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Caselist.CitesClass[1]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-09-11 04:12:30.26
	1	+2016-09-11 04:12:30.0

Caselist.CitesClass[2]

Cites

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	1	+Uranium mining is key to the African economy – the aff collapses demand for uranium fuel
	2	+Dasnois 12 Nicholas Dasnois, Political analyst at the Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, "Uranium Mining in Africa: A Continent at the Centre of a Global Nuclear Renaissance," South African Institute Of International Affairs, September, 2012 AZ
	3	+Contrary to popular belief, uranium mining in Africa1 did not start with the relatively recent ‘nuclear renaissance’. The Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) first attracted interest from colonial Belgium, when Union Minière du Haut Katanga discovered uranium there in 1915 and Société Générale Métallurgique de Hoboken began extracting uranium in its plant in Olen. At that time, experts used the radium extracted from uranium for a form of radiotherapy against certain cancers. Shinkolobwe was closed briefly in 1937 before the US revived it and bought around 30 000 tonnes of uranium (tU) from the mine between 1942 and 1944. The uranium was used to manufacture the first atomic bombs.2 The mine was closed when the DRC became independent in 1960 because mining uranium from Shinkolobwe was too expensive and too dangerous. Although for the next four decades nuclear powers still mined and bought uranium, mining it in Africa attracted less attention. This is not to say that it stopped altogether. In Niger mining began in 1971, with all the output going to French nuclear reactors, and in Namibia, the Rössing mine has been operating since 1976. South Africa’s uranium extraction from gold mines in the Witwatersrand area near Johannesburg began in 1951.3 Yet Africa’s share in the global uranium market remained relatively small, for several reasons. These included the low price of uranium worldwide (which reflected low demand, especially after the 1979 Three Mile Island and 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accidents); the high cost of establishing and running a uranium mine; an adequate supply of uranium from mines in the US, Canada and Australia; and the ready availability of uranium from dismantled weapons in military nuclear stockpiles as the Cold War came to a close in the 1980s. Today, the position is different. Africa accounts for 18 of world uranium production with mining operations taking place in Namibia (8 of global production), Niger (7), Malawi (1.2) and South Africa (1). The other large producers of uranium are Kazakhstan (33 of world production), Canada (18) and Australia (11). At respective prices of $80 a kilogramme of uranium ($/kgU), $130/kgU and $260/kgU, Africa represents 8.5, 16 and 14.7 of world reserves. The largest are in Namibia, Niger and South Africa.4 By comparison, the world’s main uranium reserves at $80/kgU, $130/ kgU and $260/kgU are in Australia.5 Annex I shows which countries produce the world’s uranium and the location of reserves (at different prices).6This paper first examines Africa’s place in the global nuclear renaissance through its four current uranium producers, and those African countries where exploration is taking place and where mining is likely in the future. Secondly, it analyses the effects of uranium mining on the African continent at political, economic, social and environmental levels, examining stakeholders’ efforts and challenges. Thirdly, the paper looks into international and African tools that either exist or are being set up to improve the governance of uranium mining in Africa. Its conclusion is that improvement requires, in particular, attention to strengthening government capacity and ensuring wider consultative processes. Interest in nuclear power has greatly increased over the past decade, for a number of reasons. First, global demand for energy is growing rapidly. World primary energy demand is expected to grow by 40 from 2007 to 2030 and demand for electricity will increase by 76 over the same period. Secondly, rising concern about climate change is encouraging the search for energy sources with lower carbon emissions. At present, nuclear power is the only such source that could adequately meet global demand.7 Thirdly, the world supply of uranium is sufficient to meet government concerns over security of supply; uranium supply is less uncertain than that of, say, oil and gas. Fourthly, over the past decade fossil fuel price rises and price volatility have increased the relative cost-efficiency of nuclear power. Fifth, because the main cost in producing nuclear power lies in building the power plant itself, not in buying the uranium (as opposed to energy derived from fossil fuels, where the larger investment is in oil or coal as fuels) countries investing in nuclear power are less exposed to long-term raw material price fluctuations.8 Although uranium prices dropped after the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe on 11 March 2011 (from $300/kg in June 2007 to $110/kg in August 2011), they have since started to rise again, to $115/kg at the time of writing.9 As the appeal of nuclear power for governments increases, so does their interest in countries that can supply uranium.
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	5	+Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that triggers hotspots around the globe – co-opts all other causes of war
	6	+Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf Increased Potential for Global Conflict
	7	+Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
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	10	+African conflicts cause great power war
	11	+Glick 7 (Caroline – senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday, p. http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56andcategoryid=56andsubcategoryid=90andnewsid=11568)
	12	+The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-09-11 04:12:30.540

Judge

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	1	+Michael OKrent

Opponent

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	1	+Brentwood ELi

ParentRound

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	1	+0

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Palos Verdes Gaur Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPTOCT - DA - Mining

Tournament

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	1	+Loyola