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1		-The affirmative advocates for an ethical philosophy of minimizing structural violence. While traditional philosopher spend time theorizing about the nature of truth and normativity in their ivory tower offices, real people suffer from structural oppression every single day and are materially excluded from living a good life. Thus, the value criterion is minimizing structural oppression. Instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field, we should take steps to correct the material injustice. This means that the MOST important impacts in this debate are the lives of materially oppressed people living in the status quo. Two warrants:
2		-First, Non-ideal theory is the most epistemologically sound starting point for moral decisions- other methods foreclose viewpoints.
3		-Charles Mills writes, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,
4		-The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading. Think of the original challenge Marxist models of capitalism posed to liberalism’s social ontology: the claim that to focus on relations of aparently equal exchange, free and fair, among equal individuals was illusory, since at the level of the relations of production, the real ontology of worker and capitalist manifested a deep structure of constraint that limited proletarian freedom. Think of the innovation of using patriarchy to force people to recognize, and condemn as political and oppressive, rather than natural, apolitical, and unproblematic, male domination of women. Think of the recent resurrection of the concept of white supremacy to map the reality of a white domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of de jure segregation. These are all global, high-level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they abstract, they do not idealize. Or consider conceptual innovation at the more local level: the challenge to the traditional way the public/private distinction was drawn, the concept of sexual harassment. In the first case, a seemingly neutral and innocuous conceptual divide turned out, once it was viewed from the perspective of gender subordination, as contributing to the reproduction of the gender system by its relegation of “women’s issues” to a seemingly apolitical and naturalized space. In the case of sexual harassment, a familiar reality—a staple of cartoons in men’s magazines for years (bosses chasing secretaries around the desk and so on)—was reconceptualized as negative (not something funny, but something morally wrong) and a contributor to making the workplace hostile for women. These realizations, these recognitions, did not spontaneously crystallize out of nowhere; they required conceptual labor, a different map of social reality, a valorization of the distinctive experience of women. As a result of having these concepts as visual aids, we can now see better: our perceptions are no longer ignorant blinded to realities to which we were previously obtuse. In some sense, an ideal observer should have been able to see them—yet they did not, as shown by the nonappearance of these realities in male-dominated philosophical literature.
5		-End quote. Three Impacts
6		-a. only non-ideal theory is epistemologically sound- other theories have a privileged view of ethics that excludes knowledge and is thus false.
7		-b. Only non-ideal theory is motivating: oppressed groups cant participate in ideal theory which means they cant be compelled to participate in such a system. That’s a prerequisite to ethics- if no one can adopt a theory it has no use.
8		-c. Non-ideal philosophical discussion is key since its always been excluded from academia which means it offers unique education about liberating the oppressed.
9		-To clarify, ideal philosophies are philosophies like Kantian ethics that start from the premise that morality is a search for truth and not a practical guide to action. My aff answers these types of frameworks by denying their fundamental assumption.
10		-Second, debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences—abstract philosophy legitimizes oppression.
11		-Tommy Curry writes, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,
12		-Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, there is a conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to we must reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the oppressed worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
13		-
14		-End quote. The affirmative advocates the following plan text: The Supreme Court of the United States shall limit qualified immunity for police officers by forcing lower courts to give reason for exercising constitutional discretion, effectively overturning the precedent set in Pearson v. Callahan.
15		-Christopher Walker in 2015 Christopher J. Walker, Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Aaron L. Nielson, Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “The New Qualified Immunity,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1-65, Oct. 19, 2015 JW
16		-Whereas the core constitutional stagnation fear expressed about Pearson discretion is probably exaggerated, the facts on the ground nevertheless show that Pearson is not perfect. There appears to be some stagnation with respect to rights-making; variation across the circuits; and the potential of substantive asymmetries. All of this suggests that the Supreme Court might need to revisit Pearson. Indeed, following Camreta, there may be some appetite to require lower courts to decide whether the alleged right is clearly established and, if it is not, to stop the analysis there.230 Others, however, may press for a return to Saucier, as many scholars advised when Pearson was decided.231 Neither of those options is perfect, nor, in any event, likely. Accordingly, we urge a middle path: the Court should require lower courts—both trial and appellate courts—to give reasons for exercising (or not) their Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions. We are not writing on a blank slate, but borrow from long-settled principles of administrative law that stress the danger that arises when decisionmakers fail to contemporaneously explain why they have elected to exercise their discretion in a particular way.232 The value of reason giving is not limited to administrative law but has been explored in the law more generally,233 and we are not the first to import it into civil litigation.234 In fact, in his initial response to Pearson, Jack Beermann advanced a reason- giving recommendation: “At a minimum, in light of the strong reasons for reaching the constitutional merits, courts should be required to give reasons for not doing so.”235
17		-The plan is topical~-~-it limits QI
18		-a) Pearson allowed courts to skip over the legal discretion plank, to the second step, which always resolves the case. The aff forces them to answers both so they have to meet more steps to qualify for immunity.
19		-b) Aff limits the freedom for lower courts to choose how to evaluate Qualified Immunity, which is a limit in itself.
20		-My sole contention is constitutional stagnation
21		-Pearson v. Callahan established a precedent of deference to the lower courts which creates confusion on which rights the Constitution guarantees
22		-Christopher Walker in 2015 Christopher J. Walker, Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Aaron L. Nielson, Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “The New Qualified Immunity,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1-65, Oct. 19, 2015 JW
23		-Qualified immunity, however, is more than just substantively controversial; it also creates a procedural puzzle. This immunity shields government officials from personal liability whenever an alleged right was not “clearly established.” This means that a plaintiff seeking damages from an individual officer must clear two hurdles. First, she must be able to show that her constitutional right was violated. And second, she must be able to show that “a reasonable person would have known” of the violation at the time.12 Hence the puzzle: Because many constitutional issues arise in cases subject to qualified immunity, if courts were simply to resolve such claims on the ground that there is no clearly established right, then the constitutional rights may never be clearly established—especially when new fact patterns and technologies are at issue. This dilemma has been dubbed “constitutional stagnation.”13 Yet few judicial principles are as entrenched as Justice Brandeis’s warning that a court should “not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of”14—a rule Alexander Bickel included among his “passive virtues” for judging.15 With qualified immunity, the urge to prevent constitutional stagnation and the rule against reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily are at loggerheads. The Supreme Court has long struggled with this puzzle. Most recently, in 2009, the Court changed the procedures governing qualified immunity. In Pearson, 16 the Court unanimously overruled Saucier v. Katz, which had required that courts “must” first decide whether the Constitution was violated and only then decide whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established.17 Rather than requiring Saucier’s rigid “order of battle,” Pearson leaves sequencing to the “sound discretion” of the lower courts.18 Pearson thus effectuates Justice Breyer’s forceful charge—based on concerns about judicial resources and the dangers of unnecessary constitutional decisions—to “end the failed Saucier experiment now.”19 Whereas Saucier gave courts no flexibility at all, Pearson now gives courts maximalist discretion.20 Pearson was controversial when decided and “remains controversial” today.21 This is unsurprising. Pearson poses thorny theoretical questions. Many scholars and judges fear, for instance, that without Saucier, constitutional law will “stagnate as lower courts flee from the merits.”22 Reflecting the same point but from a different perspective, Judge Harvey Wilkinson celebrates Pearson as a signal that “the trend toward constitutional avoidance seems, finally, to be taking hold.”23 Some contend that Saucier had an important psychological component—that forcing courts to decide constitutional questions first affected whether they imposed liability.24 Others reject that view.25 Many also worry that courts will get bogged down in debates about when to decide constitutional questions.26
24		-End quote. Empirically proven that Pearson increased constitutional stagnation as circuit courts refused to answer constitutional questions
25		-Christopher Walker in 2015 Christopher J. Walker, Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Aaron L. Nielson, Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “The New Qualified Immunity,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1-65, Oct. 19, 2015 JW
26		-On the other hand, if one is concerned not only with courts reaching constitutional questions, but also with courts finding constitutional violations where the law is not clearly established (in other words, in the pure Saucier manner), the numbers may be less encouraging. In only one in twenty instances (5.0 or 53 claims) in which qualified immunity was granted did the court recognize a constitutional violation that was not clearly established but that, because of the court’s decision, would be in future cases. This means that in the overwhelming majority of cases in which courts opt to use their discretion to decide the constitutional merits, they are concluding that no right has been violated. To be sure, assessing whether Pearson discretion has increased the risk of constitutional stagnation requires a comparison between pre- and post-Pearson judicial decisionmaking. As discussed in Part II.A, several empirical studies were conducted before Pearson and two were conducted on cases decided shortly after Pearson. These studies do not provide perfect comparisons, as the methodologies differ. For instance, like this study, the Leong and Rolfs studies analyze both published and unpublished circuit decisions, whereas the Hughes, Sobolski-Steinberg, and JonesYauch studies look only at published decisions.194 Each study analyzes cases from different time periods before and after Saucier and Pearson, 195 which may matter. Similarly, whereas most of the prior studies draw on random samples of cases that contained certain keys words,196 our study, like the Jones-Yauch study, looks at every case within the defined population (and time period) but that population is limited to those decisions that cite Pearson. With those qualifications in mind, comparing the studies’ findings provides some (albeit limited) context on the development of constitutional law before and after Pearson, as well as before and after Saucier—the Supreme Court precedent that required courts to answer constitutional questions in every case.197 Table 1 provides that purely descriptive comparison.198 As these comparisons suggest, circuit courts unsurprisingly opt not to reach constitutional questions as often; indeed, this result flows directly from Pearson. What matters, however, is how often courts do so. The data suggest that courts decline to decide constitutional questions at a rate similar to the pre-Saucier period—in around one in four cases, as opposed to less than six percent during the Saucier regime. The overall rate of reaching constitutional questions accordingly has decreased after Pearson; it would be shocking if it were otherwise. This decrease by itself is not necessarily problematic. For the reasons given by the Pearson Court, some cases are poor vehicles to decide constitutional questions because, for instance, they are poorly briefed.199 Presumably no one thinks it is a bad thing that those cases are not being resolved on constitutional grounds. 200 Moreover, it is not obvious that civil libertarians should prefer Saucier. Imagine a world in which courts keep declining to clarify a point of law regarding a certain practice. Police might avoid that practice, or use it sparingly, because of the legal uncertainty. But if the practice is declared constitutional, police may no longer be reluctant to use it broadly. Nonetheless, as to constitutional stagnation in the pure Saucier sense, the concern about post-Pearson stagnation appears well founded: all of the post-Pearson studies—ours and the Jones-Rauch and Rolfs studies—found that circuit courts found constitutional violations of rights that were not clearly established in 3.6, 7.9, and 2.5, respectively, of the total claims reviewed, whereas the three pre-Pearson studies found rates ranging from 6.5 to 13.9 during the Saucier mandatory sequencing regime.201 Our findings suggest something has changed. The implications of these findings for substantive constitutional law are important. Pure Saucier cases are often difficult—as they should be. Finding a constitutional violation that has not been identified before is one of the most momentous things a judge can do. Such cases are often contentious. For instance, to return to the example used in the Introduction, the en banc Ninth Circuit’s holding that Officer Aikala’s use of a Taser on Ms. Mattos violated the Fourth Amendment but that the right was not “clearly established”202 prompted fierce dissent. Indeed, then-Chief Judge Kozinski warned that the majority’s constitutional “mistake will be paid for in the blood and lives of police and members of the public.”203 Hence, it is possible that courts—perhaps for the sake of comity on the bench or simply because of the call of other work—may decide not to resolve difficult constitutional questions. For instance, in one case, a prisoner’s “ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy.”204 A divided panel concluded that the doctors did not violate any clearly established law.205 The majority’s decision to just apply qualified immunity rather than reach the constitutional question obviously can be defended. But one could imagine other panels resolving the constitutional question too, as the Supreme Court did in Plumhoff v. Rickard. 206 The risk, post-Pearson, is that this type of constitutional question—i.e., a contentious one—may fall through the cracks more often after Pearson than before it.207 In sum, post-Pearson constitutional law continues to develop, but the finding of constitutional violations (when granting qualified immunity)— the pure Saucier development of constitutional law—has decreased. The data thus provide at least some support for the post-Pearson constitutional stagnation theory discussed in Part I.D
27		-End quote. Qualified immunity doesn’t even involve a question of constitutionality anymore as a result of Pearson v. Callahan.
28		-Alan Chen in 2015 Alan K. Chen, William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair and professor of law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Qualified Immunity Liming Access to Justice and Impeding Development of the Law,” Human Rights Magazine Vol 41 No 1, 2015, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015~-~-vol~-~-41-/vol~-~-41~-~-no~-~-1~-~--lurking-in-the-shadows~-~-the-supreme-court-s-qui/qualified-immunity-limiting-access-to-justice-and-impeding-devel.html JW
29		-To address this concern, the Court at one point instructed lower courts to order their decision making so that they first addressed whether the official’s conduct violated the Constitution before deciding whether he or she had immunity from suit. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Thus, as in Savana Redding’s case, while she might not have benefited from the articulation of the relevant constitutional rule, at least similarly situated future plaintiffs could have benefited. But just a few years later, the Court reversed course and restored the lower courts’ discretion to determine in which order to decide those questions. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009). There was some skepticism about how often lower courts addressed the merits question first, even under the Saucier regime, Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 889, 927 n.247 (2010), or if, when they did, they recognized a previously unarticulated constitutional right. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepp . L. Rev. 667, 692– 93 (2009). In any event, lower courts now have a green light to avoid the “harder” constitutional law question and simply decide that defendants are entitled to immunity whether or not they violated the Constitution. What this means is that in cases involving cutting-edge issues of constitutional law, qualified immunity may itself prevent the law from ever becoming clearly established. A couple of examples will help illustrate this phenomenon. One area of First Amendment doctrine that is not yet fully developed is whether or not citizens have a right to surreptitiously record police officers during the course of their duties. In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010), the court reviewed the First Amendment claim of an automobile passenger who attempted to videotape a police officer during a traffic stop. After discovering the passenger’s conduct, the officer arrested him and confiscated his camera. Id. at 251–52. Rather than address the merits of the passenger’s First Amendment claim, the Third Circuit instead found that the right to record police officers was not clearly established and affirmed the officer’s claim that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 262. Other federal courts have followed this same practice, thus failing to clarify or advance the relevant First Amendment law. See Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2009).
30		-End quote. Constitutional stagnation has 2 Impacts
31		-1. Judicial establishment of constitutional rights is key to check back large-scale oppression. Cases like Brown v. Board prove.
32		-Ilya Somin in 2016, Ilya, The Supreme Court Is a Check on Big Government, Protection for Minorities, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/06/is-the-supreme-court-too-powerful/the-supreme-court-is-a-check-on-big-government-protection-for-minorities
33		-The Supreme Court gets many things wrong. Yet America would be a far worse society without it. If judicial review were seriously curtailed, the executive and legislative branches of government could ignore most constitutional limits on their powers. This is a particularly grave danger in a world where government is as large and powerful as it is today – spending nearly 40 percent of our gross domestic product, and regulating almost every aspect of human activity. Without an independent judiciary to check their vast powers, federal and state governments would often be free to use their full might to censor opposition speech, confiscate property and otherwise persecute those they disapprove of. Avoiding that is well-worth the price of putting up with a good many flawed judicial rulings. Public opinion imposes some constraints on oppressive policies. But with a government as large and complex as ours, many of its abuses are little-known to voters, who generally pay scant attention to public policy. Moreover, some of the worst abuses target groups disliked by mainstream public opinion, such as unpopular ethnic and religious minorities. Absent judicial protection for political rights, political incumbents could even use their powers to insulate themselves against future electoral competition – as has happened in some other countries that lack strong judicial review. The court’s historical record is mixed. But it has had a major beneficial impact in helping protect the rights of racial minorities – not only in iconic cases like Brown v. Board of Education, but in lesser-known decisions, like Buchanan v. Warley, an underappreciated 1917 ruling that struck down laws preventing blacks from moving into majority-white neighborhoods. There is also little doubt that unpopular speech and religious worship has far greater protection than would exist in the court’s absence. The same is true of the rights of criminal defendants, another vulnerable group that tends to get short shrift from the political process. In recent years, the court has done much to curtail uncompensated takings of private property by both federal and state officials. This June, it struck down a program that seized large quantities of raisins from their producers to facilitate a cartel that raises prices for the benefit of politically connected agribusiness interests. Many Americans have reason to be grateful for this little-known aspect of the court’s work. Historically, many of the court’s worst decisions were cases where it chose not to strike down an oppressive unconstitutional policy – cases like Plessy v. Ferguson, which permitted racial segregation, and Korematsu v. United States, which permitted the expulsion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast during World War II. Weakening the court would increase the incidence of such outrages.
34		-End quote. That is supercharged by the fact that we are slowly realizing our laws aren’t progressive enough. In the world of Pearson we get stuck with the 2016 constitutional interpretation of things. In 100 years from now a 2016 constitution will be as outdated as the 1916 constitution would be to us.
35		-2. Court Clog
36		-Pearson complicates court procedures, reversing it decreases court clog. It also decreases it long term because constitutional precedent is set, so there doesn’t have to be a trial when the established law is very clear.
37		-Michael Avery in 08 Michael Avery, Counsel of Record SUFFOLK LAW SCHOOL, “CORDELL PEARSON, et al., Petitioners, v. AFTON CALLAHAN, Respondent. BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE NATIONAL POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT AND ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT,” American Bar Association, August 13, 2008 JW
38		-Justice Breyer has suggested permitting lower courts some flexibility with regard to the order of decisionmaking. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (“We should overrule the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz, that lower courts must first decide the ‘constitutional question’ before they turn to the ‘qualified immunity question.’ Instead, lower courts should be free to decide the two questions in whatever order makes sense in the context of a particular case.”) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Amici respectfully submit that such flexibility in this area will in practice further complicate adjudications under Section 1983 and Bivens without realizing any corresponding benefit. Rather than focusing on Section 1983’s central inquiry – has a person acting under color of state law violated any constitutional right of another person? – flexibility in ordering will add yet another layer to the current two-step approach to adjudicating civil rights claims. Adding this meta-issue will only add to the already inordinate complexity, expense, and delay of litigating these cases. The current rule has the strong benefit of clarity; the merits of a civil rights claim should resolved prior to considering the defense of qualified immunity. Only in this manner can the law develop clear standards and implement the Congressional intent underlying section 1983.
39		-1. Imaging state solutions is key to getting students into politics and prevent a ceding of power to political elites, empirics confirm. This is a pre-fiat reason to vote them down if they read a non-policy alt. It has dangerous representations.
40		-Henry Giroux, Henry, Sociologist, “The abandoned generation: The urban debate league and the politics of possibility,” 2006
41		-The decline of democratic values and informed citizenship can be seen in research studies done by The Justice Project in 2001 in which a substantial number of teenagers and young people were asked what they thought democracy meant. The answers testified to a growing depoliticization of American life and largely consisted of statements along the following lines: "Nothing," "I don't know," or "My rights, just like, pride, I guess, to some extent, and paying taxes," or "I just think, like, what does it really mean? I know its our, like, our government, but I don't know what it 6 technically is." The transition from being ignorant about democracy to actually sup- porting antidemocratic Tendencies can be seen in a number of youth surveys that have been taken since 2000. For instance, a survey released by the University of California, Berkeley, revealed that 69 percent of students support school prayer and 44 percent of young people aged fifteen to twenty-two support government restric- tions on abortions. A 2004 survey of 112,003 high school students on First Amendment rights showed that one third of students surveyed believed that the First Amendment went too far in the rights it guarantees and 36 percent believed that the press enjoyed too much freedom. This suggests not just a failing of education, but a crisis of citizenship and democracy. One consequence of the decline in democratic values and citizenship literacy is that all levels of government are being hollowed our, their role reduced to dismantling the gains of the welfare state as they increasingly construct policies that criminalize social problems and prioritize penal methods over social investments. When citizenship is reduced to consumerism, it should come as no surprise that people develop an indifference to civic engagement and participation in democratic public life. Unlike some theorists who suggest that politics as critical exchange and social engagement is either dead or in a state of terminal arrest, I believe that the current depressing state of politics points to an urgent challenge: reformulating the crisis of democracy as a fundamental crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not simply about power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, "has to do with political judgments and value choices," meaning that questions of civic education—learning how 8 to become a skilled citizen—afe central to democracy itself. Educators at all levels need to challenge the assumption that politics is dead, or the nature of politics will be determined exclusively by government leaders and experts m the heat of moral frenzy. Educators need to take a more critical position, arguing that knowledge, debate, and dialogue about pressing social problems offer individuals and groups some hope in shaping the conditions that bear down on their lives. Public civic engagement is essential if the concepts of social life and the public sphere are to be used to revitalize the language of civic education and democratization as part of a broader discourse of political agency and critical citizenship in a global world. Linking the social to democratic public values represents an attempt, however incom- plete, to link democracy to public action, as part of a comprehensive attempt to revitalize civic activism and citizen access to decision-making while simultaneously addressing basic problems of social justice and global democracy. Educators within public schools need to find ways to engage political issues by making social problems visible and by debating them in the political sphere. They also need to be at the forefront of the defense of the most progressive historical advances and gains of the state. 1-rcnch sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is right when he calls for collective work by educators to prevent those who arc mobilized against the welfare state from destroying the most precious democratic conquests in labor legis- lation, health, social protection, and education.'' At the very least, this would suggest that educators should defend schools as democratic public spheres, struggle against the de-skilling of teachers and students that has accompanied the emphasis on teach- ing for test-taking, and argue for pedagogy grounded in democratic values rather than testing schemes that severely limit the creative, ethical, and liberatory potential of education.

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-05 21:08:55.0

Judge

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1		-Rick Brundage

Opponent

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1		-WDM Valley CR

ParentRound

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1		-16

Round

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1		-6

Team

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1		-Strake Jesuit Chen Aff

Title

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1		-ND - SCOTUS AC Lay Structural Violence

Tournament

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1		-Apple Valley