Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[52]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[61]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[52]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2017-01-31 00:57:55.12
	1	+2017-01-31 00:57:55.0

Caselist.CitesClass[61]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,23 @@
	1	+First- framework.
	2	+Ethics by definition concerns our interaction with the other as every system of morality seeks to guide or make sense of that encounter. Attempting to rationalize the ethical encounter or ground ethics in pure reason is self-defeating because it is impossible to form ideas about or attribute characteristics to the Other before encountering them without totalizing the Other into a concept that misrepresents the Other's difference. Thus, ethics can only emerge from the direct encounter with a concrete, unique, and situated Other.
	3	+
	4	+Beavers agrees:
	5	+
	6	+If we can accept this notion that ideas are inventions of the mind, that ideas are, when it comes down to it, only interpretations of something, and if ethics, in fact, is taken to refer to real other persons who exist apart from my interpretations, then we are up against a problem: there is no way in which ideas, on the current model, refer to independently existing other persons, and as such, ideas cannot be used to found an ethics. There can be no pure practical reason until after contact with the other is established. Given this view towards ideas, then, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the real person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut off the connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to refer to real other people. This is a central violence to the other that denies the other his/her own autonomy. Levinas calls this violence "totalization" and it occurs whenever I limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise. Indeed, it occurs whenever I already know what the other is about before the other has spoken. Totalization is a denial of the other's difference, the denial of the otherness of the other. That is, it is the inscription of the other in the same. If ethics presupposes the real other person, then such totalization will, in itself, be unethical. If reducing the other to my sphere of ideas cuts off contact with the other, then we are presupposing that contact with the other has already been established. And if contact with the other cannot be established through ideas, then we must look elsewhere.
	7	+
	8	+
	9	+Ethics is the fundamental human experience, and is grounded in permanent responsibility for the other. And, since ethics concerns the relationships between multiple people, the only way to be an ethical subject is to be for the other. Ethical subjectivity is an ongoing process, so I have a permanent responsibility for the other.
	10	+
	11	+Nealon:
	12	+
	13	+For Levinas, on the other hand, if one is to be an ethical subject, one must escape the dark, anonymous rumbling of Being; in order for there to be a subjectivity responsive to the other, there must be a hypostasis that lifts the subject out of its wallowing in the Solipsistic raw Materiality of the il y a. Out of the “there is” of anonymous being, there must rise a “Here I Am.” me voici that nonetheless retains the trace of the hesitation and debt ~-~- what Levinas will call the "passivity" ~-~- characteristic of the il y a's impossibility. As he writes, hypostasis is subject-production, the introduction of space or place into the anonymous murmur of being: "to be conscious is to be torn away from the “there is" (EandE, p. 60/98). Subjectivity is torn away from impersonal being the anonymity of the there is by a responding to the other that is not reducible to any simple rule-governed or universalizing code; the ethical subject is, in other words, a responding, site-specific performative that is irreducible to an ontological or transhistorical substantive. As Levinas writes, “the body is the very advent of consciousness. It is nowise a thing ~-~- not only because a soul inhabits it, but because its being belongs to the order of events and not to that of substantives. It is not posited; it is a position. It is not situated in space given beforehand; it is the irruption in anonymous being of localization itself. . . . The body as subjectivity does not express an event; it is itself this Event. (EandE, pp. 71,72/122,124)” This is perhaps the most concise statement of Levinas's understanding of a subjectivity that rises out of the il y a through hypostasis: the subject comes about through a performative response to the call of the other, through the bodily taking up of a "position," "the irruption in anonymous being of localization itself." However, this hypostasis is not the intentional act of a subject; it is, rather, subjection in and through the face-to-face encounter with the other person. As Levinas writes, "the localization of consciousness is not subjective; it is the subjectivization of the subject" (EandE, p. 69/118). Thus, "here I am" rises out of the there is as an accusative, where I am the object rather than the subject of the statement, where I am responding to a call from the face of the other. As Jan de Greef writes, "for Levinas the movement of subjectivity does not go from me to the other but from the other to me . . . . “Here I Am” (me voici) ~-~- the unconditional of the hostage ~-~- can only be said in response to an 'appeal' or a 'preliminary citation.' Convocation precedes invocation."16 It is to-the-other that one responds in the hypostasis that lifts the subject out of the il y a the face of the other, and its call for response-as-subjection, is the only thing that can break the subject's imprisonment in the anonymous il y a and open the space of continuing response to alterity. As Levinas sums up the project of his Existence and Existents, "it sets out to approach the idea of Being in general in its impersonality so as to then be able to analyze the notion of the present and of position, in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises in impersonal Being, through a hypostasis" (p. 19/18). As the evasion of the "impersonal being" that is the il y a hypostasis (as the concrete performative response to the face or voice of the other person) is the birth of the ethical Levinasian subject. Such a so subjection to the other which makes or produces a subject at the same time that it unmakes any chance for the subject to remain an alienated or free monad. As Levinas writes, "The subject is inseparable from this appeal or this election, which cannot be declined" (OTB, p. 53/68), so the subject cannot be thematized in terms of alienation from some prior state of wholeness; in Levinasian subjectivity, there is an originary interpellating appeal of expropriation, not an originary loss of the ability to appropriate.
	14	+
	15	+Thus, the ethical subject is heteronomous, not autonomous, from the very moment of self-consciousness. The notion of ethical responsibility is being obligated to the Other. It is in responsibility for the Other that the self can have an actual encounter with ethics.
	16	+
	17	+Beavers 2 concludes:
	18	+
	19	+Furthermore, "the tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility “as well. Thus, responsibility is the link between the subject and the other person, or, in more general terms, the source of the moral "ought" and the appearance of the other person as person and not as thing are one and the same. There is no authentic sociality apart from ethics, and there is no ethics apart from sociality. To say that responsibility is foundational for ethics and interpersonal relations is to say then not only that responsibility it is what relates one subject to another, but it is to go on to say that the meaning of the otherness of the other person is given in responsibility, and not in my interpretation of the other person. The very meaning of being another person is "the one to whom I am responsible." Thus, the contact with the real other person that I spoke of at the beginning of this lecture as something presupposed by the very meaning of ethics turns out to be, in Levinas' account, the source of the moral "ought."
	20	+
	21	+Thus, the standard is consistency with Levinasian principles of responsibility. I contend that the AC is incompatible with the NC’s ethic.
	22	+
	23	+similar analytic offense

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2017-01-31 00:58:02.619

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Panel

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Marcus

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+52

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Finals

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+North Crowley Reed Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+4- Levi-nasty NC

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Flomo