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++Agency, or the setting and pursuing of ends, is inescapable.
++Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8
++3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 3.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on ordinary enterprises their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14 Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15
++This outweighs: A. Agents can’t arbitrarily ignore rationality since it function as a condition of agency in the first place. So even if another framework were true, that too would operate within the requirements of reason itself. B. Morality must provide a motivational reason for action otherwise agents can’t be morally culpable. Simply knowing that an action is immoral is not sufficient to override the action absent of some motivation to do so. And, agency is non-optional, which means rationality is intrinsically binding and motivational.
++And, agency posits universalizability. Two warrants.
++1.	Ends must be universalizable. Any other norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends, which also means reason acts as a side constraint on ends-based frameworks.
++Siyar Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999:
++. Now, when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of action, precluding other actions, etc. Thus, my ends function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can or must do (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that other subjects can also recognize my end as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, in representing an end, I in effect demand recognition for it from other subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that if I am committed to some end, e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, I cannot be indifferent to the attitudes and actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am in fact committed to realizing my end, i.e. if I represent an end at all, I must demand that the worth of my end, its status as to be done, be recognized by others.
++2.	Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent.
++Korsgaard“Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard
++The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.
++Thus the standard is consistency with willing universal maxims. Prefer the standard.
++1.	A priori knowledge is a constraint on knowledge.
++Wood “Critique of Pure Reason” by Immanuel Kant 1787 Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood “The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant” re published 1998
++Now it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori judgments. If one wants an example from the sciences, one need only look at all the propositions of mathematics; if one would have one from the commonest use of the understanding, the proposition that every alteration must have a cause will do; indeed in the latter the very concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely lost if one sought, as Hume did, to derive it from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes and a habit (thus a merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations arising from that association.13 Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus establish it II priori. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent hence one could hardly allow these to count as first principles. Yet here we can content ourselves with having displayed the pure use of our cognitive faculty as a fact together with its indication. Not merely in judgments, however, but even in concepts is an origin of some of them revealed a priori. Gradually remove from your experiential concept of a body everything that is empirical in it - the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impenetrability - there still remains the space that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely disappeared), and you cannot leave that out. Likewise, if you remove from your empirical concept of every object,' whether corporeal or incorporeal, all those properties of which experience teaches you, you could still not take from it that by means of which you think of it as a substance or as dependent on a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object! in general). Thus, convinced by the necessity with which this concept presses itself on you, you must concede that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition a priori.
++A priori principles mean universalizability.
++Wood 2 “Critique of Pure Reason” by Immanuel Kant 1787 Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood “The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant” re published 1998
++At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure cognition from an empirical one. Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. First, then, if a proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. Second: Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is therefore only an arbitrary increase in validity from that which holds in most cases to that which holds in all, as in, e.g., the proposition "All bodies are heavy," whereas strict universality belongs to a judgment essentially; this points to a special source of cognition for it, namely a faculty of a priori cognition. Necessity and strict universality are therefore secure indications of an a priori cognition, and also belong together inseparably. But since in their use it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation in judgments than the contingency in them, or is often more plausible to show the unrestricted universality that we ascribe to a judgment than its necessity, it is advisable to employ separately these two criteria, each of which is in itself infallible. 12
++2.	Kantianism  is a pre-requisite to any other form of discussion on this topic-
++a)	This topic requires universalism as a starting point for particular material discussions.
++King 1 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++“Discussions on statutory rights tend to be question-begging, in that they take for granted that rights exist, and that therefore action is necessary by the state to institutionalise them and then to act upon them. But what we need to know is why rights exist and thus why it is that governments have felt the need to legislate for them. This initially necessitates an abstract discussion, which defines rights and how they might be categorised. We might then be able to attaches the notion of rights to housing in a more fundamental way. What this means, in effect, is that statutory housing rights rest on an understanding of a need for a right to housing. This is not merely a semantic argument. The terminological distinction here is important. The concept of housing rights tells us what we have (or in some cases, ought to have), whilst the right to housing is a justificatory argument which addresses why we should have certain forms of provision in the first place. Housing rights tell us what this provision might be, but not why it ought to be there. The right to housing is therefore serving an deeper but more abstract purpose.” (663)
++b)	Even if their approach to ethics is best, we should still use a universal approach in this specific instance. Concentrating on social distinctions with the concrete other dooms the political priority of the right to housing.
++King 2 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++“Second, this argument, by offering a fundamental basis for housing policy, places housing alongside other welfare goods. One of the key problems for housing policy is its relatively low political priority when compared to issues such as health, education and transport. This is because, in the developed world at least, housing as a social problem it is all too frequently seen as particularist and concerned with a minority concern of the population. Housing policy, particularly in the developed world, is equated with social housing and not with the generality of the population, whereas health provision is of concerns to nearly all the popu- lation. Discourses based on needs or equality, despite their strong normative appeal, exacerbate this problem by emphasising the distinct characteristics of those who ought to be helped. It can be argued, therefore, that social housing justified on grounds of need or equality, it institutionalises the very social exclusion it is intended to remedy. However, a discourse based on freedom rights concentrates on common features within a population by emphasising those basic elements which most take for granted, but which are impossible without access to housing. Hence, the stress is on what is common and universal to us all and not what separates or excludes certain groups or individuals. This offers a much more powerful basis for policy than that presented by need or equality. Thus again the freedom rights argument presents the means to discuss housing across widely different political structures and levels of economic development.” (670)
++3.	Only the AC framework explains how a state obligation can function. This also takes out util, governments have side-constraints.
++Korsgaard 08 Korsgaard, Christine M (Exceptionally practical reasoner). 2008.
++Taking the law into our own hands: Kant on the right to revolution. In The Constitution of Agency, 233-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, eds. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Why is it permissible for others to force or coerce you to conform to the duties of justice? The Universal Principle of Justice in effect says that the only restriction on freedom is consistency with the freedom of everyone else. Anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just, and you therefore have a right to do it. If someone tries to interfere with that right, he is interfering with your freedom and so violating the Universal Principle of Justice. Violations of the Universal Principle of Justice may be opposed by coercion for the simple reason that anything that hinders a hindrance to freedom is consistent with freedom, and anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just. It follows that rights are coercively enforceable. Indeed, coercive enforceability is not something attached to rights; it is constitutive of their very nature (MPJ 6:232). To have a right just is to have the executive authority to enforce a certain claim. This in turn is the foundation of the executive or coercive authority of the political state. Kant’s political philosophy is a social contract theory, in obvious ways in the tradition of Locke. But the differences are important. In Locke’s view, individuals have rights in the state of nature, and may enforce those rights. But when each person determines and enforces his own rights the result is social disorder. Since this disorder is contrary to our interests, people join together into a political state, transferring our executive authority to a government.
++1AC – Advocacy
++Advocacy Text: The United States ought to guarantee the right to housing. I don’t defend implementation but can grant links if asked in CX. The framework questions whether or not the affirmative’s rights based approach to housing passes the test of non-contradiction, which is prerequisite to policy action.
++King 3 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++“This paper has suggested there is great merit in presenting housing as a freedom right instead of a socio-economic claim. It has been argued that rights are important entities and can serve, if presented properly, to heighten the political and moral significance of housing. Indeed, this rights-based argument can be used to claim that housing is an elemental right upon which other basic human functions depend. I believe this to be an argument of some significance that has implications for policy and for the status of housing more generally.”
++1AC – Contention
++A violation of freedom is a contradiction.
++Stephen Engstrom (PhD, Professor of Ethics at University of Pittsburg). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”. Pg. 19-20
++“Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. 19In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to shares the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.”
++Now, affirm-
++First, the right to housing is an intrinsic extension of our right to freedom. It serves as the bedrock that allows us to freely exercise all other rights.
++King 4 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++“Freedom rights can be seen as negative rights, in that they prohibit coercion and interference in the interests of others (Berlin, 1969). The importance of negative rights for some libertarian thinkers such as Machan (1989) and Ras- mussen and Den Uyl (1991), is that they do not clash. Omissions can have simultaneous multiple effects. Coercion by the state impinges on the rights of all its citizens. But importantly, these thinkers would argue that the enjoyment of life, liberty and property by one does not deny it to others. The amount of liberty in any society is not governed by a zero-sum game, where one person taking a share diminishes the pool left for the rest. However, socio-economic claims frequently entail the distribution of scarce resources, and thus any settlement will involve the adjudication between rival claims. Thus, because they involve finite resources, these claims place individual rights-holders in direct competition with their fellow citizens. As a result, these libertarians thinkers limit the remit of rights to indivisible goods such as liberty and autonomy, and to property rights, which, they suggest, underpin these other rights. Sen (1985) has argued that the notion of negative rights, as propounded in this case by Nozick (1974), is flawed. Sen questions whether it is sufficient to allow individuals legitimately to pursue their ends even when this might have disastrous consequences. Sen’s point is that individuals may be unable to command certain necessary goods because they have no entitlement to possess those goods. In this case, they have no property rights over goods and services. Bengtsson (1995) relates Sen’s argument to housing, and states, “It is not difficult to find examples of how people have been deprived of shelter, just because they lacked—and others had—control of private property” (p. 126). This implies that the positive rights of some, to property, clash with the negative rights of others. Again it suggests that one cannot divorce rights-based theories from utilitarian considerations (which is precisely why libertarian theories like those of Machan and Rasmussen and Den Uyl restrict rights to negative entities only). An interesting way around the apparent clash between freedom rights and socio-economic claims has been offered by Waldron (1993b). His discussion is also important for a further reason. It shows that the right to housing might actually be one of the most significant rights, if not the most significant right. This is because it acts as the bedrock for all others, in that all rights must be situated.” (665-666)
++
++Second, the situated nature of existence requires we own property before we are able to freely will actions. The right to housing ensures that everyone can wills freely regardless of your starting point.
++King 5Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++
++“Property rules determine where one has a right to be. They define rights of use and exclusion. Thus they grant the owner the power to exclude those with whom they do not wish to share the property. This situation applies whether the property is owned privately or by some public body. This means that some agents have property rights that they can legitimately exercise over their property. This may involve excluding all others from that property. However, all actions are situated in that they must be done somewhere. One must sleep somewhere, wash somewhere, urinate somewhere, and so on. Thus one is not free to perform an action unless there is somewhere where one is free to perform it. Waldron limits his discussion of actions to those absolutely necessary for human survival. However, his list is not an exhaustive one. Indeed, all actions, be they urinating, love-making, reading a book or discussing philosophy, are situated. As will be seen when Nussbaum’s fuller list of functionings is discussed, it is the situated nature of what might be called higher order functions that lead to a full right to housing.” (667)
++Third, an absolutist account of property is coercive. It constrains the homeless from literally doing anything by using the logic of violating someone’s property rights.
++King 6 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++
++“Homelessness is defined by Waldron as the very condition where one is “excluded from all the places governed by private property rules” (1993b, p. 313, author’s emphasis). The homeless are entitled only to be in public places. They have no right to be on private property unless given permission by the owner. They must therefore rely on public places to undertake their situated functions. But this is possible, however, only so long as the public authorities that own this property tolerate them. Just as private owners can exercise their right to exclude, so can public bodies. Waldron rightly points out that there is an increasing regulation and policing of public property that prevents the homeless from exercising their basic functions in public. Waldron gives the example of removing seating from subways in US cities to prevent them from being used by the homeless. This form of ‘zero tolerance’ of vagrancy can also be seen in the attitudes of politicians and public agencies in the UK. The homeless are seen as having no right to be on the streets, there being enough hostel spaces for them. In addition, begging is seen as aggressive and intimidatory behaviour. Waldron argues that “a person not free to be in any place is not free to do anything” (p. 316). One important consequence of this argument is to show that freedom rights do indeed clash. Property rights, as commonly defined in terms of exclusivity of use and disposal, are clearly freedom rights. Private individuals and public corporations who prevent the homeless from accessing their property are thus acting entirely legally and within their rights. Yet there are certain rights we must have, homeless or not, if we are to carry out our basic functions. These too are freedom rights, in that we must be free to be in a place before we can undertake these basic functions. But the situated nature of this freedom means that certain rights can only be fulfilled when the property rights of some are overruled. Likewise, side-constraints prohibiting interference to property rights may well mean that the basic rights of others are infringed because they do not have the freedom to be. The homeless might be so constrained that they are literally unable to do anything without infringing the rights of others.” (667)
++
++Finally, rights based approaches are key. They reaffirm individual freedom and check power relations. Consequential considerations collapse to rights in order to preserve their overall utility.
++King 7 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
++
++“First, though, it is necessary to suggest briefly why rights-based arguments are important. Waldron (1993a) contends that theories of rights teach us about the importance of individual interests, and that they cannot simply be overridden for a seemingly superior (s ocial) good. He sees that the idea of individual rights is attractive “because each of us wants a life governed in part by their own thinking, feeling and decision-making” (p. 583), and not have this trumped by considerations of utility. We are all important beings and thus in what sense can it be legitimate to sacrifice one or some of us for the perceived benefit of others? We might, if we were selfish, see our interests as more important than those of others, and therefore ours should take precedence. However, once we appreciate that this selfishness is likely to be reciprocated, and consequently all that this boils down to is power relations, we might wish to return to some recognition that the interests of others count as much as our own.” (662)
++1AC – Underview
++Truth Testing
++The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best meets their burden under a truth testing paradigm. This requires the AFF to prove the resolution true and the NEG to prove the resolution false.
++A. Text- To affirm is defined as: “to say that something is true in a confident way” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm and to negate is defined as: “to deny the existence or truth of” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate So, the binding standards ascribed in the actions of affirming and negating assume a truth testing model.
++B. Any property assumes the truth of the property -. Thus any counter-role of the ballot collapses to truth testing.
++Frege ’03. Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” in Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell. Broadview Press. March 2003. Pg. 204.
++“It may nevertheless be thought that we cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time realizing the thought that this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing is joined a property of a thought, namely, that of truth. It is also worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has just the same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent of violets”.
++Util Underview
++Empirics flow aff- a right to housing is effective at reducing poverty and homelessness.
++Carrier 15 Scott Carrier, Peabody Award-winning journalist, “Room for Improvement,” Mother Jones March 2015
++In 1992, a psychologist at New York University named Sam Tsemberis decided to test a new model. His idea was to just give the chronically homeless a place to live, on a permanent basis, without making them pass any tests or attend any programs or fill out any forms. "Okay," Tsemberis recalls thinking, "they're schizophrenic, alcoholic, traumatized, brain damaged. What if we don't make them pass any tests or fill out any forms? They aren't any good at that stuff. Inability to pass tests and fill out forms was a large part of how they ended up homeless in the first place. Why not just give them a place to live and offer them free counseling and therapy, health care, and let them decide if they want to participate? Why not treat chronically homeless people as human beings and members of our community who have a basic right to housing and health care?" Tsemberis and his associates, a group called Pathways to Housing, ran a large test in which they provided apartments to 242 chronically homeless individuals, no questions asked. In their apartments they could drink, take drugs, and suffer mental breakdowns, as long as they didn't hurt anyone or bother their neighbors. If they needed and wanted to go to rehab or detox, these services were provided. If they needed and wanted medical care, it was also provided. But it was up to the client to decide what services and care to participate in. The results were remarkable. After five years, 88 percent of the clients were still in their apartments, and the cost of caring for them in their own homes was a little less than what it would have cost to take care of them on the street. A subsequent study of 4,679 New York City homeless with severe mental illness found that each cost an average of $40,449 a year in emergency room, shelter, and other expenses to the system, and that getting those individuals in supportive housing saved an average of $16,282. Soon other cities such as Seattle and Portland, Maine, as well as states like Rhode Island and Illinois, ran their own tests with similar results. Denver found that emergency-service costs alone went down 73 percent for people put in Housing First, for a savings of $31,545 per person; detox visits went down 82 percent, for an additional savings of $8,732. By 2003, Housing First had been embraced by the Bush administration.
++Multiple countries prove housing rights are possible and effective.
++ABA 13 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report on the Right to Housing, 8/12/13, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/homelessness_poverty/resolution117.authcheckdam.pdf
++Scotland, France, and South Africa all show that the progressive implementation of the right to housing through legislation and case law is possible where the political will exists. Scotland’s Homeless Act of 2003 progressively expanded the right to be immediately housed and the right to long-term, supportive housing for as long as it is needed, starting with target populations, but available to all in need as of 2012. The law also includes a private right of action and requires jurisdictions to plan for development of adequate affordable housing supplies.54 France created similar legislation in 2007 in response to public pressure and a decision of the European Committee on Social Rights under the European Social Charter.55 South Africa’s constitutional right to housing protects even those squatting in informal settlements, requiring the provision of adequate alternative housing before families and individuals can be evicted.56 This law has been enforced in local communities to even require rebuilding housing that has been torn down.57 While not yet perfect, these countries are proving that progressively implementing the right to housing is both economically feasible and judicially manageable.

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