Summary

• Objects (0 modified, 0 added, 1 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[0]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[0]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,80 +1,0 @@
1		-Agency cannot be separated from norms of dependency towards Others. Vulnerability and opaqueness ground existence. 2 warrants:
2		-
3		-1. Although we believe we act as independent agents, our judgements are always mediated by a set of norms that are not fully our own. Butler
4		-Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
5		-In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over-looked the fact that the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening. This opening calls into question the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self becomes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue see Foucault. Whether or not the Other is singular, the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter. For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seriously that the recognition comes from me. But in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not singlehandedly make them, then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use.
6		-
7		-2. To give an account of one’s agency is impossible. My body has a history that I cannot recuperate, yet nonetheless grounds who I am. Existence begins with bare vulnerability towards the Other. I cannot escape this relationship because it grounds a part of who I am that I don’t have an account for. Butler 2
8		-Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
9		-There are, then, several ways in which the account I may give of myself has the potential to break apart and to become undermined. My efforts to give an account of myself founder in part upon the fact of my exposure to you, an exposure in spoken language and, in a different way, in written address as well see Felman. This is a condition of my narration that I cannot fully thematize within any narrative I might provide, and that does not fully yield to a sequential account. There is a bodily referent here, a condition of me, that I can point to, but I cannot narrate precisely, even though there are no doubt stories about where my body went and what it did and did not do. But there is also a history to my body for which I can have no recollection, and there is as well a part of bodily experience-what is indexed by the word "exposure-that only with difficulty, if at all, can assume narrative form. On the other hand, exposure, like the operation of the norm, constitutes the conditions of my own emergence and knowability, and I cannot be present to a temporality that precedes my own capacity for self-reflec- tion. This means that my narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make me and my story in language possible. And it means that my story always arrives late., reconstructing, even as I produce myself differently in the very act of telling. My account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I have no definitive story. I cannot explain exactly why I have emerged in this way, and my efforts at narrative reconstruction are always undergoing revision. There is that in me and of me for which I can give no account. But does this mean that I am not, in the moral sense, accountable for who I am and for what I do? And if I find that despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot make myself fully accountable to you, is this ethical failure? Or is it a failure that gives rise to a certain ethical disposition in the place of a full and satisfying notion of narrative accountability?
10		-
11		-Analytics:
12		-a)
13		-b)
14		-c)
15		-
16		-And, the subject does not have jurisdiction over its own opacity so it cannot ignore obligations from precariousness because they ground the subject in ways that cannot be repossessed in giving an account one’s self. Butler 3
17		-Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
18		-“In recent years, the critique of poststructuralism, itself loquacious, has held that the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding undermines the possibility of respon- sibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself. Critics have argued that the various critical reconsiderations of the subject, including those that do away with the theory of the subject altogether, cannot provide the basis for an account of responsibil- ity, that if we are, as it were, divided, ungrounded, or incoherent from the start, it will be impossible to ground a notion of personal or social responsibility on the basis of such a view. I would like to try to rebut this view in what follows, and to show how a theory of subject-formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge can work in the ser- vice of a conception of ethics and, indeed, of responsibility. If the subject is opaque to itself, it is not therefore licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its relations to others. Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of its relations to others that it is opaque to itself, and if those relations to others are precisely the venue for its ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue of the subject's opacity to itself that it sustains some of its most important ethical bonds.”
19		-
20		-Thus, the standard is rejecting norms that deny the precariousness of our agency. Precariousness is defined as understanding our vulnerability as agents to the world around us- there is always difference that needs to be acknowledged for an ethical system to be formed.
21		-
22		-Prefer additionally:
23		-
24		-Identity depends upon differentiation in the subject. 2 warrants:
25		-
26		-1. Any identity depends upon its negative to have a conception of that structure, so violence is constitutive of any judgement. HÄGGLUND
27		-“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
28		-“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, political juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and there can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
29		-2. The state can never recognize universal equality since it depends upon exclusion in its very construction. Ought implies can so ethics must recognize that state obligations stem from violence. Mouffe
30		-“The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 DD
31		-“In order to illustrate his point, Schmitt indicates that, even in modem democratic states where universal human equality has been established, there is a category of people who are excluded as foreigners or aliens and that there is therefore no abso¬lute equality of persons. He also shows how the correlate of the equality among the citizenry found in those states is a much stronger emphasis on national homo¬geneity and on the line of demarcation between those who belong to the state and those who remain outside it. This is, he notes, to be expected and, if this were not the case and a state attempted to realize the universal equality of individuals in the political realm without concern for national or any other form of homogeneity, the consequence would be a complete devaluation of political equality and of politics itself. To be sure, this would in no way mean the disappearance of substantive inequalities, but says Schmitt,‘they would shift in another sphere, perhaps separated from the political and concen¬trated in the economic, leaving this area to take on a new, disproportionately decisive importance. Under the conditions of superficial political equality, another sphere in which substantial inequalities prevail (today for example the economic sphere) will dominate politics.’ It seems to me that, unpleasant as they are to liberal ears, those arguments need to be considered carefully. They carry an important warning for those who believe that the process of globalization is laying the basis for worldwide democratization and cosmopolitan citizenship. They also provide important insights for understand¬ing the current dominance of economics over politics. We should indeed be aware that without a demos to which they belong, those cosmopolitan citizen pilgrims would in fact have loset the possibility of exercising their democratic rights of law¬making. They would be left, at best, with their liberal rights of appealing to transna¬tional courts to defend their individual rights when those have been violated. In all probability, such a cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be realized, would not be more than an empty name disguising the actual disappearance of democratic forms of government and indicating the triumph of the liberal form of governmental rationality that Foucault called ‘govermentality’. True, by reading him in that way, I am doing violence to Schmitt’s questioning since his main concern is not democratic participation but political unity. He con¬siders that such a unity is crucial because without it the state cannot exist. But his reflections are relevant for the issue of democracy since he considers that in a demo¬cratic state, it is through their participation in this unity that the citizens can be treated as equals and exercise their democratic rights. Democracy, according to Schmitt, consists fundamentally in the identity between rulers and ruled. It is linked to the fundamental principle of the unity of the demos and the sovereignty of its will. But for the people to rule it is necessary to determine who belongs to the peo¬ple. "Without any criterion to determine who are the bearers of democratic rights, the will of the people cannot take shape. It could, of course, be objected that this is a view of democracy which is at odds with the liberal democratic one and some would certainly claim that this should not be called democracy but populism. To be sure, Schmitt is no democrat in the liberal understanding of the term and he had only contempt for the constraints imposed by liberal institutions on the democratic will of the people. But the issue that he raises is a crucial one, even for those who advocate liberal democratic forms. The logic of democracy does indeed imply a moment of closure which is required by the very process of constituting the ‘people’. This cannot be avoided, even in a liberal democratic model, it can only be negotiated differently. But this can only be done if this closure and the paradox that it implies are acknowledged. By stressing that the identity of a democratic political community hinges on the possibility of drawing a frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’, Schmitt highlights the fact that democracy always entails relations of inclusion/exclusion. This is a vital insight that democrats would be ill-advised to dismiss because they dislike its author. One of the main problems with liberalism—and one that can endanger democracy—is precisely its incapacity to conceptualize such a frontier. As Schmitt indicates, the central concept of liberal discourse is ‘humanity’, which, as he rightly points out, is not a political concept and does not correspond to any political entity. The central question of the political constitution of ‘the people’ is something that liberal theory is unable to tackle adequately because the necessity of drawing a ‘frontier’ is in contradiction with its universalistic rhetoric. Against the liberal emphasis on ‘humanity’, it is important to stress that the key concepts in concep¬tualizing democracy are the ‘demos’ and the ‘people’.” (41-44)
32		-
33		-Implications:
34		-A. Precedes idealized starting points. They necessitate a world of nothingness and justify absolute violence. HÄGGLUND 2:
35		-“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
36		-“A possible objection here is that we must strive toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
37		-
38		-Encountering radical difference is to encounter the limits of acknowledgement itself. You can never know the radically different as they know themselves because your identity depends on the exclusion of theirs, yet nonetheless you need them to have any conception of yourself. Embracing radical difference requires we embrace precariousness in order to better understand the other. Butler 4
39		-Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40. UH-DD
40		-Can a new sense of ethics emerge from that inevitable ethical failure? I suggest that it can, and that it would be spawned from a certain willingness to acknowledge the limits of acknowledgment itself, that when we claim to know and present ourselves, we will fail in some ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are, and that we cannot expect anything else from others. If we speak about an acknowledgment of the limits of acknowledgment itself, are we then assuming that acknowledgment in the first sense is full and complete in its determination of the limits of acknowledgment in the second? In other words, do we know in an unqualified way that acknowledgment is always qualified? Is the first kind of knowing qualified by the qualification that it knows? This would have to be the case, for to acknowledge one's own opacity or that of another does not transform opacity into transparency. To know the limits of acknowledgment is a self-limiting act and, as a result, to experience the limits of knowing itself. This can, by the way, constitute a disposition of humility, and of generosity, since I will need to be forgiven for what I cannot fully know, what I could not have fully known, and I will be under a similar obligation to offer forgiveness to others who are also constituted in partial opacity to themselves.
41		- “So how do these concerns relate to the question of whether one can give an account of oneself? Let us remember that one gives an account of oneself to another, and that every accounting takes place in the context of an address. I give an account of myself to you. Further, the con
42		-
43		-Impact Calc:
44		-a) analytic
45		-b) Analytic
46		-
47		-Advocacy: Countries will prohibit the production of nuclear power.
48		-I defend the resolution on general principle. If reasonable, I will defend a specific advocacy or implementation if you ask me to do so in cross x or prep time.
49		-
50		-Advantage 1 is Grievability
51		-The United States has historically manipulated data on radioactive waste risk to cover up disproportionate radiation exposure on minorities and continues to underestimate future waste risk. This renders lives ungrievable. The ability to manipulate data in order to congeal oppression is the active construction of the politics of disposability. Alldred et al 09
52		-Mary Alldred and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/final-pdf-ej-nuke-siting-wi-Alldred_08-0544.pdf
53		-US nuclear-waste policies in stages (8)–(9), radioactive waste transport/storage, likewise have already caused Environmental Injustice, or EIJ (as serious contamination at Hanford, Maxey Flats, Sa- vannah River, and other cases have shown), and EIJ also is likely when future waste-containment canisters fail— long before the million years that (the US National Acad- emy of Sciences says) nuclear wastes must be completely secured.22 Because the US government has falsified and manipulated data on radioactive-waste risk 22,23,24 (much of which will be borne by Appalachian, Latino, and Na- tive-American populations, who live in higher propor- tions near existing and proposed nuclear-waste-storage sites),3 United Nations and nuclear-industry studies warn that the US government may underestimate future waste- repository-radiation doses by 9–12 orders of magnitude.25 Yet even if proposed future US nuclear-waste standards are met, their leniency likely will impose EIJ on future generations. After 10,000 years, they would allow exposures of 100 millirems/year (limits 1,000 percent higher than current standards for US Department of Energy facilities). They also use only mean or average dose to assess regulatory compliance. This means that, provided that the average person’s exposure is no more than 100 millirems, many other people would be allowed to receive higher, even fatal, doses.8,26
54		-And, A. Even if you solve for waste you still render lives ungrievable because the power plants remain disproportionately placed. This means nuclear threats are pushed off towards the disposal. B. Even if you proportionally place nuclear power plants you still randomly render lives disposable. The impact is no longer disproportionate, but still exists.
55		-
56		-And, nuclear power depends on the congealment of worker radiation doses. This allows them to trick employees for the sole purpose of fueling the nuclear industry. Alldred 2
57		-Mary Alldred and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/final-pdf-ej-nuke-siting-wi-Alldred_08-0544.pdf
58		-In stages (2)–(5) of the nuclear fuel cycle, tens of millions of radiation workers, including nearly two million in the United States,16 also have faced EIJ. US nuclear-facility owners legally may expose workers to annual radiation doses up to 50 times higher than those allowed for mem- bers of the public,17 although there is no safe dose of ion- izing radiation.7 Yet radiation workers typically receive no hazard pay or compensating wage differential.3 Often they also do not voluntarily accept dangerous nuclear jobs but take them because of economic necessity,3 because gov- ernment falsification of worker radiation doses has mislead them,18,19 or because flawed radiation standards, flawed risk disclosure, and flawed workplace-radiation monitor- ing cause them to underestimate risks.20 Yet the risks are substantial. The International Agency for Research on Can- cer (IARC) shows roughly 1 additional fatal cancer each time 60 people are exposed to the maximum-allowable, an- nual occupational-radiation dose of 50 mSv
59		-
60		-And, the state of being rendered ungrievable is more than just being oppressed. Non-grievability separates death from having any impact on a social relationship, which reduces agency to something outside of precariousness. Grievability is necessary to apprehended the vulnerability in our ontology. Butler 6
61		-“Frames of War” by Judith Butler 2009 UH-DD
62		-“Over and against an existential concept of finitude that singularizes our relation to death and to life, precariousness underscores our radical substitutability and anonymity in relation both to certain socially facilitated modes of dying and death and to other socially conditioned modes of persisting and flourishing. It is not that we are born and then later become precarious, but rather that precariousness is coextensive with birth itself (birth is, by definition, precarious), which means that it matters whether or not this infant being survives, and that its survival is dependent on what we might call a social network of hands. Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters. For the most part, we imagine that an infant comes into the world, is sustained in and by that world through to adulthood and old age, and finally dies. We imagine that when the child is wanted, there is celebration at the beginning of life. But there can be no celebration without an implicit understanding that the life is grievable, that it would be grieved if it were lost, and that this future anterior is installed as the condition of its life. In ordinary language, grief attends the life that has already been lived, and presupposes that life as having ended. But, according to the future anterior (which is also part of ordinary language), grievability is a condition of a life's emergence and sustenance.7 The future anterior, "a life has been lived," is presupposed at the beginning of a life that has only begun to be lived. In other words, "this will be a life that will have been lived" is the presupposition of a grievable life, which means that this will be a life that can be regarded as a life, and be sustained by that regard. Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, "there is a life that will never have been lived," sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of precarious life. Grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the living being as living, exposed to non-life from the start.” 14-15
63		-And, the prohibition is key. Norms of non-grievability depend upon the reproduction of their usage through frames, such as the manipulation and underdetermination of data. Our stance must impede upon the reproduction of this frame, which requires we recognize that nuclear power is inseparable from its norms of usage. Butler 7
64		-“Frames of War” by Judith Butler 2009 UH-DD
65		-“The frame that seeks to contain, convey, and determine what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing precisely that) depends upon the conditions of reproducibility in order to succeed. And yet, this very reproducibility entails a constant breaking from context, a constant delimitation of new context, which means that the "frame" does not quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time it seeks to give definitive organization to its content. In other words, the frame does not hold anything together in one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place. As the frame constantly breaks from its context, this self-breaking becomes part of the very definition. This leads us to a different way of understanding both the frame's efficacy and its vulnerability to reversal, to subversion, even to critical instrumentalization. What is taken for granted in one instance becomes thematized critically or even incredulously in another. This shifting temporal dimension of the frame constitutes the possibility and trajectory of its affect as well. Thus the digital image circulates outside the confines of Abu Ghraib, or the poetry in Guantanamo is recovered by constitutional lawyers who arrange for its publication throughout the world. The conditions are set for astonishment, outrage, revulsion, admiration, and discovery, depending on how the content is framed by shifting time and place. The movement of the image or the text outside of confinement is a kind of "breaking out," so that even though neither the image nor the poetry can free anyone from prison, or stop a bomb or, indeed, reverse the course ofthe war, they nevertheless do provide the conditions for breaking out of the quotidian acceptance of war and for a more generalized horror and outrage that will support and impel calls for justice and an end to violence. Earlier we noted that one sense of "to be framed" means to be subject to a con, to a tactic by which evidence is orchestrated so to make a false accusation appear true. Some power manipulates the terms of appearance and one cannot break out of the frame; one is framed, which means one is accused, but also judged in advance, without valid evidence and without any obvious means of redress. But if the frame is understood as a certain "breaking out," or "breaking from," then it would seem to be more analogous to a prison break. This suggests a certain release, a loosening of the mechanism of control, and with it, a new trajectory of affect. The frame, in this sense, permits-even requires-this breaking out. This happened when the photos of Guantanamo prisoners kneeling and shackled were released to the public and outrage ensued; it happened again when the digital images from Abu Ghraib were circulated globally across the internet, facilitating a widespread visceral tum against the war. What happens at such moments? And are they merely transient moments or are they, in fact, occasions when the frame as a forcible and plausible con is exposed, resulting in a critical and exuberant release from the force of illegitimate authority?” 10-11
66		-
67		-And, the prohibition is key. Historical injustice commits us to historical rectification. This means we undo what has historically caused the problem. Mills:
68		-(“White Time: The chronic Injustice of Ideal Theory” Du Bois Review. 2014 )
69		-“Would it be in the least surprising, then, if the version of social contract theory that Rawls resurrects more than a century and a half later with the publication of Theory continues to be structured by this exclusionary normative blueprint? As the second wave of feminist political theorists pointed out (most famously Susan Moller Okin 1989), the substantive as against merely nominal inclusion of women required a redrawing of the contract’s assumptions about the demarcation of the public and private spheres, and the realms where justice did and did not apply. Gender justice neces- sitated a gender-based reconceptualization of the apparatus. My claim would be that racial justice requires a similarly profound rethinking, and that the crucial normative boundary here—the racial equivalent of the public/private demarcation—is temporal: the limitation of justice to the distributive and synchronic. For if racial oppression has indeed been central to the history and structure of the United States, or, more generally the Western “democracies” (putatively) that become Rawls’ normative reference-point, then the substantive normative inclusion of previously excluded non-White populations will require the correction of the disadvantages inherited diachronically from that history. Rectificatory justice will be their priority. I suggest, then, that the Whiteness of the Rawlsian theoretical temporality as originally formulated by Rawls, and subsequently developed in the secondary litera- ture by the overwhelmingly White community of political philosophers, inheres in the simple fact that the entire apparatus is oriented towards ideal distributive justice, not non-ideal rectificatory justice. Though Rawls (1999c) asserted at the start of Theory that ideal theory was the best foundation for doing non-ideal theory, he never made good on this claim. Nowhere in the two thousand pages of Rawls’ five authored books is there any discussion of rectificatory justice (“compensatory justice” for Rawls). For the four-stage sequence to provide a theoretical entrée for such matters, a self-conscious theorization of ill-ordered societies characterized by systemic oppression would be necessary, and an explanation of how the successive raising of different layers of the veil must modify—in the transition from the original position through the constitu- tional and legislative stages to the stage of the “application of rules to particular cases by judges and administrators” (Rawls 1999c, p. 175)—the two principles so as to derive appropriate norms of compensatory justice to remedy past wrongs and eliminate ongo- ing structural subordination. But no such account is provided. Instead, Rawls (1999c) tells us that “principles of partial compliance theory are discussed from the point of view of the original position after those of ideal theory have been chosen” (p. 175), and directs us to section thirty-nine, where we learn only that we should prioritize the remedying of the most extreme “deviations from perfect justice” guided by the “lexi- cal ranking of the ideal principles” (p. 216). But no details are given, unlike for “the cases of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal” (p. 175) which are discussed at length over five sections of the book (sections fifty-five to fifty-nine). Neither in Rawls nor his myriad commentators, exegetes, and disciples over the succeeding forty years has there been any attempt to work out what the principles of compensatory justice would be for “removing” (1999c, p. 216) the “pressing and urgent” injustices revealed by the final lifting of the veil, despite the fact that achieving “a systematic grasp” (p. 8) of the principles for guiding such removal was precisely the rationale for beginning with ideal theory in the first place. I submit that the complete lack of urgency about these matters makes clear that the “history” that has been permitted entry to the four-stage process is the sanitized and idealized White time of the modern Western liberal Euro-states, conceived of as “democracies” simpliciter rather than (in Pierre van den Berghe’s (1972 1978) famous phrase) Herrenvolk democracies, and purged of their actual history (undesirable and unacknowledged non-White time) of genocide, slavery, aboriginal expropriation, and absolutist colonial rule over people of color. The history of racial oppression cannot be admitted into the “socially shared moral geography” (Lipsitz 2011, p. 29) of the White mnemonic philosophical community, because of its foundational disruption of the notion of society as a cooperative venture created by human beings whose moral equality is reciprocally recognized. The contractarian framework fits with the “mental relief map,” the “norms of remembrance” (Zerubavel 2003, pp. 7, 5), of the modern Euro- narrative, completely amnesiac about—or, at best, radically revisionist of—the colonial past. The legitimacy of distributive justice as a classless entitlement of all White men is now admitted. The struggle of White women to expand this entitlement is challenge enough. The struggle of people of color not merely to be distributively included but to raise the deeper question of making rectificatory rather than distributive justice central is too extreme even to be considered. Ideal theory establishes the coor- dinates for a White time map in which issues of rectificatory justice, the dikailogical concern most pressing for the non-White population, are literally off the map. It is a general manifestation of the socially privileged demography of the profession, and, with respect to race, its Whiteness. The very fact that the deep and flagrant racial injustice that has been central to modern world history is so undiscussed in the Rawls literature brings home how White this whole discourse is. It is the normative discourse of the non-enslaved, the non-expropriated, and the non-survivors victims of genocide— the discourse of the racially privileged Euro- and White settler population, whose normative temporality need pay no attention in determining questions of justice to a deeply non-ideal (non-admitted, non-mapped, non-theorized, and thus non-existent) past that has been altered not metaphysically but representationally, gated out of their moral consideration.”
70		-
71		-Advantage 2 is Condemnation
72		-
73		-Nuclearization enforces an epistemically bankrupt model of thinking about our relationship towards the other in the international arena. It shatters conceptions of unity and contributes to the condemnation of difference. Wise Environmental Racism and Nuclear Development By the WISE-Amsterdam Collective WISE News Communique; 387-388; March 28, 1993; www.antenna.nlwise; Accessed August 8 2016
74		-Racism, by itself, is a symptom of the deep sickness at the heart of our society. But racism never exists by itself. The sickness of which it is a symptom is rooted in the shattering of what was once a strong connection the people who walked the earth had with the land and all living systems. To understand this rupture ~-~- a rupture which underlies the entwined oppressions of race, sex, class and ecological destruction ~-~- we need to look at two things: first, at the current model of development, then at the history of the last 500 years which led to this model.The current model of development includes a system that benefits a relatively small part of the world's population who can be found in the industrialized countries and in the local elites of Central and Eastern Europe and the South. For this model to operate, political choices have to be made. In the case of nuclear development, one of the choices has been to ignore the social costs. When social costs are ignored, selected groups of people are made victims. This is marginalization.More is involved here than even the marginalization of people. Knowledge is also marginalized, set aside, lost. Traditional ways of thinking and practical knowledge disappear forever. With the development of a nuclear (nuclearized?) society, we are becoming poorer in knowledge and solutions. We have lost wisdom, impoverishing ourselves by cutting ourselves off from receiving what Starhawk, author of Dreaming the Dark, calls "the rich gifts of vision that come from those who see from a different vantage point."
75		-
76		-We have an ethical obligation to reject condemnation. If I cannot give a full account of myself, then I cannot expect the other to give a full account of themselves. Condemnation is counter-productive to obligations from precariousness because they constrain my ability to understand the other. Butler 8
77		-Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 22-40.
78		-The scene of moral judgment, when it is the judgment of persons that is at issue, is invariably one which establishes a clear moral distance between the one who judges and the one who is judged. If you consider, for instance, Simone de Beauvoir's question, "Must We Burn Sade?," matters become more complicated. It turns out that it may be that only through an experience of the Other under conditions of suspended judgment do we finally become capable of an ethical reflection on the humanity of the Other, even when that humanity has turned against itself. And though I am certainly not arguing that we ought never to make judgments-they are necessary for political and personal life alike: I make them, and I will-I think that it would be important, in rethinking the terms of the culture of ethics, to remember that not all ethical relations are reducible to acts of judgment. The capacity to make and justify moral judgments does not exhaust the sphere of ethics, of either ethical obligation or ethical relationality. Indeed, prior to judging an Other, we must be in some relation to him or her, and this relation will ground and inform the ethical judgments we finally do make. We will, in some way, have to ask the question, "Who are you?'If we forget that we are related to those we condemn, even those we must condemn, then we lose the chance to be ethically educated or "addressed" by a consideration of who they are and what their personhood says about the range of human possibility that exists, and even to prepare ourselves for or against such possibilities. We also forget that judging an Other is a mode of address: even punishments are pronounced and delivered to the face of the Other, requiring that Other's bodily presence. Hence, if there is an ethic to the address, and judgment, including legal judgment, is one form of address, then the value of judgment will be conditioned by the form of address it takes. Consider that one way we become responsible and self-knowing is precisely by deferring judgments, since condemnation, denunciation, and excoriation works as quick ways to posit an ontological difference between judge and judged
79		-
80		-, and even to purge oneself of another so that condemnation becomes the way in which we establish the Other as nonrecognizable. In this sense, condemnation can work precisely against self- knowledge inasmuch as it moralizes a self through a disavowal. Although self-knowledge is surely limited, that is not a reason to turn against it as a project; but condemnation tends to do precisely this, seeksing to purge and externalize one's own opacity, and in this sense failing to own its own limitations, providing no felicitous basis for a reciprocal recognition of human beings as constitutively limited.

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-2016-09-11 14:08:36.0

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-Dylan Cavanaugh

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-CPS ZD

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-2

Round

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-2

Team

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

Title

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-SO - Precarity AC

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,0 @@
1		-Grapevine