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  • Caselist.RoundClass[62]
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Caselist.RoundClass[62]

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Caselist.CitesClass[68]

Cites

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	1	+1AC
	2	+Part 1 - Biology
	3	+First, our body is a condensed history of millions of years of mutations, and we continue to be vulnerable to the random laws of genetics. Random mutations create the inevitable conditions for evolution and explain the diversity of life. HAVILAND: Haviland, William A. Anthropology: The Human Challenge claim, 15th Edition. Cengage Learning, 2017. Yuzu. UH-DD
	4	+“At the level of an individual, genetic traits are transmitted from parent to offspring, enabling a prediction about the chances that any given individual will display some phenotypic characteristic. At the level of a group, the study of genetics takes on additional significance. It reveals how evolutionary processes accounts for the diversity of life on earth. A key concept in genetics is that of the population, or a group of individuals within which breeding takes place. Gene pool refers to all the genetic variants possessed by members of a population. Over generations, the relative proportions of alleles in a population change (biological evolution) according to the varying reproductive success of individuals within that population. In other words, at the level of population genetics, evolution can be defined as changes in allele frequencies in populations. This is also known as microevolution. Four evolutionary forces—mutation, genetic drift, gene flow, and natural selection—create and pattern biological diversity. Mutation: Mutation, the ultimate source of evolutionary change, constantly genetic mutatesions. A random mutation might create a new allele that modifies a protein, making possible a novel biological task. Without the variation brought in through mutations, populations could not change over time in response to changing environments. Mutations may arise whenever copying mistakes are made during cell division. This may involve a change in a single base of a DNA sequence or, at the other extreme, relocation of large segments of DNA, including entire chromosomes. As you read this page, the DNA in each cell of your body is being damaged (Culotta and Koshland, 1994). Fortunately, DNA repair enzymes constantly scan DNA for mistakes, slicing out damaged segments and patching up gaps. Moreover, for sexually reproducing species like humans, the only mutations of any evolutionary consequence are those occurring in sex cells because these cells form future generations. New Mutations arise continuously because no species has perfect DNA repair; thus all species continue to evolve. Environmental factors may increase the rate at which mutations occur (Figure 2.12). These factors include certain dyes, antibiotics, and chemicals used in food preservation. Radiation, whether of industrial or solar origin, represents another important cause of mutations. Even stress can increase mutation rates (Chicurel, 2001) Ultimately, mutations confer versatility at the population level, makeing it possible for an evolving species to adapt more quickly to environmental changes. Remember, however, that mutations occur randomly and thus do not arise out of need for some new adaptation.” (Pg. 41)
	5	+Implications:
	6	+A) Universal starting points are wrong. They visualize a universal and theoretical subject, but this ignores that mutation creates the conditions for diversity and an evolving subject.
	7	+B) Non-ideal starting points that fail to account for evolution are as abstract as ideal theory since they remove themselves from the conditions that construct an embodied subject.
	8	+Second, our ability to experience the world and how we experience the world is specifically conditioned by evolution. Adaptive pressures refine sensory organs through time. HAVILAND 2: Haviland, William A. Anthropology: The Human Challenge, 15th Edition. Cengage Learning, 2017. Yuzu. UH-DD
	9	+“Adaptation to arboreal life involved changes in primates’ sensory organs. The sense of smell, vital for the earliest ground-dwelling, nocturnal mammals, enabled them to sniff out their food and detect hidden predators in the dark. But for active tree life during daylight, good vision provides advantages for judging the location of the next branch or tasty morsel. Accordingly, the sense of smell declined in primates over time, while vision became highly developed. Travel through the trees demands judgments concerning depth, direction, distance, and the spatial relationships between objects such as vines or branches. Monkeys, apes, and humans achieved this through binocular stereoscopic color vision (Figure 3.7), the ability to see the world in the three dimensions of height, width, and depth. Binocular vision (in which two eyes sit next to each other on the same plane so that their visual fields overlap) and nerve connections that run from each eye to both sides of the brain confer complete depth perception characteristic of three-dimensional or stereoscopic vision. This arrangement allows nerve cells to integrate the images derived from each eye. Increased brain size in the visual area in primates, and a greater complexity at nerve connections, also contribute to stereoscopic color vision. Visual acuity varies throughout the primate order in terms of both color and spatial perception. Prosimians, most of whom are nocturnal (like the slow loris from the beginning of this chapter), lack color vision. The eyes of lemurs and lorises (but not tarsiers) are capable of reflecting light off the retina, the surface where nerve fibers gather images in the back of the eye, intensifying the limited light in the forest at night. In addition, prosimian vision is binocular without the benefits of stereoscopy. Their eyes look out from either side of their muzzle or snout. Though there is some overlap of visual fields, their nerve fibers do not cross from each eye to both halves of the brain. By contrast, monkeys, apes, and humans possess both color and stereoscopic vision. The ability to distinguish colors allows anthropoid primates to choose ripe red fruits or tender, immature green leaves due to their coloration. This markedly improves their diet compared to most other mammals. In addition to color vision, anthropoid primates possess a unique structure called the fovea centralis, or central pit, in the retina of each eye. Like a camera lens, this feature enables the animal to focus on a particular object for acutely clear perception without sacrificing visual contact with the object’s surroundings.” (Pg. 62-63)
	10	+Implications:
	11	+A) Any ethical theory that assumes a human centric starting point is epistemically flawed. Different species adapt to different conditions so species develop distinct sensory organs and experience the world in distinct ways. For example, dolphins have sonar capabilities and some birds use magnetism.
	12	+B) Accounting for our senses is a constraint on ethical theories since they determine how we act upon obligations. They inevitable influence how I experience and pursue any end.
	13	+
	14	+Part 2 - Culture
	15	+The evolution of our brains created the conditions for cultural adaptation. No longer did we have to wait generations to prevail environmental pressures. Through culture, we could overcome challenges that were not possible from a purely biology standpoint. HAVILAND 5: Haviland, William A. Anthropology: The Human Challenge, 15th Edition. Cengage Learning, 2017. Yuzu. UH-DD
	16	+“In the quest for the origin of modern humans, paleoanthropologist confront mysteries by drawing from scant evidence that can be misleading and contradictory. Some of the mystery stems from the kind of evolutionary change that was set in motion with the appearance of the genus Homo. The earliest proposed members of genus Homo were recently discovered in sediments in Afar, Ethiopia, and date to about 2.8 million years ago (mya) (DiMaggio et al., 2015; Villmoare et al., 2015). The new South African Homo naledi fossils introduced in the previous chapter may date to a similar time range (Berger et al, 2015). Around this time, the brain size of our ancestors began to grow. Simultaneously, these first members of the genus Homo improved their cultural manipulation of the physical world through use of stone tools. Over time, they increasingly relied on cultural adaptation as a rapid and effective way to adjust to the environment. The evolution of the human brain was imperative for human survival and the evolution of human culture. Over the course of the next 2.5 million or so years, increasing brain size and specialization of function permitted the development of language, planning, new technologies, and artistic expression. With the evolution of a brain that made versatile behavior possible, members of the genus Homo became biocultural beings. U.S. biological anthropologist Misia Landau describes the narrative of human evolutionary history as a heroic epic (Landau, 1991). The hero, or evolving human, faces natural challenges that cannot be overcome from a strictly biological standpoint. When endowed with the gift of intelligence, the hero meets these challenges and becomes fully human. In this narrative, cultural capabilities increasingly separate humans from other evolving animals, recent advances in primatology are undercutting this notion of human uniqueness. The mechanics of biological and cultural change differ. Cultural equipment and techniques can develop rapidly with innovations occurring during an individual’s life-time. By contrast, biological change requires many generations because it depends upon heritable traits. When a new type of stone tool appears, paleoanthropologists investigate whether the cultural change corresponds to a major biological change, such as the appearance of a new species. Debate within paleoanthropology often features the relationship between biological and cultural change.” (Pg. 167-168)
	17	+Implications:
	18	+A. Culture influences our conception of reason and experience. How we act and what we chose to act on is inextricably tied to a cultural conception. For example, willing to go to the store presumes the concept of the store that escapes the independent agency of the individual.
	19	+B. Cultural conflict is inevitable. Since different agents respond to different environments, different and conflicting cultures will arise. For example, different animals biologically evolve to different environments and obviously look different. Traits that would be advantageous in one environment can become disadvantageous in another. In regards to culture, social practices are normalized to adapt to specific and distinct environments, which ensures differing cultures.
	20	+C. Universal starting points cannot solve for cultural conflict because they specifically start from the assumption of removing particularities and acknowledging sameness.
	21	+And, if cultural conflict is inevitable, the goal of intercultural politics is not to eradicate conflict, but to channel conflict in ways productive to intercultural coexistence. This requires an agonistic commitment, which reframes the other as an advisory instead of an enemy. MOUFFE: “The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 UH-DD
	22	+“Once the theoretical terrain has been delineated in such a way, we can begin formulating an alternative to both the aggregative and the deliberative model, one that I propose to call 'agonistic pluralism'.30 A first distinction is needed in order to clarify the new perspective that I am putting forward, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political'. By 'the political', I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. 'Politics', on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'. I consider that it is only when we acknowledge the dimension of 'the political' and understand that 'politics' consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations, that we can pose what I take to be the central question for democratic politics. This question, pace the rationalists, is not how to arrive at a consensus without exclusion, since this would imply the eradication of the political. Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an 'us' by the determination of a 'them'. The novelty of democratic Politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition - which is an impossibility - but the different way in which it is established. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. Envisaged from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', the aim of democratic politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed but as an 'adversary', that is. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents. This category of the 'adversary' does not eliminate antagonism, though, and it should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes identified. An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: libeny and equality, but we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value. there is no rational resolution of the conflict, hence its antagonistic dimension. This does not mean. of course, that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion man a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a conversion). Compromises are, ofcourse, also possible; they are part and parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation.” (Pg. 101-102)
	23	+Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy.
	24	+Prefer additionally-
	25	+Using educational spaces as a sites of empowerment places the judge into the role of the authoritarian adjudicator who molds students in accordance to a particular political end. This kills any conception of critical citizenship
	26	+Rickert Rickert, Thomas. ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World." JacOnline Journal
	27	+“An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized by Giroux and Peter Mclaren. They explain, "Fundamental to the principles that inform critical pedagogy is the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). A presumption here is that it is the teacher who knows (best), and this orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite: though it presents itself as oppositional to the state and the dominant forms of pedagogy that serve the state and its capitalist interests, it nevertheless reinscribes an authoritarian model that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogies that "school" the student in proper behavior. As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and liberatory pedagogies "often camouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function within a disciplinary matrix of power, a covert carceral system, that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212). Such oedipalizing pedagogies are less effective in practice than what the claims for them assert; indeed, the attempt to "school" students in the manner called for by Giroux and McLaren is complicitous with the malaise of postmodern cynicism. Students will dutifully go through their liberatory motions, producing the proper assignments, but it remains an open question whether they carry an oppositional politics with them. The "critical distance" supposedly created with liberatory pedagogy also opens up a cynical distance toward the writing produced in class.” (299-300)
	28	+The only solution to this pedagogical imperialism comes in the form of allowing a pedagogy that embraces contestation, which require agonistic commitment.
	29	+Rickert 2 Rickert, Thomas. ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World." JacOnline Journal
	30	+ “This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives. Pedagogy could reflect this concern in its practices by attending to the idea that each student's life is its own telos, meaning that the individual struggles of each student cannot and should not necessarily mirror our own. Or, to put it another way, students must sooner or later overcome us, even though we may legitimate our sense of service with the idea that we have their best interests in mind. However, we should be suspicious of this presumptive ethic, for, as Mann astutely observes, "nothing is more aggressive than the desire to serve the other” (48)
	31	+Rickert 1 and 2 Outweigh:
	32	+A. This is uniquely true in the context of debate because the norms the judge adopts as reflective of their vision towards resistance are only apparent after they have decided the round, which enforce those norms as legitimate upon the student.
	33	+Impact Calc:
	34	+1. the framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation.
	35	+Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	36	+"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
	37	+2. Arguments about construction of certain identities can never turn the framework- that misses the goal of agonism.
	38	+Mouffe 3 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	39	+A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.
	40	+
	41	+Part 3: Advocacy
	42	+I defend the resolution as a general principle, but will specify further if asked in CX.
	43	+Part 4: Contention
	44	+Advantage 1 is Cencorship is Antagonism-
	45	+Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
	46	+Mouffe 4 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
	47	+I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
	48	+This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
	49	+Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
	50	+ Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private language, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claiming that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is simply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
	51	+Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent—even if it results in violent things the speech in and of itself isn’t harmful.
	52	+Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
	53	+Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that End Page 285 is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities.
	54	+
	55	+Contention 2: Temporal Language
	56	+ Injurious speech is specifically conditioned by a history of social normalization. Strategies that account for the damage of the utterance in the moment cannot solve for the violence that precedes and follows the moment.
	57	+BUTLER: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
	58	+As utterances, they work to the extent that they are given in the form of a ritual, that is, repeated in time, and, hence, maintain a sphere of operation that is not restricted to the moment of the utterance itself. The illocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment. The "moment" in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance.” (Pg. 3)
	59	+Implications-
	60	+1. Linguistic Reversibility- injurious speech subjugates agents but paradoxically marks them as socially recognizable within language. This presents a site of linguistic reversibility. Since language is temporal, we can reverse the norms that make injurious speech possible.
	61	+BUTLER 2: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
	62	+“One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a named, one is also, paradoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one it injures. What is this force, and how might we come to understand its faultlines?” (Pg. 2)
	63	+2. Censorship is guaranteed failure~-~- It prevents survival strategies and it requires using injurious speech in its own critique. This ensures recirculation.
	64	+BUTLER 3: “Excitable Speech: A Politics of Performativity” by Judith Butler 1997 UH-DD
	65	+“Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a moment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning" those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context of legal speech. Paradoxically, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech.
	66	+Impacts:
	67	+A. Censorship destroy legitimate forms of resistance and survival methods by closing off the ability to appropriate. So, censorship’s net benefit is non-unique.
	68	+B. Censorship can’t solve for its own impacts. Using the rhetoric becomes necessary in criticism against the speech. This is particularly true in a legal context that proliferates the utterance in policy.
	69	+C. This outweighs- directly kills any solvency censorship could have and it turns the link on a long-term basis. The recirculation of speech ensures its survival in language. This is specifically true in the context of censorship critique since it requires deploying the speech in its context. Instead we should appropriate.
	70	+Part 4: Underview
	71	+1. Theory Paradigm issues:
	72	+a) Aff gets 1AR Theory- otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this- meta theory also precedes the evaluation of initial theory shells because it determines whether or not I could engage in theory in the first place.
	73	+b) 1AR theory is drop the debater- the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance- you must be punished.
	74	+c) No neg RVI- the 6 minute 2NR has more than enough time to win both theory and substance and a 6 minute 2NR that can go all in on theory and read me out which prevents theory from being recourse against even truly abusive positions.
	75	+d) Competing interps- reasonability assumes competing interps since you need offense defense to evaluate the theory framework debate, which concedes the authority of competing interps.
	76	+
	77	+2. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best meets their burden under a truth testing paradigm. This requires the AFF to prove the resolution true and the NEG to prove the resolution false.
	78	+A. Text- To affirm is defined as: “to say that something is true in a confident way” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm and to negate is defined as: “to deny the existence or truth of” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate So, the binding standards ascribed in the actions of affirming and negating assume a truth testing model.
	79	+B. Any property assumes the truth of the property -. Thus any counter-role of the ballot collapses to truth testing.
	80	+Frege ’03. Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” in Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell. Broadview Press. March 2003. Pg. 204.
	81	+“It may nevertheless be thought that we cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time realizing the thought that this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing is joined a property of a thought, namely, that of truth. It is also worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has just the same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent of violets”.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-03-18 04:52:46.165

Judge

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	1	+gandra, lin, gamble

Opponent

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	1	+Cedar Park MG

ParentRound

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	1	+62

Round

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	1	+Semis

Team

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

Title

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	1	+JF - 1AC - Agonism - V3

Tournament

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	1	+UH