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1 -=frats cp=
1 +Given to me by frances zhaung my teamate thanks homie
2 2  
3 -====Counterplan text: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech other than fraternity advertising, organization, or membership.====
4 -
5 5  ====Competes through net benefits and mutual exclusivity, aff advocates that all forms of constitutionally protected speech should be allowed. Fraternities are protected by the First Amendment's right to free speech. Greg Lukianoff, an award-winning author, writes in 2015:====
6 -Lukianoff 11 Greg Lukianoff (President and CEO, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education), "To Survive, Fraternities Need to Stand for Something, Anything," Huffington Post, 8/1/2015 AZ
4 +Lukianoff 11 Greg Lukianoff (President and CEO, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education), "To Survive, Fraternities Need to Stand for Something, Anything," Huffington Post, 8/1/2015
7 7  A lot of fraternities seem to know that their freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. (While the freedom to join and form groups is not technically listed in the text of the First Amendment, it is understood to arise~~s~~ from the protections of freedom of speech and the right to assembly.) What fraternities often do not know, however, is that there are several different kinds of freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, and they are not all made equal. The strongest kind of freedom of association protected by the First Amendment is the right to "intimate" association, best represented by the family. Our government recognizes that the bonds of family are particularly important and that it should do its best to avoid actions that interfere with this bond. The second strongest kind of freedom of association is called "expressive" association. Sensibly, courts understand that the right to freedom of expression would not mean a great deal if we are forbidden from joining together with like-minded individuals to amplify the power of our voices and take collective action. This understanding forms the basis of our right to form groups around commonly held beliefs whether they are religious, secular, or ideological. Everything from Mothers Against Drunk Driving to NORML is a kind of expressive association. (This includes my nonprofit, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, as well.)
8 8  
9 9  ====Expert consensus agrees that nowadays, fraternities are sites of rape. While the system may have started with honorable intentions, fraternities have become some of the most dangerous sites on campus. Andrew Lohse, a former member of Sigma Alpha Epsilon at Dartmouth, writes in 2015:====
10 -Andrew Lohse ~~former member of Sigma Alpha Epsilon at Dartmouth College and the author of "Confessions of an Ivy league Frat Boy"~~. Why fraternities need to be abolished. March 20, 2015. http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-fraternities-need-be-abolished. FZ.
8 +Andrew Lohse ~~former member of Sigma Alpha Epsilon at Dartmouth College and the author of "Confessions of an Ivy league Frat Boy"~~. Why fraternities need to be abolished. March 20, 2015. http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-fraternities-need-be-abolished.
11 11  The idea that Greek organizations can self-reform or self-regulate – especially on an issue as crucial as campus sexual assault – is as ludicrous as arguing that Goldman Sachs should run the SEC. After all, a much-cited 2007 study showed that fraternity members are 300 more likely to commit rape than non-affiliated students. This study wasn’t an outlier, but the third of its kind confirming the same data.
12 12  
13 13  ====The root cause of this issue is fraternities. Lohse continues:====
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14 14  How can we expect higher education to be a ladder of opportunity for all students if neither universities nor the federal government can ensure basic safety by eradicating the hostile environment that is privileged, perpetuated, and protected by these organizations? As a former member of Dartmouth College’s SAE – a house notorious for its foul hazing – I’ve witnessed how the hyper-masculine groupthink that supposedly builds a fraternity "brotherhood" is the same cult psychology that teaches young men to do things they’d never do on their own.
15 15  
16 16  ====Studies also prove that fraternities are home to extremely unhealthy practices antithetical to academic growth, including but not limited to binge drinking. Jake New, a reporter who specializes in on-campus subjects, writes in 2015:====
17 -Jake New. Bad Apples or The Barrel? April 15, 2015. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/15/how-widespread-are-issues-facing-fraternities. FZ.
15 +Jake New. Bad Apples or The Barrel? April 15, 2015. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/15/how-widespread-are-issues-facing-fraternities.
18 18  Another study published in the NASPA Journal in 2009 found that 86 percent of fraternity house residents engaged in binge drinking, compared to 45 percent of nonfraternity men. Fraternity members were twice as likely as nonfraternity men to fall behind in academic work, engage in unplanned sex or be injured due to drinking. Fraternity members were more likely to have unprotected sex, damage property and drive while under the influence of alcohol. Since 2005, at least 70 students have died in fraternity-related incidents, most of them connected to hazing and alcohol. "It's not just a stereotype," said George Koob, the director of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. "There’s pretty good evidence that fraternity individuals are drinking more, particularly in the heavy range of binge drinking. They have more problems associated with drinking."
19 19  
20 20  ====Ban on campus fraternities solves – even banning fraternity advertising alone is good. Jon Schuppe writes for NBC News in 2015:====
21 -Jon Schuppe. Fraternity Crackdown: Universities Are Clamping Down Hard, But Do Bans Work? March 10, 2015. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/scrutiny-fraternities-prompts-crackdowns-greek-life-n320211. FZ.
19 +Jon Schuppe. Fraternity Crackdown: Universities Are Clamping Down Hard, But Do Bans Work? March 10, 2015. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/scrutiny-fraternities-prompts-crackdowns-greek-life-n320211.
22 22  "If students are showing dangerous behavior or taking different types of risks, it's up to us to step in to try to grab their attention and say, 'This is unacceptable,'" said Corey Farris, dean of students at West Virginia University, which lifted its suspension in January after working with the fraternities to improve their codes of conduct. "I also think there's a cultural shift where society and parents are less tolerant of it. And people are more willing to step up and speak out."
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1 +====Counterplan text, resolved: Public colleges and universities in the united states ought not restrict any speech except for term papers produced by professionals who sell them to students who turn them in as original work for academic credit. DUKE clarifies competition:====
2 +Term Paper Companies and the Constitution, 1973 Duke Law Journal 1275-1317 (1974) Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol22/iss6/3
3 +The preparation and sale of term papers involves not only written communication but also "
4 +AND
5 +protection as magazines which contain "nothing of any possible value to society."
6 +
7 +====The prevalence of students buying term papers from professionals, using "ghostwriting services", is incredibly high, and is a significant problem even in highly respected fields such as medicine. David Tomar, a former ghostwriter, writes:====
8 +David A. Tomar. Detecting and Deterring Ghostwritten Papers: A Guide to Best Practices. http://www.thebestschools.org/resources/detecting-deterring-ghostwritten-papers-best-practices/~~#Prevalence. FZ.
9 +Before it is possible to prevent and police ghostwriting, one must understand the industry
10 +AND
11 +this: It is extremely easy for students to cheat using ghostwriting services.
12 +
13 +====Ghostwriting causes excessive medical prescription and drug dependence. McHenry 2010:====
14 +McHenry 10’-Leemon, "Of Sophists and Spin-Doctors: Industry-Sponsored Ghostwriting and the Crisis of Academic Medicine McHenry L," No Publication, http://msmonographs.org/article.asp?issn=0973-1229;year=2010;volume=8;issue=1;spage=129;epage=145;aulast=McHenry
15 +There is little doubt that the ghostwritten publications are meant to influence physicians' prescribing habits
16 +AND
17 +on and over-use of drugs (House of Commons, 2005).
18 +
19 +====Hundreds of thousands die from false reports made by ghostwriting.====
20 +Ellison No Date-, Shane xx-xx-xxxx, "How Big Pharma Lies To Doctors about The Medicine You are Taking," People's Chemist, https://thepeopleschemist.com/how-big-pharma-lies-to-doctors-about-the-medicine-you-are-taking/
21 +Following doctor’s orders has become synonymous with danger. In my book, Over-The-Counter Natural Cures, I documented that every year, FDA- approved drugs kill twice as many people as the total number of U.S. deaths from the Vietnam War. Death by medicine flourishes because deceit, not science, governs a doctor’s prescribing habits. Working as a pharmaceutical chemist, I learned that the deceit comes in many forms. Medical ghostwriting and checkbook ‘science’ are the most prominent. Doctors rely on peer-reviewed medical journals to learn about prescription drugs. These journals include the Lancet, British Medical Journal, New England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association. It’s assumed that these professional journals offer the hard science behind any given drug. This assumption is wrong. Thanks to medical ghost-writing, medical journals can’t be trusted. Medical ghostwriting is the practice of hiring Ph.D.s to crank out drug reports that hype benefits while hiding negative side effects. Once complete, drug companies recruit doctors to put their name on the report as the authors. These reports are then published in the above mentioned medical journals. The carrot for this deceitful practice is money and prestige. Ghostwriters can receive up to $20,000 per report. Doctors receive prestige from having been published. As deplorable as medical ghostwriting sounds, it is more common than you think. Dr. Jeffrey Drazen, editor for the New England Journal of Medicine, insists that he cannot find drug review authors who do not have financial ties to drug companies. Dr. David Healy, of the University of Wales, predicts that 50 of the journals drug review articles are written by ghostwriters hired by Big Pharma.
22 +
23 +====Universities must take a harsh stance against cheating in order to ensure that education remains valuable and ethical. Professor Thomas writes in 2015:====
24 +Adele Thomas ~~Prof of Management @ University of Johannesberg~~. Ghostwriters are Undermining Our Universities. August 22, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/ghost-writers-are-undermining-our-universities-364897. FZ.
25 +Universities exist to advance thought leadership and moral development in society. As such, their academics must be role models and must promote ethical behaviour within the academy. There should be a zero tolerance policy for academics who cheat~~ing~~. Extensive instruction should be provided to students about the pitfalls of cheating and they must be taught techniques to improve their academic writing skills. Universities must develop a culture of integrity and maintain this through ongoing dialogue about the values on which academia is based. They also need to develop institutional moral responsibility by really examining how student cheating is dealt with, confronting academics' resistance to reporting and dealing with such cheating, and taking a tough stand on student cheating. If this is done well then institutional values will become internalised and practised as the norm. Developing such cultures requires determined leadership at senior university levels.
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1 +ALL THE PEOPLE I PUT AS STRIKES AND GOT ANYWAYS
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1 +HARVARD WESTLAKE ALL OF THEM
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1 +Jan feb my college essay
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1 +Research is used to commodify pain narratives and damage representations to reproduce oppression with the justification of the academy
2 +Tuck and Yang 14 Eve, and K.W., 2014, “R-Words: Refusing Research.” In n D. Paris and M. T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing research: Decolonizing qualitative inquiry with youth and communities https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf
3 +Urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to posi-tion themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken.Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from com-munities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demon-strated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have cho-sen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).
4 +
5 +Reject the research of the aff in conjunction with the academy – it opens us to possibilities for change not coopted by academia
6 +Tuck and Yang, 04
7 +Eve (Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz. Earned her Ph.D.in Urban Education at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York in 2008) and K Wayne (Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley), “R-Words: Refusing Research, pg. 232-235, RSR
8 +One might ask what is meant by the academy, and by the academy being undeserving or unworthy of some stories or forms of knowledge. For some, the academy refers to institutions of research and higher education, and the individuals that inhabit them. For others, the term applies to the relationships between institutions of research and higher education, the nation-state, private and governmental funders, and all involved individuals. When we invoke the academy, or academe, we are invoking a community of practice that is focused upon the propagation and promulgation of (settler colonial) knowledge. Thus, when we say that there are some forms of knowledge that the academy does not deserve, it is because we have observed the academy as a community of practice that, as a whole: Stockpiles examples of injustice, yet will not make explicit a commitment to social justice Produces knowledge shaped by the imperatives of the nation-state, while claiming neutrality and universality in knowledge production Accumulates intellectual and financial capital, while informants give a part of themselves away Absorbs or repudiates competing knowledge systems, while claiming limitless horizons Like the previous axiom’s question—Why collect narratives of pain?—we ask nonrhetorically, what knowledges does the academy deserve? Beyond narratives of pain, there may be language, experiences, and wisdoms better left alone by social science. Paula Gunn Allen (1998) notes that for many Indigenous peoples, “a person is expected to know no more than is necessary, sufficient and congruent with their spiritual and social place” (p. 56). To apply this idea to the production of social science research, we might think of this as a differentiation between what is made public and what is kept sacred. Not everything, or even most things, uncovered in a research process need to be reported in academic journals or settings. Contrasting Indigenous relationships to knowledge with settler relationships to knowledge, Gunn Allen remarks, In the white world, information is to be saved and analyzed at all costs. It is not seen as residing in the minds and molecules of human beings, but as—dare I say it?— transcendent. Civilization and its attendant virtues of freedom and primacy depend on the accessibility of millions of megabytes of data; no matter that the data has lost its meaning by virtue of loss of its human context . . . the white world has a different set of values from the Indigenous world, one which requires learning all and telling all in the interests of knowledge, objectivity, and freedom. This ethos and its obverse—a nearly neurotic distress in the presence of secrets and mystery—underlie much of modern American culture (p. 59) As social science researchers, there are stories that are entrusted to us, stories that are told to us because research is a human activity, and we make meaningful relationships with participants in our work. At times we come to individuals and communities with promises of proper procedure and confidentiality-anonymity in hand, and are told, “Oh, we’re not worried about that; we trust you!” Or, “You don’t need to tell us all that; we know you will do the right thing by us.” Doing social science research is intimate work, worked that is strained by a tension between informants’ expectations that something useful or helpful will come from the divulging of (deep) secrets, and the academy’s voracious hunger for the secrets. This is not just a question of getting permission to tell a story through a signature on an IRB-approved participant consent form. Permission is an individualizing discourse—it situates collective wisdom as individual property to be signed away. Tissue samples, blood draws, and cheek swabs are not only our own; the DNA contained in them is shared by our relatives, our ancestors, our future generations (most evident when blood samples are misused as bounty for biopiracy.) This is equally true of stories. Furthermore, power is protected by such a collapse of ethics into litigation-proof relationships between individual and research institution. Power, which deserves the most careful scrutiny, will never sign such a permission slip.3 There are also stories that we overhear, because when our research is going well, we are really in peoples’ lives. Though it is tempting, and though it would be easy to do so, these stories are not simply y/ours to take. In our work, we come across stories, vignettes, moments, turns of phrase, pauses, that would humiliate participants to share, or are too sensationalist to publish. Novice researchers in doctoral and master’s programs are often encouraged to do research on what or who is most available to them. People who are underrepresented in the academy by social location—race or ethnicity, indigeneity, class, gender, sexuality, or ability—frequently experience a pressure to become the n/ Native informant, and might begin to suspect that some members of the academy perceive them as a route of easy access to communities that have so far largely eluded researchers. Doctoral programs, dissertations, and the master’s thesis process tacitly encourage novice researchers to reach for low-hanging fruit. These are stories and data that require little effort—and what we know from years and years of academic colonialism is that it is easy to do research on people in pain. That kind of voyeurism practically writes itself. “Just get the dissertation or thesis finished,” novice researchers are told. The theorem of lowhanging fruit stands for pretenured faculty too: “Just publish, just produce; research in the way you want to after tenure, later.” This is how the academy reproduces its own irrepressible irresponsibility. Adding to the complexity, many of us also bring to our work in the academy our family and community legacies of having been researched. As the researched, we carry stories from grandmothers’ laps and breaths, from below deck, from on the run, from inside closets, from exclaves. We carry the proof of oppression on our backs, under our fingernails; and we carry the proof of our survivance (Vizenor, 2008) in our photo boxes, our calluses, our wombs, our dreams. These stories, too, are not always ours to give away, though they are sometimes the very us of us. It needs to be said that we are not arguing for silence. Stories are meant to be passed along appropriately, especially among loved ones, but not all of them as social science research. Although such knowledge is often a source of wisdom that informs the perspectives in our writing, we do not intend to share them as social science research. It is enough that we know them.
9 +
10 +
11 +The 1AC’s scholarship is founded from a Euro-American standpoint – that kills any possibility for true change
12 +Barker and Murray, English Professors University of Birmingham, University of Leeds 10
13 +Clare Barker, Stuart Murray, Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies Volume 4, Number 3, 2010 “Disabling Postcolonialism: Global Disability Cultures and Democratic Criticism,†accessed 7-13-12 BC
14 +The majority of disability scholarship has emerged from traditions that emphasize local aspects of social application. In Europe and the U.K. especially, such work has stressed the processes of law and governance, with a resulting focus on such issues as community-based social services. In the U.S., where a discourse- and humanities-based model has played a greater part in the development of Disability Studies, it has nevertheless been the case that American examples have predominated. In both instances, there has been an understanding that such models may well have application in non-Euro-American contexts (claims for the social model, for example, assert that it can adapt to the local variants of other cultures), but there has been a singular lack of specificity as to the detail of such applications, especially as they might take into account the nature of cultures shaped by colonization and its consequences. It is this question of applicability that concerns us in this special issue. In aiming to develop strategies for postcolonial disability analysis, we aspire toward future scholarship in which the nuanced methods we find in much Euro-American-focused disability criticism are replicated in work on global disability.
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1 +Jan feb stop im not as photogenic as i look
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1 +Human rights only re-inscribe sovereign power, which inevitably produces bare life as its constitutive feature. Aff gives citizens the right to speak and even claims that doing so is power over the government.,
2 +Gundogdu 15 (Ayten, assistant professor of political science at Barnard University) “Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants” Oxford University Press, 2015 AT
3 +Giorgio Agamben makes a distinctive contribution to these contemporary debates by inquiring into the more inimical effects of a politics of human rights as he demonstrates how they participate in the production of lives that are irredeemably exposed to violence. Agamben locates the starting point of this troublesome development in modern rights declarations, which make natural life the foundation of the modern nation-state. As a result, every aspect of life becomes politicized and is subjected to sovereign power to an unprecedented degree. Sovereign decisions with regards to who is to be included in and excluded from citizenship and humanity produce various categories of human beings as "bare life," or life that is left at the threshold of politics and nature,law and life, right and fact, and as such, vulnerable to an unpunishable violence. Agamben concludes his critique with a call for a politics beyond human rights to sever the link that holds human life in the grip of sovereign power. This chapter turns to Agamben’s critical inquiry for two main reasons: First, in many ways, Agamben provides us with one of the most challenging and persuasive criticisms of the account of human rights analyzed in the previous chapter. As his starting point, he takes the contemporary plight of those who are turned into "unfortunate exceptions" in a progressively evolving system of human rights. Agamben centers on these figures to argue that their precarious condition is not anomalous; it is instead emblematic of the pervasive violence of sovereign politics that human rights are inextricably tied to. One of the questions that this chapter aims to address is the extent to which Agamben provides us with the main contours of the critical inquiry of human rights that the last chapter called for. Second, Agamben significantly draws on the work of Hannah Arendt. He is particularly interested in Arendfs attempts to read the pervasive condition of rightlessness encountered by stateless persons as symptomatic of the"perplexities,” or constitutive tensions, that have pervaded human rights since their early formulations in the eighteenth century declarations. Agamben ends up reading Arendt for the purposes of a critical inquiry calling for a politics beyond human rights. Since his reading is significantly different than the one I provide, a close engagement with his critical inquiry of human rights is crucial for preparing the groundwork for the interpretive analysis 1 undertake in the rest of the dissertation. With these two concerns in mind, this chapter aims to offer a critical evaluation of Agamben's inquiry into the underlying assumptions, constitutive terms, and political effects of human rights. My goal is not only to understand Agamben's distinctive intervention in the contemporary debates on human rights but also to inquire into the problematical aspects of his concluding call for a politics beyond human rights. I argue that this call is necessitated by a counternarralive of Western politics that ties human rights inextricably to the "logic" Agamben ascribes to biopolitical sovereignty. Within this stringent logic, any politics organized around human rights cannot help but reproduce sovereign violence. I show how this counternarrative, which aims to demystify or unveil all the myths that sustain sovereignty, ends up repeating what it identifies as the distinctive mythologizing gesture: rendering the contingent necessary. Agamben's conclusion that rights struggles eventually contribute to the further entrenchment of a biopolitical "logic," I argue, evades the possibility that rights, including human rights, can indeed be reclaimed in inventive and unanticipated ways by various groups who are excluded from the prevailing definitions of their constitutive terms (e.g. "man" and "citizen") and yet who can dispute their exclusion by resignifying these terms in imaginative ways. Agamben provides us with significant insights into how thecontemporary predicament of several categories of non-citizens shed light on the constitutive terms, underlying assumptions, and political effects of human rights. However, his imposition of a biopolitical "logic" on sovereignty and human rights is no less problematical than the assumption of evolutionary temporality in the scholarly accounts discussed in the previous chapter. Bare Life at the Intersection of Biopower and Sovereignty Giorgio Agamben's critical inquiry of sovereignly and human rights counters the tempting move that turns refugees, along with asylum-seekers, undocumented migrants, and other disadvantaged groups of non-citizens, into anomalous cases in a progressively evolving system of human rights. Agamben centers his critique on these marginalized figures. Indeed, takes the refugee as a "limit concept" revealing the crises of the traditional political-juridical categories, including sovereignty, citizenship, and human rights (Agamben 1098. 134; 2000, 16). Drawing on Hannah Arendfs analysis of twentieth-century statelessness, Agamben argues that whenever refugees can no longer be represented as individual cases and become a "mass phenomenon," international organizations have failed to provide a solution to their plight despite all the declarations of inalienable human rights (1998, 133; 2000, 19). Agamben's critical inquiry also poses a challenge to the conventional explanation of this incapacity - i.e. implementation or enforcement deficit, which denotes a gap that will be slowly but surely closed as the currently imperfect practice will gradually meet the ideal state embodied by human rights norms - that appears in the scholarship discussed in Chapter 1. Agamben argues that the incapacity to address and resolve therefugee problem effectively cannot be understood merely in terms of "the selfishness and blindness of bureaucratic apparatuses" (Agamben 2000, 19). In other words, it is not merely the flawed individual practices of states or international organizations that constitute the problem. Drawing on Arendt's critical analysis of the "perplexities of the Rights of Man," which will be analyzed at length in the next chapter, Agamben argues that the problem instead lies in the "'very ambiguity of the fundamental notions regulating the inscription of the native (that is of life) in the juridical order of the nation-state" (Agamben 2000, 19). This argument strikes a blow against the widely shared assumption that the problem is one of implementation, and draws our attention to the ambiguities,paradoxes, and constitutive tensions, or "perplexities" to use Arendt's term, at the heart of human rights. Finally, Agamben's account also challenges the prevailing conception of human rights as normative setbacks to sovereignty that underlies the major arguments of the scholarship discussed in the previous chapter: "It is time to stop regarding declarations of rights as proclamations of eternal, metajuridical values binding the legislator (in fact, without much success) to respect eternal ethical principles, and to begin to consider them according to their real historical function in the modern nation-state" (Agamben 1998, 127). Warning against the temptation to read the post-1945 ascendancy of human rights as a sign heralding a postnational order, Agamben instead underlines that human rights have been inextricably intertwined with the nation-state (and its biopolitical sovereignty) from their early origins in the eighteenth century declarations. These rights do not work against sovereignty, Agamben contends; they instead reinscribe it in new ways. To understand how Agamben links human rights to sovereignty and biopolitics, we need to understand what he exactly means by these two terms. Below I outline themain contours of Agamben's analysis of biopolitical sovereignty to provide the groundwork for a discussion of his arguments regarding the complicity of human rights in the perpetuation and augmentation of sovereign violence. Agamben, particularly in his Homo Sacer, argues that sovereignty consists in a decision over life and that this decision always produces bare lives that can be irredeemably exposed to violence. To understand the insidious effects of a power that centers on decisions over life, Agamben draws on the work of Michel Foucault (1998, 3). Of particular interest for his purposes is Foucault's contention that biopower historicallysucceeds sovereignty and emerges in the modern era with the increasing inclusion of natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of state power. Contra Foucault, Agamben argues that biopower is not a distinctively modern form of power but is always already implicated in sovereignty. It is the type of power at work not only in modern democracies but also in absolute monarchies. To the extent that sovereignty, in its archaic and modern forms, always consists in a decision on life, it is indeed inseparable from biopower. Agamben argues that Foucault's failure to analyze the ways in which these two forms of power have always interacted with each other is a "blind spot" or a "vanishing point" in his theory (1998, 6).22 It is this theoretical contestation that provides the starting point for Agamben's inquiry of the intersection between juridico-institutional power and biopower. Agamben starts off his analysis with the premise that "the production of a biopolitical body is the originary activity of sovereign exception" (1998, 6; emphasis in the original). As he works on this premise, he leaves aside Foucault's genealogy, and optsinstead for a formal-logical analysis that aims to delineate what is always already biopohtical in the permanent structure of sovereignty throughout Western politics. To do this, he draws on Carl Schmitt \s definition of sovereignty as the decision on the exception (Agamben 1998, 19, 67, 83; Schmitt 2005, 5). For both Agamben and Schmitt, sovereignty has a paradoxical logic: "I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law" (Agamben 1998, 15). This paradoxical structure of sovereignty can be particularly seen in states of exception when the sovereign can suspend the validity of positive law (Agamben 1998. 15). Agamben underlines the ambivalent relationship that the sovereign has to law in deciding on the exception: On the one hand, the sovereign suspends the legal order and thus can be said to be existing outside it; on the other hand, the sovereign still belongs to the legal order in this extraordinary moment since the order itself presupposes and inscribes this suspension as its very condition of possibility (1998, 15-17).": To underscore the second point, we can think of the constitutional clauses that attribute the sovereign a (constitutional) power to suspend the legal order. From Agamben's Schmittian perspective, this impossibility to locate the sovereign exception either inside or outside the legal order reveals the limits of any analysis that aims to fix the location of sovereignty according to the "topographical opposition (inside/outside)" (Agamben 2005, 23). Sovereignty instead needs to be understood as a "limit-concept" denoting both the constitutive principle and boundary of the juridico-political order (1998, 15). As the boundary of the juridico-political order, itpoints to a gray zone between law and fact at the very origins of this order. As the constitutive principle of this order, it denotes a fundamental activity through which the very space in which the juridico-political order can have any validity is created and defined (1998, 19). Only on the basis of such a fundamental activity, which involves the "ordering of space," the topological categories of inside and outside, defining what is to be included in and excluded from the juridico-political order, acquire their meaning (1998, 19). By highlighting the paradoxical nature of sovereignty as manifested in states of exception, Agamben aims to challenge particularly liberal-normative accounts of sovereignty that aim to ground its law-making and law-preserving powers in generalizable norms. He would include, for example, the scholarly account of human rights discussed in Chapter 1 among such attempts to normatively ground and contain sovereign decision. He instead underscores the exteriority or factuality that grounds and animates the sovereign law and escapes any such normative attempt. To understand the relation between sovereign law and this exteriority. Agamben turns to the etymologicalorigins of ""exception.'' Exception literally means ""taken outside (ex-capere)." This etymology indicates that sovereign exception is not merely exclusion: it is more precisely an "inclusive exclusion," which signifies a double movement - maintaining or capturing at the very moment of excluding (1998, 21). On the basis of this etymology, Agamben argues that the logic of sovereignty consists in capturing and taking in what is outside of or exterior to the juridico-political order. What is this "exteriority" or "factuality" that is captured in sovereign law? This question is indeed key to Agamben's inquiry of the intersection between biopolitics andactivities of the political association (1998, 7). In the context of the Greek polis, Agamben"s analysis would suggest, polis can only be constituted on the basis of the constitutive exclusion of women and slaves, among others. It is this biopolitical division of political and natural life that always produces remainders and turns certain categories of living beings into "bare life” ' Bare life is neither simple natural life of zoe nor politically qualified life of bios (1998, 90, 106, 109); rather it is a life that is left at the threshold of these two, dwelling in a "zone of indistinction" and marking a "continuous transition between man and beast, nature and culture" (1998, 109). The production of bare life constitutes the foundation of Western politics and metaphysics, according to Agamben. In both individual and collective terms, sovereignty consists in separating a "natural" life that will be set in opposition to a "political" way of life.26 Since it is this originary exclusion that founds, sustains, and defines the political community, Agamben uses the term "inclusive exclusion," reminding us again of the etymological origins of "exception," to describe the relationship between bare life and political life (1998, 7). By arguing that the "inclusive exclusion" of life has been the permanent characteristic of biopolitical sovereignty, Agamben contests Foucault and argues that the novelty of modern biopolitics consists neither in the inclusion of zoe in the political sphere nor in the fact that politics is concerned with life (Agamben 1998. 9). What is the distinctive nature of modern power, however, if not, as Foucault suggests, the inclusion of natural life in mechanisms and calculations of state power? Agamben argues that with modernity the meaning of politics goes through a dramatic transformation, as natural life, which was confined to the sphere of the oikos in the classical world, becomes the foundation of politics. Healing the biopolitical fracture between political and natural life becomes the distinctive goal of modern democracies, which dedicate themselves to the task of "vindication and liberation of zoe' (1998, 9). However, in doing this, modern democracies end up subjecting every aspect of life to sovereign power and turn each political subject virtually into bare life (1998, 111). As a result of this unprecedented politicization of life, what was exceptional bare life becomes the rule and can no longer be contained in a state of exception (1998, 9). What was relegated to oikos in the ancient world, in other words, comes to dwell in the polis. Agamben attributes a significant role to some modern juridico-political innovations such as habeas corpus and declarations of rights in this major historical transformation, and it is to these I now turn to discuss Agamben's distinctive contribution to contemporary debates on human rights.
4 +
5 +By its very existence, law can be suspended by the sovereign, who is outside the law – it is impossible for even the strictest of laws to restrict sovereign power Agamben 98 bracketed for gendered language
6 + (Giorgio, prof of philosophy at univ of Verona) “HOMO SACER: Sovereign Power and Bare Life” available online. All parantheses except those modifying gendered language in original. *we don’t endorse gendered language AT
7 +Juridical = relating to the administration of law
8 +1.1 The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order. If the sovereign is truly the one to whom the juridical order grants the power of proclaiming a state of exception and, therefore, of suspending the order’s own validity, then “the sovereign stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, since it is up to it him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended in toto” (Schmitt, Politische Theologie, p. 13). The specification that the sovereign is “at the same time outside and inside the juridical order” (emphasis added) is not insignificant: the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places itself himself outside the law. This means that the paradox can also be formulated this way: “the law is outside itself,” or: “I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law che non ce unfiiori legge.” The topology implicit in the paradox is worth reflecting upon, since the degree to which sovereignty marks the limit (in the double sense of end and principle) of the juridical order will become clear only once the structure of the paradox is grasped. Schmitt presents this structure as the structure of the exception (Ausnahme): The exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it simultaneously reveals a specifically juridical formal element: the decision in absolute purity. The exception appears in its absolute form when it is a question of creating a situation in which juridical rules can be valid. Every general rule demands a regular, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is submitted to its regulations. The rule requires a homogeneous medium. This factual regularity is not merely an “external presupposition” that the jurist can ignore; it belongs, rather, to the rule’s immanent validity. There is no rule that is applicable to chaos. Order must be established for juridical order to make sense. A regular situation must be created, and sovereign is he who definitely decides if this situation is actually effective. All law is “situational law.” The sovereign creates and guarantees the situation as a whole in its totality. He has the monopoly over the final decision. Therein consists the essence of State sovereignty, which must therefore be properly juridically defined not as the monopoly to sanction or to rule but as the monopoly to decide, where the word “monopoly” is used in a general sense that is still to be developed. The decision reveals the essence of State authority most clearly. Here the decision must be distinguished from the juridical regulation, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves itself not to need law to create law. . . . The exception is more interesting than the regular case. The latter proves nothing; the exception proves everything. The exception does not only confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone. A Protestant theologian who demonstrated the vital intensity of which theological reflection was still capable in the nineteenth century said: “The exception explains the general and itself. And when one really wants to study the general, one need only look around for a real exception. It brings everything to light more clearly than the general itself. After a while, one becomes disgusted with the endless talk about the general – there are exceptions. If they cannot be explained, then neither can the general be explained. Usually the difficulty is not noticed, since the general is thought about not with passion but only with comfortable superficiality. The exception, on the other hand, thinks the general with intense passion.” (Politische Theologie, pp. 19-22) It is not by chance that in defining the exception Schmitt refers to the work of a theologian (who is none other than Søren Kierkegaard). Giambattista Vico had, to be sure, affirmed the superiority of the exception, which he called “the ultimate configuration of facts,” over positive law in a way which was not so dissimilar: “An esteemed jurist is, therefore, not someone who, with the help of a good memory, masters positive law or the general complex of laws, but rather someone who, with sharp judgment, knows how to look into cases and see the ultimate circumstances of facts that merit equitable consideration and exceptions from general rules” (De antiquissima, chap. 2). Yet nowhere in the realm of the juridical sciences can one find a theory that grants such a high position to the exception. For what is at issue in the sovereign exception is, according to Schmitt, the very condition of possibility of juridical rule and, along with it, the very meaning of State authority. Through the state of exception, the sovereign “creates and guarantees the situation” that the law needs for its own validity. But what is this “situation,” what is its structure, such that it consists in nothing other than the suspension of the rule? The Vichian opposition between positive Law (ins theticum) and exception well expresses the particular status of the exception. The exception is an element in law that transcends positive law in the form of its suspension. The exception is to positive law what negative theology is to positive theology. While the latter affirms and predicates determinate qualities of God, negative (or mystical) theology, with its “neither ... nor ... ,” negates and suspends the attribution to God of any predicate whatsoever. Yet negative theology is not outside theology and can actually be shown to function as the principle grounding the possibility in general of anything like a theology. Only because it has been negatively presupposed as what subsists outside any possible predicate can divinity become the subject of a predication. Analogously, only because its validity is suspended in the state of exception can positive law define the normal case as the realm of its own validity.
9 +This outweighs A) This turns the aff because their policy will always grant power to the militaristic state, making it only increase the amount of violence in society. B) This functions as terminal defense because the violence will never be solved by the aff because the root cause of violence in the state is the state itself. So long as the state exists so will violence. C) Means the sovereign can override any action universities take as seen in segregation cases historically that’s terminal defense since the state will just repeat whatever you do,
10 +
11 +Excluding some life is innate to politics, so political solutions only make the problem worse. Biopolitics brings bare, biological life into the political realm, managing citizens as living bodies or bare life – this makes unlimited and escalating violence inevitable
12 +Ziarek 12 (Ewa Plonowska, Julian Park Professor of Comparative Literature) “9. Bare Life” Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 2 AT
13 +For Agamben, bare life constitutes the original but “concealed nucleus” of Western biopolitics in so far as its exclusion founds the political realm. Bare life is always already captured by the political in a double way: first, in the form of the exclusion from the polis—it is included in the political in the form of exclusion—and, second, in the form of the unlimited exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime. Thus, the most fundamental categories of Western politics are not the social contract, or the friend and the enemy, but bare life and sovereign power (7–8). As Agamben’s broad outline of the political genealogy suggests, the position and the political function of bare life changes historically. This genealogy begins with the most distant memory and the first figuration of bare life expressed in ancient Roman law by the obscure notion of homo sacer—that is, the notion of the banned man who can be killed with impunity by all but is unworthy of either juridical punishment or religious sacrifice. Neither the condemned criminal nor the sacrificial scapegoat, and thus outside the human and divine law, homo sacer is the target of sovereign violence exceeding the force of law and yet anticipated and authorized by that law. Banished from collectivity, he is the referent of the sovereign decision on the state of exception, which both confirms and suspends the normal operation of the law. In Agamben’s genealogy, the major shift in the politicization of bare life occurs in modernity. With the mutation of sovereignty into biopower, bare life ceases to be the excluded outside of the political but in fact becomes its inner hidden norm: bare life “gradually begins to coincide with the political realm” (9). However, this inclusion and distribution of bare life within the political does not mean its integration with political existence; rather, it is a disjunctive inclusion of the inassimilable remnant, which still remains the target of sovereign violence. As Agamben argues, “Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoe and bios” (11). In contrast to the ancient ban, or the inclusive exclusion from the political, a new form of disjunctive inclusion of bare life within the polis emerges with modern democracies. In democratic regimes this hidden incorporation of bare life both into the political realm and into the structure of citizenship manifests itself, according to Agamben, as the inscription of “birth” within human rights—an inscription that establishes a dangerous link between citizenship, nation, and biological kinship. As the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims, men do not become equal by virtue of their political association but are “born and remain” equal. Democratic citizens are thus bearers of both bare life and human rights, they are at the same time the targets of disciplinary power and free democratic subjects. In a political revision of Foucault’s formulation of modern subjectivity as “empirico-transcendental” doublet, 4 Agamben argues that the modern citizen is “a two-faced being, the bearer both of subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties (Agamben, 1998, 125). The democratic subject of rights is thus characterized by the aporia between political freedom and the subjection of mere life, without a clear distinction, mediation, or reconciliation between them. Since bare life is included within Western democracies as their hidden inner ground and as such cannot mark their borders, modern politics is about the search for new racialized and gendered targets of exclusion, for the new living dead (130). In our own times, such targets multiply with astonishing speed and infiltrate bodies down to the cellular level: from refugees, illegal immigrants, inmates on death row subject to suicide watch, comatose patients on life support, to organ transplants and fetal stem cells. For Agamben, this inclusion of bare life within the bodies of each citizen becomes catastrophically apparent with the reversal of the democratic state into totalitarian regimes at the beginning of the 20th century. As the disasters of fascism and soviet totalitarianism demonstrate, and as the continuous histories of genocide show, by suspending political forms of life, totalitarian regimes can reduce whole populations to disposable bare life that could be destroyed with impunity. This is what according to Agamben constitutes the unprecedented horror of Nazi concentration camps: the extreme destitution and degradation of human life to bare life subject to mass extermination: “Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation” (171). If Agamben controversially claims that camps are not just the extreme aberration of modernity but its “fundamental biopolitical paradigm” (181), which shows the “thanatopolitical face”of power (142, 150), it is because concentration camps for the first time actualize the danger implicit in Western politics, namely, the total genocide made possible by the reversal of the exception signified by homo sacer into a new thanato-political norm. Such collapse of the distinction between exception and norm, such transformation of the temporal exception into material space, together with the “absolute” and unmediated subjection of life to death, constitutes the “supreme” political principle of genocide.
14 +The impact outweighs:
15 +A. Root cause – Bare life is the root cause of violence – people are inevitably exposed to violence when they are bare life which makes mass death inevitable
16 +B. Value to Life – bare life devalues life itself – this makes every life the aff saves totally meaningless – they can’t win an impac
17 +C. EXTINCTION ZIZEC SAYS ESCALATING VIOLENCE
18 +
19 +The alt is Rejection of the 1AC's BIOPOLITICAL representations of the state it allows us to access “whatever being” – a form of existence that is relevant whatever it is – this abolishes the separation of bare and qualified life which solves – every instance of rejection is key, which is a disad to any permutation
20 +Caldwell 4 (Anne, prof of poli-sci @ U of Louisville, Theory and Event, vol 7(2))
21 +Can we imagine another form of humanity, and another form of power? The bio-sovereignty described by Agamben is so fluid as to appear irresistible. Yet Agamben never suggests this order is necessary. Bio-sovereignty results from a particular and contingent history, and it requires certain conditions. Sovereign power, as Agamben describes it, finds its grounds in specific coordinates of life, which it then places in a relation of indeterminacy. What defies sovereign power is a life that cannot be reduced to those determinations: a life "that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life. " (2.3). In his earlier Coming Community, Agamben describes this alternative life as "whatever being." More recently he has used the term "forms-of-life." These concepts come from the figure Benjamin proposed as a counter to homo sacer: the "total condition that is 'man'." For Benjamin and Agamben, mere life is the life which unites law and life. That tie permits law, in its endless cycle of violence, to reduce life an instrument of its own power. The total condition that is man refers to an alternative life incapable of serving as the ground of law. Such a life would exist outside sovereignty. Agamben's own concept of whatever being is extraordinarily dense. It is made up of varied concepts, including language and potentiality; it is also shaped by several particular dense thinkers, including Benjamin and Heidegger. What follows is only a brief consideration of whatever being, in its relation to sovereign power. "Whatever being," as described by Agamben, lacks the features permitting the sovereign capture and regulation of life in our tradition. Sovereignty's capture of life has been conditional upon the separation of natural and political life. That separation has permitted the emergence of a sovereign power grounded in this distinction, and empowered to decide on the value, and non-value of life (1998: 142). Since then, every further politicization of life, in turn, calls for "a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only 'sacred life,' and can as such be eliminated without punishment" (p. 139). This expansion of the range of life meriting protection does not limit sovereignty, but provides sites for its expansion. In recent decades, factors that once might have been indifferent to sovereignty become a field for its exercise. Attributes such as national status, economic status, color, race, sex, religion, geo-political position have become the subjects of rights declarations. From a liberal or cosmopolitan perspective, such enumerations expand the range of life protected from and serving as a limit upon sovereignty. Agamben's analysis suggests the contrary. If indeed sovereignty is bio-political before it is juridical, then juridical rights come into being only where life is incorporated within the field of bio-sovereignty. The language of rights, in other words, calls up and depends upon the life caught within sovereignty: homo sacer. Agamben's alternative is therefore radical. He does not contest particular aspects of the tradition. He does not suggest we expand the range of rights available to life. He does not call us to deconstruct a tradition whose power lies in its indeterminate status.21 Instead, he suggests we take leave of the tradition and all its terms. Whatever being is a life that defies the classifications of the tradition, and its reduction of all forms of life to homo sacer. Whatever being therefore has no common ground, no presuppositions, and no particular attributes. It cannot be broken into discrete parts; it has no essence to be separated from its attributes; and it has no common substrate of existence defining its relation to others. Whatever being cannot then be broken down into some common element of life to which additive series of rights would then be attached. Whatever being retains all its properties, without any of them constituting a different valuation of life (1993: 18.9). As a result, whatever being is "reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) ~-~- and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself." (0.1-1.2).Indifferent to any distinction between a ground and added determinations of its essence, whatever being cannot be grasped by a power built upon the separation of a common natural life, and its political specification. Whatever being dissolves the material ground of the sovereign exception and cancels its terms. This form of life is less post-metaphysical or anti-sovereign, than a-metaphysical and a-sovereign. Whatever is indifferent not because its status does not matter, but because it has no particular attribute which gives it more value than another whatever being. As Agamben suggests, whatever being is akin to Heidegger's Dasein. Dasein, as Heidegger describes it, is that life which always has its own being as its concern ~-~- regardless of the way any other power might determine its status. Whatever being, in the manner of Dasein, takes the form of an "indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold" (Agamben 1998: 153).We should pay attention to this comparison. For what Agamben suggests is that whatever being is not any abstract, inaccessible life, perhaps promised to us in the future. Whatever being, should we care to see it, is all around us, wherever we reject the criteria sovereign power would use to classify and value life. "In the final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity ~-~- even that of a State identity within the State . . . What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without a representable condition of belonging" (Agamben 1993:85.6). At every point where we refuse the distinctions sovereignty and the state would demand of us, the possibility of a non-state world, made up of whatever life, appears.
22 +Alt solves the case – whatever-being cannot be reduced to bare life, which makes violence against it impossible – without bare life, economic violence and denial of access to basic needs becomes impossible- and the alt means if they win no link the alt doesnt do anything bc there's nothing to reject
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1 +ALL THE PEOPLE I PUT AS STRIKES AND GOT ANYWAYS
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1 +HARVARD WESTLAKE ALL OF THEM
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1 +8
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1 +Palo Alto Independent Fee Neg
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1 +JAN FEB stop there are even more cameras
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1 +BACKFILING

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