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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,3 @@ 1 +AFF actors should remove all restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech, and ban the usage of all hate speech, including hate speech not protected by the First Amendment. Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness. 2 +Jared Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ **Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position //LADI 3 +First-Amendment guarantees of free speech are a cherished part of the American tradition and set us apart from virtually every other country. They are not without critics, however, and the free speech guarantees under sharpest attack are those that protect so-called “hate speech.” Jeremy Waldron, an academic originally from New Zealand, has written a whole book explaining why “hate speech” does not deserve protection—and Harvard University Press has published it. Prof. Waldron teaches law and philosophy at New York University Law School, is a professor of social and political theory at Oxford, and is an adjunct professor at Victoria University in New Zealand. Perhaps his foreign origins influence his view of the First Amendment. In this book, Professor Waldron makes just one argument for banning “hate speech.” It is not a good argument, and if this is the best the opponents of free speech can do, the First Amendment should be secure. However, in the current atmosphere of “anti-racism,” any argument against “hate speech” could influence policy, so let us understand his argument as best we can. First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,3 @@ 1 +The United States Federal Government should repeal the Patriot Act – that’s key to increase free speech and foster progressive criticism of the status quo on campuses. 2 +Macdonald 03 Morgan MacDonald, Patriot Act stifles dissent on campus, Baltimore Sun, 11/24/03, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-11-24/news/0311240117_1_student-groups-student-information-college-campuses //LADI 3 +AS A COLLEGE student, I am acutely aware of both the legal and social effects of the USA Patriot Act on my life and on the lives of my peers. Passed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Patriot Act has led to a broadening of governmental power to define protest as terrorism and to intrude on our fundamental rights as citizens. I am concerned by the Patriot Act's impact on the lives of all citizens, but especially on my peers in colleges across the country. No matter what provision of the Patriot Act we examine, its effects are tenfold on a college campus. A college campus is highly interconnected in every imaginable way, and in that sense differs from the typical small American city. Students are plugged into one central Internet server, student records are compiled in one database, students live in centralized college housing, student groups meet on campus, and so on. To monitor for "subversive" activity or to track a specific e-mail account is made exponentially easier when all the information is centralized and in the control of school administrations. Students on college campuses have far less privacy than the average person. When this problem is compounded by the expansion of government oversight, students' rights are placed in the most precarious of positions. Under the Patriot Act, student groups can be labeled "terrorist" organizations if they engage in certain types of protest or civil disobedience. In Minnesota, student groups such as Anti-Racist Action and Students Against War were labeled as potential terrorist threats. The government can demand that schools hand over student information without presenting probable cause that a crime has been committed. According to the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, more than 200 colleges and universities have turned over student information to the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service and other law enforcement agencies. Some college police are reporting directly to federal law enforcement agencies, thus allowing the government to monitor the actions of student groups and individual students without notification to the students or even college administrators. Beyond violating constitutionally guaranteed rights, the effect of the Patriot Act on college campuses is to create a suffocating educational and social atmosphere. The result of this legislation is the slow deterioration of student involvement and full intellectual participation on college campuses. If students are not allowed to express themselves in college - to question authority and to team with other students for positive social change - America's future is bleak. I am infuriated when I sit in a student anti-war strategy meeting and one of my peers says she cannot participate in our protest because she is not from the United States and fears the consequences of her actions. That is not the American way. That is not how universities contribute to progress in this country. Those who drafted the Patriot Act failed to create legislation that protects both the safety and the rights of each American. That lack of attention to our country's fundamental values is striking college campuses like a hidden illness. America is a country that advocates free speech and free expression because of the belief that a marketplace of contradictory opinions is beneficial to the progress of society. When students are deterred from participating in free discussion and demonstrations of individuality, the marketplace of ideas loses one of its biggest and most essential contributors. We are not afraid to oppose the Patriot Act because we know the consequences of its implementation. The destruction of our educational freedom must not be allowed. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,18 @@ 1 +Interpretation: The affirmative must defend removing restrictions on ALL constitutionally protected speech. The affirmative may only defend removing specific restrictions on time, place, or manner of protected speech. 2 +Any is defined as every 3 +Your Dictionary NO DATE (Your Dictionary, online reference, “any,” http://www.yourdictionary.com/any///LADI) 4 +every: any child can do it 5 +Any is an indefinite pronoun that refers to things generally 6 +Language NO DATE (Online English grammar textbook, Unit 42: - Indefinite Pronouns,” http://www.1-language.com/englishcoursenew/unit42_grammar.htm///LADI) 7 +Indefinite pronouns replace specific things with general, non-specific concepts. For example: - I want to live abroad in Italy. - I want to live abroad somewhere. This unit covers indefinite pronouns made with some, any, no, and every. Some / any Some and any can be combined with "-thing" to refer to an undefined object. For example: - There's someone outside the door. - There isn't anyone in the office. Some and any can be combined with "-where" to refer to an undefined location. For example: - I'm looking for somewhere to live. - We don't want to live anywhere near here. Some and any can be combined with "-body" or "-one" to refer to an undefined person. There is very little difference in meaning between "-body" and "-one". For example: - If you have a problem, someone/somebody will help you. - Do you know anyone/anybody who can help? These compound nouns follow the same rules as some and any, that is some is used in affirmative statements, and any is used in negative statements and questions. For example: - I need something from the supermarket. - I don't need anything from the supermarket. - Do you need anything from the supermarket? 8 +Restrict is defined by Merriam Webster as 9 +to subject to bounds or limits 10 +Literature about constitutionally protected speech centers on time, place, and manner restrictions, not content-based restrictions 11 +Legal Dictionary "Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions" AZ 12 +The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Freedom of Speech. This guarantee generally safeguards the right of individuals to express themselves without governmental restraint. Nevertheless, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is not absolute. It has never been interpreted to guarantee all forms of speech without any restraint whatsoever. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that state and federal governments may place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of individual expression. Time, place, and manner (TPM) restrictions accommodate public convenience and promote order by regulating traffic flow, preserving property interests, conserving the environment, and protecting the administration of justice. 13 +Violation: The plan ends restrictions surrounding specific forms of speech 14 +Net Benefits— 15 +1. Limits 16 +A. Fairness 17 +B. Education 18 +2. Topical version of the aff - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,8 @@ 1 +Counterplan Text: The Supreme Court of the United States, in the next available test case, should rule that public colleges and universities ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. 2 +Lawsuits are piling up against free speech restrictions – the counterplan strengthens First Amendment protections and solves the entirety of the case 3 +Watanabe 14 Teresa Watanabe (covers education for the LA Times), "Students challenge free-speech rules on college campuses," LA Times, 7/1/2014 AZ 4 +College students in California and three other states filed lawsuits against their campuses Tuesday in what is thought to be the first-ever coordinated legal attack on free speech restrictions in higher education. Vincenzo Sinapi-Riddle, a 20-year-old studying computer science, alleged that Citrus College in Glendora had violated his 1st Amendment rights by restricting his petitioning activities to a small "free-speech zone" in the campus quad. According to Sinapi-Riddle's complaint, a campus official stopped him last fall from talking to another student about his campaign against spying by the National Security Agency, saying he had strayed outside the free-speech zone. The official said he had the authority to eject Sinapi-Riddle from campus if he did not comply. "It was shocking to me that there could be so much hostility about me talking to another student peacefully about government spying," Sinapi-Riddle said in an interview. "My vision of college was to express what I think." In his lawsuit, Sinapi-Riddle is challenging Citrus' free-speech zone, an anti-harassment policy that he argues is overly broad and vague and a multi-step process for approving student group events. The college had eliminated its free-speech zones in a 2003 legal settlement with another student, but last year "readopted in essence the unconstitutional policy it abandoned," the complaint alleged. College officials were not immediately available for comment. But communications director Paula Green forwarded copies of Citrus' free-speech policy, which declares that the campus is a "non-public forum" except where otherwise designated to "prevent the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the college." The policy instructs the college to enact procedures that "reasonably regulate" free expression. The "Stand Up for Speech" litigation project is sponsored by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, a Philadelphia-based group that promotes free speech and due process rights at colleges and universities. Its aim is to eliminate speech codes and other campus policies that restrict expression. In a report published this year, the foundation found that 58 of 427 major colleges and universities surveyed maintain restrictive speech codes despite what it called a "virtually unbroken string of legal defeats" against them dating to 1989. Even in California — unique in the nation for two state laws that explicitly bar free speech restrictions at both public and private universities — the majority of campuses retain written speech codes, he said. Among 16 California State University campuses surveyed by the group, for instance, 11 were rated "red" for employing at least one policy that "substantially restricts" free speech. "Universities are scared of people who demand censorship ~-~- they're afraid of lawsuits and PR problems," said Robert Shibley, the foundation’s senior vice president. "Unfortunately, they are more worried about that than about ignoring their 1st Amendment responsibilities," he added. "The point of the project is to balance out the incentives that cause universities to institute rules that censor speech." The foundation intends to target campuses in each of four federal court circuits; after each case is settled, it will file another lawsuit. In other cases filed Tuesday: — Iowa State University students Paul Gerlich and Erin Furleigh challenged administrative rejection of their campus club T-shirt promoting legalization of marijuana. The university said the shirt violated rules that bar the use of the school name to promote "dangerous, illegal or unhealthy" products and behavior, according to the complaint. — Chicago State University faculty members Phillip Beverly and Robert Bionaz sued over what they said were repeated attempts to silence a blog they write on alleged administrative corruption. — Ohio University student Isaac Smith challenged the campus speech code that forbids any act that "degrades, demeans or disgraces another." University officials invoked the code to veto a T-shirt by Smith’s Students Defending Students campus group — which defends peers accused of campus disciplinary offenses. The T-shirt said, "We get you off for free," a phrase that administrators found "objectified women" and "promoted prostitution," the complaint said. 5 + 6 +Courts are better checks on implementation – they decide the birghtline for whether speech is constitutionally protected. 7 +Arthur 11 (Joyce, Founder and Executive Director of the Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, a national political pro-choice group, “The Limits of Free Speech,” Sep 21, 2011, https://rewire.news/article/2011/09/21/limits-free-speech-5/ 8 +A common objection to prosecuting hate speech is that it might endanger speech that counters hate speech. For example, a critique may repeat the offending words and discuss their import, or it may subvert the hate message in a subtle or creative way that could be misunderstood by some. But context is everything when determining whether speech is actually hateful or not, so this objection seems nonsensical. Any reasonable judge should be able to discern the difference in intent or effect behind a hateful message and the speech that critiques it. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,13 @@ 1 +International law banned hate speech 2 +Matsuda 89 Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989 AZ 3 +The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi- nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite- ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi- nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ- ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm- ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio- lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro- hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur- gency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination. 4 +Prefer – it explicitly compares international obligations to protect free speech against the need to ban hate speech and concludes that banning hate speech is more important 5 + 6 +The impact is unrestrained use of force in conflict 7 +Modirzadeh 14 Naz K. Modirzadeh 14, Senior Fellow at Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Law and Security, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Modirzadeh-Final.pdf 8 +The central purpose of the convergence of IHL and IHRL is to increase the protection of individuals in armed conflict. The notion behind the insistence that IHL and IHRL are part of the same discipline suggests that IHL is part of the far larger and more broadly applicable legal realm of IHRL. Indeed, the very idea of the “humanization of humanitarian law”159 is that the cold, brutal balancing of IHL, its perceived deference to the military and the needs of the state is opened up and mitigated by a body of law that protects the individual’s human rights against the state. Yet here the story flips: It is IHRL that seems to become part of IHL. It is IHRL that, by the end of our narrative, seems to be brought into the service of conflict, to act not as a powerful check on the brute force of the sovereign, not as the voice of the international community against those who wish to prioritize national security over individual liberties, but rather as a means to regulate the use of lethal violence. Having argued vociferously that IHRL applies in all situations of armed conflict at all times in order to protect individuals, the argument suddenly turns in the other direction. It becomes possible to say that IHRL can be utilized to allow for one state to invade another state’s territory in order to murder individuals without an attempt to arrest, detain, charge, and try these individuals. What is so striking in this view is how well—if that is the right word—the convergence argument worked, or at least how much work convergence ended up doing. Remarkably, many who wish to justify a far broader and even more aggressive CIA drone program cite convergence as a basis for doing so.160 9 +For the application of IHL, on the other hand, the dominant assumption of convergence—that human rights law and IHL are part of the same general field, that they apply simultaneously, and that they are part of the same conversation—may have had the effect of loosening the boundaries around the field of application of IHL. As the two bodies of law began to be used interchangeably—as an attack utilizing a five hundred pound bomb is analogized to a police officer using a weapon when faced with the imminent danger of a hostage situation—one effect on the perception of IHL may be that it is no longer seen as a tightly controlled body of law. As many leading IHL lawyers warned in 2001 and 2002, once IHL is applied, many ugly things that we generally see as illegal, as outside the realm of rule of law, suddenly become lawful. Those IHRL lawyers who argued that IHRL applies simultaneously to IHL during armed conflict may have contributed to the blurring of the line between war and not-war. 10 + 11 +Global war 12 +Goodman 09 Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12 13 +A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be more concerned about the prospect of future Kosovos – ambitious military actions without clear legal authority – or future Rwandas – inaction and deadlock at the Security Council. Indeed, various institutional designs will tend to favor one of those outcomes over the other. In 1999, Kofi Annan delivered a powerful statement that appeared to consider the prospect of repeat Rwandas the greater concern; and he issued a call to arms to support the ‘developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’.95 Ifoneassumesthatthereis,indeed,aneedforcontinuedorgreatersupport for humanitarian uses of force, Type I erosions of the separation principle pose a serious threat to that vision. And the threat is not limited to unilateral uses of force. It also applies to military operations authorized by the Security Council. In short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach. The scheme imposes greater requirements on armed forces engaged in a humanitarian mission with respect to safeguarding civilian ives.96 If that scheme is intended to smoke out illicit intent,97 it is likely to have perverse effects: suppressing sincere humanitarian efforts at least on the margins. Actors engaged in a bona fide humanitarian intervention generally tend to be more protective of their own armed forces than in other conflicts. It is instructive to consider, for instance, the precipitous US withdrawal from the UN mission in Somalia – code-named Operation Restore Hope – after the loss of eighteen American soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and the ‘lesson’ that policymakers drew from that conflict.98 Additionally, the Kosovoc ampaign – code-named Operation Noble Anvil – was designed to be a ‘zero-casualty war’ for US soldiers, because domestic public support for the campaign was shallow and unstable. The important point is that the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach would impose additional costs on genuine humanitarian efforts, for which it is already difficult to build and sustain popular support. As a result, we can expect to see fewer bona fide interventions to protect civilians from atrocities.99 Notably, such results are more likely to affect two types of states: states with robust, democratic institutions that effectively reflect public opinion and states that highly value compliance with jus in bello. Both of those are the very states that one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the British House of Lords decision in Al-Jedda which cast doubt on the validity of derogations taken in peacekeeping operations as well as other military efforts in which the homeland is not directly at stake and the state could similarly withdraw. The scheme imposes a tax on such interventions by precluding the government from adopting measures that would otherwise be considered lawful and necessary to meet exigent circumstances related to the conflict. Such extraordinary constraints in wartime may very well temper the resolve to engage in altruistic intervention and military efforts that involve similar forms of voluntarism on the part of the state. Such a legal scheme may thus yield fewer such operations and the participation of fewer states in such multilateral efforts. And, the impact of the scheme should disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties: states that decide whether and to what degree to participate in a coalition with the principal intervener. It is to be expected that the commitment on the part of the principal intervener will be stronger, and thus not as easily shifted by the erosion of the separation principle. The ability, however, to hold together a coalition of states is made much more difficult by these added burdens. Indeed, as the United States learned in the Kosovo campaign, important European allies were wary about the intervention, in part due to its lack of an international legal pedigree. And the weakness of the alliance, including German and Italian calls for an early suspension of the bombing campaign, impeded the ability to wage war in the first place. It may be these third party states and their decision whether to join a humanitarian intervention where the international legal regime matters most. Without such backing of important allies, the intervention itself is less likely to occur. It is also those states – the more democratic, the more rights respecting, and the more law abiding – that the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘undesirable wars’ more likely. In previous writing, I argue that encouraging states to frame their resort to force through humanitarian objectives rather than other rationales would, in the aggregate, reduce the overall level of disputes that result in uncontrolled escalation and war.100 A reverse relationship also holds true. That is, encouraging states to forego humanitarian rationales in favor of other justifications for using force may culminate in more international disputes ending in uncontrolled escalation and war. This outcome is especially likely to result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach) and ‘wars of choice’ (the Al-Jedda approach) would encourage states to justify their resort to force on alternative grounds. For example, states would be incentivized to invoke other legitimated frameworks – such as security rationales involving the right to self-defense, collective self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, and traditional threats to international peace and security. And, even if military action is pursued through the Security Council, states may be reluctant to adopt language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over humanitarian ones is more likely to lead to uncontrolled escalation and war. A growing body of social science scholarship demonstrates that the type of issue in dispute can constitute an important variable in shaping the course of interstate hostilities. The first generation of empirical scholarship on the origins of war did not consider this dimension. Political scientists instead concentrated on features of the international system (for example, the distribution of power among states) and on the characteristics of states (for example, forms of domestic governance structures) as the key explanatory variables. Research agendas broadened considerably, however, in subsequent years. More recently, ‘several studies have identified substantial differences in conflict behavior over different types of issues’.101 The available evidence shows that states are significantly more inclined to fight over particular types of issues that are elevated in a dispute, despite likely overall material and strategic losses.102 Academic studies have also illuminated possible causal explanations for these empirical patterns. Specifically, domestic (popular and elite) constituencies more readily support bellicose behavior by their government when certain salient cultural or ideological issues are in contention. Particular issue areas may also determine the expert communities (humanitarian versus security mindsets) that gain influence in governmental circles – a development that can shape the hard-line or soft-line strategies adopted in the course of the dispute. In short, these links between domestic political processes and the framing of international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in interstate disputes with rivals and that those disputes which are framed through security and strategic rationales are more likely to escalate to war. Indeed, the inclusion of a humanitarian rationale provides windows of opportunity to control and deescalate a conflict. Thus, eliminating or demoting a humanitarian rationale from a mix of justifications (even if it is not replaced by another rationale) can be independently destabilizing. Espousing or promoting security rationales, on the other hand, is more likely to culminate in public demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of international law to influence state behavior directly. It is reasonable to assume that international law is unlikely to alter the determination of a state to wage war, and that international law is far more likely to influence only the justificatory discourse states employ while proceeding down the warpath. However, as I argue in my earlier work, leaders (of democratic and nondemocratic) states become caught in their official justifications for military campaigns. Consequently, framing the resort to force as a pursuit of security objectives, or adding such issues to an ongoing conflict, can reshape domestic political arrangements, which narrows the subsequent range of policy options. Issues that initially enter a conflict due to disingenuous representations by political leaders can become an authentic part of the dispute over time. Indeed, the available social science research, primarily qualitative case studies, is even more relevant here. A range of empirical studies demonstrate such unintended consequences primarily in the case of leaders employing security-based and strategic rationales to justify bellicose behavior.104 A central finding is that pretextual and superficial justifications can meaningfully influence later stages of the process that shape popular and elite conceptions of the international dispute. And it is those understandings that affect national security strategies and the ladder of escalation to war. Indeed, one set of studies – of empires – suggests these are mechanisms for powerful states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend. - EntryDate
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