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+====I value morality, which deals with assigning goodness to actions. Actions are only differentiated from events if they are constituted by practical reasoning.==== |
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+**Rodl 2k:** Sebastian, German philosopher and professor of practical philosophy at the University of Leipzig, he studied philosophy, musicology, German literature and history in Frankfurt am Main and Berlin. His work focuses on the nature of human thought and action. He contributes to philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, epistemology and action theory. From 2005-2012 he was professor of philosophy at the University of Basel. "Self-Consciousness" Harvard University Press. 2007. IB |
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+Calculation from desire does not yield a premise … of a movement, and I would not, in doing A1 and A2, be doing B. |
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+====That outweighs– even reflecting about what framework we should use concedes the authority of reasoning. Next, any moral rule must be universal as there is no inherent distinction between agents.==== |
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+**Velleman 06:** David, Professor of Philosophy at New York University in the NYU Department of Philosophy. He taught previously for more than twenty years at the University of Michigan, Professor Velleman's work in the philosophy of action includes the book Practical Reflection (reprinted 2007, CSLI Publications) and a collection of papers, The Possibility of Practical Reason (open-access second edition 2015, Maize Books). His papers on the self are collected in Self to Self (Cambridge 2006). His work on the foundations of morality comprises two monographs: How We Get Along (Cambridge 2009) and Foundations for Moral Relativism (open-access second edition 2015, Open Book Publishers). Velleman has received fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Guggenheim Foundation, and he is a founding co-Editor of Philosophers' Imprint. "Self to Self" Cambridge University Press. 2006. |
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+Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from … of the sum is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all. |
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+====Next, willing coercion is a contradiction because we simultaneously extend our own freedom to will while curtailing it.==== |
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+**Engstrom:** Stephen, professor of ethics at the University of Pittsburgh, he previously taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard, and since joining the Department he has held visiting positions at UCLA, the University of Leipzig, and the University of Chicago. His areas of interest include ethics, metaphysics, modern philosophy (especially Kant), and ancient philosophy. "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge." No Date. IB |
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+Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to … both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom. |
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+====A respect for everyone as ends is key to any social movement – the affirmative conceptualizes Kantian philosophy to create an emancipatory political theory.==== |
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+Mills 15: Charles, the John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern University, author of the Racial Contract. "Black Radical Liberalism (by Charles Mills)." February 23, 2015. http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/02/black-radical-liberalism-and-why-it-isnt-an-oxymoron.html |
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+"Black radical liberalism" is my attempt to reconstruct from different … liberalism would be addressed rather than evaded. |
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+====Thus the standard is consistency with a system of equal freedom. Prefer – ==== |
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+====1. Human Worth – it follows from practical reason that rational beings have inherent value. ==== |
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+**Korsgaard 96:** Christine, professor of philosophy at Harvard. "The Sources of Normativity." 1996. |
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+This is just a fancy new model of … reasons and values must be valued for its own sake. |
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+====This sense of value proves human worth – this comes before aggregation because human worth can’t be added to create more human worth.==== |
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+**Korsgaard 93:** Christine, professor of philosophy at Harvard. "The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values." Cambridge University Press, 1993. Previously published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51. |
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+The difference between these two interpretations of … about value may be a consequentialist, while an Intersubjectivist will not. |
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+====Human worth generates a system of equal freedom – this creates a mutual responsibility and honor. Rightful honor means that you cannot set your worth above another. ==== |
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+**Ripstein 09:** Arthur, professor of law at the University of Toronto. "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009. SA-IB |
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+The same right to be your own master within a system of … characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others. |
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+====2. Governments – the right to freedom is the foundation of government authority – the state exists in order to maintain that freedom. That defines a government’s original purpose – means the aff is the most actor specific.==== |
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+**Korsgaard 08:** Christine, professor of philosophy at Harvard. "Taking the law into our own hands: Kant on the right to revolution." In The Constitution of Agency, 233-262. 2008. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, eds. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. |
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+Why is it permissible for others to force or coerce you to conform … transferring our executive authority to a government. |
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+====3. Human Equality – that mandates a system of equal freedom, it’s the only way to respect equality amongst agents.==== |
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+**Ripstein 09:** Arthur, professor of law at the University of Toronto. "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009. |
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+Kant offers different formulations of innate right, each of which … make your life go well, or has a pressing need that only you can satisfy. |
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+====Qualified immunity sets an officer’s worth above citizens – this allows them to wrongfully injure and act without responsibility to others – that violates equal freedom and enables police brutality.==== |
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+**Sand 13:** Georgia, activist and reporter at Cop Block: Badges Don’t Grant Extra Rights. "Ignorance of the law is legally an excuse for police officers" March 15, 2013. http://www.copblock.org/28642/ignorance-of-the-law-is-legally-an-excuse-for-police-officers/ SA-IB |
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+Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine by which police … may act as they please, unless the law has clearly established that doing so is a violation of the victim’s rights. |
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+====Thus the plan: On its next appropriate test case, the United States Supreme Court ought to remove qualified immunity for nominal damage suits against police officers.==== |
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+**Pfander 11:** James, the Owen L. Coon Professor of Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, teaches civil procedure, conflicts of law, federal jurisdiction, and constitutional law. A member of the American Law Institute, Pfander has served as chair of the procedure and jurisdiction sections of the Association of American Law Schools. He has published dozens of scholarly articles and essays in such journals as the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the Columbia Law Review. "RESOLVING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DILEMMA: CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES" Faculty Working Papers, Northwestern University School of Law. 2011. SA-IB |
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+Applying the principles in these leading cases, one can … seeking one dollar. The next part addresses these concerns. |
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+====This allows constitutional vindication and deterrence – only that prevents court backlash and maximizes the clarity of tort law.==== |
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+**Pfander 11:** James, the Owen L. Coon Professor of Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, teaches civil procedure, conflicts of law, federal jurisdiction, and constitutional law. A member of the American Law Institute, Pfander has served as chair of the procedure and jurisdiction sections of the Association of American Law Schools. He has published dozens of scholarly articles and essays in such journals as the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the Columbia Law Review. "RESOLVING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DILEMMA: CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES" Faculty Working Papers, Northwestern University School of Law. 2011. SA-IB |
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+Building on these early foundations, this essay … the norms in question can be regarded as clearly established. |
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+====This links to the standard – a) when you violate my rights, you should be held accountable and open to liability and b) when officers act however they want due to immunity from liability, that violates their responsibility to others. A respect for people as ends requires the ability to enforce liability through tort law – everyone has a unique responsibility to others.==== |
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+**Ripstein 04:** Arthur, professor of law at the University of Toronto. "The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort" Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 04-02. SA-IB |
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+This brings us back to the law of tort. Almost … to set and pursue your own conception of the good. |
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+====The affirmative’s conception of Kantian philosophy is key to solve racism – this takes out any abstracting link – the affirmative employs abstraction for the purpose of a) transcending arbitrary differences between humans and affirm the inherent equality in everyone and b) abstracting away from personal interests to avoid egoism and uphold equality.==== |
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+**Farr 02:** Arnold, professor of philosophy at University of Kentucky who focuses on German idealism, race philosophy, postmodernism, psychoanalsysis, and liberation philosophy. "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" Journal of Social Philosophy. Volume 33, No. 1. Spring 2002. |
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+Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation … categorical imperative without first exploring its emancipatory potential. |