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  • Caselist.RoundClass[47]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[52]

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Caselist.RoundClass[47]

EntryDate

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Caselist.CitesClass[52]

Cites

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	1	+Morality requires a system of mutual constraints- if I decide that a certain action is good or moral, I must recognize that others can take the same good or moral action. Impeding on such actions is logically contradictory since it would justify that others could impede upon your action. For example, if I decide that I want ice cream and I have the right to pursue getting ice cream, I cannot then go out and steal someone else’s ice cream. Otherwise, this would justify others could steal from me, which contradicts my ultimate goal.
	2	+Jamsheed Siyar furthers Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999:
	3	+. Now, when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of action, precluding other actions, etc. Thus, my ends function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can or must do (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that other subjects can also recognize my end as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, in representing an end, I in effect demand recognition for it from other subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that if I am committed to some end, e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, I cannot be indifferent to the attitudes and actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am in fact committed to realizing my end, i.e. if I represent an end at all, I must demand that the worth of my end, its status as to be done, be recognized by others.
	4	+This gives rise to a system of mutual rights through a governmental system- once we have commited ourselves to understanding the value of others making decisions, we need a political state that maintains a system of rights for all.
	5	+Christine Korsgaard explains Korsgaard, Christine M (Exceptionally practical reasoner). 2008.
	6	+Taking the law into our own hands: Kant on the right to revolution. In The Constitution of Agency, 233-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, eds. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Why is it permissible for others to force or coerce you to conform to the duties of justice? The Universal Principle of Justice in effect says that the only restriction on freedom is consistency with the freedom of everyone else. Anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just, and you therefore have a right to do it. If someone tries to interfere with that right, he is interfering with your freedom and so violating the Universal Principle of Justice. Violations of the Universal Principle of Justice may be opposed by coercion for the simple reason that anything that hinders a hindrance to freedom is consistent with freedom, and anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just. It follows that rights are coercively enforceable. Indeed, coercive enforceability is not something attached to rights; it is constitutive of their very nature (MPJ 6:232). To have a right just is to have the executive authority to enforce a certain claim. This in turn is the foundation of the executive or coercive authority of the political state. Kant’s political philosophy is a social contract theory, in obvious ways in the tradition of Locke. But the differences are important. In Locke’s view, individuals have rights in the state of nature, and may enforce those rights. But when each person determines and enforces his own rights the result is social disorder. Since this disorder is contrary to our interests, people join together into a political state, transferring our executive authority to a government.
	7	+
	8	+The sphere of the state is derived from the force of agreement from the general will of the population. Such conceptions stem from the natural value of human freedom.
	9	+Jean Jacques Rousseau. “The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right”. 1762. Translated by G.D.H Cole. Constitution Project.
	10	+I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and Since the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. But, as men cannot engender new forces, but can only unite and direct existing forces ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power and cause to act in concert. This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man person are the chief instruments of his their self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting themselves himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remains as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution. If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision. This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part. But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act,
	11	+
	12	+However, to exercise rights, certain material conditions must be met before you can take action. For example, I cannot exercise the right to liberty if I have been trapped in a dungeon. Thus, we need a system of bedrock rights that accounts for our material needs- this is the value criterion for the round.
	13	+Peter King in 2003 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
	14	+
	15	+“Property rules determine where one has a right to be. They define rights of use and exclusion. Thus they grant the owner the power to exclude those with whom they do not wish to share the property. This situation applies whether the property is owned privately or by some public body. This means that some agents have property rights that they can legitimately exercise over their property. This may involve excluding all others from that property. However, all actions are situated in that they must be done somewhere. One must sleep somewhere, wash somewhere, urinate somewhere, and so on. Thus one is not free to perform an action unless there is somewhere where one is free to perform it. Waldron limits his discussion of actions to those absolutely necessary for human survival. However, his list is not an exhaustive one. Indeed, all actions, be they urinating, love-making, reading a book or discussing philosophy, are situated. As will be seen when Nussbaum’s fuller list of functionings is discussed, it is the situated nature of what might be called higher order functions that lead to a full right to housing.” (667))
	16	+
	17	+Adv 1 is Civic Engagement
	18	+HAVING A HOME IS KEY TO CITIZENSHIP/FULL PERSONHOOD
	19	+Adams 08 Kristen David (Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law). "Do we need a right to housing." Nev. LJ 9 (2008): 275.
	20	+Having a home is part of being a citizen. Stated somewhat differently, housing may be an important component of fully realized personhood or even existence in the fullest sense of that word.227 Citing Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of personhood, Benjamin Barros has acknowledged the particular connection between the concept of “home” and personal identity.228 G.W.F. Hegel’s conception of “personality” connects personhood, rights, and property in a way that shows how a right to housing could be important to personhood. As Hegel has stated, “Personality implies, in general, a capacity to possess rights, and constitutes the conception and abstract basis of abstract right.”229 Elsewhere, Hegel states, “It is only personality which gives us a right to things.”230 Connecting Hegel’s two statements and taking his argument one step further, if indeed housing is an important component of personhood, it may be possible to argue that homeless persons, whom society perhaps does not currently recognize as fully actualized persons, also are not seen as being capable of holding the same kinds of rights as housed persons. If this statement is correct—that is, if only having a home qualifies a person to be a fully actualized citizen who is capable of having rights, such as a right to a home—it would obviously suggest the existence of a cycle that would be very difficult to break.
	21	+
	22	+HOUSING KEY TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
	23	+Hartman, Chester (urban planner, author, and academic. He is Director of Research of the Poverty and Race Research Action Council in Washington, D.C.). "The case for a right to housing." (1998): 223-246.
	24	+Beyond these mostly tangible, and in theory measurable, practical impacts lies the notion that political participation and political rights, particularly in a democratic society, are closely dependent on satisfaction of basic economic rights.8 As Michael Stone (1993, 314) writes, a right to decent, affordable housing ‘‘builds as well upon recognition that the political and civil rights for which we have struggled and continue to struggle have little practical meaning or utility for those among us whose material existence is precarious.’’ The issue here is dignity as well, in the sense of asserting and receiving full respect for membership in one’s community and in the society at large (Miller 1993). Suffrage in the United States has had a history of property ownership prerequisites—a situation not unrelated to the disenfranchisement of homeless persons for lack of a ‘‘real’’ address, an issue that has recently been successfully fought in the courts.9
	25	+Adv 2 is Bedrock Freedoms
	26	+the right to housing is an intrinsic extension of our right to freedom. It serves as the bedrock that allows us to freely exercise all other rights.
	27	+King 2 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
	28	+“Freedom rights can be seen as negative rights, in that they prohibit coercion and interference in the interests of others (Berlin, 1969). The importance of negative rights for some libertarian thinkers such as Machan (1989) and Ras- mussen and Den Uyl (1991), is that they do not clash. Omissions can have simultaneous multiple effects. Coercion by the state impinges on the rights of all its citizens. But importantly, these thinkers would argue that the enjoyment of life, liberty and property by one does not deny it to others. The amount of liberty in any society is not governed by a zero-sum game, where one person taking a share diminishes the pool left for the rest. However, socio-economic claims frequently entail the distribution of scarce resources, and thus any settlement will involve the adjudication between rival claims. Thus, because they involve finite resources, these claims place individual rights-holders in direct competition with their fellow citizens. As a result, these libertarians thinkers limit the remit of rights to indivisible goods such as liberty and autonomy, and to property rights, which, they suggest, underpin these other rights. Sen (1985) has argued that the notion of negative rights, as propounded in this case by Nozick (1974), is flawed. Sen questions whether it is sufficient to allow individuals legitimately to pursue their ends even when this might have disastrous consequences. Sen’s point is that individuals may be unable to command certain necessary goods because they have no entitlement to possess those goods. In this case, they have no property rights over goods and services. Bengtsson (1995) relates Sen’s argument to housing, and states, “It is not difficult to find examples of how people have been deprived of shelter, just because they lacked—and others had—control of private property” (p. 126). This implies that the positive rights of some, to property, clash with the negative rights of others. Again it suggests that one cannot divorce rights-based theories from utilitarian considerations (which is precisely why libertarian theories like those of Machan and Rasmussen and Den Uyl restrict rights to negative entities only). An interesting way around the apparent clash between freedom rights and socio-economic claims has been offered by Waldron (1993b). His discussion is also important for a further reason. It shows that the right to housing might actually be one of the most significant rights, if not the most significant right. This is because it acts as the bedrock for all others, in that all rights must be situated.” (665-666)
	29	+
	30	+An absolutist account of property is coercive. It constrains the homeless from literally doing anything by using the logic of violating someone’s property rights.
	31	+King 3 Housing as a Freedom Right” PETER KING Housing Studies, Vol. 18, No. 5, 661–672, September 2003 Centre for Comparative Housing Research, Department of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester
	32	+
	33	+“Homelessness is defined by Waldron as the very condition where one is “excluded from all the places governed by private property rules” (1993b, p. 313, author’s emphasis). The homeless are entitled only to be in public places. They have no right to be on private property unless given permission by the owner. They must therefore rely on public places to undertake their situated functions. But this is possible, however, only so long as the public authorities that own this property tolerate them. Just as private owners can exercise their right to exclude, so can public bodies. Waldron rightly points out that there is an increasing regulation and policing of public property that prevents the homeless from exercising their basic functions in public. Waldron gives the example of removing seating from subways in US cities to prevent them from being used by the homeless. This form of ‘zero tolerance’ of vagrancy can also be seen in the attitudes of politicians and public agencies in the UK. The homeless are seen as having no right to be on the streets, there being enough hostel spaces for them. In addition, begging is seen as aggressive and intimidatory behaviour. Waldron argues that “a person not free to be in any place is not free to do anything” (p. 316). One important consequence of this argument is to show that freedom rights do indeed clash. Property rights, as commonly defined in terms of exclusivity of use and disposal, are clearly freedom rights. Private individuals and public corporations who prevent the homeless from accessing their property are thus acting entirely legally and within their rights. Yet there are certain rights we must have, homeless or not, if we are to carry out our basic functions. These too are freedom rights, in that we must be free to be in a place before we can undertake these basic functions. But the situated nature of this freedom means that certain rights can only be fulfilled when the property rights of some are overruled. Likewise, side-constraints prohibiting interference to property rights may well mean that the basic rights of others are infringed because they do not have the freedom to be. The homeless might be so constrained that they are literally unable to do anything without infringing the rights of others.” (667
	34	+
	35	+Equal recognition of humanity entails right to housing Young
	36	+OXFORD POLITICAL THEORY Series Editors: Will Kymlicka, David Miller, and Alan Ryan INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY Iris Marion Young
	37	+Let me review one final example of political claims of justice critics often deride as divisive identity politics: political claims of gay men and lesbians. Especially after internal movement criticisms of efforts to ‘identify’ what it means to ‘be’ gay, more people whose desires and actions transgress heterosexual norms, and who find affinities with gay and lesbian institutions, would deny that they have or express a ‘gay identity’ they share with others. They do claim that they ought to be free to express their desires and to cultivate institutions without hiding, and without fear of harassment, violence, loss of employment, or housing. Many claim, further, that same-sex partners should have access to the same material benefits in tax law, property relations, and access to partner’s employment benefits as heterosexual couples can have through marriage. For the most part, these claims of justice are not ‘identity’ claims. Nor are they simple claims to ‘recognition’. They are claims that they should be free to be openly different from the majority without suffering social and economic disadvantage on account of that difference.
	38	+
	39	+Adv 3 is International Law
	40	+The right to housing is a right guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. UN Habitat
	41	+UN Habitat. "The Right to Adequate Housing." UN Habitat (n.d.): n. pag. Ohchr.org. UN. Web. 11 July 2016. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf
	42	+The right to adequate housing is a human right recognized in international human rights law as part of the right to an adequate standard of living. One of the first references to it is in article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, widely considered as the central instrument for the protection of the right to adequate housing, refers to the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (art. 11). As mentioned above, the Committee has adopted general comments on the right to adequate housing and housing-related issues which provide authoritative guidance on the Covenant’s provisions, in particular its general comments Nos. 4, 7 and 16. Other international human rights tzoreaties have addressed the right to adequate housing in different ways. Some are of general application while others cover the human rights of specific groups, such as women, children, indigenous peoples, migrant workers and members of their families, or persons with disabilities.
	43	+This evidence is most indicative of international law since it is of the consensus with the committee which means its most likely to accurately represent ILaw even if a few technicalities flow neg.
	44	+Following a deliberative community of international is key to preventing conflict and genocide.
	45	+Shaw, Martin Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex. “The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals and the new politics of international relations.” October 3, 2001. http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf
	46	+The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognize three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction—despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will become a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalized Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context—but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organizations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilize local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratizing local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-25 20:40:41.283

Judge

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	1	+Idk

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	1	+Idk

ParentRound

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	1	+47

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	1	+3

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	1	+Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

Title

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	1	+MA - 1AC - Stacked Phil

Tournament

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	1	+NSDA