Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[6]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[6]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-16 15:21:39.940
	1	+2016-10-16 15:21:39.0

Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Cites

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	1	+Armenia’s nuclear power is key to relations with Russia
	2	+http://arka.am/en/news/economy/levitin_armenia_s_nuclear_power_plant_enables_armenia_and_russia_to_step_up_their_cooperation_in_ene/
	3	+Arka ‘15
	4	+YEREVAN, October 15. /ARKA/. Armenia’s nuclear power plant in Metsamor enables Armenia and Russia to step up their cooperation in energy sector, Igor Levitin, the Russian president’s advisor who long years led the Armenian-Russian intergovernmental commission, said Saturday in Yerevan. “Our relations in this area very firm, and there is a good potential for developing them by using atomic energy,” he said answering ARKA News Agency’s question. Leviting said that Armenia can generate more electric power by using new technologies in the atomic energy. He said the two countries’ presidents gave appropriate instructions to the ministers when they met earlier this year. Armenia plans to build a new unit for the NPP which is expected to be commissioned in 2019-2020. In order to attract foreign investors, the Armenian parliament in 2006 abolished the state monopoly on ownership of new nuclear power units. The Armenian Metsamor nuclear power plant is located some 30 kilometers west of Yerevan. It was built in the 1970s but was closed following a devastating earthquake in 1988. One of its two VVER 440-V230 light-water reactors was reactivated in 1995. Armenian authorities said they will build a new nuclear power plant to replace the aging facility. The new plant is supposed to operate at twice the capacity of the Soviet-constructed facility. Metsamor currently generates some 40 percent of Armenia's electricity. But the government has yet to attract funding for the project that was estimated by a U.S.-funded feasibility study to cost at as much as $5 billion.
	5	+Relations are on the brink now – they’re key to manage Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – energy’s the key internal link
	6	+Anna Nemtsova 16 (Anna Nemtsova, ) In Nagorno-Karabakh, a Bloody New War With Putin on Both Sides, Daily Beast 4-4-2016 AT
	7	+Armenia's relationship with Russia was tested this year, despite that Armenia joined Russia's Eurasian Union and received financial assistance and weapons deliveries from Moscow. In January, a Russian soldier killed an entire Armenian family in Giumri. Moscow eventually allowed the Armenian government to conduct its own trial of the soldier, but not before igniting protests across Armenia and raising anti-Russia sentiments. Protests later sprang up in Yerevan against a price hike for electricity demanded by a Russia company. Although the protesters claimed their discontent was only with social issues, Russian politicians were visibly worried that the protest would turn to overall discontent with Armenia's pro-Russia stance. Armenia's economy, hurt by Russia's economic decline in the face of Western sanctions, also declined, which has further enflamed domestic anger. Moreover, Armenia and the European Union started to work on a new cooperation agreement, which could also cause some problems with Moscow by complicating its standoff with the West. Empowering Russia-based Armenian politicians amenable to Moscow's interests would certainly benefit Russia's negotiations with Sarkisian's government, especially on another, more important issue: Nagorno-Karabakh. Stratfor recently noted numerous efforts on Azerbaijan's part to change an existing status quo regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Usually, small-scale clashes along the contact line that define the conflict result in mostly Armenian casualties and loss of military equipment. However, Yerevan suspects that a recent Russian-Azerbaijani diplomatic rapprochement might lead Russia to allegedly agree to a possible change of this status quo. Several theories have been propounded, from withdrawing Armenian forces from the seven regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, to the placement of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — the Russia-led military bloc — peacekeepers. But Armenia's political elite, predominantly made up of politicians originating from Nagorno-Karabakh (like Sarkisian), has staunchly objected to any of these scenarios. Thus it may not be entirely coincidental that Yerevan, following the alleged Russian-Azerbaijani talks, decided to ramp up its forces along the contact line as well as to overtly criticize the CSTO. Moreover, Armenian leaders even threatened that in case of an Azerbaijani military attack, Yerevan would consider recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, which would make placing any peacekeepers there virtually impossible. The Kremlin's decision to overtly support Russia-based Armenians is a direct response to Moscow's challenges with the Armenian government. More important, Russia's overall strategy of isolating the former Soviet state to keep it dependent is part of its grand design to maintain a grip on the entire former Soviet periphery. Since the collapse of the pro-Russia government in Ukraine in 2014 and the conflicts and regional political maneuvers that followed, Russia has feared the loss of this sphere of influence to the West. Hence, losing clout in Armenia, even to a non-Western country such as Iran, let alone Europe, risks putting another dent in Russia's weakened buffer zone. So in the long term, pro-Russia figures such as Karapetian and Abrahamian are likely to play important role in Armenian politics. The influence of Russian companies in Armenia's energy sector will have equally strategic repercussions, limiting the country's ability to become a transit country for Iranian exports and increasing its dependence on Russia.
	8	+
	9	+Failure to manage the conflict causes a proxy war in the Caucasus
	10	+Anna Nemtsova 16 (Anna Nemtsova, ) In Nagorno-Karabakh, a Bloody New War With Putin on Both Sides, Daily Beast 4-4-2016 AT
	11	+MOSCOW — Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan that became breakaway republic backed by Armenia in all spheres of life, has been living in a not-quite-frozen state of war since 1994. Every schoolboy in the mountainous little republic has grown up knowing that after graduation he will put on a uniform and join the military to police the unstable cease-fire. The republic’s 150,000 people, mostly ethnic Armenians, remember rockets destroying apartment buildings in the fighting more than 20 years ago, and have long feared that their worst nightmare of full-scale war would return. Now it looks like it has. The war woke up on Saturday night with both sides of the front using armored vehicles, battle tanks, and aviation, launching multiple rockets, and shooting artillery at each other. Over 30 people were killed and dozens wounded in the worst combat in the last two decades. The regional implications are hard to miss. Armenia is one of Russia’s closest allies and Turkey immediately backed up Azerbaijan at a time when relations between Moscow and Ankara are bitter and vindictive. Given the war in Syria, where Russia and Turkey back opposing sides, and Turkey shot down a Russian warplane in November, the current eruption between Armenia and Azerbaijan is even more geopolitically dangerous than two decades ago. On the eve of violent clashes Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan were attending the Nuclear Summit in Washington, but obviously had no chance to shake hands and make peace to prevent the tragedy. Among the first victims of the latest violent clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh were children: a 12 year old boy, Vaginak Grigorian, was killed in the cross fire by one of Azerbaijan’s Grad multiple-rocket launchers, the Armenian papers reported; two more children were wounded among dozens of civilian victims. On Monday, the Karabakh ministry of defense claimed its forces had destroyed 19 of Azerbaijan’s tanks, and posted dreadful images on Twitter of buildings shelled the night before, of burned vehicles, of dead bodies, and of victims covered in blood. The Armenian government claimed that a bus with Armenian volunteers going to Karabakh was hit by an Azerbaijani drone. Five volunteers were killed. Azerbaijan meanwhile reported on dozens of casualties. It would be hard to overstate the dependence of the Armenian contingent on Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh’s officials told The Daily Beast in interviews last summer that neither Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh could survive without Russia’s support in the conflict with Azerbaijan. In 2014 Armenia joined Vladimir Putin’s dream project, the Eurasian Economic Union, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Armenian military doctrine holds that Russia is the guarantor of the country’s military security, and in the last few years Russia equipped its military bases in Armenian Gyumri and Erebuni with MiG-29 fighters, Mi-24 helicopters, as well as with more than 70 tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems. Last December, Russia delivered new helicopters to its aviation base in Erebuni. In February Moscow announced it was selling $200 million worth of arms to Armenia. But, here’s the rub: at the same time, Russia sold hundreds of tanks to Armenia’s long time enemy, Azerbaijan. Last year the contracts for Russian military exports to Azerbaijan included armored vehicles, artillery and mortar systems. While in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, many wondered what else they had to do to prove their loyalty and devotion to the Kremlin, in Moscow it was clear that President Putin needed Azerbaijan as Russia’s ally, too, especially as relations between Russia and Turkey worsened. There are many reasons it’s not in the Kremlin’s interest to lose Azerbaijan’s friendship. In 2014 Russia’s Rosneft and Azerbaijan’s Socar oil companies created a joint venture to explore oil and gas fields together in both countries, and Azerbaijan’s exports to Russia have been growing. Experts both in Moscow and in Baku believe that president Putin would do almost anything to avoid a full-scale conflict between Russia and Azerbaijan. “Putin cannot afford to lose Azerbaijan, he would do everything to negotiate the peace for Nagorno-Karabakh now,” an independent political analyst, Dmitriy Oreshkin, told The Daily Beast on Monday. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was planning to visit Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, this week, while Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev planned to visit Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. Many in Yerevan wish that U.S. President Barack Obama had managed somehow to play a peacemaker’s role in Washington last week to prevent the escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That was not to be. But, as Armenian parliament member Tevan Poghosyna told The Daily Beast, “If the international community does not manage to stop the war now, several countries might be involved in the conflict, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supporting Azerbaijan and Russia, we hope, supporting Armenia.” Another descent into chaos and proxy war is, to be sure, the last thing the world needs right now.This is also an alt cause to the relations advantage
	12	+Causes a full-scale US-Russia war
	13	+Friedman 9 George, Fall. Founder and Chief Executive Officer of STRATFOR, Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University. “The Coming Conflict With Russia,” Journal of International Security Affairs No 17, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/17/friedman.php
	14	+The Caucasus serves as the boundary between Russian and Turkish power, and has historically been a flash point between the two empires. It was also a flash point during the Cold War. The Turkish–Soviet border ran through the Caucasus, with the Soviet side consisting of three separate republics: Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, all now independent. The Caucasus also ran north into the Russian Federation itself, including into the Muslim areas of Dagestan and, most important, Chechnya, where a guerrilla war against Russian domination raged after the fall of Communism. From a purely defensive point of view, the precise boundaries of Russian and Turkish influence don’t matter, so long as both are based somewhere in the Caucasus. The rugged terrain makes defense relatively easy. Should the Russians lose their position in the Caucasus altogether and be pushed north into the lowlands, however, Russia’s position would become difficult. With the gap between Ukraine and Kazakhstan only a few hundred miles wide, Russia would be in strategic trouble. This is the reason the Russians are so unwilling to compromise on Chechnya. The southern part of Chechnya is deep in the northern Caucasus. If that were lost, the entire Russian position would unravel. Given a choice, the Russians would prefer to be anchored farther south, in Georgia. Armenia is already an ally of Russia. If Georgia were Russian, Moscow’s entire position would be much more stable. Controlling Chechnya is indispensable. Reabsorbing Georgia is desirable. Holding Azerbaijan does not provide a strategic advantage—but the Russians would not mind having it as a buffer with the Iranians. Russia’s position here is not intolerable, but Georgia, not incidentally closely allied with the United States, is a tempting target, as was seen in the August 2008 conflict. The situation in the Caucasus is not only difficult to understand but also difficult to deal with. The Soviet Union actually managed to solve the complexity by incorporating all these countries after World War I and ruthlessly suppressing their autonomy. It is impossible for Russia to be indifferent to the region now or in the future—unless it is prepared to lose its position in the Caucasus. Therefore, the Russians can be expected to reassert their position, most likely starting with Georgia. And since the United States sees Georgia as a strategic asset, Russia’s reassertion there will lead to confrontation with the United States. Unless the Chechen rebellion completely disappears, the Russians will have to move south, then isolate the rebellion and nail down their position in the mountains. There are two powers that will not want this to happen. The United States is one, and the other is Turkey. Americans will see Russian domination of Georgia as undermining their position in the region. The Turks will see this as energizing the Armenians and returning the Russian army in force to their borders. The Russians will become more convinced of the need to act because of this resistance. A duel in the Caucasus will be the likely result.
	15	+Russia war=extinction
	16	+Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science and Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis)
	17	+
	18	+War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-16 15:21:41.423

Judge

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	1	+Srikar Pyda

Opponent

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	1	+Strake VL

ParentRound

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	1	+6

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+Palos Verdes Gaur Neg

Title

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	1	+Relations DA

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks