Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[64]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[65]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[64]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2017-02-19 04:15:34.728
	1	+2017-02-19 04:15:34.0

Caselist.CitesClass[65]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,16 @@
	1	+Fisrt the link: their killjoy arguments frames suffering and acts of violence in a way intended to access personhood through injury- your framing may be good, but your reps fail to do your method and link to the k
	2	+
	3	+Second the impact: Framing the demand for recognition in terms of stories of suffering makes personhood only accessible through injury – turns case: legitimizes violence and means any gains only reinscribe pain and subjugation. Tuck and Yang 14 explain with an example:
	4	+
	5	+The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slave- owning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “The recognition of humanity requires the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).
	6	+
	7	+The alternative is to phrase the violence trough the lens of the oppressor, rather than the oppressed. The alt adequately portrays suffering and uses the knowledge we get from suffering so that we can work against it, but it refuses to satisfy the fascination with suffering and de-spectaclizes it. This also does your method better- we refuse the ability for the oppressor to gain perverse joy through the representation of the suffering they cause- our alternative is the shit that makes white people uncomfortable.- Yang 2 explain with an example:
	8	+
	9	+Gonzales-Day’s Erased Lynching series reintroduces the photographs of lynching to a contemporary audience, with one critical intervention: The ropes and the lynch victim have been removed from the images. Per Gonzales-Day’s website (n.d.), the series enacted a conceptual gesture intended to direct the viewer’s attention, not upon the lifeless body of the lynch victim, but upon the mechanisms of lynching themselves: the crowd, the spectacle, the photographer, and even consider the impact of flash photography upon this dismal past. The perpetrators, if present, remain fully visible, jeering, laughing, or pulling at the air in a deadly pantomime. As such, this series strives to make the invisible visible.¶ The Erased Lynching series yields another context in which we might consider what a social scientist’s refusal stance might comprise. Though indeed centering on the erasure of the former object, refusal need not be thought of as a subtractive methodology. Refusal prompts analysis of the festive spectators regularly backgrounded in favor of wounded bodies, strange fruit, interesting scars. Refusal shifts the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments—in this case, the lynch mob, which does not disappear when the lynching is over, but continues to live, accumulating land and wealth through the extermination and subordination of the Other. Thus, refusal helps move us from thinking of violence as an event and toward an analysis of it as a structure.¶ Gonzales-Day might have decided to reproduce and redistribute the images as postcards, which, by way of showing up in mundane spaces, might have effectively inspired reflection on the spectacle of violence and media of terror. However, in removing the body and the ropes, he installed limits on what the audience can access, and redirected our gaze to the bodies of those who were there to see a murder take place, and to the empty space beneath the branches. Gonzales-Day introduced a new representational territory, one that refuses to play by the rules of the settler colonial gaze, and one that refuses to satisfy the morbid curiosity derived from settler colonialism’s preoccupation with pain.¶ Refusals are needed for narratives and images arising in social science research that rehumiliate when circulated, but also when, in Simpson’s words, “the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years” (p. 78). As researcher-narrator, Simpson tells us, “I reached my own limit when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the deeply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other Indigenous peoples that they have been mired within anthropologically” (p. 78). Here Simpson makes clear the ways in which research is not the intervention that is needed—that is, the inter- ventions of furthering sovereignty or countering misrepresentations of Native people as anthropological objects.¶ Considering Erased Lynchings dialogically with On Ethnographic Refusal, we can see how refusal is not a prohibition but a generative form. First, refusal turns the gaze back upon power, specifically the colonial modalities of knowing per- sons as bodies to be differentially counted, violated, saved, and put to work. It makes transparent the metanarrative of knowledge production—its spectatorship for pain and its preoccupation for documenting and ruling over racial difference. Thus, refusal to be made meaningful first and foremost is grounded in a critique of settler colonialism, its construction of Whiteness, and its regimes of representation. Second, refusal generates, expands, champions representationsal territories that colonial knowledge endeavors to settle, enclose, domesticate. Simpson com- plicates the portrayals of Iroquois, without resorting to reportrayals of anthropo- logical Indians. Gonzales-Day portrays the violations without reportraying the victimizations. Third, refusal is a critical intervention into research and its circu- lar self-defining ethics. The ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling—its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know, and to defend its violations in the name of “good science.” Refusal challenges the individualizing discourse of IRB consent and “good science” by high- lighting the problems of collective harm, of representational harm, and of knowledge colonization. Fourth, refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory. Simpson presents refusal on the part of the researcher as a type of calculus ethnography. Gonzales-Day deploys refusal as a mode of representation. Simpson theorizes refusal by the Kahnawake Nation as anticolonial, and rooted in the desire for possibilities outside of colonial logics, not as a reactive stance. This final point about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler colonial knowledge.
	10	+
	11	+
	12	+And, The distinction between violation and victimization solves all their offense against the K. We understand the violation, which is the consciousness-raising they’re going to try to leverage, but that isn’t what we focus on.
	13	+
	14	+Their identification in terms of suffering also spills over, it 1. creates a totalizing, essentialist notion of group identity that stops members of the group from defining themselves as anything but injured, and 2., excludes members that haven’t experienced all the harms or don’t identify “correctly” with a particular set of harms. This also is relevant under your method- the killjoy cant let their identity be defined by the oppressor, as that cedes even more power. This also turns your collectivization argument. Brown 96
	15	+
	16	+If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see~-~-indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation~-~-at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured. In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant~-~-gender, race, sexuality, and so forth~-~-confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confessing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group. This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adults who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such~-~-these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude the very women these traditions mean to empower. (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?)

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2017-02-19 04:15:36.254

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Panel

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Stuyvesant KF

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+55

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+3

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1- Tuck and Yang

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Harvard RR