Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[8]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[9]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[8]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-12-02 20:52:19.345
	1	+2016-12-02 20:52:19.0

Caselist.CitesClass[9]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,44 @@
	1	+Part 1 is Framing
	2	+The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the best policy option to reduce structural violence.
	3	+1, Because pedagogical contexts are inherently political, we have a unique opportunity to promote real change. Trifonas 3:
	4	+PETER PERICLES TRIFONAS. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE/ RoutledgeFalmer. New York, London. 2003. Questia.
	5	+Just as objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of action, so it is not transformed by chance. If men/women produce social reality (which in the “inversion of praxis” turns back upon them and conditions them), then transforming that reality is an historical task, a task for men/women. Reality which becomes oppressive results in the contradistinction of men/women as oppressors and oppressed. The latter, whose task it is to struggle for their liberation together with those who show true solidarity, must acquire a critical awareness of oppression through the praxis of this struggle. One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge men's/women's consciousness. Functionally oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. (36)In this passage we see the fundamental importance that Freire places on the development of a critical consciousness of social existence. An end to oppression, which is the fundamental objective of Freire's call for a socially transformative praxis, requires that men and women have the ability to perceive their existence in the world. He argues that their action in the world is largely determined by the way they see themselves within it, and that a correct perception necessitates of an ongoing reflection on their world. For Freire it is neither the mere action nor the mere reflection and critical consciousness of men and women that will transform the world and end oppression. This can only be achieved through “praxis: the action and reflection of men in the world in order to transform it” (66). The ability to perceive correctly and arrive at a critical consciousness of the world, however, does not come automatically; it is itself the product of praxis. From this position Freire argues for an educational practice (a pedagogical praxis) that engages with the oppressed in reflection that leads to action on their concrete reality. He calls for a pedagogy that makes oppression and its causes objects of a reflection that will allow the oppressed to develop a consciousness of “their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation” (33). Freire clearly articulates the essential importance of critical consciousness to transformative action that is liberating: In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action. (34) He attributes to education an essential role in the development of developing critical consciousness that Freire ascribes to education: In problem posing education, men and women develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves. They come to see the world not as static reality, but as reality in process, in transformation. Although the dialectical relations of men with the world exist independently of how these relations are perceived (or whether or not they are perceived at all) it is also true that the form of action men adopt is to a large extent a function of how they perceived themselves in the world. Hence the teacher-student and the students-teachers reflect multaneously on themselves and the world without dichotomizing this reflection from action, and thus establish an authentic form of thought and action. (71) From Freire we understand that a social transformation that works in the interests of working-class indigenous and nonwhite peoples necessitates a critical consciousness of social existence and the possibility of its transformation. We argue that a critical decolonizing consciousness is fundamental to the transformation of the internal neocolonial condition of social existence in the contemporary United States. One need only consider the level of post-September 11 patriotism and expressed belief in official rhetoric (about America's moral righteousness and freedom loving and defending tradition) among working-class indigenous and nonwhite people to see the degree to which our internal neocolonial condition has “submerged” the consciousness of men and women who live and experience the effects of that condition on a daily basis. The vast majority of working-class indigenous and nonwhite people in the contemporary United States cannot see the extent to which the essence of the colonialism that made them English-speaking, Christian individuals continues to define their social existence. We agree with Freire that how men and women act in the world is largely related to how they perceive themselves in the world, and thus we understand that the existent potential to transform our internal neocolonial condition will remain unrealized if we fail to appropriately perceive and develop a critical consciousness of this condition and its possible undoing. A social transformation that ends our neocolonial oppression and exploitation in American society will require a cycle of emancipatory thought, action, and reflection-in other words, a praxiological cycle. We build on Freire and contend that critical consciousness is developed through the struggle against internal neocolonialism both in the classroom and the larger social context. Critical pedagogy has put forth the notion that classroom practice integrates particular curriculum content and design, instructional strategies and techniques, and forms of evaluation. It argues that these specify a particular version about what knowledge is of most worth, what it means to know something, and how we might construct a representation of our world and our place within it (McLaren 1998). From this perspective, the pedagogical is inherently political. For us a decolonizing pedagogy encompasses both an anticolonial and decolonizing notion of pedagogy and an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis. It is an anticolonial and decolonizing theory and praxis that insists that colonial domination and its ideological frameworks operate and are reproduced in and through the curricular content and design, the instructional practices, the social organization of learning, and the forms of evaluation that inexorably sort and label students into enduring categories of success and failure of schooling. Thus, an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis explicitly works to transform these dimensions of schooling so that schools into become sites for the development of a critical decolonizing consciousness and activity that work to ameliorate and ultimately end the mutually constitutive forms of violence that characterize our internal neocolonial condition. For us, a decolonizing pedagogy addresses both the means and the ends of schooling.
	6	+
	7	+2, Our discussions cannot be based on ideal theory—policy discussions are key but policies mean nothing unless they change the values to the people they affect. Curry 14:
	8	+Dr. Tommy J. Curry 1The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century. 2014.
	9	+Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are is fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.”At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual(in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social ph,enomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
	10	+
	11	+3, Using the state and political sphere are key to using the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house in order to fight oppression. Kapoor 8:
	12	+Kapoor 8 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 138-139)
	13	+There are perhaps several other social movement campaigns that could be cited as examples of a ‘hybridizing strategy’. But what emerges as important from the Chipko and NBA campaigns is the way in which they treat laws and policies, institutional practices, and ideological apparatuses as deconstructible. That is, they refuse to take dominant authority at face value, and proceed to reveal its contingencies. Sometimes, they expose what the hegemon is trying to disavow or hide (exclusion of affected communities in project design and implementation, fault information gathering and dissemination). Sometimes, they problematize dominant or naturalized truths (‘development = unlimited economic growth = capitalism’, ‘big is better’, ‘technology can save the environment’). In either case, by contesting, publicizing, and politicizing accepted or hidden truths, they hybridize power, challenging its smugness and triumphalism, revealing its impurities. They show power to be, literally and figuratively, a bastard. While speaking truth to power, a hybridizing strategy also exploits the instabilities of power. In part, this involves showing up and taking advantage of the equivocations of power- conflicting laws, contradictory policies, unfulfilled promises. A lot has to do here with publicly shaming the hegemon, forcing it to remedy injustices and live up to stated commitments in a more accountable and transparent manner. And, in part, this involves nurturing or manipulating the splits and strains within institutions. Such maneuvering can take the form of cultivating allies, forging alliances, or throwing doubt on prevailing orthodoxy. Note, lastly, the way in which a hybridizing strategy works with the dominant discourse. This strategy may outwit the hegemon, but it does so from the interstices of the hegemony. The master may be paralyzed, but his paralysis is induced using his own poison/medicine. It is for this reason that cultivating allies in the adversarial camp is possible: when you speak their language and appeal to their own ethical horizons, you are building a modicum of common ground. It is for this reason also that the master cannot easily dismiss or crush you. Observing his rules and playing his their game makes it difficult for them him not to take you seriously or grant you a certain legitimacy. The use of non-violent tactics may be crucial in this regard: state repression is easily justified against violent adversaries, but it is vulnerable to public criticism when used against non-violence. Thus, the fact that Chipko and the NBA deployed civil disobedience- pioneered, it must be pointed out, by the ‘father of the nation’ (i.e. Gandhi)- made it difficult for the state to quash them or deflect their claims.
	14	+4, Challenging institutional racism is a prior ethical question— it makes violence structurally inevitable and foundationally negates morality. Memmi 2k:
	15	+Albert Memmi 2k, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165
	16	+The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
	17	+
	18	+Part 2 is Contention
	19	+Most people have heard news stories of stop and frisk procedures, but most are also unaware about this toll this takes on the lives of persons of color. Vesely-Flad 14:
	20	+Rima Vesely-Flad is a professor of Religious Studies and the director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College. She holds a Ph.D. in Social Ethics from Union Theological Seminary and is the Founder and former Director and Chairman of the Board of the Interfaith Coalition of Advocates for Reentry and Employment ("ICARE"). THE LAW AS VIOLENCE: ESSAY: NEW YORK CITY UNDER SIEGE: THE MORAL POLITICS OF POLICING PRACTICES, 1993-2013, Fall, 2014, Wake Forest Law Review, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 889, Lexis Nexis, spark.
	21	+It is against the law in every jurisdiction in the country for police departments to institute quotas on actions such as stop and frisk. n41 However, NYPD officers are required to meet "productivity measures" with performance indicated by the number of UF-250 forms they fill out after conducting a stop and frisk. n42 These productivity measures function as what one officer called a "highly developed" system that mandates numerical quotas for arrests, summonses, and stop-and-frisk encounters. n43 Police officers *896 document stopping people for vague reasons such as "Suspicious Bulge/Object," "Furtive Movements," and "Wearing Clothes/Disguises Commonly Used in the Commission of Crime." n44 In 2011, as in previous years, the most common reason given for stops was Furtive Movement.n45 Such imprecise language can justify what is in reality the practice of racially profiling blacks and Latinos. As one resident described the culture of fear that has developed: For young people in my neighborhood, getting stopped and frisked is a rite of passage. We expect the police to jump us at any moment. We know the rules: don't run and don't try to explain, because speaking up for yourself might get you arrested or worse. And we all feel the same way - degraded, harassed, violated and criminalized because we're black or Latino. n46 The feelings of violation are pervasive among those who have been stopped and frisked. Joseph "Jazz" Hayden, a community activist who initiated the Campaign to End the New Jim Crow at the Riverside Church, has argued that the state's rejection of certain populations, along with middle-class flight, has contributed to an extensive youth culture in which com-munity members are enraged *897 at their treatment by police officers, but also view it as normal. n47 People interviewed by the Center for Constitutional Rights described an environment so saturated with a hostile police presence that being stopped and harassed by police has become integrated into the fabric of daily life experience. n48 Many interviewees explained how they have changed their clothing styles and/or hairstyles, altered their routes or avoided walking on the street, and made a "habit of carrying around documents such as ID, mail, and pay stubs to provide police officers if stopped." n49 One interviewee noted: It makes you anxious about just being, walking around and doing your daily thing while having a bunch of police always there, always present and stopping people that look like me. They say if you're a young black male, you're more likely to be stopped. So, it's always this fear that "okay, this cop might stop me," for no reason, while I'm just sitting there in my neighborhood. n50 Residents of disproportionately policed neighborhoods also noted the lack of accountability in incidents of police aggression: In my complex I feel like we're under torment, like we're under like this big gang that's bullying all of us. To me, NYPD is the biggest gang in New York. They're worse than any gang, "cause they could get away with stuff. When they're killing people and they don't get any kind of disciplinary action. n51 Indeed, in the experiences of some individuals who were stopped and frisked, police officers behaved like the criminals whom they sought to arrest. For example, Derrick Barnicot reported that as he walked with a bike he had just bought for his girlfriend, an officer stopped him and told him that if they received another stolen bike report, they would come after him. n52 Barnicot testified: "I felt endangered. I've been mugged before and it felt like that." n53 *898 People who are stopped and frisked have argued that they are being used as a means to an end - to fill quotas - and brutally so. n54 Another victim of these tactics shared: My jeans were ripped. I had bruises on my face. My whole face was swollen. I was sent to the precinct for disorderly conduct. I got out two days later. The charges were dismissed. At central booking, they threw out the charge. No charge. I felt like I couldn't defend myself, didn't know what to do. No witnesses there to see what was going on. I just wish someone was there to witness it. I felt like no one would believe me. I couldn't tell anyone. I kept it in till now ... I still am scared. n55 The trauma enacted upon people who are stopped and frisked can be isolating, as noted above, as well as enraging and humiliating. During random stops, police officers have been known to sexually harass individuals during stops and frisks. n56 Furthermore, in addition to (literally) warrantless intimidation and resultant feelings of fear, an arrest can trigger severe consequences even when it does not lead to a conviction. Arrests can create permanent criminal records that are easily located on the internet by employers, landlords, schools, credit agencies, licensing boards, and banks. n57 While the extent of collateral consequences is hard to quantify, anecdotal evidence illuminates the considerable hardships caused by arrests. For example, thirty-six-year-old transit worker Daryl George, who had never been arrested, was in the lobby of a Brooklyn building when the police entered and searched everyone. n58 He had no contraband, but he was arrested alongside someone who did. n59 The charges were dismissed - but not before the Transit Authority suspended him and he lost five months of pay and benefits. n60 The practice of stopping and frisking black people and other marginalized individuals has been challenged in the court system *899 and New York City Council cham-bers. n61 Advocates have protested stop-and-frisk practices in three separate lawsuits filed in federal court that allege racial profiling and violations of constitutional rights. n62 In two of the court cases, advocates charged the City of New York with breaching constitutional rights by allowing police officers to stop and frisk residents and visitors of private apartment buildings. n63 In these cases, the plaintiffs alleged that residents, who were simply in the hallways, stairwells, or elevators of their own buildings, or in front of their buildings, were under siege by police officers. n64 As one person testified: I'll go into the building with the key and they're still stopping me, asking me what I'm doing in the building ... In the summertime, it's nice outside. Why can't I hang out in front of my building? The NYPD gives you a ticket for trespassing "cause you're sitting on the bench that's in front of your building. I can't sit on the bench in front of my building? Why's the bench there? n65 The phenomenon of entering buildings and randomly searching residents is amplified in the domain of public housing. A 2010 report documented that residents of the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") sites receive inordinate attention from the police. n66 Many public housing residents describe being constantly harassed when coming to and going from their apartments. n67
	22	+These policies are part and parcel of a broader disruption of civil liberties and institutional racism that targets people of color by every possible metric. Kaplan-Lyman 12:
	23	+Jeremy Kaplan-Lyman, Yale Law School, J.D., A Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New York City, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 15 Yale H.R. and Dev. L.J. 177, Lexis Nexis, spark
	24	+Whatever positive impact the NYPD's approach to weapons policing may have had, it has been achieved in part through a massive expansion of *216 the NYPD's surveillance power. n259 Once the NYPD linked stop-and-frisk to policing disorder, the number of people that could be searched expanded exponentially. To find pretext of a quality-of-life violation is not particularly difficult for a police officer. n260 She has at her disposal any of the twenty-five or so quality-of-life violations referenced in the NYPD Quality of Life Enforcement Options Reference Guide, n261 not to mention vague and relatively easy to establish crimes like disorderly conduct. Once a police officer detains an individual, she doesn't need much cause to search the suspect. For example, under the Constitution, an officer can generally search an individual she reasonably believes was involved in trafficking drugs, and will be justified in a pat-down search when the suspect makes furtive movements in the area of their waistband. n262 Moreover, civil lawsuits and civilian complaints are notoriously weak incentives to get officers to improve their conduct, so constitutional and other forms of legal regulation may be poor deterrents for preventing illegal Terry stops. n263 In most instances, officer abuse of stop-and-frisk will go unreported. All of this is to say that when stop-and-frisk tactics become linked to disorder policing and their unlawful application is generally unrestrained by legal or political structures, police officers have wide discretion to detain and pat down huge numbers of citizens (and indeed may be required to by their supervisors). n264 This potentially massive expansion of police surveillance may enable police officers to root out more weapons from the street but it also brings with it serious costs. The rest of this Section will outline those costs, which include widespread infringement on individuals' privacy and liberty interests, racially discriminatory and stigmatizing policing, and loss of police legitimacy. Increased surveillance leads to intrusions upon individuals' privacy rights and liberty interests. A Terry stop, while less invasive than an arrest, can be a serious intrusion into individuals' liberties. As the Supreme Court recognized in Terry, "even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps hu-miliating experience." n265 Moreover, the experience of being *217 subjected to a Terry stop can be more traumatizing for individuals who are innocent of any crime. n266 But the fact that a policing tactic leads to viola-tions of individuals' rights may not be particularly troubling if they are merely occasional and shared across diverse communities. Indeed, every police tactic will inevitably violate some people's rights; it is only when those violations are particularly egregious, where only some communities shoulder most of their costs, or when they happen with high frequency, that we should be particularly concerned. Research into stop-and-frisk policing, however, indicates that the NYPD's use of Terry stops is concentrated in certain communities and, as a result, occurs within those communities at a high frequency. A 1999 study, authored by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, of over 175,000 Terry stops from January 1998 to March 1999, revealed significant disparities in the targets of stop-and-frisk policing. n267 Across the city, blacks and latinos were stopped at disproportionately high rates as compared to white New Yorkers. The report found that "blacks were over six times more likely to be "stopped' than whites in New York City, while Hispanics were over four times more likely to be "stopped' than whites in New York City." n268 When controlling for differentials in crime rates by racial groups, the report's analysis revealed that in aggregate across all crime categories and precincts citywide, "blacks were "stopped' 23 more often (in comparison to the crime rate) than whites. Hispanics were "stopped' 39 more often than whites." n269 As one might expect given the disparities between stop rates and crime rates for people of color, stops of black and latino New Yorkers were less likely to result in arrests than for whites. "Police "stopped' 9.5 blacks for every "stop' that yielded an arrest, and 8.8 Hispanics, but only 7.9 whites per one arrest. Because of the large number of cases sampled, luck or random chance cannot explain why police "stopped' 1.6 more blacks than whites to achieve an arrest." n270 The Attorney General's report also shows that Terry stops happen with much higher frequency in neighborhoods with more people of color. Spitzer's report found that nine of the ten precincts with the highest stop rates in the city were majority-minority precincts, a result which was in "stark divergence from the City as a whole, in which almost half of the *218 precincts (48) are majority-white." n271 The report found that the disproportionately high frequency of stops in districts with populations that were composed of a majority of people of color was still present when it controlled for differences in crime rates between precincts. n272 In other words, differences in crime rates between precincts do not explain disparities in stop rates between majority white and majority people of color precincts. Finally, it should be noted that racial disparities in enforcement frequency between different precincts are in part explained by differences in poverty rates by geographic area. Using the Attorney General's data, Jeffery Fagan and Garth Davies ran a multivariate analysis to isolate causes that explain racial differences in stop-rate. Fagan and Davies found that "after controlling for crime, stops within the sub-boroughs were predicted by their poverty rates. Accordingly, policing in the city's neighborhoods appears to reflect the economic status of people ... . " n273 Race and class disparities of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policing represent significant costs that may not only outweigh justifications for this approach to policing but also undermine any positive impact the enforcement regime may have on crime. Racially discriminatory enforcement has the potential to stigmatize communities of color. Not only do racial stigmas produce costly psychic harm, they also have the potential to undermine police legitimacy, making the kind of police-community collaboration and informal community control envisioned by Broken Windows theory policing impossible. n274 As Fagan and Davies explain, "Broad surveillance of African Americans is stigmatizing, undermining respect for authorities and commitment to law and discouraging the everyday interactions (or collective efficacy) that expresses social control and conveys respect for other members of the group." n275 They go on to note that unfair policing "may actually increase the likelihood of reoffending, rather than reduce it." n276 These legitimacy concerns are borne out by interviews with individuals unfairly stopped-and-frisked by the police. A fifty four-year-old woman said she felt that she could no longer "trust" police officers after her Terry stop. n277 An educator reported that he now thinks "police officers in my community do not care about the citizens." n278 School principals assert that their students "fear" police officers. n279 *219 These costs of aggressive stop-and-frisk policing - that is, loss of civil liberties, stigmas, and decreasing of police legitimacy - weigh heavily against the NYPD's approach to weapons enforcement. At the same time, most community members likely gain some semblance of safer streets as a result of the NYPD's heavy-handed tactics. n280 While evaluating such costs and benefits may pose a difficult task to conscientious city policy makers, those well-positioned to weigh in on the issue - the poor communities which are being policed - have generally been excluded from the police department's decision-making process. If the police are going to tackle street disorder and weapons by broadly applying heavy-handed tactics like stops and frisks without active input and buy-in from the policed communities, they do so at the expense of their own legitimacy. Unfortunately, the police don't bear most of the costs when they lose legitimacy. Instead, the true victims of police delegitimization are the residents of poor communities who no longer feel they can turn to the police for security. n281 The NYPD's go-at-it-alone, punitive approach to policing therefore makes poor communities pay twice. On the front end, the police produce insecurity in targeted communities, whose residents fear that the police will violate their liberty, privacy, and dignity. On the back end, the residents of poor communities have more difficulty in creating security from crime because they don't feel comfortable collaborating with the police. n282 Because members of the community bear the costs of the police strategy the NYPD adopts, there must be a concerted and structured effort to meaningfully involve them in decisions over precinct enforcement priorities.
	25	+Stop and frisk is the worst form of the chilling effect – it creates a learned helplessness that suppresses dissent. Butler 14:
	26	+Butler 14—Paul Butler is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University (2014, The Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, “Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities”, HSA)
	27	+An African-American mother, writing on a blog about raising children, said this about her son's experience growing up in New York City: The saddest part of all of this is he'd begun to become "immune" to being stopped. He, like too many other men of color in this city, had become desensitized to being treated criminally. They take it as par for the course; they shrug it off and most will laughingly share their war stories. But listen closely and you can hear anger comingled with humiliation and a weary, reluctant acceptance. n59 The Supreme Court got it right in Terry when it noted that frisks might be "motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets." n60 The "weary, reluctant acceptance" of humiliation is how torture-lite succeeds. It induces in its victims a learned helplessness. One African-American resident of Brooklyn told the New York Times that residents "fear the police because you can get stopped at any time." n61 Professor Luban describes the torturer's work as inflicting "pain one-on-one, deliberately, up close and personal, in order to break the spirit of the victim~-~-in other words, to tyrannize and dominate the victim." n62 Stop and frisk does not (usually) leave a physical mark, but as one study of torture-lite noted, "psychological manipulations conducive to anxiety, fear, and helplessness in the detainee do not seem to be substantially different from physical torture in terms of the extent of mental suffering they cause, the underlying mechanisms of traumatic stress, and their long-term traumatic effects." n63 The stories of many black men who are subject to seize and search are the stories of men who have had their spirits broken. They are afraid of the police. This is, in fact, its point. Seize and search, like torture-lite, demonstrates who is in charge, and the violent consequences of dissent.
	28	+
	29	+Clearly established law allows officers to evade responsibility for unlawful searches and seizures. Justia 9:
	30	+Justia No Date- Most recent date 2009, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule," Justia Law, http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/30-exclusionary-rule.html
	31	+A right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared by the Fourth Amendment, but how this right translates into concrete terms is not specified. Several possible methods of enforcement have been suggested, but only one—the exclusionary rule—has been applied with any frequency by the Supreme Court, and the Court in recent years has limited its application. Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule.—Theoretically, there are several alternatives to the exclusionary rule. An illegal search and seizure may be criminally actionable and officers undertaking one thus subject to prosecution, but the examples when officers are may be criminally prosecuted for overzealous law enforcement but are extremely rarely.353 A policeman who makes an illegal search and seizure is subject to internal departmental discipline which may be backed up in the few jurisdictions which have adopted them by the oversight of police review boards, but again the examples of disciplinary actions are exceedingly rare.354 351 See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), appeal after remand 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on remand, 444 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd. in part, rev'd. in part, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Truong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), after remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 352 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1797, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of disclosure restrictions in Act). 353 Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REV. 621 (1955). Persons who have been illegally arrested or who have had their privacy invaded will usually have a tort action available under state statutory or common law. Moreover, police officers acting under color of state law who violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights are subject to a suit for damages and other remedies355 under a civil rights statute in federal courts.356 While federal officers and others acting under color of federal law are not subject to this statute, the Supreme Court has recently held that a right to damages for violation of Fourth Amendment rights arises by implication and that this right is enforceable in federal courts.357 While a damage remedy might be made more effectual,358 a number of legal and practical problems stand in the way.359 Police officers have available to them the usual common-law defenses, most important of which is the claim of good faith.360 Such “good faith” claims, however, are not based on the subjective intent of the officer. Instead, officers are entitled to qualified immunity “where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment,”36 or where they had an objectively reasonable belief that a warrantless search later determined to violate the Fourth Amendment was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances.361.
	32	+
	33	+Thus the plan: the Supreme Court of the United States ought to implement the Saucier ruling in Fourth Amendment cases. Kerr 11:
	34	+Kerr 11’- Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States Orin S. Kerr, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/2011/9/camrettadaviskerr_0.pdf
	35	+Whatever my own preferences, it appears likely that the Supreme Court will soon take more steps toward requiring Fourth Amendment development in a zone of limited or no remedies. Let’s assume that prediction comes true. In 10 or 20 years, Fourth Amendment remedies will be more limited than they are today. The question becomes, what legal rules or procedures might enhance law development in that future? Fourth Amendment remedies are a well-covered subject in the literature, and perhaps there are no new proposals under the sun. But let me offer two ideas that may be among the more fruitful: a Saucier-like rule for motions to suppress and active involvement of the justices in adding questions presented in Supreme Court litigation. If the Court eventually aligns the exclusionary rule with qualified immunity, the development of the Fourth Amendment would be sharply stunted. Because liability would attach only when the constitutional violation seemed rather obvious, law-developing claims would arise mostly when the lack of a suppression was clear. If that comes to pass, some sort of Saucier rule governing the reaching of merits claims may become necessary. When it remained good law, Saucier required courts to first evaluate the merits of Fourth Amendment claims and then to turn, if necessary, to qualified immunity. A similar rule could require courts to evaluate the merits of Fourth Amendment claims in motions to suppress before proceeding to the remedy. At first blush, such a rule might seem quite unlikely to be adopted. The Court recently rejected Saucier in Pearson,92 and the Court has traditionally rejected a Saucier-type rule in the suppression context.93 The critical difference is the tremendous loss of law-developing litigation that would follow adoption of a qualified immunity standard. The extent of law development in Fourth Amendment damages cases is relatively modest, as is law development in the context of defective warrants where the good-faith exception originally arose.94 The exclusionary rule is different. It has served as the engine of settling Fourth Amendment law since its inception. Without an exclusionary rule, many of the basic rules of Fourth Amendment law that govern everyday interactions with the police might still be unclear.95 The loss of clarity that would follow adopting the qualified immunity standard for all suppression claims would be dramatic. In my view, that difference could justify different treatment. If the Court insists on moving toward law development in a zone of limited remedies, it may need a Saucier-like rule to ensure that limited remedies don’t end law development. An alternative approach would be for the Supreme Court to take a more active role in law development by adding questions presented when it agrees to review Fourth Amendment claims. In most Supreme Court litigation, the petitioner crafts the questions the Court should answer. When the Court grants a petition for certiorari, it usually adopts the question presented by the petition in whole or in part. The Court always has the option of adding questions, however. If the remedies of Fourth Amendment law recede, the Court may need to fuel law development by adding its own questions for parties to brief that the Court can then decide. This process already occurs occasionally in Fourth Amendment litigation, and there is some evidence of a recent uptick in its frequency. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court added the question of whether to overturn Saucier.96 And earlier this year, the Supreme Court added the question of whether police installation of a GPS
	36	+
	37	+Removing the “clearly established” doctrine requirement solves. Wright 15:
	38	+Wright, 2015 (Journalist and PHD in Law. "Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity." http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/)
	39	+In order to truly hold police accountable for bad acts, civilians must be able to bring, and win, civil rights suits themselves — not rely on the Department of Justice, or special prosecutors, or civilian review boards to hold officers accountable. And in order to both bring and win civil rights suits, civilians need a level playing field in court. Right now, they don’t have one. Instead, police officers have recourse to the broad protections of the judicially established doctrine of qualified immunity. Under QI this doctrine, state actors are protected from suit even if they’ve violated the law by, say, using excessive force, or performing an unwarranted body cavity search — as long as their violation was not one of “clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would be aware.” In other words, if there’s not already a case where a court has held that an officer’s identical or near-identical conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, there’s a good chance that even an obviously malfeasant officer will avoid liability and — will avoid accountability. To bring about true accountability and change police behavior, this needs to change. And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts?
	40	+
	41	+The removal of the “clearly established” doctrine bolsters civil suits against police officers, which are key to creating tangible changes within the system.
	42	+Kabakova 12.
	43	+Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department's Investigative Stops, 160 Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal 1631 (Summer 2012) (260 Footnotes Omitted) (Student Note). FZ.
	44	+This Note provides an in-depth analysis of the NYPD's "stop and frisk" policy and demonstrates that the actions of police officers in stop- ping and frisking civilians are largely unreviewable, both judicially and administratively. In these instances, there is generally no arrest and thus no evidence to suppress, so the exclusionary remedy is largely irrelevant.o Additionally, individual civil rights suits based on wrongful stops are mostly blocked by qualified immunity," and administrative review is largely ineffectual because of a lack of cooperation by the NYPD.12 As a result, for the vast majority of those stopped by police officers, the officers' actions remain unreviewable.13 Civil rights suits brought by groups to address racial disparities in the numbers of minorities stopped and frisked represent the best avenue for inspiring reform.

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-12-02 20:52:19.832

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+any

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+any

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+5

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Palo Alto Aff

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Ipv aff v2

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+any on nov dec