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1		-2017-01-27 03:38:45.660
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Caselist.CitesClass[3]

Cites

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	1	+The Affirmative’s portrayal of the racial Other is intimately tied to processes of violent biological colonialism. ‘Benign’ representations of difference necessitate attempts to purify racial identity.
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	3	+Antonio Hardt, Prof of Lit @ Duke, and Michael Negri, Indi Researcher, Empire, 2000
	4	+In the logic of colonialist representations, the construction of a separate colonized other and the segregation of identity and alterity turns out paradoxically to be at once absolute and extremely intimate. The process consists, in fact, of two moments that are dialectically related. In the first moment difference has to be pushed to the extreme. In the colonial imaginary the colonized is not simply an other banished outside the realm of civilization; rather, it is grasped or produced as Other, as the absolute negation, as the most distant point on the horizon. Eighteenth-century colonial slaveholders, for example, recognized the absoluteness of this difference clearly. "The Negro is a being, whose nature and dispositions are not merely different from those of the European, they are the reverse of them. Kindness and compassion excite in his breast implacable and deadly hatred; but stripes, and insults, and abuse, generate gratitude, affection, and inviolable attachment!"25 Thus the slaveholders' mentality, according to an abolitionist pamphlet. The non-European subject acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.
	5	+Precisely because the difference of the Other is absolute, it can be inverted in a second moment as the foundation of the Self. In other words, the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what make possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self. What first appears strange, foreign, and distant thus turns out to be very close and intimate. Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential, even if this knowledge and contact take place only on the plane of representation and relate little to the actual subjects in the colonies and the metropole. The intimate struggle with the slave, feeling the sweat on its skin, smelling its odor, defines the vitality of the master. This intimacy, however, in no way blurs the division between the two identities in struggle, but only makes more important that the boundaries and the purity of the identities be policed. The identity of the European Self is produced in this dialectical movement. Once the colonial subject is constructed as absolutely Other, it can in turn be subsumed (canceled and raised up) within a higher unity. The absolute Other is reflected back into the most proper. Only through opposition to the colonized does the metropolitan subject really become itself. What first appeared as a simple logic of exclusion, then, turns out to be a negative dialectic of recognition. The colonizer does produce the colonized as negation, but, through a dialectical twist, that negative colonized identity is negated in turn to found the positive colonizer Self. Modern European thought and the modern Selfare both necessarily bound to what Paul Gilroy calls the "relationship of racial terror and subordination."26 The gilded monuments not only of European cities but also of modern European thought itself are founded on the intimate dialectical struggle with its Others.
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	7	+Race as a system perpetuates itself on the basis of racial identification. This method of purging racism ignores the broader desire for the “pure race” and a separation from it. Such an investment of power relations leads to inevitable violence and disastorous politics.
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	9	+Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, assistant professor of English at Boston College, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian analysis of race, 2000, p. 8-9
	10	+My contention that the category of race is inherently a discourse of supremacy may seem inattentive to the advances that our legal systems and liberal social ideologies have made precisely in relation to “racism” and “racist" practices. Modern civil society refuses to permit its subjects the enjoyment of supremacist rhetoric, the rhetoric of exceptionality, by distinguishing between race and racism. It draws this distinction between a supposed ontology (the study of physical or cultural differences) and an epistemology (discriminatory logic) in the name of preserving a semblance of inter-subjectivity Race, it suggests, is a neutral description of human difference; racism, it suggests, is the misappropriation of such difference. The liberal consensus is that we must do away with such ideological misappropriation, but that we must “celebrate difference.” It is understood as a “baby and the bath water” syndrome, in which the dirty water of racism must be eliminated, to reveal the cleansed and beloved “fact” of racial identity. This rather myopic perspective refuses to address the peculiar resiliency of “race,” the subjective investment in racial difference, and the hypervalorization of appearance. It dismisses these issues or trivializes them because race seems a historical inevitability. The logic is that people have been constituted for material and other reasons as black and white and that this has had powerful historical consequences for peoples thus constituted. Whether race exists or not, whether race and racism are artificial distinctions or not, racialization is a hard historical fact and a concrete instance of social reality We have no choice, according to this reasoning, but to inhabit our assigned racial positions. Not to do so is a form of idealism, and a groundless belief that power can be wished away In making this ostensibly pragmatic” move, such social theorists effectively reify “race.” Lukacs, who elaborated Marx’s notion of reification in relation to the commodity form in History and Class Consciousness, is worth recalling here: Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing, and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonmy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people (1923: 89). To arrest analysis of race at the point where one discerns and marks its historical effects is to reproduce those very relations of power that one intends to oppose. It is to render race so objective that it is impossible to conceive human difference or inter-subjectivity anew. Modern civil society engages in such reification because ultimately its desire is to keep the dialectic between races alive. It must thus prohibit what it terms racism in order to prevent the annihilation not so much of the “inferior” races but of the system of race itself. This is how the system of “desiring purenessWhiteness” perpetuates itself, even in the discourses that are most pragmatically aimed against racism. The resilience and endurability of race as a structure can thus be attributed to its denials and disavowals. On the one hand, it is never in the place that one expects it to be: it disavows its own historicity in order to hold out the promise of being to the subject — the something more than symbolic — a sense of wholeness, of exceptionality. On the other hand, as a social law, it must disavow this object in order to keep the system viable and to perpetuate the dialectic: the race for Whiteness. Exploring the structure of race requires a toleration of paradox, an appreciation of the fact that it is an inherently contradictory discourse, and a willingness to see beyond relations of power in order to mine the depth of subjective investment in it.
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	13	+Racial representations necessitates a framework where war and genocide against the Other are expected to reaffirm the boundaries of one’s own identified race, as well as the creation of other ‘threats’ that cause oppression and turn the AC.
	14	+Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 1995
	15	+For Foucault, this is the point where racism intervenes. It is not that all racisms are invented at this moment. Racisms have existed in other forms at other times: Now, “what inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state is the emergence of biopower . . . . racism inscribes itself as a fundamental mechanism of power that exercises itself in modern states” (TM: 53). What does racist discourse do? For one, it is a “means of introducing . . . a fundamental division between those who must live and those who must die” (TM: 53). It fragments the biological field, it establishes a break (cesure) inside the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as “good,” fit, and superior.
	16	+More Importantly, it establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life. It posits that “the more you kill and . . . let die, the more you will live.” It is neither racism nor the state that invented this connection, but the permanency of war-like relations inside the social body. Racism now activates this discourse in a novel way, establishing a biological confrontation “between my life and the death of others” (TM 53). It gives credence to the claim that the more “degenerates” and “abnormals” are eliminated, the lives of those who speak will be stronger, more vigorous, and improved. The enemies are not political adversaries, but those identified as external and internal threats to the population. “Racism is the condition that makes it acceptable to put certain people to death in a society of normalization” (TM: 54). The murderous function of the biopolitical state can only be assured by racism which is “indispensable” to it (TM: 54).
	17	+Several crucial phenomena follow from this. One is evidence in the knot that binds nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power:
	18	+Basicly, evolutionism understood in the broad sense, that is not so much Darwin’s theory itself but the ensemble of its notions, has become . . .in the nineteenth century, not only a way of transcribing political discourse in biological terms, . . . of hiding political discourse in scientific dress, but a way of thinking the relations of colonization, the necessity of war, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness. . . (TM: 55) In addition, racism will develop in modern societies where biopower is prevalent and particularly at certain “privileged points” where the right to kill is required, “primo with colonization, with colonizing genocide.” How else, Foucault rhetorically asks, could a biopolitical state kill “peoples, a population, civilizations” if not by activating the “themes of evolutionism” and racism (TM: 55). Colonialism is only mentioned in passing because what really concerns him is not racism’s legitimating function to kill “others,” but its part in justifying the “exposure of one’s own citizens” to death and war. In modern racist discourse, war does more than reinforce one’s own kind by eliminating a racial adversary; it “regenerates” one’s own race (TM: 56).
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	21	+The method through which we frame and discuss racial representations forms the fabric of social reality. Unless they justify their conception of racial difference, solvency based on that conception is impossible.
	22	+Martin Jones, Prof of Law at U. of Miami, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 1993
	23	+But race, for all its rhetorical power, is an incoherent fiction. "The truth is," as Anthony Appiah notes, "there are no races." Racial categories are neither objective nor natural, but ideological and constructed. In these terms race is not so much a category but a practice: people are raced. Consequently, the problems of race have been viewed not only as political or psychological or cultural, but somehow external to language itself.
	24	+For these reasons, the problem in conventional legal theory is that significance is often irrationally attributed to race. Race is understood as something that is already "there," freestanding. This conventional account ultimately collides with its own lurking objectivism. Thus, as a construction, as a social product, and as a barrier to discourse, race lies beyond the ken of the conventional legal theory.
	25	+From President Lincoln to Justice O'Connor, from classical to modern American law, this specious perspective has imposed false horizons on our values and discourse. This figure of race seeks to draw its line of difference in the dialogue about democracy and equality between those who fit within and those who fit without. So long as this unreconstructed trope of difference remains as the lens ~-~- indeed as the dark glass

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	1	+2017-01-27 03:38:46.572

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	1	+Any

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	1	+Any

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	1	+0

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	1	+Finals

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	1	+Northwood Arnold Aff

Title

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	1	+JanFeb Bio Colonialism K

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	1	+Any