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... ... @@ -1,18 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation: The affirmative must defend removing restrictions on ALL constitutionally protected speech. The affirmative may only defend removing specific restrictions on time, place, or manner of protected speech. 2 -Any is defined as every 3 -Your Dictionary NO DATE (Your Dictionary, online reference, “any,” http://www.yourdictionary.com/any///LADI) 4 -every: any child can do it 5 -Any is an indefinite pronoun that refers to things generally 6 -Language NO DATE (Online English grammar textbook, Unit 42: - Indefinite Pronouns,” http://www.1-language.com/englishcoursenew/unit42_grammar.htm///LADI) 7 -Indefinite pronouns replace specific things with general, non-specific concepts. For example: - I want to live abroad in Italy. - I want to live abroad somewhere. This unit covers indefinite pronouns made with some, any, no, and every. Some / any Some and any can be combined with "-thing" to refer to an undefined object. For example: - There's someone outside the door. - There isn't anyone in the office. Some and any can be combined with "-where" to refer to an undefined location. For example: - I'm looking for somewhere to live. - We don't want to live anywhere near here. Some and any can be combined with "-body" or "-one" to refer to an undefined person. There is very little difference in meaning between "-body" and "-one". For example: - If you have a problem, someone/somebody will help you. - Do you know anyone/anybody who can help? These compound nouns follow the same rules as some and any, that is some is used in affirmative statements, and any is used in negative statements and questions. For example: - I need something from the supermarket. - I don't need anything from the supermarket. - Do you need anything from the supermarket? 8 -Restrict is defined by Merriam Webster as 9 -to subject to bounds or limits 10 -Literature about constitutionally protected speech centers on time, place, and manner restrictions, not content-based restrictions 11 -Legal Dictionary "Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions" AZ 12 -The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Freedom of Speech. This guarantee generally safeguards the right of individuals to express themselves without governmental restraint. Nevertheless, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is not absolute. It has never been interpreted to guarantee all forms of speech without any restraint whatsoever. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that state and federal governments may place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of individual expression. Time, place, and manner (TPM) restrictions accommodate public convenience and promote order by regulating traffic flow, preserving property interests, conserving the environment, and protecting the administration of justice. 13 -Violation: The plan ends restrictions surrounding specific forms of speech 14 -Net Benefits— 15 -1. Limits 16 -A. Fairness 17 -B. Education 18 -2. Topical version of the aff - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,8 +1,0 @@ 1 -Counterplan Text: The Supreme Court of the United States, in the next available test case, should rule that public colleges and universities ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. 2 -Lawsuits are piling up against free speech restrictions – the counterplan strengthens First Amendment protections and solves the entirety of the case 3 -Watanabe 14 Teresa Watanabe (covers education for the LA Times), "Students challenge free-speech rules on college campuses," LA Times, 7/1/2014 AZ 4 -College students in California and three other states filed lawsuits against their campuses Tuesday in what is thought to be the first-ever coordinated legal attack on free speech restrictions in higher education. Vincenzo Sinapi-Riddle, a 20-year-old studying computer science, alleged that Citrus College in Glendora had violated his 1st Amendment rights by restricting his petitioning activities to a small "free-speech zone" in the campus quad. According to Sinapi-Riddle's complaint, a campus official stopped him last fall from talking to another student about his campaign against spying by the National Security Agency, saying he had strayed outside the free-speech zone. The official said he had the authority to eject Sinapi-Riddle from campus if he did not comply. "It was shocking to me that there could be so much hostility about me talking to another student peacefully about government spying," Sinapi-Riddle said in an interview. "My vision of college was to express what I think." In his lawsuit, Sinapi-Riddle is challenging Citrus' free-speech zone, an anti-harassment policy that he argues is overly broad and vague and a multi-step process for approving student group events. The college had eliminated its free-speech zones in a 2003 legal settlement with another student, but last year "readopted in essence the unconstitutional policy it abandoned," the complaint alleged. College officials were not immediately available for comment. But communications director Paula Green forwarded copies of Citrus' free-speech policy, which declares that the campus is a "non-public forum" except where otherwise designated to "prevent the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the college." The policy instructs the college to enact procedures that "reasonably regulate" free expression. The "Stand Up for Speech" litigation project is sponsored by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, a Philadelphia-based group that promotes free speech and due process rights at colleges and universities. Its aim is to eliminate speech codes and other campus policies that restrict expression. In a report published this year, the foundation found that 58 of 427 major colleges and universities surveyed maintain restrictive speech codes despite what it called a "virtually unbroken string of legal defeats" against them dating to 1989. Even in California — unique in the nation for two state laws that explicitly bar free speech restrictions at both public and private universities — the majority of campuses retain written speech codes, he said. Among 16 California State University campuses surveyed by the group, for instance, 11 were rated "red" for employing at least one policy that "substantially restricts" free speech. "Universities are scared of people who demand censorship ~-~- they're afraid of lawsuits and PR problems," said Robert Shibley, the foundation’s senior vice president. "Unfortunately, they are more worried about that than about ignoring their 1st Amendment responsibilities," he added. "The point of the project is to balance out the incentives that cause universities to institute rules that censor speech." The foundation intends to target campuses in each of four federal court circuits; after each case is settled, it will file another lawsuit. In other cases filed Tuesday: — Iowa State University students Paul Gerlich and Erin Furleigh challenged administrative rejection of their campus club T-shirt promoting legalization of marijuana. The university said the shirt violated rules that bar the use of the school name to promote "dangerous, illegal or unhealthy" products and behavior, according to the complaint. — Chicago State University faculty members Phillip Beverly and Robert Bionaz sued over what they said were repeated attempts to silence a blog they write on alleged administrative corruption. — Ohio University student Isaac Smith challenged the campus speech code that forbids any act that "degrades, demeans or disgraces another." University officials invoked the code to veto a T-shirt by Smith’s Students Defending Students campus group — which defends peers accused of campus disciplinary offenses. The T-shirt said, "We get you off for free," a phrase that administrators found "objectified women" and "promoted prostitution," the complaint said. 5 - 6 -Courts are better checks on implementation – they decide the birghtline for whether speech is constitutionally protected. 7 -Arthur 11 (Joyce, Founder and Executive Director of the Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, a national political pro-choice group, “The Limits of Free Speech,” Sep 21, 2011, https://rewire.news/article/2011/09/21/limits-free-speech-5/ 8 -A common objection to prosecuting hate speech is that it might endanger speech that counters hate speech. For example, a critique may repeat the offending words and discuss their import, or it may subvert the hate message in a subtle or creative way that could be misunderstood by some. But context is everything when determining whether speech is actually hateful or not, so this objection seems nonsensical. Any reasonable judge should be able to discern the difference in intent or effect behind a hateful message and the speech that critiques it. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,13 +1,0 @@ 1 -International law banned hate speech 2 -Matsuda 89 Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989 AZ 3 -The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi- nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite- ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi- nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ- ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm- ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio- lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro- hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur- gency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination. 4 -Prefer – it explicitly compares international obligations to protect free speech against the need to ban hate speech and concludes that banning hate speech is more important 5 - 6 -The impact is unrestrained use of force in conflict 7 -Modirzadeh 14 Naz K. Modirzadeh 14, Senior Fellow at Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Law and Security, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Modirzadeh-Final.pdf 8 -The central purpose of the convergence of IHL and IHRL is to increase the protection of individuals in armed conflict. The notion behind the insistence that IHL and IHRL are part of the same discipline suggests that IHL is part of the far larger and more broadly applicable legal realm of IHRL. Indeed, the very idea of the “humanization of humanitarian law”159 is that the cold, brutal balancing of IHL, its perceived deference to the military and the needs of the state is opened up and mitigated by a body of law that protects the individual’s human rights against the state. Yet here the story flips: It is IHRL that seems to become part of IHL. It is IHRL that, by the end of our narrative, seems to be brought into the service of conflict, to act not as a powerful check on the brute force of the sovereign, not as the voice of the international community against those who wish to prioritize national security over individual liberties, but rather as a means to regulate the use of lethal violence. Having argued vociferously that IHRL applies in all situations of armed conflict at all times in order to protect individuals, the argument suddenly turns in the other direction. It becomes possible to say that IHRL can be utilized to allow for one state to invade another state’s territory in order to murder individuals without an attempt to arrest, detain, charge, and try these individuals. What is so striking in this view is how well—if that is the right word—the convergence argument worked, or at least how much work convergence ended up doing. Remarkably, many who wish to justify a far broader and even more aggressive CIA drone program cite convergence as a basis for doing so.160 9 -For the application of IHL, on the other hand, the dominant assumption of convergence—that human rights law and IHL are part of the same general field, that they apply simultaneously, and that they are part of the same conversation—may have had the effect of loosening the boundaries around the field of application of IHL. As the two bodies of law began to be used interchangeably—as an attack utilizing a five hundred pound bomb is analogized to a police officer using a weapon when faced with the imminent danger of a hostage situation—one effect on the perception of IHL may be that it is no longer seen as a tightly controlled body of law. As many leading IHL lawyers warned in 2001 and 2002, once IHL is applied, many ugly things that we generally see as illegal, as outside the realm of rule of law, suddenly become lawful. Those IHRL lawyers who argued that IHRL applies simultaneously to IHL during armed conflict may have contributed to the blurring of the line between war and not-war. 10 - 11 -Global war 12 -Goodman 09 Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12 13 -A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be more concerned about the prospect of future Kosovos – ambitious military actions without clear legal authority – or future Rwandas – inaction and deadlock at the Security Council. Indeed, various institutional designs will tend to favor one of those outcomes over the other. In 1999, Kofi Annan delivered a powerful statement that appeared to consider the prospect of repeat Rwandas the greater concern; and he issued a call to arms to support the ‘developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’.95 Ifoneassumesthatthereis,indeed,aneedforcontinuedorgreatersupport for humanitarian uses of force, Type I erosions of the separation principle pose a serious threat to that vision. And the threat is not limited to unilateral uses of force. It also applies to military operations authorized by the Security Council. In short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach. The scheme imposes greater requirements on armed forces engaged in a humanitarian mission with respect to safeguarding civilian ives.96 If that scheme is intended to smoke out illicit intent,97 it is likely to have perverse effects: suppressing sincere humanitarian efforts at least on the margins. Actors engaged in a bona fide humanitarian intervention generally tend to be more protective of their own armed forces than in other conflicts. It is instructive to consider, for instance, the precipitous US withdrawal from the UN mission in Somalia – code-named Operation Restore Hope – after the loss of eighteen American soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and the ‘lesson’ that policymakers drew from that conflict.98 Additionally, the Kosovoc ampaign – code-named Operation Noble Anvil – was designed to be a ‘zero-casualty war’ for US soldiers, because domestic public support for the campaign was shallow and unstable. The important point is that the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach would impose additional costs on genuine humanitarian efforts, for which it is already difficult to build and sustain popular support. As a result, we can expect to see fewer bona fide interventions to protect civilians from atrocities.99 Notably, such results are more likely to affect two types of states: states with robust, democratic institutions that effectively reflect public opinion and states that highly value compliance with jus in bello. Both of those are the very states that one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the British House of Lords decision in Al-Jedda which cast doubt on the validity of derogations taken in peacekeeping operations as well as other military efforts in which the homeland is not directly at stake and the state could similarly withdraw. The scheme imposes a tax on such interventions by precluding the government from adopting measures that would otherwise be considered lawful and necessary to meet exigent circumstances related to the conflict. Such extraordinary constraints in wartime may very well temper the resolve to engage in altruistic intervention and military efforts that involve similar forms of voluntarism on the part of the state. Such a legal scheme may thus yield fewer such operations and the participation of fewer states in such multilateral efforts. And, the impact of the scheme should disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties: states that decide whether and to what degree to participate in a coalition with the principal intervener. It is to be expected that the commitment on the part of the principal intervener will be stronger, and thus not as easily shifted by the erosion of the separation principle. The ability, however, to hold together a coalition of states is made much more difficult by these added burdens. Indeed, as the United States learned in the Kosovo campaign, important European allies were wary about the intervention, in part due to its lack of an international legal pedigree. And the weakness of the alliance, including German and Italian calls for an early suspension of the bombing campaign, impeded the ability to wage war in the first place. It may be these third party states and their decision whether to join a humanitarian intervention where the international legal regime matters most. Without such backing of important allies, the intervention itself is less likely to occur. It is also those states – the more democratic, the more rights respecting, and the more law abiding – that the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘undesirable wars’ more likely. In previous writing, I argue that encouraging states to frame their resort to force through humanitarian objectives rather than other rationales would, in the aggregate, reduce the overall level of disputes that result in uncontrolled escalation and war.100 A reverse relationship also holds true. That is, encouraging states to forego humanitarian rationales in favor of other justifications for using force may culminate in more international disputes ending in uncontrolled escalation and war. This outcome is especially likely to result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach) and ‘wars of choice’ (the Al-Jedda approach) would encourage states to justify their resort to force on alternative grounds. For example, states would be incentivized to invoke other legitimated frameworks – such as security rationales involving the right to self-defense, collective self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, and traditional threats to international peace and security. And, even if military action is pursued through the Security Council, states may be reluctant to adopt language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over humanitarian ones is more likely to lead to uncontrolled escalation and war. A growing body of social science scholarship demonstrates that the type of issue in dispute can constitute an important variable in shaping the course of interstate hostilities. The first generation of empirical scholarship on the origins of war did not consider this dimension. Political scientists instead concentrated on features of the international system (for example, the distribution of power among states) and on the characteristics of states (for example, forms of domestic governance structures) as the key explanatory variables. Research agendas broadened considerably, however, in subsequent years. More recently, ‘several studies have identified substantial differences in conflict behavior over different types of issues’.101 The available evidence shows that states are significantly more inclined to fight over particular types of issues that are elevated in a dispute, despite likely overall material and strategic losses.102 Academic studies have also illuminated possible causal explanations for these empirical patterns. Specifically, domestic (popular and elite) constituencies more readily support bellicose behavior by their government when certain salient cultural or ideological issues are in contention. Particular issue areas may also determine the expert communities (humanitarian versus security mindsets) that gain influence in governmental circles – a development that can shape the hard-line or soft-line strategies adopted in the course of the dispute. In short, these links between domestic political processes and the framing of international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in interstate disputes with rivals and that those disputes which are framed through security and strategic rationales are more likely to escalate to war. Indeed, the inclusion of a humanitarian rationale provides windows of opportunity to control and deescalate a conflict. Thus, eliminating or demoting a humanitarian rationale from a mix of justifications (even if it is not replaced by another rationale) can be independently destabilizing. Espousing or promoting security rationales, on the other hand, is more likely to culminate in public demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of international law to influence state behavior directly. It is reasonable to assume that international law is unlikely to alter the determination of a state to wage war, and that international law is far more likely to influence only the justificatory discourse states employ while proceeding down the warpath. However, as I argue in my earlier work, leaders (of democratic and nondemocratic) states become caught in their official justifications for military campaigns. Consequently, framing the resort to force as a pursuit of security objectives, or adding such issues to an ongoing conflict, can reshape domestic political arrangements, which narrows the subsequent range of policy options. Issues that initially enter a conflict due to disingenuous representations by political leaders can become an authentic part of the dispute over time. Indeed, the available social science research, primarily qualitative case studies, is even more relevant here. A range of empirical studies demonstrate such unintended consequences primarily in the case of leaders employing security-based and strategic rationales to justify bellicose behavior.104 A central finding is that pretextual and superficial justifications can meaningfully influence later stages of the process that shape popular and elite conceptions of the international dispute. And it is those understandings that affect national security strategies and the ladder of escalation to war. Indeed, one set of studies – of empires – suggests these are mechanisms for powerful states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,11 +1,0 @@ 1 -A. Revenge porn is propped up by free speech and considered constitutionally protected- court precedent proves. Humbach: 2 - 3 -“The inherent repulsiveness of revenge porn has led to calls to for laws making it a crime and, as of this writing, at least ten states have enacted statutes to prohibit revenge-porn dissemination. Moreover, an important article offering ‘recommendations to lawmakers working to criminalize revenge porn’ was recently published by Professors Danielle Keats Citron (University of Maryland) and Mary Anne Franks (University of Miami). While there are variations in the specific provisions of the various revenge porn laws, both as enacted and proposed, they typically share two key prohibitions, namely, they forbid: images of that show sexual exposure or contact, and dissemination without consent of those persons depicted. Unfortunately, these two key prohibitions of revenge porn laws seem to contradict fly directly in the face of the free speech clause and press guarantees of the First Amendment.10 In short, they are two prohibitions constitute unconstitutional content discrimination, and viewpoint discrimination and speaker discrimination, not to mention prior restraint. A restriction on speech that is limited to particular content, e.g., sexual exposure, is content discrimination. A restriction on designed to suppress a particular point of view, e.g., negative or unflattering personal information, is viewpoint discrimination. And a restriction that is applicable only to persons who have not received consent is speaker discrimination,13 as well as a prior restraint—among the most disfavored of restrictions on speech.1 While the Supreme Court has recognized a number of circumstances that justify government impingements on free expression, the Court has been extremely reluctant to permit speech restrictions that discriminate based on a message’s content, its or viewpoint, or the speaker.” 4 -Humbach, John A. "The Constitution and Revenge Porn." Pace Law Review 35.1 (2015). 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 -Revenge porn totalizes the identities of those targeted, defining them to the world and leaving them literally helpless to respond. Murray: 9 - 10 -“One woman of the participants in our research described the impact of revenge porn on her: 'I am powerless to keep him from doing what he pleases with the videos he took of me having sex without my knowledge or consent.’ This quote captures the sense of powerlessness and loss of control that may accompany being targeted for revenge porn. Sharing~-~-publicly and spitefully~-~-the most intimate details of one’s sexuality, sexual relationship, and private moments with one’s partner has no place in a healthy relationship. while Technology allows it that sharing to go far beyond one’s immediate social network and spread literally across the world in a matter of moments. Not only is this a violation of a person’s privacy, it also can lead to safety risks, in that it can lead to stalking, unwanted sexual advances, and harassment by others, including strangers. Some people who are targeted even go so far as to change their names to protect themselves. Unfortunately, laws haven’t yet caught up to technology yet in the case of revenge porn. As Jill Filipovic said on The Guardian, 'Right now, the law and our culture are both is on the side of those who Revenge porn shames and humiliates women for sport, instead of those of us who just want to go about our normal lives.' Some actions are being taken to create laws to stop revenge porn, such as in Pennsylvania and Illinois. A bill may even see its way into the U.S. Congress. However, until the laws catch up, more actions will be needed at the individual, community, and national level to support people who are targeted, hold offenders accountable, and raise awareness of this important issue.” 11 -Murray, Christine and Allison Crowe. “‘Revenge porn as a form of intimate partner violence.” See the Triumph, April 6, 2014. Web. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,12 +1,0 @@ 1 -Interpretation: All debaters who have attended at least 1 bid tournament must disclose all positions they have read on the NDCA 2016-17 LD wiki under their school and name and correct sides. The disclosure must include a tag, citation, and the first and last 3 words of each piece of evidence they read originally written by another author. 2 - 3 -Violation: 4 - 5 -Standards: 6 -1. Resource equity: 7 -2. Educational benefits 8 -3. Research: Disclosure creates a high incentive to do deeper and more focused research, since debaters quickly learn the stock arguments and can do specific research that they know will be useful. 9 -Nails 13 Jacob Nails (Debate Coach, Sacred Heart HS). “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure).” NSDUpdate. October 10th, 2013. http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/ AJ 10 -I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and advocacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. 11 -4. de-incentivizes anti-educational arguments 12 -5. Academic honesty - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,27 +1,0 @@ 1 -Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments. 2 -This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter. 3 - 4 -Our impact is procedural fairness ~-~-- a limited point of stasis is necessary for effective limits which provides equitable ground to both sides ~-~-- this does not exclude their content but does require them to be topical 5 - 6 -Fairness and willingness to test convictions are necessary for debate to occur. Their attempt to rig the game creates a moral hazard to run from engagement, preventing the judge from adequately evaluating who did the better debating. 7 -Andrew F. SMITH, assistant professor of philosophy at Drexel University, 11 The Deliberative Impulse, 2011, p. 71-4 8 - 9 -Inasmuch as public deliberation is to occur via reasoned argument, all proposals are to be articulated, defended, and criticized through the use of reasons that are, in principle, fully accessible to all deliberators and designed to win their endorsement. As a result, deliberative processes are intended to offer free and equal citizens the opportunity to consider relevant matters from multiple points of view, critically converse with one another about the options before them, and enlarge their understanding of these matters. At their best, deliberative processes may improve the epistemic quality of political decisions inasmuch as they are the result of in- formed decision making. There is considerable debate, however, regarding whether moral judgments in particular-which so frequently drive conflicts in public forums-maintain truth values such that they can pro- vide bases for reaching political decisions of enhanced epistemic quality. Moreover, it is far from clear if the assessment of the truth of such judgments provides any practical advantage whatsoever in seeking to resolve disagreements. I set aside the first of these matters in order to focus concerted attention on the second. 10 -Julian Dodd suggests that there is no discernible difference, practically speaking, between the pursuit of true judgments and the pursuit of judgments that are justifiable in the sense that they are persuasive to others. Believing that we act in accordance with a norm of truth, as it were, simply props up the benighted notion that our judgments must be answerable to something beyond ourselves and our communities.4 We END PAGE 71 should instead acknowledge that what we actually seek to achieve is what we can refer to as communal warranted assertibility—judgments that count as being justified because they cohere with other judgments offered in our community. Alternatively, John Gray suggests that appeals to truth are perhaps better regarded as manifestations, subtle though they may be, of the quest for power over those with whom we disagree. But as we will see, neither of these assertions ultimately holds up. The appeal to truth does have important-indeed, crucial-practical implications for how we live our lives, and this appeal goes far beyond striving for power. If we are to make any sense of the epistemic incentives to engage in public deliberation, we must see why this is so. 11 -As will be discussed at greater length below, most of us have a strong tendency to employ our deliberative faculties to justify our initial reaction to a given event or experience. We rarely seek disconfirming evidence of our own accord, in particular when we set out to win over others to that in which we are conscientiously invested. But in the process of seeking to influence others, we can find ourselves influenced in return. This is a normal and unexceptionable byproduct of our encounters with others. As Jonathan Haidt remarks, "most moral change happens as a result of social interaction. Other people often influence us, in part by presenting counterevidence we rarely seek ourselves."6 We are corrected by a trusted authority or a pivotal life experience with regard to how we have been interpreting a passage from a sacred text around which we have centered our moral life. Our eyes are opened to the horrible plight of domesticated animals bred for human consumption upon learning of the conditions in which they live and die. The environmental threat posed by our dependence on oil hits home upon receiving news of a major spill. We recognize, from time to time at least, that our convictions are in need of emendation. How we have justified our practices to ourselves and to others in the past is now suspect. We hereby accept that we are prone to error no matter how strong our commitment to our convictions is. Our judgments are fallible. 12 -As mundane as this proposition may seem, it is not insignificant. For as Price notes, the notion that our judgments (or those of others, of course) are wroyng and in need of emendation would be incoherent if we did not accept that they must be responsive to something beyond our own patterns of thought. That our beliefs can be subject to improvement re- quires that our ability to justify them to ourselves-to have them cohere with one another, say-does not make them right. 13 -Perhaps Dodd is correct, then, that our ability to justify them to others, in fact to all others within our community or wider society, is all we need to regard our judgments as right. Perhaps what really counts is that END PAGE 72 we correct discrepancies between our beliefs and those maintained by others. What is required, then, is that we win over others to our way of thinking. Or maybe we seek means to reveal to them that what we are attempting to persuade them to endorse does not interfere with-hence, is not in conflict with-the goals they desire to pursue. If we want, we can take ourselves and our interlocutors to be engaged in the enterprise of truth assessment, but what is really guiding our practices here is a norm of communal warrant. 14 -Yet Price questions whether the pursuit of communal warrant should-or even can-be one's central goal when engaging in public deliberation. When undertaking such a pursuit, we are likely to run into situations in which our convictions are subject to forceful criticism and even censure. Such disagreements, most notably the expression by others of disapproval with respect to our convictions, do not signal merely that our beliefs and those held by others fail adequately at present to cohere. Disagreement and disapproval are, Price remarks, "taken as a sign of fault. " They reflect the judgment that someone must be in the wrong: us, our critic(s), or possibly both. It is not, as Dodd may suggest, that ascribing fault is simply shorthand for expressing the wish that others regard that in which we are invested to be something in which they too should be invested. "What is missing," Price notes with just such a suggestion in mind, "is the automatic and quite unconscious sense of engagement in a common purpose that distinguishes assertoric dialogue from a mere roll call of individual opinion. Truth is the grit that makes our individual opinions engage with one another. Truth puts the cogs in cognition, at least in its public manifestation." Also missing is an account of why it is that we can experience genuine tension, agitation, and even doubt with respect to our convictions when the pursuit of persuasion proves unsuccessful. 15 -Dodd could respond by arguing that what viscerally disturbs us in such cases is our inability to achieve a state of communal warrant. It is not, then, that disagreement must be taken as a sign of fault. Perhaps it is instead that we have failed as of yet to bring to bear suitable means of persuasion, which certainly can cause consternation. But this still does not explain why we may end up doubting ourselves or, moreover, why the pursuit of persuasion is explicitly intended to convince others to doubt themselves. In the absence of a norm of truth, we can make little sense of why we should experience the compulsion to actively engage with others: to voice praise and blame in the process of answering their challenges and responding with our own. 16 -But in what way, exactly, should disagreement motivate public deliberation? Price notes that assertoric dialogue is only possible if inter-END PAGE 73 locutors are intolerant of disagreement. "This needs to be present already in the background, a pragmatic presupposition of judgment itself. I am not a maker of assertions, a judger, at all, unless I am already playing the game to win."8 But certainly this on its own cannot be enough. If we exhibit this sort of intolerance, why not instead just seek to silence others in whatever way we can or force them to fall in line with our way of thinking? Why not search out means to rig the game-in our case, the political decision-making process-to ensure our victory? From time to time, are most of us not compelled to maintain that no matter how fallible our judgments may be our fallibility cannot possibly reach to certain of our core convictions? Would it not be downright dangerous to forgo ensuring that we garner adequate political power under such circumstances? This proposition is, of course, sometimes very tempting to endorse. As Daniel Dennett so nicely puts it: 17 -if I encounter people conveying a message I thought was so dangerous that I could not risk giving it a fair hearing, I would be at least strongly tempted to misrepresent it, to caricature it for the public good. I'd want to make up some good epithets, such as genetic determinist or reductionist or Darwinian fundamentalist, and then flail those straw men as hard as I could. As the saying goes, it's a dirty job, but somebody's got to do it. 9 18 -But we must resist this sort of temptation if we are to do right not only by our convictions but also by ourselves as epistemic agents. In turning now to our examination of Talisse's pragmatist philosophy of democracy, we see more clearly why this is so in cases in which we experience even so much as an inkling of doubt regarding the viability of our convictions. 19 -Preparation is necessary for useful debates—it lets the aff train with the heavy bats of prepared negative strategies which internal link turns their ability to advocate change outside of debate. It enables both teams to more effectively challenge injustice and support movements for change. 20 -Talisse 5 – Professor of Philosophy @ Vandy (Robert, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges,” 31(4) p. 429-431) 21 -The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86 Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.) 17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable. 22 -Additionally, unpredictability causes debaters to latch onto un-vetted ideals as political end-points—there are an infinite number of unintended pitfalls to the aff. A well-prepared negative is better able to identify those and nudge the aff towards improvement—this turns solvency. 23 -Individual rounds do not change subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused research is the only chance to change attitudes—this means you should prioritize our impacts about how they hurt the broader model of debate even if the aff’s good for them. 24 -Goodin and Niemeyer 3 Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf 25 -What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features. 26 - 27 -Last—presume every 1AC truth claim false because it hasn’t been properly tested. - EntryDate
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