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Cites

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	1	+Part 1 is the Framework
	2	+Agency cannot be separated from norms of dependency towards Others. Precariousness, or the state of being vulnerable towards the other and opaque, ground existence. 2 warrants:
	3	+1. Although we believe we act as independent agents, our judgements are always mediated by a set of norms that are not fully our own. Butler
	4	+Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
	5	+In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over-looked the fact that the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening. This opening calls into question the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self becomes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue see Foucault. Whether or not the Other is singular, the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter. For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seriously that the recognition comes from me. But in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not singlehandedly make them, then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use.
	6	+
	7	+2. To give a full account of one’s agency is impossible. My body has a history that I cannot recollect, yet nonetheless it grounds who I am. Existence begins with bare vulnerability towards the Other. I cannot escape this relationship because it grounds a part of who I am that I don’t have an account for. Butler 2
	8	+Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
	9	+There are, then, several ways in which the account I may give of myself has the potential to break apart and to become undermined. My efforts to give an account of myself founder in part upon the fact of my exposure to you, an exposure in spoken language and, in a different way, in written address as well see Felman. This is a condition of my narration that I cannot fully thematize within any narrative I might provide, and that does not fully yield to a sequential account. There is a bodily referent here, a condition of me, that I can point to, but I cannot narrate precisely, even though there are no doubt stories about where my body went and what it did and did not do. But there is also a history to my body for which I can have no recollection, and there is as well a part of bodily experience-what is indexed by the word "exposure-that only with difficulty, if at all, can assume narrative form. On the other hand, exposure, like the operation of the norm, constitutes the conditions of my own emergence and knowability, and I cannot be present to a temporality that precedes my own capacity for self-reflec- tion. This means that my narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make me and my story in language possible. And it means that my story always arrives late., reconstructing, even as I produce myself differently in the very act of telling. My account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I have no definitive story. I cannot explain exactly why I have emerged in this way, and my efforts at narrative reconstruction are always undergoing revision. There is that in me and of me for which I can give no account. But does this mean that I am not, in the moral sense, accountable for who I am and for what I do? And if I find that despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot make myself fully accountable to you, is this ethical failure? Or is it a failure that gives rise to a certain ethical disposition in the place of a full and satisfying notion of narrative accountability?
	10	+This means that Identity is fluid – agency and ability to act as an agent depends upon bare vulnerability towards Others to ground who one is and how one acts. Since relationships with Others change, identity changes. Implications:
	11	+A. Static starting points are counterproductive to notions of fluid identity because they start from the assumption of a universal relationship with the other, which is impossible.
	12	+B. Any starting point of liberation that does not relate its methodology to vulnerability fails to apprehend the conditions of existence because they have treated the subject as singular and its narrative as independent of the Other.
	13	+And, the subject does not have jurisdiction over its own opacity so it cannot ignore obligations from precariousness because they ground the subject in ways that cannot be repossessed in giving an account one’s self. Butler 3
	14	+Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
	15	+“In recent years, the critique of poststructuralism, itself loquacious, has held that the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding undermines the possibility of respon- sibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself. Critics have argued that the various critical reconsiderations of the subject, including those that do away with the theory of the subject altogether, cannot provide the basis for an account of responsibil- ity, that if we are, as it were, divided, ungrounded, or incoherent from the start, it will be impossible to ground a notion of personal or social responsibility on the basis of such a view. I would like to try to rebut this view in what follows, and to show how a theory of subject-formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge can work in the ser- vice of a conception of ethics and, indeed, of responsibility. If the subject is opaque to itself, it is not therefore licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its relations to others. Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of its relations to others that it is opaque to itself, and if those relations to others are precisely the venue for its ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue of the subject's opacity to itself that it sustains some of its most important ethical bonds.”
	16	+
	17	+Outweighs: It is not sufficiently binding on agents to simply know is moral. The ethical theory must provide a reason why agents must care about being moral. Butler explains that our theory is binding in virtue of not having control over our precarious history.
	18	+Thus, the standard is rejecting norms that deny the precariousness of our agency.
	19	+
	20	+Additionally prefer- deconstructive logic is constitutive of metaphysics. All concepts, identities, and judgements are constructed in opposition to their negative. There can be no conception of good without bad, friendship without betrayal, promises without promise breaking. Ontological violence is foundational to any ethical or political framework.
	21	+Hagglund “THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
	22	+“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, political, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all.
	23	+Encountering radical difference is to encounter the limits of acknowledgement itself. You can never know the radically different as they know themselves because your identity depends on the exclusion of theirs, yet nonetheless you need them to have any conception of yourself. Embracing radical difference requires we embrace precariousness and interdependence of our nature in order to better understand the other. Butler 4
	24	+Giving an Account of Oneself.  Judith Butler.  Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40. UH-DD
	25	+Can a new sense of ethics emerge from that inevitable ethical failure? I suggest that it can, and that it would be spawned from a certain willingness to acknowledge the limits of acknowledgment itself, that when we claim to know and present ourselves, we will fail in some ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are, and that we cannot expect anything else from others. If we speak about an acknowledgment of the limits of acknowledgment itself, are we then assuming that acknowledgment in the first sense is full and complete in its determination of the limits of acknowledgment in the second? In other words, do we know in an unqualified way that acknowledgment is always qualified? Is the first kind of knowing qualified by the qualification that it knows? This would have to be the case, for to acknowledge one's own opacity or that of another does not transform opacity into transparency. To know the limits of acknowledgment is a self-limiting act and, as a result, to experience the limits of knowing itself. This can, by the way, constitute a disposition of humility, and of generosity, since I will need to be forgiven for what I cannot fully know, what I could not have fully known, and I will be under a similar obligation to offer forgiveness to others who are also constituted in partial opacity to themselves.
	26	+
	27	+
	28	+Impact Calculus-
	29	+
	30	+1. Grievability is a precondition for precariousness. The state of being rendered ungrievable is more than just being oppressed. Non-grievability separates death from having any impact on a social relationship, which reduces agency to something outside of precariousness. Grievability is necessary to apprehended the vulnerability in our ontology. Butler 5
	31	+“Frames of War” by Judith Butler 2009 UH-DD
	32	+“Over and against an existential concept of finitude that singularizes our relation to death and to life, precariousness underscores our radical substitutability and anonymity in relation both to certain socially facilitated modes of dying and death and to other socially conditioned modes of persisting and flourishing. It is not that we are born and then later become precarious, but rather that precariousness is coextensive with birth itself (birth is, by definition, precarious), which means that it matters whether or not this infant being survives, and that its survival is dependent on what we might call a social network of hands. Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters. For the most part, we imagine that an infant comes into the world, is sustained in and by that world through to adulthood and old age, and finally dies. We imagine that when the child is wanted, there is celebration at the beginning of life. But there can be no celebration without an implicit understanding that the life is grievable, that it would be grieved if it were lost, and that this future anterior is installed as the condition of its life. In ordinary language, grief attends the life that has already been lived, and presupposes that life as having ended. But, according to the future anterior (which is also part of ordinary language), grievability is a condition of a life's emergence and sustenance.7 The future anterior, "a life has been lived," is presupposed at the beginning of a life that has only begun to be lived. In other words, "this will be a life that will have been lived" is the presupposition of a grievable life, which means that this will be a life that can be regarded as a life, and be sustained by that regard. Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, "there is a life that will never have been lived," sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of precarious life. Grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the living being as living, exposed to non-life from the start.” 14-15
	33	+
	34	+2. The framework is not ends based.
	35	+structural violence matters because it makes distinctions between levels of precocity, but ungreivability comes first because it positions subjects outside of grievability when in fact they are grievable
	36	+A. Ending the denial of precarity requires that we orient ourselves to deconstruct grievability. We do this through a repetitive deconstruction of ungrievable frames.
	37	+Butler 61 Judith Butler, “Frames of War”
	38	+
	39	+The frame that seeks to contain, convey, and determine what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing precisely that) depends upon the conditions of reproducibility in order to succeed. And yet, this very reproducibility entails a constant breaking from context, a constant delimitation of new context, which means that the "frame" does not quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time it seeks to give definitive organization to its content. In other words, the frame does not hold anything together in one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place. As the frame constantly breaks from its context, this self-breaking becomes part of the very definition. This leads us to a different way of understanding both the frame's efficacy and its vulnerability to reversal, to subversion, even to critical instrumentalization. What is taken for granted in one instance becomes thematized critically or even incredulously in another. This shifting temporal dimension of the frame constitutes the possibility and trajectory of its affect as well. Thus the digital image circulates outside the confines of Abu Ghraib, or the poetry in Guantanamo is recovered by constitutional lawyers who arrange for its publication throughout the world. The conditions are set for astonishment, outrage, revulsion, admiration, and discovery, depending on how the content is framed by shifting time and place. The movement of the image or the text outside of confinement is a kind of "breaking out," so that even though neither the image nor the poetry can free anyone from prison, or stop a bomb or, indeed, reverse the course of the war, they nevertheless do provide the conditions for breaking out of the quotidian acceptance of war and for a more generalized horror and outrage that will support and impel calls for justice and an end to violence.
	40	+Part 2 is the Ungrievable
	41	+Homeless exclusion is based upon fear and disease rhetoric—homeless bodies are social and physically excluded.
	42	+Amster
	43	+Amster, Randall. “Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness,” Social Justice. Vol. 30, No. 1 (91), Race, Security and Social Movements (2003), pp. 195-221
	44	+In light of the hegemonic nature of the Disney aesthetic, it is worth considering how this notion of "disease" seems to originate primarily within the dominant culture, and then is projected onto marginalized populations such as the homeless. In this regard, it is instructive to consider how constructions of street people and the homeless serve to perpetuate stereotypes and maintain stigmatization, since¶ these processes serve to reinforce such projections and reify bourgeois fears. As Talmadge Wright (1997:69) infers, "the homeless body in the public imagination represents the body of decay, the degenerate body, a body that is constantly¶ rejected by the public as 'sick,' 'scary,' 'dirty,' and 'smelly,' and a host of other pejoratives used to create social distance between housed and unhoused persons."¶ This sense of social distancing reflects "the desire of those who feel threatened to¶ distance themselves from defiled people and defiled places...places associated with¶ ethnic and racial minorities, like the inner city, that are still tainted and perceived as¶ polluting in racist discourses, and place-related phobias that are similarly evident in¶ response to other minorities, like gays and the homeless" (Sibley, 1995: 49, 59). In analyzing "new urban spaces," Wright (2000: 27) thus observes: "In effect, street people, camping in parks, who exhibit appearances at odds with middle class comportment, evoke fears of 'contamination' and disgust, a reminder of the¶ power of abjection. Homeless persons embody the social fear of privileged consumers, fear for their families, for their children, fear that 'those' people will¶ harm them and therefore must be placed as far away as possible from safe¶ neighborhoods." Likewise, Samira Kawash (1998: 329) notes: "The public view of the homeless as 'filth' marks the danger of this body as body to the homogeneity¶ and wholeness of the public... The solution to this impasse appears as the ultimate aim of the 'homeless wars': to exert such pressures against this body that will reduce it to nothing, to squeeze it until it is so small that it disappears, such that the circle of the social will again appear closed." Bringing this cycle of demonization¶ and repression to its logical conclusion, Wright (2000: 27) concludes: "The subsequent social death which homeless persons endure is all too often accompanied by real death and injury as social exclusion moves from criminalization of poverty to social isolation and incarceration in institutional systems of control¶shelters and prisons."
	45	+
	46	+Homelessness marks individuals as ungrievable—they live nameless lives parallel to those precariously housed.
	47	+Peck
	48	+Peck, Alice. “CREATING INTERSECTIONS: MAPPING THE PARALLEL LIVES OF HOMELESSNESS IN WASHINGTON D.C.” George Mason University. http://digilib.gmu.edu/jspui/bitstream/handle/1920/10342/Peck_thesis_2015.pdf?sequence=1andisAllowed=y
	49	+
	50	+The physical existence of homelessness is life on the margins of society, exposed to hunger, poverty, social exclusion, and humiliation in cities where affordable housing is¶ supplanted by new development, influx of capital, and the overriding logic of¶ consumption (Harvey; 2013; Scheper-Hughes, 2004). Denied the same life chances, this¶ structural violence is compounded by cultural stigma and stereotypes associated with¶ homelessness, the everyday indifference of domiciled citizens, and the routine prejudice of bureaucratic settings (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004). In the context of¶ neoliberal United States, where a rugged American individualism inculcates societal¶ dispositions, the inequality, social marginalisation, and poverty of homelessness can be¶ misrecognised as the natural order of things, prompting some individuals to internalise¶ blame for their situation as homeless. This is the symbolic violence of neoliberalism¶ whereby individuals’ “habitus”, their preconscious likes, dislikes, preferences, and¶ beliefs, exist in submission to the neoliberal logic of productivity, accountability and¶ successful citizenship (Bourdieu, 2000). To diverge from this neoliberal subject is to¶ break from recognizable frames of worthy life, and to exists as a precarious Other: a homeless body that becomes unnameable and ungrievable (Butler, 2006). Laura has a name, a face, a body. She is a human, as are the thousands of people who, for myriad reasons, are homeless or precariously housed in Washington D.C. Despite cohabiting in the same city and sharing a common humanity, people who are homeless exist on the margins; bereft of equal life chances, they are a swathe of society living a radically parallel life. This research hopes to relay the experiences of several people who are homeless as they navigate the social and physical spaces of the city. My goal is not to “reveal” or “uncover” the lives of these homeless individuals; such language suggests homelessness as a hidden or concealed existence in need of a benevolent researcher to expose - a claim that is visibly false.
	51	+
	52	+Part 3 is The Home
	53	+Advocacy: I defend the resolution as a general principle, but can specify further if asked in CX.
	54	+First, there is no current public space in which one can be homeless and grievable. Private space for the homeless is key.
	55	+Peck 2
	56	+Peck, Alice. “CREATING INTERSECTIONS: MAPPING THE PARALLEL LIVES OF HOMELESSNESS IN WASHINGTON D.C.” George Mason University. http://digilib.gmu.edu/jspui/bitstream/handle/1920/10342/Peck_thesis_2015.pdf?sequence=1andisAllowed=y
	57	+Despite inhabiting¶ environments of poverty, instability and precarity, the symbolic power of the neoliberal¶ logic inculcates all bodies – both those homeless and those domiciled, with the habitus¶ that this is the natural way of things. Homeless subjects, as unproductive, inactive bodies, are not considered mournable lives, and the disposition of indifference to the inequity and intolerable suffering of homelessness becomes normalised. This segregation between the¶ homeless and domiciled is not only normalised, but actively created and controlled through the construction of spatial poverty in cities.¶ Increasing commodification of urban spaces and the segregation of cities along¶ economic lines renders social marginalization and spatial exclusion an inevitable byproduct of urban redevelopment. Spatial exclusion is guaranteed through the development of spaces that are gated, privatized, commodified, and under surveillance,¶ spaces which deny access to populations, like the homeless, who do not possess sufficient economic capital to enter (Harvey, 2013). Drawing on David Harvey’s theories of¶ neoliberalism connects processes of urban redevelopment within Washington D.C. to¶ individual experiences of homelessness, contextualising the daily marginalisation of the¶ homeless at the micro level within macro processes of neoliberalism. This spatial and social marginalisation is enforced through the surveillance,¶ discipline, and criminalisation of homeless bodies in urban spaces, a form of power¶ wielded over the homeless as a deliberate force to render them invisible and remove them¶ from the public eye.
	58	+
	59	+Second, denying housing annihilates not only a place for the homeless, but also their existence. The right to housing is the right to exist.
	60	+Amster 2
	61	+Amster, Randall. “Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness,” Social Justice. Vol. 30, No. 1 (91), Race, Security and Social Movements (2003), pp. 195-221
	62	+With the homeless, it is very apparent: panhandling, sleeping in public, and¶ sidewalk sitting. Despite frequent assertions that only "conduct" is being targeted¶ and not "status" (e.g., Kelling and Coles, 1996:40), it is clear that certain conduct¶ attaches to specific groups, and that proscribing the conduct is equivalent to¶ criminalizing the category. In some cases, as with teen curfews or "car cruising"¶ laws, the prohibited conduct affects the target group's identities and liberties, but¶ does not necessarily undermine their basic ability to survive, Neil Smith (1996:¶ 225), however, observes that "the criminalization of more and more aspects of the¶ everyday life of homeless people is increasingly pervasive." Likewise, Ferrell¶ (2001:164) notes that the daily lives of the homeless "are all but outlawed through¶ a plethora of new statutes and enforcement strategies regarding sitting, sleeping,¶ begging, loitering, and 'urban camping.'"3 As Mitchell (1998a: 10) emphasizes,¶ "if homeless people can only live in public, and if the things one must do to live are not allowed in public space, then homelessness is not just criminalized; life for homeless people is made impossible." The implications and intentions are all too¶ clear:¶ By in effect annihilating the spaces in which the homeless must live, these laws seek simply to annihilate homeless people themselves.... The intent¶ is clear: to control behavior and space such that homeless people simply¶ cannot do what they must do in order to survive without breaking laws.¶ Survival itself is criminalized.... In other words, we are creating a world in which a whole class of people simply cannot be, entirely because they have no place to be (Mitchell, 1997a: 305-311) 4¶ According to Smith (1996: 230), "in the revanchist city, homeless people suffer¶ a symbolic extermination and erasure."¶ An impressive and detailed body of work that illustrates and amplifies these¶ points has been generated by Maria Foscarinis and various associates affiliated¶ with her National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP). A series¶ of scholarly articles (e.g., Foscarinis et al., 1999; Foscarinis, 1996; Foscarinis and¶ Herz, 1995; Brown, 1999), demonstrates beyond doubt an ongoing and pervasive¶ national trend toward "the criminalization of homelessness," evidenced by the¶ mounting number of cities and towns with laws prohibiting behaviors including¶ "aggressive panhandling," "urban camping," and "sidewalk sitting."
	63	+Third, it is also more than physical spaces, housing determines interpersonal relationships, and life is not precarious without this social existence.
	64	+Hartman
	65	+Hartman, Chester. Poverty and Race Research Action Council, “The Case for a Right to Housing” Housing Policy Debate, Volume 9, Issue 2.
	66	+
	67	+The right to adequate housing finds legal substance within more¶ than a dozen international human rights texts . . . and has been¶ reaffirmed in numerous international declaratory and policyoriented¶ instruments. More than fifty national constitutions¶ enshrine various formulations of housing rights and other¶ housing-related state responsibilities . . . and a plethora of domestic¶ laws in nearly all countries have a bearing upon one or¶ more of the core elements of housing rights. Without exception,¶ every government has explicitly recognized that adequate housing¶ is a right under international law. Though on the surface a¶ favorable situation, such legal recognition at the international¶ level has rarely been transformed into effective domestic legislative¶ and policy measures seeking to apply and implement—in¶ good faith—international obligations relevant to housing¶ rights. . . . No government could realistically proclaim that housing¶ rights exist as much in fact as they do in law (Leckie 1994,¶ 14–15; see also Herman 1994).¶ In short, because housing is so central to one’s life, it merits attaining the status of a right. It is at the core of one’s social and personal life, determining the kinds of influences and relationships one has and access to key opportunities and services (education, employment,¶ health care). Housing also is an outward sign of status and¶ affects the health and well-being of the surrounding community.¶ Probably only those who have experienced how hard it is to have¶ personal and family stability or land a job without a home, how¶ hard it is to keep up with schoolwork in an overcrowded apartment,¶ how much the sheer pressure to make the rent can overwhelm the¶ rest of one’s life—experiences largely foreign to the housing policy¶ analysts, academics, and bureaucrats who read and write articles¶ such as this—can fully comprehend just how central decent, affordable¶ housing is, or might be, and how limiting and burdensome is¶ its absence. Why just housing?¶ The question may be raised: Why housing? Why not a right to decent,¶ affordable food? To health care? Why not guarantee people¶ enough income so that, like the majority of Americans, they can¶ purchase the housing, health care, and other basics they need in¶ the market? I would answer as follows.¶ 230 Chester Hartman¶ We certainly should have a right to decent, affordable food11 and¶ health care (in the latter case, the costs, it should be noted, would¶ be somewhat lower were housing-related detriments to good health¶ eliminated); our recent failure to pass single-payer health reform¶ legislation or otherwise provide these guarantees is a tragedy of¶ massive proportions. It is not an either/or proposition, and movements¶ for basic rights must coalesce into a more potent political¶ force. Housing has a special character, not only because it consumes so large a portion of the household budget, especially for lower-income families, but because it is, as noted above, the central setting for so much of one’s personal and family life as well as the locus of mobility opportunities, access to community resources, and societal status (Hartman 1975).¶ It would be wonderful if everyone in the United States had enough¶ income to satisfy his or her needs in the market, but that goal is¶ even less likely to be achieved than is the goal of decent housing for¶ all. Widening income inequality and the structure of the job market¶ make it hard to imagine how everyone could have enough income to¶ pay for housing and other necessities. In fact, an increasingly large¶ number of Americans are unable to attain a decent standard of living¶ as prices outstrip incomes (Stone 1993). Moreover, that approach¶ misreads the nature of the housing market. The profitmaximizing¶ behavior of all actors in that market—landowners,¶ developers, builders, materials suppliers, real estate brokers, landlords,¶ even homeowners—at all points works against assuring that¶ everyone has decent, affordable housing, absent a legally enforceable¶ right to housing and explicit commitment of resources to its realization.
	68	+
	69	+Fourth, housing rights are uniquely key- they force the government to recognize of the existence of homelessness.
	70	+Housing is only getting more exclusive—the question is not whether or not a right to housing is perfect, but rather if there will be societal recognition of the homeless in its absence.
	71	+Thomas and Culhane 11
	72	+Byrne, Thomas. Dennis Culhane. “Right to Housing: An Effective Means for Addressing Homelessness, The Edward V. Sparer Symposium Issue: Partnering against Poverty: Examining Cross-Disciplinary Approaches to Public Interest Lawyering” Issue 3 Volume 14, Issue 3 (2011)
	73	+
	74	+As we have seen, one of the primary benefits of the existence of a right to housing framework in European countries is that it obliges governments to take the problems of homelessness and housing instability seriously and at least in theory, to make a concerted effort towards providing for the housing¶ needs of their citizenry. The fact that such an equivalent framework is largely nonexistent in the United States leads to the question of what then, exists in its absence. In other words, is there any framework in the¶ United States that places some responsibility on the government to provide for the housing needs of¶ vulnerable Americans? And if so, what has been the track record in upholding this responsibility? The¶ remainder of this section will be dedicated primarily to addressing these two questions.¶ In response to the first question, on a national level, the nearest approximation of a right to housing¶ in the United States can be found in the Housing Act of 1949, which calls for “the realization as soon as¶ feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.”43 While¶ strongly worded, the inclusion of this provision is not quite strong enough to be interpreted as establishing a¶ right to housing for all American citizens. Instead, it is perhaps more appropriate to describe it, as Freeman¶ does, as “an explicit social contract to provide adequate housing for America’s entire population.”44 That¶ there was an intent to make good on this contract seemed apparent in the initial decades following the¶ passage of the Housing Act of 1949, as there were great expansions in public housing and a number of¶ measures were introduced that made it possible for millions of Americans to purchase homes.45 However,¶ more recent experience indicates that the social contract created by the Housing Act is not a binding one, as¶ progress has fallen sharply in providing for the housing needs of vulnerable Americans experiencing¶ homelessness and housing instability.The degree to which progress towards the goal of providing a decent home for all Americans has stalled can be seen most clearly in the dwindling supply of affordable rental units for low-income individuals, who are most at risk of experiencing homelessness. Between 1995 and 2005, roughly 2.2¶ million low-cost rental units were lost from the nation’s rental stock, a figure that was twice as large as the¶ loss of all other types of units combined. This trend has continued through the economic recession, and most¶ of the losses in low-income units are permanent due to demolition, natural disasters or conversion to nonresidential¶ uses.
	75	+Fifth, this is try or die~-~- It is either private spaces or criminalization—no world exists in which the homeless are grievable without housing.
	76	+Amster 3
	77	+Amster, Randall. “Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness,” Social Justice. Vol. 30, No. 1 (91), Race, Security and Social Movements (2003), pp. 195-221
	78	+
	79	+file:///Users/morgangrosch/Downloads/2976817220(2).pdf
	80	+An impressive and detailed body of work that illustrates and amplifies these points has been generated by Maria Foscarinis and various associates affiliated with her National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP). A series of scholarly articles (e.g., Foscarinis et al., 1999; Foscarinis, 1996; Foscarinis and¶ Herz, 1995; Brown, 1999), demonstrates beyond doubt an ongoing and pervasive national trend toward "the criminalization of homelessness," evidenced by the mounting number of cities and towns with laws prohibiting behaviors including "aggressive panhandling," "urban camping," and "sidewalk sitting."5 In assessing the purpose of these laws, Foscarinis (1996: 22) notes that "some cities state¶ expressly that their intention is to drive their homeless residents out of the city.... In other cases, the stated purpose is to remove homeless people from particular¶ places, such as parks, streets or downtown areas.... Some target the 'visible' homeless with the goal of making them 'invisible.'" Noting certain negative¶ effects of such laws in terms of public policy including poor use of fiscal¶ resources, divisiveness, and a deepening of political and social tensions ?¶ Foscarinis (1996: 63) concludes that "decriminalization responses to homelessness¶ are inhumane, do not solve the problem, and are subject to constitutional¶ challenge."¶ In 1999, the NLCHP published an influential report (Out of Sight ? Out of¶ Mind? Anti-Homeless Laws, Litigation, and Alternatives in 50 United States¶ Cities) that expanded on some of these important points. The report found that, in¶ the cross-section of cities surveyed, 86 had anti-begging ordinances, while 73¶ had anti-sleeping laws. The presence of such laws and accompanying enforcement strategies was also found to constitute "poor public policy" by acting as barriers to self-sufficiency, unduly burdening the criminal justice system, wasting scarce municipal resources, and subjecting cities to legal liabilities and expenses. The report concluded that "criminalization is ineffective, counterproductive, and¶ inhumane," and suggested "alternatives to criminalization," including expanded¶ services, places to perform necessary functions, transitional and public housing,¶ more employment opportunities, and greater cooperation among city officials,¶ business people, and the homeless themselves (NLCHP, 1999; Foscarinis et al.,¶ 1999; Brown, 1999). Additional positive alternatives are noted in a subsequent¶ article that analyzes the NLCHP report. Fabyankovic (2000) includes alliances¶ formed between police officers, homeless advocates, and outreach workers;¶ programs that help the homeless move toward self-sufficiency; compassionate¶ approaches rather than law enforcement approaches; the development of police¶ sensitivity training programs; the creation of a day labor center; and the mediation¶ of disputes between property owners and the homeless.
	81	+An absolutist account of property contributes to eugenic ideologies. It constrains the homeless from literally doing anything by using the logic of violating someone’s property rights. The right to housing is key to affirm their intrinsic greivability.
	82	+King Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
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	84	+“Homelessness is defined by Waldron as the very condition where one is “excluded from all the places governed by private property rules” (1993b, p. 313, author’s emphasis). The homeless are entitled only to be in public places. They have no right to be on private property unless given permission by the owner. They must therefore rely on public places to undertake their situated functions. But this is possible, however, only so long as the public authorities that own this property tolerate them. Just as private owners can exercise their right to exclude, so can public bodies. Waldron rightly points out that there is an increasing regulation and policing of public property that prevents the homeless from exercising their basic functions in public. Waldron gives the example of removing seating from subways in US cities to prevent them from being used by the homeless. This form of ‘zero tolerance’ of vagrancy can also be seen in the attitudes of politicians and public agencies in the UK. The homeless are seen as having no right to be on the streets, there being enough hostel spaces for them. In addition, begging is seen as aggressive and intimidatory behaviour. Waldron argues that “a person not free to be in any place is not free to do anything” (p. 316). One important consequence of this argument is to show that freedom rights do indeed clash. Property rights, as commonly defined in terms of exclusivity of use and disposal, are clearly freedom rights. Private individuals and public corporations who prevent the homeless from accessing their property are thus acting entirely legally and within their rights. Yet there are certain rights we must have, homeless or not, if we are to carry out our basic functions. These too are freedom rights, in that we must be free to be in a place before we can undertake these basic functions. But the situated nature of this freedom means that certain rights can only be fulfilled when the property rights of some are overruled. Likewise, side-constraints prohibiting interference to property rights may well mean that the basic rights of others are infringed because they do not have the freedom to be. The homeless might be so constrained that they are literally unable to do anything without infringing the rights of others.” (667)
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	86	+Underview
	87	+K stuff
	88	+Empirics flow aff- a right to housing is effective at reducing poverty and homelessness.
	89	+Carrier 15 Scott Carrier, Peabody Award-winning journalist, “Room for Improvement,” Mother Jones March 2015
	90	+In 1992, a psychologist at New York University named Sam Tsemberis decided to test a new model. His idea was to just give the chronically homeless a place to live, on a permanent basis, without making them pass any tests or attend any programs or fill out any forms. "Okay," Tsemberis recalls thinking, "they're schizophrenic, alcoholic, traumatized, brain damaged. What if we don't make them pass any tests or fill out any forms? They aren't any good at that stuff. Inability to pass tests and fill out forms was a large part of how they ended up homeless in the first place. Why not just give them a place to live and offer them free counseling and therapy, health care, and let them decide if they want to participate? Why not treat chronically homeless people as human beings and members of our community who have a basic right to housing and health care?" Tsemberis and his associates, a group called Pathways to Housing, ran a large test in which they provided apartments to 242 chronically homeless individuals, no questions asked. In their apartments they could drink, take drugs, and suffer mental breakdowns, as long as they didn't hurt anyone or bother their neighbors. If they needed and wanted to go to rehab or detox, these services were provided. If they needed and wanted medical care, it was also provided. But it was up to the client to decide what services and care to participate in. The results were remarkable. After five years, 88 percent of the clients were still in their apartments, and the cost of caring for them in their own homes was a little less than what it would have cost to take care of them on the street
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	92	+. A subsequent study of 4,679 New York City homeless with severe mental illness found that each cost an average of $40,449 a year in emergency room, shelter, and other expenses to the system, and that getting those individuals in supportive housing saved an average of $16,282. Soon other cities such as Seattle and Portland, Maine, as well as states like Rhode Island and Illinois, ran their own tests with similar results. Denver found that emergency-service costs alone went down 73 percent for people put in Housing First, for a savings of $31,545 per person; detox visits went down 82 percent, for an additional savings of $8,732. By 2003, Housing First had been embraced by the Bush administration.

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	1	+2017-03-10 21:11:27.151

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	1	+Jacob Koshak

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	1	+Kinkaid VL

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	1	+51

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	1	+6

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

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	1	+MA - 1AC - Precarity

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	1	+TFA