| ... |
... |
@@ -1,0
+1,32 @@ |
|
1 |
+Prohibitions can only exist if actors are willing to mutually submit to rules. Otherwise, what we should do ceases to be a rational and functional statement. |
|
2 |
+ |
|
3 |
+Nigel Dower Senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. World ethics: the new agenda. Edinburgh University Press, 1998. |
|
4 |
+ |
|
5 |
+ |
|
6 |
+Hobbes was a … the first place. |
|
7 |
+ |
|
8 |
+Such mutuality is absent from international relations, and so the international realm lacks a conception of moral obligation. |
|
9 |
+ |
|
10 |
+Nigel Dower Senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. World ethics: the new agenda. Edinburgh University Press, 1998. |
|
11 |
+ |
|
12 |
+Hobbes’ argument is a … in international relations. |
|
13 |
+ |
|
14 |
+Finally, the international realm lacks a universal morality capable of obligating nations to refrain from action. |
|
15 |
+ |
|
16 |
+Nigel Dower Senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. World ethics: the new agenda. Edinburgh University Press, 1998. |
|
17 |
+ |
|
18 |
+ |
|
19 |
+The relativist thesis … systems onto others. |
|
20 |
+ |
|
21 |
+ |
|
22 |
+Abstract moral theories fail to guide state action because they ignore the state’s pursuit for power. |
|
23 |
+Mearshimer (John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, PhD in international relations, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics) |
|
24 |
+The optimists' claim … a major war. |
|
25 |
+ |
|
26 |
+Thus the standard is consistency with the principles of realism. |
|
27 |
+ |
|
28 |
+And the only relevant question when questioning consistency with realism is that if the state was tending to realist principles. That means the end results of actions don’t have bearing when discussing function. |
|
29 |
+ |
|
30 |
+Boyle, Matthew and Douglas Lavin. 2010. Goodness and desire. In Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum. New York: Oxford University Press |
|
31 |
+. |
|
32 |
+We can begin … bear this form. |