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+The affirmative attempts to prove the resolution TRUE by arguing that we ought to take the resolutional action and justifies this by appealing to a specific notion of morality in and of itself. This is a fool’s errand: words and linguistic signs only have meanings that we assign to them, but that assignment cannot represent things in themselves since all experiences of things are of particular characteristics which are forgotten when the word becomes a general idea. Friedrich Nietzsche writes: |
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+Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense”, in Literary Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed., Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford (2004). originally published 1873. p. 263. I reject the gendered language in this card. |
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+Let us still … the things themselves. |
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+A claim to morality is at bottom a valuation of some act as preferable to another. In doing so, by designating certain actions as correct, morality attempts to guide us toward one option and forcefully eliminate alternative options as morally impermissible. Nietzsche 2 explains the necessity of domination that underlies morality: |
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+Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann. p. 168. I reject the gendered language in this card. |
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+"When you have … the general good.” |
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+Since systems of virtue like morality dissuade persons from ostensibly immoral acts by denying their validity, so morality is grounded in a denial in the value of others. Through its privileging rules, systematic morality seeks to control thinking by constantly denying the value of certain acts, Nietzsche 3: |
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+Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. In Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. The Modern Library Classics: New York 2000. pp. 472-3. I reject the gendered language in this card. |
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+"The slave revolt … is fundamentally reaction." |
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+Restrictions on civil liberties mandate that individuals sacrifice their freedom for the sake of a nebulous “greater good.” Robert Nozick shows how mandating such sacrifices constitutes a denial of the individual’s moral capacity: |
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+Robert Nozick, Professor @ Harvard, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 32. I reject the gendered language in this card. |
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+"Side constraints express … between its citizens." |