Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[23]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[30]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[23]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-02-08 15:01:15.649
	1	+2017-02-08 15:01:15.0

Caselist.CitesClass[30]

Cites

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	1	+====A. Interpretation: The aff must defend that public colleges or universities may restrict no constitutionally protected speech. To clarify, they can't defend a restriction on only a kind, setting, or timing of speech.====
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	4	+====B. Violation- ====
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	7	+====C. Reasons to prefer:====
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	10	+====1. The term "any" is the res is the weak form of "any" - "not any" statements refer to "all". Cambridge Dictionary^^ ^^====
	11	+We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven't got any eggs. I've got some eggs. Not: I've got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: ~~talking about fuel for the car~~ Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren't any clean knives. They're all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don't use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book? Strong form any meaning 'it does not matter which' We use any to mean 'it does not matter which or what', to describe something which is not limited. We use this meaning of any with all types of nouns and usually in affirmative sentences. In speaking we often stress any:. (+ uncountable noun) When you make a late booking, you don't know where you're going to go, do you? It could be any destination. (+ singular countable noun) ~~talking about a contract for new employees~~ Do we have any form of agreement with new staff when they start? (+ singular countable noun) ~~a parent talking to a child about a picture he has painted~~ A: I don't think I've ever seen you paint such a beautiful picture before. Gosh! Did you choose the colours? B: We could choose any colours we wanted. (+ plural countable noun) See also: Determiners and types of noun Some and any Any as a pronoun Any can be used as a pronoun (without a noun following) when the noun is understood. A: Have you got some £1 coins on you? B: Sorry, I don't think I have any. (understood: I don't think I have any £1 coins.) ~~parents talking about their children's school homework~~ A: Do you find that Elizabeth gets lots of homework? Marie gets a lot. B: No not really. She gets hardly any. (understood: She gets hardly any homework.) A: What did you think of the cake? It was delicious, wasn't it? B: I don't know. I didn't get any. (understood: I didn't get any of the cake.) See also: Determiners used as pronouns Any of We use any with of before articles (a/an, the), demonstratives (this, these), pronouns (you, us) or possessives (his, their): Shall I keep any of these spices? I think they're all out of date. Not: … any these spices? We use any of to refer to a part of a whole: Are any of you going to the meeting? I couldn't answer any of these questions. I listen to Abba but I've never bought any of their music. Any doesn't have a negative meaning on its own. It must be used with a negative word to mean the same as no. Compare Not Any: there aren't any biscuits left. They've eaten them all. No: There are no biscuits left. They've eaten them all.
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	14	+====Outweighs - it takes into account AFF definitions which assume a strong form of "any" that justifies singular cases.====
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	17	+====Empirically proven—multiple court rulings agree with our interp. Elder 91^^ ^^====
	18	+The Michigan Supreme Court seemed to approve our dictionary definitions of "any" in Harrington v Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 210 Mich 327, 330; 178 NW 19 (1920), when it quoted Hopkins v Sanders, 172 Mich 227; 137 NW 709 (1912). The Court defined "any" like this: "In broad language, it covers 'arl'v final decree' in 'any suit at law or in chancery' in 'any circuit court.' Any' means ,every,' 'each one of all."' In a later case, the Michigan Supreme Court again held that the use of "any" in an agency contract meant "all." In Gibson v Agricultural Life Ins Co, 282 Mich 282, 284; 276 NW 450 (1937), the clause in controversy read: "14. The Company shall have, and is hereby given a first lien upon any commissions or renewals as security for any claim due or to become due to the Company from said Agent." (Emphasis added.) The Gibson court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's insistence that the word "any" meant less than "all": "Giving the wording of paragraph 14 oJ the agency contract its plain and unequivocable meaning, upon arriving at the conclusion that the sensible connotation of the word any' implies 'all' and not 'some,' the legal conclusion follows that the defendant is entitled to retain the earned renewal commissions arising from its agency contract with Gibson and cannot be held legally liable for same in this action," Gibson at 287 (quoting the trial court opinion). The Michigan Court of Appeals has similarly interpreted the word "any" as used in a Michigan statute. In McGrath v Clark, 89 Mich App 194; 280 NW2d 480 (1979), the plaintiff accepted defendant's offer of judgment. The offer said nothing about prejudgment interest. The statute the Court examined was MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013: "Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment recovered in a civil action...." The Court held that "the word 'any' is to be considered all-inclusive," so the defendants were entitled to interest. McGrath at 197 Recently, the Court has again held that "~~alny means 'every,' 'each one of all,' and is unlimited in its scope." Parker v Nationwide Mutual Ins Co, 188 Mich App 354, 356; 470 NW2d 416 (1991) (quoting Harrington v InterState Men's Accident Ass'n, supra)
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	21	+====2. Anything less than full freedom falls under regulation, not restriction. Taylor 12:^^ ^^====
	22	+Following Rawls and others, I distinguish between the "regulation" and the "restriction" of basic liberties like free speech. "The priority of these liberties," Rawls says, "is not infringed when they are merely regulated—as they must be—in order to be combined into one scheme as well as adapted to certain social conditions necessary for their enduring exercise" (Rawls 1993, 295). For instance, so-called "time, place, and manner" rules (e.g., scheduling speakers at a public forum on a "first-come, first-served" basis) usually qualify as regulations of speech, as they are merely intended to make communication mutually consistent or to protect the "central range of application" of other basic liberties. On the other hand, prohibitions on the advocacy of particular scientific or political doctrines count as restrictions of speech because they limit its content and thereby place at risk a core liberal value associated with open expression: intellectual autonomy achieved by way of the free exercise of public reason (Rawls 1993, 296; Kant 1996). Certain narrow limitations on the content of speech (e.g., bans on "fighting words," such as racial epithets used confrontationally) could be defended as regulations rather than restrictions, on the grounds that they do not threaten the free exercise of public reason and may protect the central range of application of other basic liberties (e.g., bodily security), but limitations on hate speech as I defined it above are prima facie restrictions, because they strike at the heart of such free exercise, which depends crucially on open access to all available arguments regarding scientific and political matters.2 ~~…~~ To begin, however, I should define my terms. For reasons that will become clear below, I define "hate speech" as a type of group libel: speech (oral or written) that argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical inferiority of members of particular historically-oppressed groups (e.g., blacks, women, Jews, and homosexuals). Several other definitions of hate speech are available, of course, including ones that characterize it as "face-to-face vilification" by means of ~~which I count as~~ "fighting words" or as "hostile-environment harassment."
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	25	+====Framework – Topicality is decided based only on the meaning of terms in the resolution, not matters of fairness/education. Nebel 1:^^ ^^====
	26	+One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, topicality involves two "interpretations." The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. ~~and~~ The second is a rule—namely, that the affirmative must defend the resolution.2 If we don't distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative's view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: it would be unfair to expect the negative to prepare against anything other than the resolution, because that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; the educational benefits that are unique to debate stem from clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: 1. We ought to debate the resolution. 2. The resolution means X. Therefore, 3. We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They ~~Fairness and education~~ might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant ~~something else~~ X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may ~~they only~~ show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for ~~debating the topic~~ the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.
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	29	+====Voter
	30	+analytics
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	33	+====Second, even pragmatic concerns justify debating the topic. Nebel 3:====
	34	+One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, topicality involves two "interpretations." The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second is a rule—namely, that the affirmative must defend the resolution.2 If we don't distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative's view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: it would be unfair to expect the negative to prepare against anything other than the resolution, because that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; the educational benefits that are unique to debate stem from clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: 1. We ought to debate the resolution. 2. The resolution means X. Therefore, 3. We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant ~~something else~~ X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may ~~only~~ show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for ~~debating the topic~~ the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above. 1.1 The Topicality Rule vs. Pragmatic Considerations There is an obvious objection to my argument above. If the topicality rule is justified for reasons that have to do with fairness and education, then shouldn't we just directly appeal to such considerations when determining what proposition we ought to debate? There are at least three ways I see of responding to this objection. One way admits that such pragmatic considerations are relevant—i.e., they are ~~may be~~ reasons to change the topic—but holds that they are outweighed by the reasons for ~~debating it~~ the topicality rule. It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash—including an essentially vigilantist approach to topicality in which debaters ~~would~~ enforce their own pet resolutions on an arbitrary, round-by-round basis. Think here of the utilitarian case for internalizing rules against lying, murder, and other intuitively wrong acts. As the great utilitarian Henry Sidgwick argued, wellbeing is maximized not by everyone doing what they think maximizes wellbeing, but rather (in general) by people sticking to the rules of common sense morality. Otherwise, people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules, thereby undermin~~e~~ing ~~the~~ social practices that promote wellbeing in the long run. That is exactly what happens if we reject the topicality rule in favor of direct appeals to pragmatic considerations. Sticking to a rule that applies regardless of the topic, of the debaters' preferred variations on the topic, and of debaters' familiarity with the national circuit's flavor of the week, avoids these problems.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-08 15:01:19.946

Judge

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	1	+Megan Boyd

Opponent

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	1	+Westwood DM

ParentRound

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	1	+23

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+Southlake Carroll Mohsin Neg

Title

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	1	+JANFEB-T Nebel

Tournament

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	1	+Colleyville