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1		-Framework
2		-Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
3		-1. There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing. BUTLER:
4		-(Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
5		-“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
6		-Implications:
7		-A. Ethics has to start with the self – otherwise it can’t guide action because its principle doesn't have a claim on what I ought to do. But, there is no single stable self. Any attempt to theorize the self would fail to understand the ontological status of the agent. MILLS: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
8		-“An idealized social ontology. Morality theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.” (168)
9		-B. Constraints K impacts – a social ontology conditions the subject in a way that resists concrete and structural inequalities, that's a second implication from Mills.
10		-2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence. HÄGGLUND:
11		-“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
12		-“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
13		-Impacts:
14		-A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
15		-B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence. HÄGGLUND 2: “THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
16		-“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
17		-And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence:
18		-1. The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. This requires an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy. MOUFFE: “The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000
19		-"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
20		-Our starting point is key- we don’t pretend to overcome all exclusion, we just exclude the exclusionary thing. MOUFFE:
21		-(Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”)
22		-“To avoid any confusion, I should specify that, contrary to some postmodern thinkers who envisage a pluralism without any frontiers, I do not believe that a democratic pluralist politics should not consider as legitimate all the demands formulated in a given Society. The pluralism that I advocate it requires discriminatesing between demands, which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those, which are to be excluded. A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries. The agonistic approach does not pretend to encompass all differences and to overcome all forms of exclusions. But exclusions are envisaged in political and not in moral terms. Some demands are excluded, not because they are declared to be’ 'evil', but because they challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association. To be sure, the very nature of those institutions is also part of the agonistic debate, but, for such a debate to take place, the existence of a shared symbolic space is necessary. This is what I meant when I argued in Chapter 2 that democracy requires a 'conflictual consensus': consensus on the ethico-political values of liberty and equality for all, dissent about their interpretation. A line should therefore be drawn between those who reject those values outright and those who, while accepting them, fight for conflicting interpretations.”
23		-Aiming toward consensus is a false goal because consensus is impossible, difference in inevitable. Contestation is key. Dividing people up and treating them as enemies is also a false goal because it denies that the existence of their opposing identity is what constructs yours.
24		-
25		-Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
26		-1. Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism. RICKERT:
27		-(Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal,)
28		-“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives. Pedagogy could reflect this concern in its practices by attending to the idea that each student's life is its own telos, meaning that the individual struggles of each student cannot and should not necessarily mirror our own. Or, to put it another way, students must sooner or later overcome us, even though we may legitimate our sense of service with the idea that we have their best interests in mind. However, we should be suspicious of this presumptive ethic, for, as Mann astutely observes, "nothing is more aggressive than the desire to serve the other” (48)
29		-2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
30		-A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
31		-B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
32		-
33		-Plan
34		-Resolved: The United States should limit the qualified immunity of police officers by removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity in doctrine. Wright 15
35		- (Journalist and PHD in Law. "Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity." http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/)
36		-And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts?
37		-Contention 1- Surveillance
38		-SCOTUS’s interpretation of the fourth Amendment gives police incredible search power.
39		-Carbado 16
40		-Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
41		-By prohibiting the government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose constraints on the police. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment in ways that empower, rather than constrain, the police. More precisely, the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to force engagement with African-Americans with little or no basis. To put the point more provocatively, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect police officers, not black people.130 Indeed, we might think of the Fourth Amendment as a Privileges and Immunities Clause for police officers—it confers tremendous power and discretion to police officers with respect to when they can engage people (the “privilege” protection of the Fourth Amendment) and protects them from criminal and civil sanction with respect to how they engage people (the “immunities” protection of the Fourth Amendment).
42		-The impact is that fourth Amendment power has become non-existent- only the plan solves. Carbado 16
43		-Carbado, Devon "Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes." ,2016
44		-With respect to whether the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the standard, as in the criminal context, centers on reasonableness: whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary.195 And, as in the criminal context, juries will often defer to an officer’s claim that he/she employed deadly force because he/she feared for his/her life.196 Moreover, implicit and explicit biases can inform their decision making.197 With respect to the “clearly established” doctrine, there are two problems with the standard. First, courts often avoid deciding the question of whether the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution and rule instead on whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established.198 The Supreme Court has made clear that lower courts are free to proceed in this way,199 making it relatively easy for courts to make the defense of qualified immunity available to a police officer without having to decide whether the officer violated a constitutional right.200 This avoidance compounds the extent to which the law is unsettled. And, the greater the uncertainty about the law, the greater the doctrinal space for a police officer to argue that particular rights were not “clearly established” at the time the officer acted.201 In other words, the more courts avoid weighing in on the sub stantive question of whether police conduct violates the Constitution, the more leeway police officers have to argue that their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. Consider, for example, Stanton v. Sims.202 There, the Court avoided the question of whether an officer’s entrance into a yard to effectuate the arrest of a misdemeanant violated the Fourth Amendment, but ruled that the right to avoid such an intrusion was not clearly established.203 Unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules that, absent exigent circumstances, one has a right to be free from warrantless entry into one’s yard, courts will likely grant qualified immunity in cases involving such arrests.204 A second problem with the “clearly established” doctrine pertains to how courts apply it. According to the Supreme Court, in applying the “clearly established” standard, the inquiry is whether the right is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he/she is doing violates that right.’”205 This standard creates rhetorical room for police officers to argue that not “every” reasonable officer would have understood that the right in question was clearly established.206 The standard is also, as Karen Blum observes, “riddled with contradictions and complexities.” 207 Eleventh Circuit Judge Charles Wilson puts the point this way: The way in which courts frame the question, “was the law clearly established,” virtually guarantees the outcome of the qualified immunity inquiry. Courts that permit the general principles enunciated in cases factually distinct from the case at hand to “clearly establish” the law in a particular area will be much more likely to deny qualified immunity to government actors in a variety of contexts. Conversely, those courts that find the law governing a particular area to be clear ly established only in the event that a factually identical case can be found, will find that government actors enjoy qualified immunity in nearly every context.208 When one adds the difficulties of the “clearly established” standard to the other dimensions of the qualified immunity doctrine, it becomes clear that the qualified immunity regime erects a significant doctrinal hurdle to holding police officers accountable for acts of violence.
45		-Diluted 4th Amendment protections massively expand government power, enabling mass surveillance – that chills democratic deliberation and kills privacy
46		-Hafetz 13 Jonathan Hafetz, "How NSA surveillance endangers the Fourth Amendment," National Constitution Center, 8/13/2013
47		-The New York Times has reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) is combing through vast amounts of Americans’ email and text communications into and out of the country. This latest revelation—part of the continuing fallout from the disclosures of government documents by former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden—underscores the frayed fabric of the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment and the threat to the values it protects. We already knew that the government was sweeping up international communications of American citizens under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). While the FAA authorizes the government to target foreigners abroad, it also permits the government to collect Americans’ communications with those foreign targets, as well as to retain and disseminate that information to other government agencies and foreign governments. The Times story, however, makes clear that the NSA is also acquiring—without a warrant—the communications of any foreigner “about the target,” once a target has been identified, thus sweeping in an even wider range of communications by U.S. citizens than previously believed. The Fourth Amendment provides a bulwark against this type of dragnet surveillance. Before searching Americans’ private communications, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government demonstrate probable cause or individualized suspicion. The Fourth Amendment also interposes an independent judiciary between the government and its citizenry—requiring that the government obtain a warrant by making this individualized showing before a federal judge. Review by a neutral and independent decisionmaker is crucial to the Madisonian system of checks and balances, designed to prevent government overreaching and safeguard individual freedoms. The NSA surveillance programs undermine these protections, threatening to render them a dead letter for all “foreign intelligence information”—a category broadly defined to include information not only about terrorism, but also about intelligence activities, national defense, and even the “foreign affairs” of the United States. Further, given the lax standards the NSA uses to determine whether prospective surveillance targets are foreigners abroad, errors are inevitable. This means that the NSA is likely collecting the content of purely domestic communications as well. In 1978, Congress established a special court—known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—to review requests for national security surveillance. But, at best, the FISC is merely providing review of the overall surveillance programs conducted under the FAA, and not individual requests for information. Moreover, no FISC ruling explaining its legal analysis of the FAA or “about the target” searches of Americans’ cross-border communications has been disclosed to the public. The secrecy that shrouds the FISC’s decisions heightens the risk to the Fourth Amendment, as even the reasoning used to justify massive government surveillance remains secret. The impact of NSA surveillance is deep and far-reaching. Vacuuming up Americans’ communications undermines basic principles of privacy. It also chills the communications and discourse essential to a democratic society and fundamentally alters the citizenry’s relation with its government. The NSA’s widespread, suspicionless surveillance of Americans’ private communications will not only impact the work of journalists, lawyers, and others who frequently communicate with people abroad. It will also affect the conduct of ordinary citizens, now fearful of visiting a controversial website or discussing a particular topic via email. Over time, the vibrant exchange of ideas essential to democracy will diminish and trust in the government will erode. At the same time, the government will be emboldened to justify further incursions on individual liberty in name of protecting the United States from terrorism or other threats.
48		-Surveillance is structurally antagonistic towards demarcating black bodies as hyper visible and subject to oversight. Browne 12
49		-Race and Surveillance Simone Browne 2012 Routledge International Handbooks : Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies.:Taylor and Francic, p 105
50		-“According to Christian Parenti, the history of surveillance in America can be traced to the “simple accounts” of slave owners (2003: 15). Of course, the accounting practices of transatlantic slavery were also present outside of the Americas. These simple accounts included slave vessel manifests listing human cargo, plantation inventories, diaries which contained observations about plantation life and instructions for governing slaves. One example involved the “General Rules” recorded by Charles Tait for his Columbus, Texas plantation: “4th In giving orders always do it in a mild tone, and try to leave the impression on the mind of the negro that what you say is the result of reflection.” The detailed cataloguing of slave life was a mechanism of disciplinary power, where disciplinary power, as Michel Foucault tells us, is “exercised through its invisibility,” while imposing a “compulsory visibility” on its targets (1979: 187). Disciplinary power, then, operated on the enslaved as a racializing surveillance that individuals were at once subjected to and that produced slaves them as racial, and therefore enslavable, subjects. Such a racializing surveillance was apparent in the plantation security system, a system that which relied on, as Parenti lays out, three “information technologies: the written slave pass, organized slave patrols, and wanted posters for runaways” (2003: 15). Here, surveillance and literacy were closely articulated as slaves and indentured servants who could read and write could also forge passes and manumission papers or alter existing ones by replacing dates, names and other unique identifiers, in this way functioning as “antebellum hackers” able to “crack the code of the planters’ security system” (20). These forged passes were used for unauthorized travel outside of the plan- tation and were produced by fugitives upon demand by slave patrollers, or “pattie rollers,” who were often non-property owning but armed white men who policed slave mobilities. Sometimes producing a forged pass was not necessary. Any piece of printed text would do given that fugitive slaves were aware that many of these pattie rollers were illiterate, so they would hand over these “passes” when apprehended. This security system, then, relied on the “racially defined contours of (white) literacy and (Black) illiteracy,” a dichotomy that was not so readily upheld (18). Less easily counterfeited passes were later fashioned out of metal. The compulsory visibility of the racial subject can be seen in the circulation of newspapers advertisements and wanted posters for runaway slaves and truant servants. These texts were primarily aimed at a white public that was assumed to be literate and free, and who in consuming these texts became part of the apparatus of surveillance, the eyes and ears of face-to-face watching and regulating. In detailing physical descriptions, the surveillance technology of the fugitive slave advertisement made the already hypervisible racial subject legible as “out of place.” For instance, a March 15 1783 advertisement in The Royal Gazette offering a “Two Dollars reward” for “a Mulatto, or Quadroon Girl, about 14 years of age, named Seth, but calls herself Sall,” attests to the role of fugitive slave notices, and similarly wanted posters, in upholding racial categorization. This notice went on to state: “sometimes says she is white and often paints her face to cover that deception.” Seth’s, or Sall’s, duplicity is not limited to her use of an alias, as this notice tells us, but also to her racial ambiguity, witness her apparent choosing to self-identify or pass as white, rather than as “a Mulatto” (one black parent and one white parent) or a “Quadroon Girl” (one black grandparent) as per the racial nomenclature that arose out of slavery. Later such classifications as a form of population management were made official with the first US federal census in 1790. I will return to the census as a technology that formalized racial categorization later. For now, the wanted notice for fugitive slaves as an information technology demonstrates that then as now race was a social construct that required constant policing and oversight. However, the format of the fugitive notice was repurposed in the form of handbills that functioned as a means of counter-surveillance. An 1851 handbill produced by abolitionist Theodore Parker attests to this as it cautioned “colored people of Boston” to steer clear of “watchmen and police officers” and to “keep a sharp look out for kidnappers, and have top eye open.” “Top eye” here was a directive to look out and about with keen intent as police officers were empowered to act as slave catchers under fugitive slave laws. Black spectatorship, along with the gazes of white abolitionists and other allies, functioned as a form of oppositional looking back at racializing surveillance. In her discussion of black spectatorship, the gaze and looking relations during slavery and the racial apartheid of Jim Crow in the southern United States, bell hooks tells us that black people often “cultivated the habit of casting the gaze downward so as not to appear uppity. To look directly was an assertion of subjectivity, equality” (1992: 168). hooks suggests that the often violent ways in which blacks were denied the right to look back—think of the gruesome beating and murder of 14-year-old Emmett Till in Mis- sissippi in 1955, allegedly for looking at a white woman—“had produced in us an overwhelming longing to look, a rebellious desire, an oppositional gaze” (116). Such politicized and oppositional looking were agential acts and can be seen, for example, in a June 14th 1783 runaway slave notice printed in the Royal Gazette for 16-year-old Sam, who is described in the notice as “five feet high” and “remarkable in turning up the whites of his eyes when spoken to.” This notice records Sam’s oppositional gaze, his looking back, and shows us that resistance can be found even in the simple act of rolling one’s eyes. Black looks have the power to trouble surveillance as a “technology of whiteness”
51		-Discourse of criminality excludes black agents from democratic deliberation. TRIVINGO:
52		-Trivingo ‘13. Franco V. Trivingo Guns and Virtue: The Virtue Ethical Case Against Gun Carrying Public Affairs Quarterly Volume 27 Number 4 10/2013
53		- “For the virtue ethicist, virtue is not something that I can accomplish by myself; rather, it involves cultivating certain kinds of relationships and living in a certain kind of community. For example, a person could not flourish if everyone she knew used her for profit, or if she lived in a deeply repressive and sexist society.56 What effect does cultivating the willingness to use a gun in self-defense have on one's attitude toward other people, most of whom will not in fact be criminals? As much research has demonstrated, the willingness to kill is enabled by a number of mechanisms that serve to dehumanize the potential target." The habit of carrying a gun may involve non-conscious representations of a generic "criminal" as evil and/or subhuman. Such repeated dehumanization may have deleterious effects on one's character by inhibitsing the development of virtuous character traits, enabling the development of vicious character traits, and adversely affecting moral deliberation and perception. This dehumanization can be seen as operative in two ways. First, the discourse surrounding justification for gun carrying refers to "criminals," not as individual moral subjects, but as subhuman threats to the safety of moral agents. As I note above, these attitudes are likely to be mediated by social identities, that is, one will be more likely to dehumanize African Americans. Thus, the "criminal" is likely to have has a certain "look." Consider Lott's description of what criminals are like: To put it bluntly, criminals are not typical citizens. As is well known, young males from their mid-teens to mid-thirties commit a disproportionate share of crime, but even this categorization can be substantially narrowed. We know that criminals tend to have low IQs as well as atypical personalities. For ex-ample, delinquents generally tend to be more 'assertive, unafraid, aggressive, uncontrolled, unconventional, extroverted and poorly socialized'. . . Other evidence indicates that criminals tend to be more impulsive and put relatively little weight on future events. Finally, we cannot ignore the unfortunate fact that crime (particularly violent crime and especially murder) is disproportionately committed against blacks by blacks." This picture assimilates criminals and psychopaths, who lack empathy and as a matter of fact have no qualms about harming other humans.59 The criminal is thus so deeply different and "other" that he—and it is almost always a "he"—is simply not afforded the same moral consideration as "regular" humans. Collins claims that this picture of the criminal, while picking up on certain statistically relevant correlations, is grossly overdrawn and unhelpful for predicting violence f° Second, in order for handgun carrying to be effective, one must be willing—or think one is willing—to use deadly force should it become necessary. In On Killing, Grossman argues that successfully training someone to become willing to kill involves several distancing mechanisms, all of which involves dehumanizing the potential targets.6' The distancing mechanisms include "cultural distance, such as racial and ethnic differences"; "moral distance, which takes into consideration the kind of intense belief in moral superiority"; and "social distance, which considers the impact of practice in thinking of a particular class as less than human.-62 These distancing mechanisms are meant to overcome our strong resistance to serious violence, and this resistance is a significant feature of our moral psychological makeup.63 In short, the psychological mechanisms that enable killing bypass the resistance by dehumanizing, in one way or another, the potential "target:. In order to become willing to kill another human being—even in self-defense—it is psychologically enabling to see that person as sub- or non-human.64 The core point here is that to the extent that one is successful, on one's own, at distancing oneself from others in preparing to commit serious violence, one is thereby and to that extent morally harming oneself. One does so precisely by compromising one's own ability to recognize the humanity in others, thereby undermining one's capacity for empathic concern. A reduced capacity for empathic concern will affect all sorts of other-regarding virtues, since they depend on perceiving the other as a fellow human. One may become callous and insensitive, when confronted with the suffering of these others; one may become cruel and malicious in what one says about them and hopes for them; one may become spiteful and vindic-tive when confronted with wrongdoing that "they" have committed. Conversely, several virtuous character traits may become harder to develop and impossible to fully realize: compassion, sympathy, benevolence, and kindness come to mind. A practiced attitude of dehumanization toward a certain set of people, the violent criminals, whoever one imagines them to be, is likely to have deleterious effects on moral deliberation and moral perception, which may end up fostering vicious character traits and inhibiting the development of virtuous character traits. In short, one will not be able to afford others the proper amount of moral consideration. To recognize basic human dignity from a virtue ethical perspective means that one affords others due consideration in one's moral outlook and deliberations about what to do. One must perceive others and their goals, values, and ideals as morally relevant and salient features of one's own moral situation. One needs to see them as having some basic moral value." The deleterious effects of gun carrying are on moral deliberation and moral perception can be seen as operative on two levels. First, such dehumanization cannot be done with sufficient fineness of grain to avoid dehumanizing those who are only superficially similar to the violent criminals. Since one's notion of the "criminal" is likely to be mediated by social identity and thus drawn in an overly broad way, one will develop bad habits of deliberation with respect to those who may "look like" one of "the criminals." These mechanisms are also likely to be operative at the non-conscious level, that is, one may not be aware that one is, in moral deliberation, implicitly denying the humanity of those who are only superficially similar to the criminal. One's moral perception may be affected in such a way that one simply fails to see certain groups of people as human moral agents. Second, even if one's notion of the criminal is accurate and somehow manages to avoids undue generalization, it is clear that the criminal deserves some moral consideration. The dehumanization that enables violence would seem to go too far in the denyial of moral consideration to the criminal. This may be manifested in expressed attitudes of indifference to what happens to criminals, how they are or have been treated, or, as we have seen, the belief that they ought to be treated more harshly or even killed.”
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55		-Underview:
56		-Theory analytics
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58		-K spikes

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-07 20:54:58.0

Judge

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1		-Panel

Opponent

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1		-Stuyvesant PY

ParentRound

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1		-17

Round

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1		-Triples

Team

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1		-Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

Title

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1		-ND - Antagonistic Surveillance AC

Tournament

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1		-Apple Valley