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Cites

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1		-All affirmative offense must come from the hypothetical enactment of a policy that prohibits production of nuclear power.
2		-Resolved means the affirmative must defend the implementation of a policy action by a government
3		-Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)
4		-Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.
5		-Prohibit is defined by
6		-American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2011 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/prohibit
7		-To forbid by authority: Smoking is prohibited in most theaters.
8		-
9		-Nuclear power
10		-Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/nuclear+power
11		-nuclear power n (General Physics) power, esp electrical or motive, produced by a nuclear reactor. Also called: atomic power
12		-
13		-1NC – Topic Education Good
14		-Debate about high magnitude impacts in the context of nuclear power is good – the public lacks sufficient understanding – opacity is a result of poor debate, not an intrinsic effect of nuclear power itself
15		-Srinivasan 13 T.N. Srinivasan, T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, "Fukushima and thereafter: Reassessment of risks of nuclear power," Energy Policy 52 (2013) 726–736 AZ
16		-While economic and financing costs for nuclear utilities have been a subject of much discussion, the issue of social costs and benefits of nuclear power have not received adequate attention. Economic costs are those faced by the utility, including capital charges, operating expenses, and fuel cycle costs. Social costs for each plant and its associated fuel cycle include routine environmental impacts such as air pollution as well as risk to the public from reactor accidents or sabotage and subsidies to private utilities. Relative to nuclear power, coal has lower capital costs but substantially higher fuel costs and social costs; the social costs for coal are primarily from air pollution especially sulfur oxide emissions. Nuclear power also has the problem of dealing with events that have a low probability of occurrence but have large social costs were they to occur, a feature that is present in evaluating the risks of climate change about which public has poor understanding. Regardless of the difficulties associated with public perception about low probability but high consequences events, quantitative analyses of both economic and social costs in a rigorous analytical framework is needed for engaging the public in the decision making process. This not only helps bring transparency in the decisions relating to siting and waste disposal options; it also provides a better framework for improving communication with the concerned public about various risks and benefits associated with nuclear power, and involving them appropriately. There is a vast literature on the social cost benefit analysis relevant to this subject (Barrager and Judd et al., 1976). For example, although economic costs of nuclear waste management are small compared to other costs of nuclear power, residual radioactivity that will persists for thousands of years if not carefully managed poses social costs across several generations. Hence society must confront these issues in a transparent manner to decide whether to expand the role of nuclear power from the current level. A similar dilemma also arises in the choice of fossil fuels, which have potential to cause large climatic impact. When a society’s preferences are included in any analysis in a credible and transparent way, there is a better chance of accommodating public concerns. Such an approach provides an analytical framework for comparing the benefits of nuclear versus other alternatives (all of which involve varying degrees of risk) and making the basis of public policy decisions explicit and accessible for an independent review. Except in some countries there is little evidence that this is done systematically in the decision making process. In India, decision makers simply assert without analytical justification that the priorities of development overrides other concerns and summarily dismiss the use of social cost benefit analysis in decision making (Ahluwalia, 2012)
17		-1NC— Dialogism/Inclusion
18		-Their aff avoids neg prep that applies to nuclear power bans. The topic is the basis for predictable limits – abandoning it means the affirmative can argue for anything, which the negative cannot possibly prepare for.
19		-Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy makes the discussion one-sided and exclusionary
20		-Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)
21		-Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
22		-
23		-1NC—Agonism
24		-Substantive constraints on the debate are key to actualize effective pluralism and agonistic democracy
25		-John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649
26		-A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful. Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states: To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248) Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is not just (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70). Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.
27		-Debate inevitably involves exclusions and normative constraints~-~--making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits which turn and solves the whole case
28		-Amanda Anderson 6, prof of English at Johns Hopkins The Way We Argue Now, 33-6
29		-In some ways, this is understandable as utopian writing, with recognizable antecedents throughout the history of leftist thought. But what is distinctive in Butler’s writing is the way temporal rhetoric emerges precisely at the site of uneasy normative commitment. In the case of performative subversion, a futural rhetoric displaces the problems surrounding agency, symbolic constraint, and poststructuralist ethics. Since symbolic constraint is constitutive of who we can become and what we can enact,¶ 34¶ there is clearly no way to truly envision a reworked symbolic. And since embracing an alternative symbolic would necessarily involve the imposition of newly exclusionary and normalizing norms, to do more than gesture would mean lapsing into the very practices that need to be superseded. Indeed, despite Butler’s insistence in Feminist Contentions that we must always risk new foundations, she evinces a fastidious reluctance to do so herself.¶ The forward-looking articulation of performative politics increasingly gives way, in Bodies That Matter, to a more reflective, and now strangely belated, antiexclusionary politics. Less sanguine about the efficacy of outright subversion, Butler more soberly attends to ways we might respond to the politically and ontologically necessary error of identity categories. We cannot choose not to put such categories into play, but once they are in play, we can begin to interrogate them for the exclusions they harbor and generate. Butler here is closely following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s position on essentialism, a position Butler earlier sought to sublate through the more exclusive emphasis on the unremitting subversion of identity.18 If performative subversion aimed to denaturalize identity and thus derail its pernicious effects, here, by contrast, one realizes the processes of identity formation will perforce proceed, and one simply attempts to register and redress those processes in a necessarily incomplete way. The production of exclusion, or a constitutive outside, is butler quote starts “the necessary and founding violence of any truth-regime,” but we should not simply accept that fact passively:¶ The task is to refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome. But of equal importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits, where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of truth acts as a disruptive site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability, illuminating the violent and contingent boundaries of that normative regime precisely through the inability of that regime to represent that which might pose a fundamental threat to its continuity. . . . If there is a violence necessary to the language of politics, then the risk of that violation might well be followed by another in which we begin, without ending, without mastering, to own—and yet never fully to own—the exclusions by which we proceed. (BTM, 53)¶ butler quote endsBecause the exclusionary process is productive of who and what we are, even in our oppositional politics, our attempts to acknowledge and redress it are always post hoc. Here the future horizon is ever-receding¶ 35¶ precisely because our own belated making of amends will never, and should never, tame the contingency that also begets violence. But the question arises: does Butler ever propose that we might use the evaluative criteria governing that belated critical recognition to guard against such processes of exclusion in the first place? Well, in rare moments she does project the possibility of cultivating practices that would actually disarm exclusion (and I will be discussing one such moment presently). But she invariably returns to the bleak insistence on the impossibility of ever achieving this. This retreat is necessitated, fundamentally, by Butler’s failure to distinguish evaluative criteria from the power-laden mechanisms of normalization. Yet the distinction does reappear, unacknowledged, in the rhetoric of belatedness, which, like performative thresholdism, serves to underwrite her political purism. As belated, the incomplete acts of “owning” one’s exclusions are more seemingly reactive and can appear not to be themselves normatively implicated.¶ We can see a similar maneuver in Butler’s discussion of universalist traditions in Feminist Contentions. Here she insists that Benhabib’s universalism is perniciously grounded in a transcendental account of language (communicative reason), and is hence not able to examine its own exclusionary effects or situated quality (FC, 128–32). This is, to begin with, a mischaracterization. Benhabib’s account of communicative reason is historically situated (if somewhat loosely within the horizon of modernity) and aims to justify an ongoing and self-critical process of interactive universalism—not merely through the philosophical project of articulating a theory of universal pragmatics but more significantly through the identification and cultivation of practices that enable democratic will formation.19 Butler then introduces, in contrast to Benhabib, an exemplary practice of what she calls “misappropriating” universals (Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic is cited here). Now, it is hard not to see this as a species of dogmatism. Bad people reinscribe or reinforce universals, good people “misappropriate” them. Benhabib calls for the reconstruction of Enlightenment universals, but presumably even reconstruction is tainted. The key point, however, is that misappropriation is a specifically protected derivative process, one whose own belatedness and honorific disobedience are guaranteed to displace the violence of its predecessor discourse.¶ Let me pursue here for a moment why I find this approach unsatisfactory. Simply because the activity of acknowledging exclusion or misappropriating universals is belated or derivative does not mean that such¶ 36¶ an activity is not itself as powerfully normative as the “normative political philosophy” to which Butler refers with such disdain. There is a sleight of hand occurring here: Butler attempts to imply that because such activities exist at a temporal and critical remove from “founding regimes of truth,” they more successfully avoid the insidious ruse of critical theory. But who’s rusing who here? Because Butler finds it impossible to conceive of normativity outside of normalization, she evades the challenging task of directly confronting her own normative assumptions. Yet Butler in fact advocates ethical practices that are animated by the same evaluative principles as communicative ethics: the rigorous scrutiny of all oppositional discourse for its own newly generated exclusions, and the reconfiguration of debilitating identity terms such as “women” as sites “of permanent openness and resignifiability” (FC, 50). Both these central practices rely fundamentally on democratic principles of inclusion and open contestation. Communicative ethics does no more than to clarify where among our primary social practices we might locate the preconditions for such activities of critique and transformation. By justifying its own evaluative assumptions and resources it aims not to posit a realm free of power but rather to clarify our own ongoing critiques of power. This does not mean that such critiques will not themselves require rigorous scrutiny for harboring blindnesses and further exclusions, but neither does it mean that such critiques will necessarily be driven by exclusionary logic. And communicative ethics is by no means a “merely theoretical” or “philosophical” project inasmuch as it can identify particular social and institutional practices that foster democratic ends. By casting all attempts to characterize such practices as pernicious normalizing, Butler effectively disables her own project and leaves herself no recourse but to issue dogmatic condemnations and approvals.

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1		-2016-10-07 20:40:37.0

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1		-Misc

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1		-Misc

ParentRound

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1		-4

Round

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1		-9

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1		-Palos Verdes Le Barillec Neg

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1		-SEPTOCT - Framework

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1		-Greenhill RR Misc