racist stereotypes, she demanded action from the director of her residence hall. The director organized an immediate meeting of the dormitory residents to discuss the issues. In this meeting, I explained why the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and the women who found the poster eloquently described their pain and fears. One of the women, Nichet Smith, voiced her fear that all nonminorities on campus shared the hostile stereotypes expressed in the poster. Dozens of residents expressed their support and gave assurances that they did not share the hostile stereotypes, but they conceded that even the most tolerant among them knew little about the cultures of others and would 62 benefit greatly from multicultural education.
60 + The need for multicultural education to combat intercultural ignorance and stereotyping became the theme of a press conference and public rally organized by the student African-American Coalition leader, Rossie Turman, who opted for highly visible counterspeech despite demands from some students and staff to discipline the owner of the offending poster. The result was a series of opinion letters in the campus newspaper discussing the problem of racism, numerous workshops on race relations and free speech, and overwhelming approval in the Faculty Senate of a measure to add a course on American cultural diversity to the undergraduate breadth 63 requirement.
61 + The four women who initially confronted the racist poster were empowered by the meeting at the dormitory residence and later received awards from the local chapter of the NAACP for their activism.64 Rossie Turman was rewarded for his leadership skills two years later by becoming the first African-American elected President of Associated Students of A.S.U.,65 a student body that numbered approximately 40,000 students, only 66 2.3 percent of them African-American. Although Delgado and Yun are quite right that the African-American students should never have been burdened with the need to respond to such hateful speech, Hentoff is correct that the responses just described helped them develop a sense of self-reliance and constructive activism. Moreover, the students' counterspeech inspired a community response that lightened the students' burden and provided them with a sense of community support and empowerment. Indeed, the students received assistance from faculty and administrators, who helped organize meetings, wrote opinion letters, spoke before the Faculty Senate, or joined the students in issuing public statements at the press conference and public rally.67 Perhaps most important, campus administrators wisely refrained from disciplining the owners of the poster, thus directing public attention to the issue of racism and ensuring broad community support in denouncing the racist poster. Many members of the campus and surrounding communities might have leapt to the racist speaker's defense had the state attempted to discipline the speaker and thus had created a First Amendment issue. Instead, they remained united with the offended students because the glare of the public spotlight remained sharply focused on the racist incident without the distraction of cries of state censorship. Although the counterspeech was not aimed primarily at influencing the hearts and minds of the residents of the offending dormitory room, its vigor in fact caught the residents by surprise. 68 It prompted at least three of them to apologize publicly and to display curiosity about a civil rights movement that they were too young to have witnessed first hand. 69 This effective use of education and counterspeech is not an isolated instance at A.S.U., but has been repeated on several occasions, albeit on smaller scales.7°
62 +One year after the counterspeech at A.S.U., Stanford University responded similarly to homophobic speech. In that case, a first-year law student sought to attract disciplinary proceedings and thus gain First Amendment martyrdom by shouting hateful homophobic statements about a dormitory staff member. The dean of students stated that the speaker was not subject to discipline under Stanford's code of conduct but called on the university community to speak out on the issue, triggering an avalanche of counterspeech. Students, staff, faculty, and administrators expressed their opinions in letters to the campus newspaper, in comments on a poster board at the law school, in a published petition signed by 400 members of the law school community disassociating the law school from the speaker's epithets, and in a letter written by several law students reporting the incident to a prospective employer of the offending student.71 The purveyor of hate speech indeed had made a point about the power of speech, just not the one he had intended. He had welcomed disciplinary sanctions as a form of empowerment, but the Stanford community was alert enough to catch his verbal hardball and throw it back with ten times the force. Thus, the argument that counterspeech is preferable to state suppression of offensive speech is stronger and more fully supported by experience than is conceded by Delgado and Yun. In both of the cases described above, the targets of hateful speech were supported by a community united against bigotry. The community avoided splitting into factions because the universities eliminated the issue of censorship by quickly announcing that the hateful speakers were protected from disciplinary retaliation. Indeed, the counterspeech against the bigotry was so powerful in each case that it underscored the need for top administrators to develop standards for, and some limitations on, their participation in such partisan speech. 72 Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out against intolerance when it is isolated as an issue rather than diluted in muddied waters along with concerns of censorship. Just as the nonviolent demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., depended partly for their success on the consciences of the national and international audiences monitoring the fire hoses and attack dogs on their television sets and in the print media,73 the empowerment of the targets of hateful speech rests partly in the hands of members of the campus community who sympathize with them. One can hope that the counterspeech and educational measures used with success at A.S.U. and Stanford stand a good chance of preserving an atmosphere of civility in intellectual inquiry at any campus community in which compassionate, open minds predominate. On the other hand, counterspeech by the targets of hate speech could be less empowering on a campus in which the majority of students, faculty, and staff approve of hostile epithets directed toward members of minority groups. One hopes that such campuses are exceedingly rare; although hostile racial stereotyping among college students in the United States increased during the last decade, those students who harbored significant hostilities (as contrasted with more pervasive but less openly hostile, subconscious racism) still represented a modest fraction of all students.74 Moreover, even in a pervasively hostile atmosphere, counterspeech might still be more effective than broad restrictions on speech.
63 +2) Censorship prevents survival strategies and it requires using injurious speech in its own critique, meaning that the aff is key to personal liberation.
64 +Butler 97 “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997
65 +“Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a moment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning" those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context of legal speech. Paradoxically, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech.
66 +3) The attempt to close political space is always imperfect and engenders resistance – censoring speech doesn’t change minds but redirects them – that threatens institutions and leaves supporters less prepared to defend their gains. Resistance to abortion proves.
67 +Bonnie Honig 93, Nancy Duke Lewis Professor in the departments of Modern Culture and Media (MCM) and Political Science at Brown, 4-15-1993, "Political Theory And The Displacement Of Politics," Cornell University Press.
68 +When a woman’s right to choose was first recognized in 1973 by a very different Court in Roe v. Wade, many citizens celebrated the Court‘s decision as the end of a battle. Those opposed to the decision, however, vowed to roll back Roe v. Wade and. nineteen years later, they have had great success.6 The battle is being refought in the Court and in the state houses. Those who thought it was won in 1973 were surprised by this sequence of events. Many assumed that, once juridically recognized, the right to abort a pregnancy would never be returned to the space of political contest. In the past two decades they went on to fight other battles, doing relatively little to mobilize citizens and communities to protect and stabilize this new right, leaving pro-life organizations relatively free to repoliticize and redefine the issues. In response to the juridical settlement of a woman's right to choose, pro-lifers focused on the fetus and the family and on the relations of obligation and responsibility that tie women to them. Soon abortion became known as baby killing. pro-choice became antifamily, and pregnant single women became icons of danger whose wanton, (literally) unregulated sexuality threatens the safety and the identity of the American family. These identities and identifications are not stable. But in the absence of resistance to them, they could be stabilized. That realization has energized pro-choice citizens into action in the last few years. and the sites of the battle are proliferating. ¶ These observations are by no means meant to imply that it would be better not to entrench a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy—that is a different debate, one that turns on considerations of political strategy and equal justice. My point is that there is a lesson to be learned from the experience of those who misread Roe as the end of a battle and later found themselves ill equipped and unprepared to stabilize and secure their still unstable rights when they were repoliticized and contested by their opponents. In their mistaken belief that the agon had been successfully shut down by law, pro-choice citizens ceded the agon to their opponents and found, years later, that the terms of the contest had shifted against them. Disempowered by their belief that the law had settled the issue without remainder, they failed to engage the concerns of moderate citizens who harbored doubts about the morality of abortion, leaving them and their doubts to be mobilized and radicalized by those who had no doubts about the practice‘s immorality and who were determined to see it outlawed again.7 ¶ To affirm the perpetuity of contest is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest. even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimensions of contestation. It is to see that the always imperfect closure of political space tends to engender remainders and that, if those remainders are not engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize the very closures that deny their existence.
69 +
70 +Long theory underview
EntryDate
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1 +2017-04-30 18:36:49.907
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Martin Sigalow
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Valley TF
ParentRound
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +80
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +3
Team
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Strake Jesuit Chen Aff
Title
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +JF - 1AC - Util - v3
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +TOC
Caselist.RoundClass[74]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +81
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-03-25 03:53:50.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Sims, Koshak
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Success Academy SC
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,4 @@
1 +1ac - util v2
2 +1nc - endowments da safe spaces da expenditures da politics da case turns
3 +2nr - safe spaces da case turns
4 +2ar - same as 2nr
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Kandi King RR
Caselist.RoundClass[76]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +84
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-04-29 14:38:57.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Mark Gorthey
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Lexington KB
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +1
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,3 @@
1 +1ac - intrinsic meaning
2 +1nc - empiricism is racist K burden structure theory determinism trigger case
3 +2nr - everything
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +TOC
Caselist.RoundClass[78]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +86,87
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-04-30 02:07:04.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Judge
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Opponent
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Quads
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Tournament
Caselist.RoundClass[79]
Cites
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +88
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-04-30 18:36:16.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Tom Evnen
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Kinkaid JY
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +5
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,5 @@
1 +1AC - linguistic ontology
2 +1NC - t implementation cap K case
3 +1AR - alt actor fiat bad all
4 +2NR - Cap k
5 +2AR - theory
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +TOC
Caselist.RoundClass[80]
EntryDate
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +2017-04-30 18:36:47.0
Judge
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Martin Sigalow
Opponent
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +Valley TF
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +3
RoundReport
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,5 @@
1 +1AC - util v3
2 +1nc - contracts NC "Must spec when we stop calculating under util" case
3 +1ar - cx checks metatheory an everything
4 +2nr - cx checks and contracts NC
5 +2ar - turns to NC
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +TOC

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Woodlands College Park (TX)
Wren (SC)
Yucca Valley (CA)