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	1	+The AC’s idea of full freedom of speech and expression is a form of ableism that disabled bodies cannot access.
	2	+Hirschmann 7 - Hirschmann, Nancy J., and Kirstie M. McClure, eds. Feminist Interpretations of John Locke. United States: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. Print.
	3	+This is the dominant model presumed by many philosophers who write on disability, and even more by those who write on freedom. In particular it is an accepted view of contemporary theories of freedom that freedom presupposes ability. Richard Flathman offers the standard example: we are not able “to jump, unaided, twenty-five feet straight up from the surface of the earth, to develop gills instead of or in addition to lungs… Few if any of us decide to stand upright, to walk by moving first one foot and then the other, or to see figures three-dimensionally.” What humans are able to do determines the context for freedom, for even thinking about freedom is conduct within these general facts.
	4	+Exposure to hate speech undermines student mental health.
	5	+Ford 14 - Ford, Zack. “Exposure to hate speech on Facebook undermines users’ mental health.” Think Progress. ThinkProgress, 2 Sept. 2014. Web. 12 July 2016.
	6	+A new study from Italy finds that social networking sites like Facebook have a negative impact on individuals’ mental well-being, as well as their levels of social trust, because of their exposure to hate speech and other offensive content. Researchers at Rome’s Sapienza University and the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg analyzed a wide representative sample o,f 50,000 Italian citizens, assessing how much they interacted with social media and how they rated their happiness and self-esteem. Those who used sites like Facebook more often tended to have stronger relationships with people they were connected to, but lower social trust because of the strangers they interacted with in venues like comment threads. The researchers note that “there is a tendency for people to assume that their own opinions, beliefs, preferences, values, and habits are ‘normal’ and that others also think the same way that they do.” In online networks, however, exposure to a greater diversity of ideas may cause individuals to realize they are “surrounded with preference types they dislike (e.g. a racist person may find out that most people appreciate ethnic diversity, or vise versa).” For example, “tolerant users may easily find themselves to interact with unknown, racist or homophobic readers in a ‘public’ page,” which can turn into a “powerful source of frustration and distrust.” The study notes that the high risk of being targeted with offensive behaviors and hate speech is “particularly significant for womyn and users belonging to minorities or discriminated groups.” This is exacerbated by the fact that online discussions do not obey “the same social norms usually acknowledged in physical interactions.” Because strangers’ reactions are “invisible,” the study suggests, “people care less of the risk of offending others in a conversation.” That’s why “in online interactions, dealing with strangers who advance opposite views in an aggressive and insulting way seems to be a widespread practice.” This risk of worsening people’s trust in others in turn has an impact on people’s life satisfaction. The researchers recommend that Facebook do more to moderate content and create avenues for feedback and review to hold accountable those proliferating offensive, hurtful, or hateful speech. A recent study of how young people are using social networking found that LGBT youth turn to the internet to find social support, but it also opens them to cyberbullying. LGBT young people were nearly three times as likely (42 percent vs. 15 percent) to experience cyberbullying, especially in rural areas. Back in 2012, Facebook rolled out a series of new tools to assist users who encounter cyberbullying, but it remains unclear how effectively the site has been at moderating content.
	7	+Hate speech forces negative perceptions on cultural AND handicapped minorities causing a lower psychological state
	8	+Smith 4 - Smith, Craig. “Circumventing the ‘True Threat’ Standard in Campus Hate Speech Codes.” The center for First amendment studies CSULB. 2004. Web. 12 July 2016.
	9	+Words can reinforce and/or maintain social inequality in the home, in the classroom, in the workplace, and in social settings. Hate messages are real and immediate for victims. In her article in the Miami Law Review, Professor Patricia Williams called hate messages "spirit murder."3 According to research completed by professors Kitano and Allport, the effects of hate speech include displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, withdrawal, alcoholism, and suicide. The special report of the Attorney General of California 1988 demonstrates that epithets and harassment "often cause deep emotional scarring and bring feelings of intimidation and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim's life." In his book Words that Wound, Professor Delgado demonstrates that hate speech victims suffer High Blood Pressure and loss of self-worth. In the Journal of Social Psychiatry, Professor Hafner demonstrates that psychological disturbances including headaches, social withdrawal, depression, and anxiety attacks result from working or learning in a hostile environment. Other reports clearly demonstrate that hate speech results in feelings of ethnic or gender inferiority. In the Journal of Experimental Sociology (1985), Greenberg and Pysczynski Piszynski demonstrate that overhearing a racist slur causes the listener to evaluate members of the slurred group more harshly in the future. Hostile environments trigger avoidance strategies that limit personal freedom and have serious economic consequences. Students who are victims of hate speech often avoid classes and other places of hate speech such as food courts and libraries. Their grades then suffer along with their socialization into a healthy diverse community. According to Lieberson, Stereotypes: The Consequences for Race and Ethnic Interaction in Marrett and Leggon, eds (1985) Research on Race and Ethnic Relations).
	10	+Ableism is a method of oppression that permeates all forms of discrimination – categorization based on normative biological standards justifies every form of discrimination and violence.
	11	+Siebers 9 Tobin Siebers (Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan), “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, 10/28/9, Lecture, http://disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/lecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc
	12	+Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.
	13	+The alt is to embrace vulnerability as a counter strategy for disabled bodies
	14	+ Goggin 9 - Goggin, G., Disability, Media, and the Politics of Vulnerability, Asia Paci c Media Educator, 19, 2009,
	15	+1-13.
	16	+Available at:h p://ro.uow.edu.au/apme/vol1/iss19/2
	17	+I have argued that conceptions of vulnerability and media remain problematic and narrow, and fail to grasp the conditions of media. In relation to disability and media, vulnerability is even more problematic, because it encapsulates a highly politicised and potentially oppressive account of disability — that misrecognises the social relations of disability and the construction of media helps constitute these. Should we just cast vulnerability aside, in favour of other operative concepts? Actually, I think not. There is an important revaluing and radical turn in vulnerability that critical accounts of disability allow us to recognise. Disability teaches us — and my relationships with friends, colleagues, and associates with disability have taught me personally — that vulnerability is enormously important, because it goes to the heart of what it is to be human.The dif culty has been that disability is marked out as the abnormal, the problem, the lack, and, in this case, the vulnerable.The non-disabled, the normate, and the ordinary is coded as unmarked, an operation of powerful differentiation we are familiar with from critical race, sexuality, gender, and whiteness studies (Goggin and Newell, 2005). Once we recognise that the centre, the normal, the masculine is only phantasmally invulnerable — constitutionally not admitting to weakness — then we can proceed to knowingly trace the operations of vulnerability. Here I am informed by the work of various disability studies scholars, including Michelle Jarman, who proposes: a transgressive reading of vulnerability which not only critiques these discursive practices of disability, but also understands vulnerability as a radical element in forging cross-identity, cross-cultural alliances committed to exposing and interrogating the ways western values become inscribed upon the bodies of ‘Third World’ subjects (Jarman, 2005: 108). Jarman draws upon the important work of another disability studies scholar, Margrit Shildrick, whose important study of the monstrous is premised on a critique of the ‘self-possession’ that underpins Western notions of the self — and the formulation of an alternative ethics of embracing, rather than disavowing, the vulnerable self (Shildrick 2000 and 2002). More recently,Angharad Beckett has presented a new model of ‘active citizenship’ based upon an account of ‘vulnerable personhood’ (Beckett 2006). Conclusion While there is a developed body of work on disability and vulnerability, I would suggest there is much work ahead in bringing this to bear on media — and also
	18	+using new work in media and journalism studies to better conceptualise the cultural dimensions of this. Space only permits brief concluding remarks to indicate what I see as useful directions here. In journalism, then, the idea of vulnerable subjectivity and the kinds of active citizenship that can be predicated upon it would allow us to acknowledge the vulnerability in journalists, as well as particular kinds of sources and audiences historically approached as vulnerable.This is the value of this special issue, it seems to me — because it pluralises and proliferates the gures of the vulnerable.And in 10 Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009 Asia Paci c Media Educator paying such attention to this, opens the way for us to better understand and recast relationships among these cardinal points of contemporary media. Such recognition of the politics of vulnerability allows us to nd new strategies
	19	+to rethink and improve the relationships in which media is constructed, as well as reforming the institutions and organisations which still wield much power over media producers, consumers and audiences alike. Disability scholars and activists also offer
	20	+an ethics of engagement, which can be enormously fruitful too.A sharpened sense of vulnerability can help us to draw upon, critique and reformulate the work on trauma, mental illness, grieving, and other concepts that have gured in media and journalism research and practice. Research on an expanded concept of vulnerability and how
	21	+this takes shape through media, is likely to lead to contributions to the debates and questioning with disability studies and movements about accepted forms of identity and expression — and how these can themselves lead to new forms of exclusion (Goggin and Newell 2005; Shakespeare 2006; Matthews 2008). As Ellis reminds us, for instance,‘pain and exclusion are very real aspects of the lives of people with disability and this must be acknowledged within any model that purports to empower this group’ (Ellis 2009). With a renewed, reoriented concern for questions of voice and representation comes too a new emphasis on the importance of listening (Goggin 2009), acknowledgement and collaboration — all of which promise to see better media springing from a much wider and deeper notions of vulnerability, which comprehends the broken, fragile, and still hopeful nature of whom we are.
	22	+The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best challenges structural oppression.
	23	+Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension – culminates in Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
	24	+Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 4¶ (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)¶ (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
	25	+This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

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